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Abstract 
The middle income group in Nairobi, as in many other sub-Saharan African 
cities, is of a significant size.  Many housing developments aimed at this 
group do not comply with planning laws and regulations.  The costs of non-
compliance include loss of lives when buildings collapse, costs to developers 
in terms of bribes to corrupt officials, and planning authorities’ inability to 
ensure compliance with regulations when developers do not follow formal 
procedures.  Despite this, the scholarly, legal and enforcement focus on 
informality, and housing and planning policies, is mostly on low income group 
settlements, neglecting the middle income group.  This research addresses 
this gap, investigating why there is non-compliance with building laws and 
regulations in developments for middle income residents.    
The project uses an embedded case study design within Nairobi.  Qualitative 
interviewing was aimed at understanding perceptions of the planning system 
by both planners and developers, and how and why their interests differ.  
The research finds that, despite conflicting interests in the application of 
planning laws and regulations in middle income developments, non-
compliance is tolerated or ignored because there is informal collaboration 
between state agents and developers, which validates the indispensability of 
these developments.  This informal collaboration is prompted by unmet 
housing need, and the inappropriateness of a system that is a result of 
colonial hangovers.  The results are manifested in a poor planning 
framework (including poor land use management), inadequate resources for 
planning, and shortcomings in governance, as well as unruly developers.   
The research contributes to the planning and housing literature about the 
production of rental housing for the middle income group in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  It asserts that non-compliance in such developments does not 
necessarily produce inappropriate housing developments.  Rather than 
fighting these developments, housing needs could be better served by 
positive and formal collaboration between planners, developers and other 
stakeholders, in order to secure acceptable and improved developments.  
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Chapter 1: General introduction to the research 
‘...Plans provide a framework for different interests to work together in a 
common purpose, and [provide] a transparent and accountable arena for 
negotiation of conflicts over development, both within civil society and 
between private and public interests...’ (Farmer et al., 2006:3) 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Urban planners have historically played a vital role in shaping the growth of 
towns and cities by assigning development zones and overseeing 
developments.  Nigel Taylor (1998) defines urban planning as a technical 
and political process concerned with the control of land use and urban 
environmental design, including transportation networks, to guide and ensure 
the orderly development of settlements and communities.   
Urban populations in sub-Saharan Africa are expanding at alarming rates, 
creating high demand for housing.  Most of this population is in the low and 
middle income groups, creating high housing demand, especially in the 
rental sector (Rakodi, 1992; Tipple, 1994; Rakodi, 1995; Schilderman and 
Lowe, 2002; Kessides, 2006; UN-Habitat, 2007).  Cities struggle to meet this 
demand; evidence for this includes expansive informal settlements and poor 
infrastructure systems (Schilderman, 1992; Okpala, 1999; Otiso, 2003; 
Tibaijuka, 2007, among others), as well as poor adherence to planning laws 
and regulations in residential settlements for low and middle income groups1 
(Kironde 1992a; Kironde, 1992b; Arimah and Adeagbo, 2000; Anyamba, 
2011).  
The phenomenon of non-compliance with urban planning regulations is an 
on-going concern for sub-Saharan Africa’s cities; for planners, it creates 
informality, in that the resulting developments have aspects which do not 
comply with formal planning stipulations.  This is unacceptable because 
legislation that guides planners in these countries, and which is often based 
on the British Town and Country Planning Act of 1947, is geared towards 
guiding developments to preserve order, among other aspects like health 
and safety.  For the general population, issues presented by non-compliance 
                                               
1
 Poor adherence to planning law (as will be revealed in this research) does not necessarily 
represent a struggle to meet housing demand. 
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include poor environmental standards for the majority of the city’s population, 
as well as general environmental degradation (Matrix Development 
Consultants, 1993; Mbogua, 1994; Oyugi and K’Akumu, 2007; Tibaijuka, 
2007; UN-Habitat, 2007); this leads to increased costs in public health due to 
exposure to poor environmental conditions (Oyugi and K’Akumu, 2007; 
Tibaijuka, 2007).  The resulting settlements pose concerns that cannot be 
ignored, such as poor sanitation, poor solid waste management, inadequate 
water supply, and air and water pollution.  Failure to address such concerns 
could have far reaching repercussions (Tibaijuka, 2007).   
Although non-compliant residential developments are rapidly expanding and 
are often fully occupied, they remain a problem nonetheless because they 
imply failure of the planning system to control urban developments in the 
interest of all, and disregard for the rule of law.  This research will show that, 
unlike in developed countries where a strict adherence to planning laws 
deters private developers who are seeking to maximise profit at the expense 
of neighbourhood decline (Adam and Watkins, 2008), private developers in 
sub-Saharan Africa have ways of ‘negotiating’ with the system and are 
relentless in the provision of housing, albeit outside the formal guidelines.  
This research is aimed at identifying why there is non-compliance with 
planning laws and regulations in middle income developments.  It contributes 
to knowledge about the phenomenon of non-compliance by exploring 
interactions between urban planners and residential developers for the 
middle income group in Nairobi.  It focuses on middle income developments 
because, although many developments for this group do not comply with 
planning laws and regulations, the current focus (scholarly, legal and 
enforcement) on informality, housing and planning policies, mostly considers 
low income group settlements, neglecting the middle income group.  This 
thesis will reveal that in Nairobi rental housing, specifically apartment blocks, 
are the main type of housing provided for the middle income group, thus the 
focus for this research.  Knowledge, such as will be provided by this 
research, is needed by planners in sub-Saharan Africa in their considerations 
of how to provide appropriate housing for this income group.   
Existing literature answers questions such as: what are the objectives of the 
planning system?  Are current planning laws and regulations functional and 
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just in meeting the needs of the whole population?  What is deemed relevant 
by planners and developers of these settlements, and what are the areas of 
contestation?  The research builds on existing literature and contributes to 
knowledge about the shortfalls of the present planning system.  It uses an 
interpretive approach, employing qualitative interviewing to gather 
information from planners and developers in Nairobi.    
 
1.2 Problem statement 
The vision of Kenya’s Ministry of Housing2 (the government body which is 
responsible for facilitating the development and management of good quality 
and affordable shelter for Kenyans) is ‘Excellent, affordable, adequate and 
quality housing for Kenyans’ with a Mission ‘to improve livelihoods of 
Kenyans through facilitation of access to adequate housing in sustainable 
human settlements’ (Republic of Kenya, undated).  To realise the housing 
vision, city planners and developers need to practice positive collaboration to 
ensure acceptable and sustainable standards are achieved in urban 
development.  This recognises that the government cannot do everything to 
eradicate problems in the housing sector, and that developers have a 
responsibility too.  Indeed, the Ministry acknowledges that private investors 
provide rental housing to 96% of the urban population, including rentals in 
low income settlements (Republic of Kenya, 2012a).  This affirms Rakodi’s 
(1995) observation that the majority of residential dwellings in the rental 
sector in developing countries are produced by commercial landlords 
(corporate or individuals) as an investment.  Indeed, Peattie (1983) 
highlighted that housing is ‘… a process in which different individuals and 
institutions continually invest and disinvest, maintain or fail to maintain…’ (p. 
230).    
The rate at which developments occur is partially determined by the demand 
for housing, both arising from housing need3 and a demand for housing as 
an investment asset by people already adequately housed.  It is projected 
                                               
2
 This ministry has since then been amalgamated with others to become the Ministry of 
Lands, Housing and Urban Development under the new Constitution 2010. 
3
 It is worth noting that there is housing need that does not express itself as effective 
demand in the formal housing market, which is usually met in low quality informal housing 
settlements.   
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that by the year 2030, the number of people living in the world’s urban areas 
will be 4.9 billion (UNFPA, 2007).  Recent projections, by WHO (2013), 
estimate that 60% of the population will be in urban areas by that date.  The 
UNFPA report projected that the urban population of Africa and Asia will 
double between 2000 and 2030.  This calls for effective planning to 
accommodate the housing needs of this population.   
The Vancouver Declaration on Human Settlements (Habitat, 1976) 
highlighted the need to prioritise planning processes, with a view to achieving 
socio-economic and environmental objectives when developing human 
settlements.  It recognised that the use and tenure of land should be subject 
to public control, since land is limited in supply, and defined planning as ‘…a 
process to achieve the goals and objectives of national development through 
the rational and efficient use of available resources…’ (p. 5, Vancouver 
Action Plan). 
However, Pickvance (1977) has asserted that if planning powers are 
preventative rather than powers to initiate development, actual developments 
and development patterns will depend on developers, guided by market 
forces.  Although planning is a part of urban governance and has powers of 
intervention in market processes to control land uses through a development 
plan (Taylor, 1998; Pile et al., 1999), such a plan has not been effective in 
Nairobi, as will be evidenced in Chapter 4.  Policy makers are therefore still 
faced with the challenge of developing frameworks that incorporate the 
demands of a growing national city.   
The Kenya Physical Planning Act Cap 286 states that each local authority 
has the power to ensure the proper execution and implementation of 
approved physical development plans.  It goes further to stipulate that “…no 
person shall carry out development within the area of a local authority 
without a development permission granted by the local authority” (section 
30).  The Kenya Building Code reinforces these regulations – the adopted 
by-law compels any potential developer to submit their development 
application to the local authority for approval, and local authorities are 
empowered to disapprove any such plans if they do not conform to the by-
law.  However, Wheeler (2004) points out that plans are only effective if they 
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are implemented appropriately.  Unfortunately, sometimes developers and 
planning staff have different and conflicting goals, and planning systems that 
ignore the reality of this usually fail (ibid.).  Whilst in developed cities such 
conflict might result in underdevelopment by private developers (Adams and 
Watkins, 2008; Cheshire, 2014), in sub-Saharan Africa it leads to non-
compliance (by developers) with planning laws and regulations, rendering 
the planning system ineffective in controlling developments.  Whilst some 
developers take pride in respecting the building guidelines, others circumvent 
the law, resulting in poor quality housing and increased pressure on available 
infrastructure.  A survey carried out by Bamburi Cement and the City Council 
of Nairobi (CCN) suggested that as many as 70% of buildings in Nairobi are 
constructed illegally (Construction Business Review, March 1, 2010).  
Likewise, a study by the Architectural Association of Kenya (AAK, 2011) 
revealed that 65% of the buildings in Nairobi are sub-standard and 
unapproved.4   
Non-compliance implies failure of the planning system to control 
developments.  Although on face value this does not appear to be a problem 
for developers (given the ongoing non-compliance in ever expanding 
developments),5 it ultimately leads to arrangements of land uses which are 
detrimental to urban society as a whole; overcrowding, and inadequate 
provision of infrastructure, as well as environmental degradation 
(UNCHS,1999).   While such developments may benefit individuals, the 
costs to urban society as a whole are significant (ibid.).  The literature review 
will identify costs to developers in terms of bribes to corrupt officials, to the 
target population in terms of loss of lives when buildings collapse, and to 
planning authorities when developers do not follow formal procedures.  The 
Kenya Property Developers’ Association (KPDA) highlighted the need for 
joint working between policy makers, developers and host communities to 
define ‘illegal developments’ in the light of discrepancies and inconsistencies 
                                               
4
 The AAK study was about development control in Kenya with a view to making policy 
recommendations on technical capacities and procedures in 17 Local Authorities across 
Kenya. AAK used a case study design and triangulation of different data sources, including 
questionnaires to randomly selected respondents involved in development control. The joint 
survey (using quantitative methods) by Bamburi Cement and CCN was about the use of 
building materials in relation to the building codes.  
 
5
 There could be hidden costs to developers, and this research explores that aspect. 
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in the application of planning laws and regulations.  This would remove 
ambiguity, and it would help towards equitable distribution of responsibility 
and accountability between the stakeholders (KPDA, 2010). 
This research explores why there is non-compliance with planning laws and 
regulations by developers in Nairobi, specifically in middle income residential 
developments, which have been relatively under-studied to date.  This was 
looked at from the perspective of both planners and developers, exploring 
issues of contestation between them.  The research is timely in that the 
property development industry in Nairobi seems to have picked up 
momentum, and urban areas are spreading and merging.  As Taylor (1998) 
argued, it is when a local economy is booming and there is great pressure 
from the private sector for development that local planning authorities can 
exert greater pressure on developers to conform to planning ideals.  The 
research is based on a political economy perspective, which recognises that 
the market system of land development plays a crucial role in determining 
the outcomes of planning practice (ibid.).   
 
1.3 Aim of the research 
There is widespread non-compliance with planning and building regulations 
in the provision of housing for the middle income group6, yet there is little 
research into the interplay between planners and developers in this sector.  
Most of Nairobi’s low and middle income households live in rental 
accommodation (KNBS, 2013; Habitat for Humanity, 2013), yet housing 
provision in the rental sector for the middle income group seems to have 
been neglected both in research and in national housing policy.   
The principal aim of this research project is to investigate the phenomenon of 
non-compliance in the urban planning system in Nairobi with regards to 
rental housing developments for middle income groups.  As such, its primary 
research question is:  Why is there non-compliance with planning laws and 
regulations by developers for the middle income group? 
                                               
6
 A definition of the middle income group in Nairobi (and the range of their developments) is 
given in Chapter 1.5, and non-compliance issues in housing for this group are covered in 
Chapter 2.2.3. 
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1.4 Objectives of the research 
The literature review will give context to the problem of non-compliance with 
planning regulations in sub-Saharan Africa; it will look into other research 
work done to explain urban growth and development problems.  This will 
help in identifying key themes, trends and areas of debate, and which areas 
have been neglected and would benefit from additional research.  With 
regards to this project, the question of what planning law is aiming to control 
in Nairobi and why thus far it has not been successful will be addressed, both 
in the literature review and the empirical chapters.  Rakodi (1992) has noted 
how most literature and policies have concentrated on particular residential 
areas rather than on city-wide land and housing markets; and how there are 
deficiencies with regards to understanding and explaining the processes of 
urban development, which poses a dilemma when it comes to policy 
guidance.   
The research objectives are to: 
1. Investigate the challenges that urban planners face in implementing 
planning laws and regulations and monitoring best practices in 
housing developments for the middle income group.   
2. Investigate the challenges that urban property developers face in 
adhering to the relevant laws and regulations in housing 
developments for the middle income group. 
3. Explore the characteristics of relationships between planners and 
developers. 
 
1.5 Scope of the study 
This research is based in Nairobi but has wider relevance to other fast 
developing cities in sub-Saharan Africa, especially those with shared 
historical contexts that are national or regional hubs.7   
                                               
7
 The relevance of this research to other cities in sub-Saharan Africa is explored further in 
the final chapter.  
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1.5.1 Who are the middle income group? 
‘…They are creating demand, and it's driving growth….’  (Mthuli Ncube, chief 
economist at African Development Bank Group) 
For the purposes of this research, it is important to define the ‘middle income 
group’ being considered, and which of their housing practices constitute non-
compliance.  It appears that there can be different definitions of the middle 
income group depending on the issues being investigated.  Globally, the 
middle income group has been hailed as the engine of economic growth and 
the bastion of social values (Goldman Sachs, 2008).  As well as being a 
source of demand, they have also been seen as a critical support to political 
openness – they are perceived as arbiters of political elections by driving 
political pressures, as their rising numbers generate higher demand for 
political involvement, openness and democracy (ibid.).  Although this has 
been primarily the case in developed countries, projections and such an 
analysis could be extended to sub-Saharan Africa (ibid.).    
With regards to developing countries, Banerjee and Duflo (2008) have 
defined the middle income group as those living on between $2 and $10 a 
day; and people with steady jobs, who are also probably healthier and better 
educated.  Ravallion (2009), on the other hand, defined them as those living 
on between $2 and $13 a day.  Both definitions were based on how this 
group earned their income and on consumption patterns within their own 
countries; they are thought to be better off than the poor in their own 
countries (who could be living on less than $1 or $2 a day), but may still be 
deemed poor by the standards of rich countries (Banerjee and Duflo, 2008).  
Birdsall (2010), on the other hand, has defined the middle income group in 
relative terms as the population living on more than $10 a day (in 2005)8, but 
below the 95th percentile of the income/consumption distribution in their own 
country.  She points out that economic growth is more likely where the 
middle income support, in their own interests, good governance, political and 
economic institutions, and policies that encourage investment by ensuring 
the rule of law and recognition of private property rights.  She excludes the 
top 5% of the population in her definition of the middle class on the basis that 
                                               
8
 Compared to the World Bank’s classification of $1.90 a day as an absolute poverty line, 
$10 a day is a high minimum.  In developing countries $2 a day has commonly been 
denoted as the poverty line (Birdsall, 2010). 
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their income would most likely be from inherited wealth, or based on rents 
associated with monopoly or other privileges, rather than primarily productive 
and labour activities.  This implies an inclination towards free market 
capitalism on her part.  
The middle income group has also been defined by their occupations.  
Although sub-Saharan Africa has always had a modest middle income group 
made up mostly of government workers or others tied to the ruling elite, this 
group has been growing steadily over the years within the private sector, to 
include secretaries, computer professionals, and business people.  In South 
Africa, working class occupations include plant and machinery operators, 
craft and related trade workers, skilled agriculture and fishery workers, 
service and market sales workers and all elementary occupations not 
necessarily demanding higher education levels (Visagie, 2013).  In Kenya 
middle income occupations include managers, senior officials, legislators, 
professionals (such as teachers and nurses), associate professionals, 
technicians and clerks.  It is apparent that the education levels and 
occupations which are deemed to define this group differ across different 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa (AllAfrica, 2015).  A survey carried out in 
Nigeria revealed that 92% of middle income Nigerians (defined as those with 
an average monthly income ranging between NGN75,000 and NGN100,000 
(roughly ($480 to $645, or $6,000 to $7,000 per annum)) have post-
secondary education, and 50% were skilled professionals in paid 
employment, whilst 38% were entrepreneurs (Renaissance Capital, 2011).  
This level of education does not, for example, match the typical middle 
income occupations in South Africa. 
With regards to income and spending power, a market based study across 
Africa by the African Development Bank (AfDB) revealed that a large 
percentage of Africans are firmly entrenched in the middle income category, 
spending between $2 and $20 a day – the lower margin bordering the world 
poverty line of $2 per person per day, and the upper margin bordering the 
elite in their countries (Africa Development Bank, 2011)9.  This represents 
                                               
9
 This study included middle income African Countries such as South Africa, Algeria and 
Nigeria, as well as low income countries like Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe (among others). 
Thus the figures are not a true reflection of what would be considered as middle income 
group in all the countries. 
24 
 
those between the 20th and 80th percentile of the consumption distribution, 
or between 0.75 and 1.25 times the median per capita income.  In South 
Africa the middle income group in 2010 had incomes between 50,000R and 
300,000R ($5,067 – $30,404) per annum (Bureau of Market Research 
(BMR), 2010).  In the same year, the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 
(KNBS) (2010) placed the middle income band in Nairobi at between 
KSh23,672 and KSh120,000 ($272 - $1,379) per month ($3,264 - $16,548 
per annum), accounting for 24% of the urban population, whilst the high 
income group with incomes above KSh120,000 formed only 3.7% of the 
population.  The low income band, according to KNBS, have incomes below 
KSh23,672.  This places the Kenyan middle income group at the low end in 
comparison with other countries, typically earning about $9 a day, placing it 
in the middle of the middle income band of countries (as classified by the 
AfDB, 2011).  KNBS based this definition on monthly household expenditure 
as of 2005.  Since then, the country has grown economically, and was in fact 
declared as a middle income country in 2014 (World Bank, 2014).  According 
to the World Bank (2014), Kenya was two places above Ghana and Ethiopia, 
and the fifth largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa, behind Nigeria, South 
Africa, Angola and Sudan. 
Looking at income ranges, education levels and occupations, it is apparent 
that the middle income group could be defined differently in different 
countries.  However, the common factor is that this segment of the 
population is comprised of households who are neither poor, nor rich, but 
relatively affluent; the kind of people who provide an important base of 
education and skills, promote entrepreneurship and investment, and are an 
important source of consumer demand (Kharas and Gertz, 2010; Birdsall, 
2010).  This is the group associated with productive and primarily labour 
activities to which Birdsall (2010) alluded.   For this research, however, the 
middle income group was defined based on the rent paid rather than, for 
example, income levels, occupation or education level, because such 
classifications may vary.  Moreover, the amount of rent paid is indicative of 
household income and spending power, as revealed in the following section.  
The majority of developments under study offer rental accommodation, and 
the levels of rent are set in response to effective demand. 
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1.5.2 Developments for the middle income group 
This research works on the assumption that developments for the middle 
income group are guided by effective demand for housing by this group; the 
developments studied are therefore representative of what the middle 
income group occupy, based on affordability.   
As Nairobi has evolved, most Kenyans in the low and middle income groups 
have found out that they cannot afford to buy or build their own homes 
(National Cooperative Housing Union (NACHU), 2012).  Only 8% of the 
urban population have mortgages, mainly because of lack of access to 
housing finance (Hass Consult Property Index, 2011).  This does not mean 
that the rest live in rental properties; there are owner occupiers who do not 
need mortgages to buy or build their houses, and according to NACHU, 16% 
of urban dwellers do own their housing.  However, clearly the proportion of 
housing that is owner-occupied is relatively low when compared to rental 
accommodation, because not only is access to mortgages limited, but also 
access to urban land is limited for the majority of the population due to the 
commercialisation of land (resulting in inflated land prices) (Musyoka, 2006).  
The negative consequences of contraventions of planning regulations in 
owner-occupied developments are not as far reaching as those in the much 
larger rental sector.  Likewise, although there might be non-compliance in 
housing developments for the high income group, these affect a significantly 
smaller population.  In Nairobi, the greatest demand is for rental housing, 
mostly in low and middle income neighbourhoods; according to the National 
Cooperative Housing Union (NACHU) (2012), 84% of households in urban 
areas in Kenya live in rental housing, while the Ministry of Housing has given 
a figure of 82.2% for Nairobi, as per the 1999 census, spending more than 
30% of their incomes on rent.  Historically, rental housing in Kenya was 
associated with the low-income group, and there is substantial literature on 
the rental housing market in the low income informal sector (Amis, 1984; Lee 
Smith, 1990; Amis and Lloyd, 1990; Amis, 1996; Mwangi, 1997; UN-Habitat 
2003, among others).  The rental housing market for the middle income 
group is also thriving and expanding, but tends to be overlooked.  According 
to Mwangi (1997), demand for rental housing, which has become the main 
form of housing for middle-income households, has made the sector highly 
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competitive.  This research focused on apartment blocks, which are the main 
type of rental accommodation for the middle income group (see figures 1 and 
2 for examples).   
 
Figure 1: Some middle-income rental properties in Eastlands, Nairobi, flouting 
ground coverage and plot ratio regulations.  Poor waste management is also 
noticeable (Author, 2014) 
 
 
Figure 2:  More middle-income rental properties in Eastlands, Nairobi, flouting 
ground coverage and plot ratio regulations.  (Author, 2014) 
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For the purpose of this thesis, the term ‘housing development’ is used to 
encompass all housing construction work.  The research draws on other 
studies for technical information regarding non-compliance issues, and also 
makes general observations of where by-laws have openly been flouted.   
1.5.3 Developers 
The majority of developments in Nairobi are led by private developers 
(Republic of Kenya, 2008a), and this research focuses on these rather than 
developments undertaken directly through the public sector.  It uses the term 
developer(s) to encompass all investors in residential developments, 
especially for the middle income population.  Such investors could be 
individuals, corporate entities, communal or family groups.  Investments vary 
depending on financial strength, ranging from incremental building (as and 
when funds become available) of a single block of apartments, to multiple 
developments in multiple locations by more affluent investors.  The source of 
funds could be individual or group savings (for the less affluent individual or 
group investors), or mortgages from financial institutions for those with 
collateral.  There have also been allegations of money laundering activities in 
property developments, for example proceeds from piracy in the Arabian 
Sea, international drug trafficking and wildlife trafficking (Thomson Reuters 
Foundation, 2013).  This is echoed in the local press (Property Wire, 2010; 
Business Daily Africa, 2013).   
Under the Sectional Properties Act, 1987, owners of residential apartment 
blocks, are able to profitably sell all or some of their apartments, to raise 
further funding for construction.  Sales are mostly in the high end 
development areas, whilst apartments in middle and low cost blocks are for 
rent.  Most developers do not live in their developments, but have 
accommodation elsewhere, depending on their financial and/or social status.  
However, some individual investors reside in their developments, sometimes 
building and renting out units incrementally. 
Developers (or investors) are not necessarily hands-on in the developments, 
but are supported by various agents throughout the process.  Developers’ 
agents, with regard to residential developments, include physical planners, 
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architects, structural engineers, and building contractors.  Some of the 
developers’ agents are also investors in their own right.   
The research looks at the period since 2006, when private developers in 
Nairobi formed an organised body, The Kenya Property Developers’ 
Association (KPDA), to control developers’ activities.  KPDA members pride 
themselves on observing planning laws and regulations and publicly 
condemn errant developers who circumvent the law.  It was important to get 
KPDA’s perspective on what hurdles the planning system presents that 
drives developers towards informality.   
1.5.4 Planners 
The term ‘planners’ is used broadly to represent planning professionals 
working for the state, as well as private planning consultants.  These may be 
qualified planners with relevant academic qualifications in planning, but 
others involved in planning have different skill sets. 
 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 of this thesis highlights the fact that developers in sub-Saharan 
Africa do not seem to be deterred by strict planning laws and regulations in 
their quest for profitable investments, but have instead found ways to bypass 
or negotiate with the planning system.  The theoretical framework looks at 
the aims of planning and problems of urban growth management.  It also 
discusses the political economy aspect in planning, as well as governance 
issues.   
Chapter 3 lays out the methodology adopted for this research, providing a 
rationale for the approach and detailing the methods used.  The chapter 
gives details of the research design, sampling of areas and participants, data 
collection and analysis.  It also analyses ethical issues that cropped up in the 
research. 
Chapter 4 reviews the planning framework in Nairobi.  It gives timelines of 
the evolution of master plans and planning legislation, pointing out the 
shortcomings that have resulted in the present development chaos.  It also 
analyses the new master plan and new legislation.  Chapter 5 is about the 
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actual application of the planning system in Nairobi – by whom and how 
attempts are made to implement it. 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 give the perspectives of planners and developers on the 
planning system and how it affects development.  Findings in these chapters 
show that planners and developers do not necessary want different 
outcomes, and that both parties would appreciate a more effective planning 
system.   
In conclusion, Chapter 9 asserts that there is a role for planners in balancing 
the workings of the capitalist market in property development for the middle 
income group; rather than being ‘strict’ enforcers, it is suggested that they 
could form effective liaisons with developers of housing for the middle 
income group.  Policy recommendations which were derived from this 
research are spelt out in more detail in Appendix 6. 
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Chapter 2: Literature review 
‘If the planning powers involved in plan preparation and plan implementation 
(i.e. development control) are essentially powers to prevent rather than 
powers to initiate, then the actual development which does take place 
depends on the initiators of development or ‘developers’…and not solely on 
the preventers of development, the physical planners’ (Pickvance, 1977:70) 
 
2.1 Introduction  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, non-compliance with building laws and 
regulations implies failure of the planning system to control developments.  It 
is therefore important to give a context to non-compliance in sub-Saharan 
Africa by reviewing literature by other scholars on the subject of planning 
frameworks and how non-compliance issues arise.  This chapter, in section 
2.2.2, starts by describing the context of unmet housing need in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  Section 2.2.3 gives an overview of informality in sub-Saharan Africa, 
and identifies problems in urban growth management that are hampering 
effective planning for residential development.  Since the thesis is about non-
compliance in middle income developments, the section captures how 
planning problems have manifested themselves in housing developments for 
the middle income group in sub-Saharan African cities, exacerbating 
environmental degradation and threatening sustainability in those cities.  The 
section highlights conflicting interests in the planning system.  Section 2.2.4 
highlights the impact of poor land use management on urban growth 
management, whilst section 2.2.5 reveals the effects of poor governance on 
the planning system.  
The theoretical framework gives an overview of what planning for residential 
developments entails in section 2.3; and what the planning system is aimed 
at controlling, because ultimately this affects what gets judged as 'informal' or 
illegal.  It expands on planners’ role in planning and the contestations 
therein.  It also reviews how political economy principles impact on housing 
development, with a view to understanding how market forces influence the 
operations of planning systems in sub-Saharan Africa.  Section 2.3.1 
highlights that planners are mandated to steer development trends, and 
section 2.3.2 shows that issues in land delivery, administration and 
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development impact on the effectiveness of planning. Section 2.3.3 shows 
why market forces drive developers towards meeting housing demand.  
Section 2.3.4 looks at informality as a mode of governance, noting that 
informal practices, like corruption, can permeate institutions, and undermine 
the role of the state. 
 
2.2 Planning systems in sub-Saharan Africa: inadequate tools for 
effective development control 
‘…every state has the right to plan and regulate use of land, which is one of 
its most important resources, in such a way that the growth of population 
centres both urban and rural are based on a comprehensive land use plan…’ 
(Vancouver declaration on human settlements, 1976. II: 10)   
2.2.1 Introduction 
This section reviews other research work done to explain the urban growth 
problems of sub-Saharan Africa, with a view to giving a context to the 
problem of non-compliance with planning regulations in Nairobi. 
In sub-Saharan Africa, neither market forces nor the laudable intentions of 
governments to control development have resulted in the required regulation 
of developments - developers have been left to their own devices by default.  
The results are a cause for concern.  It is therefore important to identify 
where the gaps are in the present planning systems in sub-Saharan Africa, 
and why the systems are ineffective in meeting the settlement needs of the 
urban population.  Only then can progress be made towards making the 
systems more effective.  However, first and foremost it is important to 
understand the extent of the housing needs of the urban population, as this 
will give context to planning efforts to control (housing) developments.  
Section 2.2.2 therefore gives an overview of housing need by fast growing 
populations in sub-Saharan Africa cities.  This is followed, in section 2.2.3, by 
an overview of informality in sub-Saharan Africa and ongoing inadequacies 
in the present planning systems.  Since land use control has a fundamental 
role in planning, issues related to land use management in sub-Saharan 
Africa are examined in section 2.2.4.  Section 2.2.5 discusses impunity, 
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corruption and poor governance, practices which have been placed at the 
core of the ineffectiveness of the planning system.   
2.2.2 Unmet demand for housing in urban areas 
 ‘…everyone has a right to an adequate standard of living for themselves and 
their families, including […] housing, water and sanitation, and to the 
continuous improvement of living conditions…’ Habitat Agenda (UN-Habitat, 
1996.  Chapter I:11) 
The Habitat Agenda (UN-Habitat, 1996) observed that inadequate shelter 
and homelessness in many countries are major concerns, as they increase 
the threat to standards of health, security and even life itself.  Indeed, there 
are major concerns over the escalating crisis in sub-Saharan Africa with 
regard to inadequate provision of basic services, as well as housing.    
In 2014, the UN asserted that 54% of the world’s population was residing in 
urban areas, and projected that by 2050 that proportion will rise to 66%, 
adding 2.5 billion people to urban areas (UN, 2014).  UNFPA (2015) 
corroborated this, stating that more than half of the world’s population10 now 
lives in urban areas, and that this is likely to rise to five billion by 2030.  
Nearly 90 per cent of the increase will be in Asia and Africa (UN, 2014).  
Africa’s urban population is projected to rise to over 60% by the year 2050 
(Watson, 2011).  Watson (ibid.) predicted that Lagos will be the largest city in 
the world by 2020, with over 20 million people, and observed that Nairobi is 
doubling in size every 10 years. This corroborates the UN’s projection that 
most urban growth will occur in the cities of developing countries (UN, 2014).   
As the population expands, so will the problems of cities and towns of sub-
Saharan Africa, which are frequently characterised by, among other things, 
inadequate housing, services and infrastructure.  It does not help matters 
that these countries do not have adequate resources, such as legal, 
technological, institutional, financial, and human resources (Kironde 1992b; 
Kessides, 2006; Davis, 2006; AAK, 2011; among others).  Tibaijuka (2007) 
warned that these concerns may be confined to sub-Saharan Africa now, but 
failure to address them could have widespread global repercussions, ranging 
from climate change to environmental catastrophes that threaten all, as well 
                                               
10
 World’s population is presently about 7.3 billion people (World Population Clock) 
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as migration pressures.  Planning systems have a major role to play in 
steering urban development, and reducing the ecological footprint of the 
present urban populations so as to preserve resources for the future.  But in 
sub-Saharan Africa, planning has been found lacking.  It has been blamed 
for many of the ills facing the urban poor in these countries, ranging from 
homelessness to dire living conditions in poor neighbourhoods (Kironde, 
1992a; Un-Habitat, 2003; Watson, 2009; Berrisford, 2011a, among others).    
The following two sub-sections will give an overview of informality in sub-
Saharan Africa; its origins, and why and how planning has failed to address 
urban growth problems in the major cities.  This is to rationalise non-
compliance with regulations by developers for the middle income population.  
Non-compliance in such developments implies that they have elements of 
informality, and it is important to understand how this practice has extended 
there. 
2.2.3 The origins of informality in sub-Saharan Africa and ongoing 
inadequacies in planning systems 
‘Planning activities should promote and guide development rather than 
restrict or simply control it’ (The Vancouver Action Plan, UN-Habitat 
(1976a:5). 
Although this research is about planning irregularities in middle income 
developments, it would be difficult to broach the topic of planning 
irregularities in sub-Saharan Africa without highlighting the phenomena of 
informal settlements, or how they come to be.  Indeed, it would appear that 
there is a thin line between ‘informal housing’ in slums and squatter 
settlements where non-conventional building materials are used (Urban 
Foundation 1991), and ‘informality’ in middle income settlements where 
conventional building materials are used, but the building practices offend 
the planning regulations (Gilbert and Ward, 1985).  Such middle income 
settlements may not be considered to be totally informal, but they may well 
be on the way to becoming just that.  It is evident that informality in sub-
Saharan Africa is a major contributor to environmental degradation, which in 
turn threatens sustainability in these cities (Mbogua, 1994; Tibaijuka, 2007; 
Oyugi and K’Akumu, 2007).  Nevertheless, Gilbert (2014) has highlighted 
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how in some cases ‘illegality’ in housing developments can easily be 
resolved, for example by the provision of infrastructure, or by modification of 
planning regulations.  Discussions by other scholars infer that informality is a 
matter of perspective, in the sense that ‘order’ in formality and ‘disorder’ in 
informality can have different meanings to different groups of people (Pile et 
al., 1999; Roy and AlSayyad, 2004; Roy, 2005; Roy, 2009).   
According to Anyamba (2011), informality in sub-Saharan Africa did not exist 
before the imposition of western standards; practices were so labelled 
because they did not conform to set laws and regulations.  In Nairobi, for 
example, the phenomenon of informality grew in the 1960s and 1970s, when 
developers defied the inherited planning laws and regulations to meet their 
needs (ibid.).  ‘Informalisation’ of formal settlements is mostly a result of 
transformations by dwellers and developers, through extensions and 
alterations that do not follow statutory rules and regulations (ibid.).  Anyamba 
echoes Pickvance (1977), who argued that planning systems that evolved 
from the British 1947 Town and Country Planning Act (which was adopted in 
British colonies like Kenya) gave planning authorities powers to refuse 
permission to developments that did not conform to planning rules and 
regulations – he termed these ‘negative’ powers, in that local planning 
authorities have power to refuse permission for illegal developments, but do 
not have ‘positive’ powers to take on developments themselves due to their 
limited resources, thus delegating this role, by default, to private developers.  
‘Negative’ planning powers have created spaces of resistance and struggle 
for all income groups, developers and (inter)national elites who are investing 
in housing development, with spatial divisions along economic divides.  It 
could be argued that the ‘positive’ planning powers of a state may not 
necessarily ameliorate spatial divisions; in the face of broader social and 
political ideology, housing provision by the state is part of broader role of the 
state rather than a planning role – a state’s focus might be on housing 
provision rather than planning.  However, the fact that the state cannot 
provide adequate housing paves the way for citizens to take the lead in 
provision.  There is therefore a conflict of interests between the logic of 
governing and of survival; planners aim to implement and enforce planning 
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regulations, while the majority of the population need to survive in the city 
(Watson, 2009).   
According to Bridge and Watson (2002), spaces based, for example, on Le 
Corbusier’s modernistic planning ideas, or Ebenezer Howard’s garden city, 
would be well ordered, well-functioning, with streamlined spaces and clearly 
demarcated and separated land uses.  Unfortunately, given the reality of 
housing need for the majority of the population in sub-Saharan Africa, the 
inherited planning systems are inappropriate.  For example, whilst the Global 
North was industrialising and experiencing economic growth in the 
nineteenth century (when planning was introduced planning to deal with 
housing and sanitation issues), the same level of industrialisation and growth 
has not been experienced in countries in the South.  In particular, the 
population of most countries in sub-Saharan Africa is growing at a much 
higher rate than economic growth (Kironde, 1992b; Gandy 2006).  As a 
result, the adopted standards are mostly attainable or affordable only for 
elites of the urban population because ‘…. the whole apparatus of planning 
was built around the notion of a benevolent elite working towards common 
goals...’ (Allmendinger, 2001: 2).  Such standards are virtually impossible to 
enforce for the lower income groups, who neither understand nor respect 
them (Rakodi, 2001; Berrisford, 2011b; Mbaku, 2010).  Watson (2002) 
echoes this, observing that within these cities, ‘…. highly differentiated 
patterns of access to resources are reflected in growing spatial divisions 
between a well-connected elite and the larger mass of the poor’ (p. 40).  
Despite the ‘negative power’ of planning which aims to shape and control the 
capitalist development of housing, low and middle-income housing 
developments that do not comply with planning regulations have expanded. 
It is evident that the transposition of foreign standards has been the norm for 
most countries in sub-Saharan Africa, a legacy of colonisation.  For instance, 
imported standards regarding lighting and ventilation are out of context in 
African conditions where climatic conditions are different (Okpala, 1987; 
Nguluma, 2003).  Despite the different and changing context, the inherited 
planning systems have not been revised (Kironde, 1992b; Gandy, 2006; 
Watson, 2009; Watson, 2011), and as a result the contrast in amenity levels 
between elite areas and poor areas is an on-going phenomenon (Watson, 
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2002; Nwaka, 2005; Berrisford, 2011a).  Okpala (1987) echoed this, 
cautioning that if problems are defined using inappropriate (inherited and 
unrealistic) concepts, then the resulting policy solutions will be ineffective 
and end up exacerbating the problems which they were supposed to 
address.  This echoes the Vancouver Declaration (Un-Habitat, 1976), which 
highlighted the detrimental effects of transposing standards and criteria 
which disadvantage the majority of the population; it noted that this can 
compound existing inequalities, foster the misuse of resources, and 
exacerbate environmental issues in developing countries.   
Indeed, if legal standards and grassroots expectations vis-a-vis commercially 
viable development are out-of-step with each other, then this opens up a 
space for malpractices such as corruption, and presents powerful incentives 
for developers to circumvent the law.  However, it may be undesirable and 
unreasonable to drop planning standards altogether - collapsing buildings in 
Nairobi, for example, show the importance of effective regulation that 
enhances construction standards.  The issue therefore is how much 
regulation is necessary or desirable before it becomes unrealistic.   
There are arguments that planning standards in sub-Saharan Africa are 
unrealistic and restrictive, and this leads to abuse (Kironde, 1992a; Arimah 
and Adeagbo, 2000; Rakodi, 2001; Watson 2009).  According to Rakodi 
(2001), non-compliance occurs when policies and standards are 
inappropriate to the needs of urban actors.  With regards to private 
commercial developers of rental property, contravention of set standards is 
mostly led by a desire to maximise profits, regardless of the consequences 
(Rakodi, 1995; UN-Habitat, 2003).  Rakodi (1995) further attributes non-
compliant behaviour to lack of common experiences; she argues that when 
individuals, such as absentee commercial landlords, do not have a shared 
experience (for example deterioration of the quality of urban life in terms of 
safety, environment or property values), then they might not appreciate or 
deem necessary certain restrictions.   
According to Nwaka (2005), 30%- 60% of houses in Africa are constructed 
outside formal planning laws and regulations.  Building regulations are 
violated with regards to plot coverage, provision of utilities, change of use, 
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building materials, etc.  This has been evidenced by case studies in Nigeria, 
Tanzania, and Kenya (Arimah and Adeagbo, 2000; Kironde, 1992a; 
Onyango and Olima, 2008).  However, a Member of Parliament in Nairobi, 
when opposing the demolitions of condemned non-complying buildings, 
argued that these buildings are a preferred choice for their inhabitants (Daily 
Nation, 11 April 2012).  This implies that users’ perspective is different to that 
of state enforcers’, and that alternative housing, to those being demolished, 
would obviously be less desirable, perhaps with regard to location and cost.  
The problem is that once such situations are not controlled, the new 
developments create higher density population in areas which were planned 
for low density development, leading to strains on infrastructure and the 
environment (Kironde, 1992a; Onyango and Olima, 2008).    
The Habitat Agenda recommended that governments should re-evaluate and 
periodically adjust planning and building regulatory frameworks, putting them 
in context within other policies.  It recognised that contrary to some 
misguided notions, one size does not fit all (UN-Habitat, 1996) due to the 
diverse nature of the countries, with different cultures, histories and 
experiences, as well as social, economic and political perspectives (Kironde 
1992a; UN-Habitat, 2009; Berrisford, 2011a).  Nwaka (2005), for example, 
found that the inherited colonial Master Plans implied wasteful zoning in 
post-colonial periods, since by then the urban population was much larger 
than when the plans were drawn up.  This larger  population (which was 
predominantly poor) posed a dilemma for planners with regards to land use 
control, housing and infrastructure services.  The post-independence Master 
Plans, that were drawn up for African Cities like Lagos and Nairobi, failed to 
address the needs of these cities, and were mostly abandoned before 
implementation (Otiso, 2005; Gandy 2009).   
The UN-Habitat Global Report on Human Settlements (1996) warned that 
traditional planning could not cope with urban growth and development in 
southern countries, failing to organise and control the pace of development 
and distribution of land uses in those countries.  Indeed it was doomed to fail 
in the post-colonial period, due to inadequate enforcement.  Slaughter (2004) 
points out that it is not practical to expect one law to work in contexts 
characterised by different social values, land supply, and economic 
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capacities, to name but a few.  But whilst there were cries for changes in the 
planning laws in sub-Saharan Africa, research reveals that those advocating 
change often give no indication of what needs changing, or what the new 
laws should be (Berrisford, 2011b).   
Although some planning laws have been revised over the last 50 years 
(Watson, 2011; Berrisford, 2011a), the revisions or amendments only look 
good on paper, and indeed Rakodi (2001) calls them ‘paper plans’; proposed 
changes have not been effected, mainly because implementing agencies still 
serve and protect elitist sections of the cities, whilst sanctioning those 
(mostly the poor) who fail to comply with the laws.  Implementation of the 
laws is rarely successful in meeting the purposes for which they were 
intended (ibid.).  As a result, legislation has little legitimacy in the eyes of the 
population (Rakodi, 2001; Berrisford, 2011b), resulting in of the laws.  For 
example, in South Africa there have been incidents of outright insurgence by 
the poor as they strive to claim a right to the city (Miraftab, 2009); in Ibadan, 
Nigeria, there is widespread non-compliance, not only by the ignorant, but 
even by those who are aware of existence of planning regulations (Arimah 
and Adeagbo, 2000); in Nairobi, there are numerous cases of ‘illegal’ 
housing transformations (Arimah and Adeagbo, 2000; Onyango and Olima, 
2008); whilst in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, a case study revealed 
malpractices by state agents in the allocation of plots (Kironde, 1992a).  As 
Schilderman (2002) points out, ‘...quite often, if a rule has to be enforced 
[when] it does not make sense in its own right, it is not going to work 
because people will find a way to avoid or circumvent it...’ (p. 23).  It could of 
course be argued that there are always people who will resist some rules, 
especially those that aim to redistribute costs and benefits at a societal level, 
but Schilderman was alluding to the fact that people have to be convinced of 
the necessity of rules. 
The Vancouver Declaration (UN-Habitat, 1976) stated that governments are 
obliged to remove all hindrances to the achievement of adequate shelter and 
services to all.  The Vancouver Action Plan (UN-Habitat, 1976) advised that it 
was important for settlement planning to be flexible, adapting to changing 
priorities and/or conditions.  Kironde (1992a) argues that a convergence of 
planned and unplanned areas needs to be explored; this could mean that 
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standards are not set so high to be unattainable, and would mean less 
defiance from developers.  Although Kironde was primarily focusing on self-
built housing projects in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, his argument could well 
apply to ‘informalised’ commercial developments for the middle income 
group, where authorities are turning the same blind eye.  A more flexible and 
realistic approach would arguably be more effective in development control.  
Such a flexible approach is especially important in developing countries 
where there is vast informality.  Watson (2009) takes this view and argues 
that ‘…planning can work with informality, supporting survival of the urban 
poor rather than hindering them through regulation…’ (p. 2268). This 
research aims to unearth what planning regulations are perceived as 
relevant and realistic for the middle income group, and how ‘planning can 
work with informality’ in relation to this group in sub-Saharan Africa.  For 
those involved in housing development for this group, working with 
informality would involve an assessment of the planning laws and regulations 
in operation, taking into consideration areas of contestation by developers, 
identifying redeeming features in development practices, and supporting 
developers in their efforts to meet housing need.  The key issues in this 
thesis will be to find out whether and how the perceptions of developers, who 
are potentially driven solely by profit, might not be compatible with those of 
planners, who may in turn have unrealistic standards.  The following section 
will expand on how developers of housing for the middle income group have 
negotiated planning laws and regulations. 
2.2.3.1 Non-compliance with planning laws and regulations in middle 
income developments: conflicting interests 
Watson (2003) has argued that there is a gap between the reality of 
residents and the reality of planners.  Jenkins and Anderson (2011) have 
also noted that what an urban resident might consider to be an adequate and 
suitable ‘home space’ may not meet the standards of planning officials.  As a 
result, those standards become irrelevant and destructive as people struggle 
to survive in the city.  It has been argued that housing professionals involved 
in the design and approval stages in development in Nairobi have adopted a 
top-down approach to housing design, resulting in regular and formal 
aesthetics, but designs which do not adequately address users’ needs 
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(Onyango and Olima, 2008).  As a result, the city has refused to be tamed 
and ordered as envisaged by the foreign forefather planners (Onyango and 
Olima, 2008; Anyamba, 2011).  Whilst planners seem oblivious to this gap in 
reality, developers have stepped in to create realistic living spaces for the 
residents.  It is evident that, no matter what checks and controls are put in 
place to govern space, society always tends to find a way to subvert these if 
their needs are not provided for.   
The middle income settlements, according to Anyamba (2011), have become 
‘informalized’ by virtue of them not going through the formal authorisation 
procedures, or by developers manipulating regulatory procedures to meet 
their interests.  Anyamba (2005) discusses what he terms as ‘informal 
modernism’, whereby the middle and high income groups practice 
‘intermediate’ informalities, as opposed to ‘survivalist’ and ‘primary’ 
informalities by the low income groups.  The reason Anyamba terms such 
developments informal modernism is because they use standard approved 
building materials, even though their plans may be illegal, and their quality of 
design and construction questionable.  The structures erected in Nairobi, 
based on slab and column frameworks, are similar to those reproduced 
internationally using Le Corbusier’s modernistic techniques after the second 
World War; but the difference is that they have minimal glass, thus less 
natural lighting (ibid.).   
Nairobi’s middle income developments provide numerous examples of 
incomplete modernisation.  Envisaged as modernistic developments in the 
form of high rise residential blocks, usually with commercial units on the 
ground floor (Anyamba, 2005), incomplete modernisation implies 
deterioration of the physical fabric, health and safety concerns, lack of 
amenities and high levels of pollution.  Such blocks can house as many as 
60 people per floor, with 20 people sharing a toilet and bathroom, which is in 
contravention of statutory requirements regarding sharing of sanitary facilities 
(Anyamba, 2011).       
In the wider sub-Saharan African context, some researchers have made a 
case for simplifying planning regulations and procedures (Mugova and 
Nyamayaro,1998; Schilderman and Lowe, 2002).  However, these 
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arguments are mostly made in relation to the poor/low income groups, 
implying that developers in that group neither find the regulations 
reasonable, nor do they understand the technical language.  This might not 
necessarily be the case for developers for the middle income group – it 
would be interesting to find out what problems developers for this group have 
with regards to the rationale for regulations and their understanding of them.  
This research contributes to understanding what forces are at play in 
settlements for the middle income groups.  
Housing requires land, and as the following section will show, land use 
management (including issues with zoning), poses major challenges to 
planners in their effort to regulate the built environment in the city. 
2.2.4 Poor land use management 
According to Mwangi and Nyika (2010), land use management is concerned 
with the stewardship or custodianship of land both for the present and the 
future, thus it incorporates the concept of sustainable development (as used 
by Brundtland Commission): the use of available resources now without 
compromising the use of the same resources by the future generations.    
Land management in its totality across a city is implemented through land 
use planning, thus planners in urban areas are faced with the task of 
ensuring stability and sustainability in relation to urban land resources (Healy 
et al., 1988; Taylor, 1998; Payne, 2001; Healy and Shaw, 2006; Rydin, 
2011).  Planners are involved in the identification of resources to facilitate 
planning, as well as levels of utilisation of identified resources; they are 
responsible for regulating and/or controlling what use land is put to, including 
the location, intensity and amount of land designated for various uses.  
However, Watson points out that land use regulations that accompany 
master plans ‘usually demand standards of construction and forms of land 
use which are unachievable and inappropriate for the poor in cities’ (Watson, 
2009:78).  Such standards have sometimes led to forced evictions from 
unplanned areas and demolitions of unauthorised developments; in 
Zimbabwe for example, over 700,000 urban dwellers were evicted in 2005 in 
Operation Murambatsvina and their homes demolished, as they were 
deemed not to comply with the objectives of planning (UN-Habitat, 2007).  
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Likewise, in Abuja, Nigeria, 800,000 people were evicted in 2006 from land 
because their land use did not conform to the master plan (Watson, 2009).   
UN-Habitat (2015) noted how, in many developing cities, urban land 
management is ineffective due to fragmented services and institutions, 
corruption, and lengthy and costly procedures.  The Habitat Agenda 
recommended that there should be appropriate structures for enforcement of 
land laws and regulations, provision of institutional support, accountability 
and transparency in land management, and generation of accurate 
information on land ownership, and land transactions, as well as land use.  
This research aims to look at the land administration structure in Nairobi and 
the perceived constraints therein.   
The next section reviews some practices that have been placed at the heart 
of the failure of the planning system in controlling non-compliance with 
planning laws and regulations. 
2.2.5 The blind eye syndrome and poor governance 
Inherited laws and regulations have been seen to promote social inequality, 
and their implementation to exacerbate the plight of the poor in sub-Saharan 
Africa (Gandy, 2006).  According to Arimah and Adeagbo (2000), demolitions 
are often the official approach to unauthorised housing developments.  But 
whilst planning authorities are quick to condemn some developments, there 
are many housing developments, even in planned areas, which do not 
comply with planning laws and regulations, yet the planning authorities seem 
to turn a blind eye to their irregularities.  In Umoja, Nairobi, for example, 
illegal extensions (in otherwise planned areas) that started modestly as 
single storey hidden developments gradually developed into multi-storey 
buildings in the absence of any counteractive intervention by the planning 
authorities (Kironde, 1992a).  In Dar es Salaam, superfluous open spaces in 
planned areas have been sub-divided and developed without sanctions from 
planning authorities (ibid.).   
Similar to Olima’s (1997) findings in Nairobi, Arimah and Adeagbo (2000) 
found that planning authorities in Ibadan were seen to be under the influence 
of politicians, who made them biased against enabling aspects of planning 
regulations in favour of restrictive ones, which were generating more income; 
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maintaining unrealistically high specifications presented opportunities for 
illicit income generation.  In Nairobi, Onyango and Olima (2008) noted that 
planners often turn a blind eye to non-complying developments, and planned 
settlement areas for the middle income population are constantly 
metamorphosing as dwellers and developers implement transformations to 
meet their social and economic needs.   
With regard to poor implementation, enforcement and monitoring, critics 
have cited inefficiency in planning institutions, corruption and abuse of office 
by staff, and lack of accountability to the general public, as the reasons why 
the system is not effective (Muraguri, 1999; Mwangi, 2007).  Government 
agents have been known to use enforcement of planning regulations as a 
means of generating income, not for the government but for themselves 
(Mwangi, 2010; Schilderman and Lowe, 2002; Nwaka, 2005; Gandy 2006; 
among others).  Schilderman and Lowe (2002) went as far as to say that 
corruption in the public sector is universal when it comes to implementation 
of planning and building regulations, land registration and allocation.  They 
attribute poor implementation of building regulations in countries of the South 
to the fact that the regulations, which were formulated in the northern 
countries, assume the availability of competent and incorruptible officials, as 
well as adequate resources to enable implementation, which might not be 
the case in the South.  Nwaka (2005) reinforces this, saying that, when it 
comes to land use control procedures in Africa, not only are laws 
cumbersome and over-bureaucratized, but also administrative practices are 
usually slow, inequitable and corrupt.  He also argues that land is allocated 
inefficiently and in a discriminatory manner, creating administrative and legal 
blockages to land development.  Similar sentiments regarding corruption are 
echoed by Gandy (2006), who argues that funds which were meant for 
investment in public infrastructure, health care and housing in Lagos were 
being pilfered by the political and military elites.  Indeed, the United Nations 
Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS) (1999) highlighted how political 
interference in council activities has contributed to poor enforcement of 
planning regulations in most African countries. 
Rakodi (2001) points out that not only do such practices undermine 
confidence and trust in the planning institutions, but erosion of their fiscal 
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base leads to crisis management and reactive decision making.  There is 
also a view by developers that operating formally (i.e. applying for planning 
regulations) is expensive, although Anyamba (2011) points out that it might 
actually be cheaper, since non-compliers usually have to pay protection fees 
to corrupt state officials so that they will turn a blind eye to non-compliance 
with building regulations.  He argues that informality can only survive where 
the state’s legal system and administrative capacity are weak, as a result 
allowing certain social groups to manipulate regulatory regimes to their 
advantage.  This is echoed by Rukwaro and Olima (2003), who argue that 
non-compliance with planning regulations by developers in housing provision 
in this sector is a manifestation of the weak administrative and institutional 
framework of the city council - ‘...laxity on the part of the enforcement 
agencies and corrupt practices within the local authority....’(p. 153).  UNCHS 
(1999) asserted that inadequate manpower regulations in African countries 
also affect enforcement of planning regulations, and Anyamba (2005) noted 
that a lack of capacity hinders implementation of regulations. 
With regards to poor governance, Schilderman argued that there is too much 
bureaucracy in the revision of legislation, and too many conflicting interests 
when setting up and developing legislative frameworks (Schilderman, 2002).  
Meeting such interests to the satisfaction of all simultaneously is not 
possible, leading Schilderman to argue for an increase in local involvement 
and control.  Conflicting interests between the main actors also lead to poor 
implementation, for example enforcement officers may be out to maximise 
their income through corruption, and it would not be in their interest to ensure 
that regulations are adhered to (ibid.).  Chabal and Daloz (1999) argue that 
implementation of regulations is not supported by the ruling elite because 
they want to maintain the status quo based on a ‘big man’ patronage system 
based on reciprocal interdependence between leaders and the general 
population; the former need such manipulations to maintain their control over 
the poor.   
However, in practice such practices end up increasing environmental poverty 
for the majority of the urban population.  For example, when regulations 
regarding the installation of lifts (for buildings with more than 5 floors) and 
adequate provision of sanitary facilities are not implemented in residential 
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housing blocks in middle income settlements (Anyamba, 2005), it is the 
tenants who suffer.  The same applies when infrastructural facilities, such as 
access roads, are neglected (ibid.).  Developers’ interests in maximising 
profit are also not in the best interests of the inhabitants - developers are not 
concerned about the comfort and physical environment of the tenants.  
However, this does not deter prospective occupants because effective 
demand for apartments is greater than supply; as a result sub-standard 
developers continue to thrive.  It would take vigilant and consistent 
enforcement of rules and regulations for such developers to delve into their 
profit margins to enhance the lived experiences of their tenants. 
Poor governance is exacerbated by lack of knowledge and information. 
Lewis (2008) and K’Akumu (2006), for example, have put partial blame for 
poor governance on the lack of social information (including on community 
needs) and housing statistics for the area to be planned for, arguing that 
information and statistics are needed by planners in order to formulate 
suitable land use management systems.  There are also strong arguments 
for inclusive planning frameworks, which are people centred and value 
inhabitants’ knowledge.  Arimah and Adeagbo (2000) argue that this would 
give inhabitants a sense of ownership of local environments, and would 
promote accountability and transparency in planning systems.  Other 
researchers have taken a similar stance, making a case for Residential 
Neighbourhood Associations (RNAs); and arguing that RNAs, which are 
driven by residents with a vested interest in the welfare and quality of their 
neighbourhood, would promote quality and sustainability (Rukwaro and 
Olima, 2003; Onyango and Olima, 2008).  Rakodi (2001) is of the opinion 
that it might be more worthwhile to concentrate on governance arrangements 
rather than on the quality of urban spatial plans, in order to break the vicious 
circle of inefficiency and ineffectiveness.   She advocates creating alliances 
with different stakeholders involved in planning, taking a collaborative 
approach which is based on realistic understanding of actors’ strengths.  
However, she acknowledges that this would only be possible if the relevant 
policies are regularly reviewed, in collaboration with the different 
stakeholders.  Improvements in governance would also need a change in 
existing negative norms by all stakeholders.  However, change can be 
46 
 
disruptive and Watson (1969) noted how people resist change as a natural 
reaction to anything that interferes with the status quo.  This was echoed by 
Conner (1998), who argued that human inertia encourages attachment to 
certainty and stability.  This research looks into governance of the planning 
system in Nairobi, with a view to identifying shortfalls.  It also explores ways 
in which the system could be improved to meet the needs of some of the key 
stakeholders (planners and developers), and how resistance to changes in 
the system might be overcome.  
This chapter so far has discussed the mismatch between over-ambitious 
planning legislation in sub-Saharan Africa and the capacity to implement it on 
the ground.  This has paved the way for practices that undermine good 
planning outcomes.  The chapter has also suggested that vested interests 
would prefer to maintain the status quo, for example enforcement officers 
who benefit from bribes and the ruling elite who benefit from being in control.  
However, the chapter has also shown a range of practices that might reduce 
the gap between planning legislation and implementation, from better 
information flows to the participatory review of legislation.  This research will 
examine, from the perspective of planners and developers in Nairobi, how 
inherited planning concepts, land use management problems, unmet 
demand for housing, and poor governance, have contributed to non-
compliance with planning laws and regulations.     
 
2.3 Planning and informality in housing developments: wider literature 
debates 
This section discusses underlying international debates that will be used to 
refine the thesis’ questions about the phenomenon of non-compliance with 
building laws and regulations in Nairobi.  The literature so far has revealed 
challenges in urban growth management in sub-Saharan Africa, ranging from 
unmet housing need, rise of informality, land use management challenges, to 
poor governance.  These challenges imply deficiencies of the state in 
providing adequate housing for citizens, and in controlling urban growth.  
Section 2.3.1 looks at motivations and rationalities for land use planning.  It 
looks at what planning for residential developments involve.  The concepts in 
this section will help to understand why non-compliance with building laws 
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and regulations in sub-Saharan Africa is widespread.  Section 2.3.2 
examines the impact of land delivery and administration on such planning.  
Section 2.3.3 looks at political economy drivers in planning and housing 
development, and why investors might feel compelled to disregard laws and 
regulations.  Section 2.3.4 highlights the effects of informality in governance, 
and how it can corrupt institutions and systems. 
2.3.1 Planning for residential developments  
Whittemore (2014) noted that planners and academics respond to events 
and ideas in the wider society.  This has indeed been the case in planning 
practice over the years, with responses ranging from Lindblom’s (1959) 
‘muddling through’, to Schön’s (1983) ‘reflective planning’.  Planning 
practices evolve because, as Kirchner (1967) noted, a solution to one 
problem raises other problems.  For the purposes of this research, it is 
important to look at the role of planning and the constraints on it, especially 
with regard to residential developments.  This is to give context to the 
investigations of this research by highlighting important aspects that planning 
for residential developments should pay heed to.  This section therefore 
highlights some theoretical bases for planning practice, ranging from public 
health, and beautification, to political/power rationalities.  It looks at some 
conceptualisations that have been used in the global North, such as social 
and economic planning, that have not been applicable to the global South.  It 
also looks at the evolution of planning in sub-Saharan Africa, and the 
fundamental differences in planning realities between Global North cities, 
where the concepts originated, and cities of the Global South.  The section 
juxtaposes planning as a social good versus planning as a necessary 
regulatory tool in securing sustainable economic development.  It highlights 
conflicting interests in planning; the contestations between planning and 
politics, as well as between planning and a capitalist economy.   
There are different conceptualisations of planning for residential 
developments.  In Britain, for example, public health was a big driver for the 
creation of the modern planning system in the late 19th century (Taylor, 1998; 
Healey and Shaw, 2006; Hall, 2002). That kind of planning is viewed as 
social planning (Taylor, 1998).  Planning to secure spatial justice in a 
redistributive sense, or to rebalance inequalities, for example in employment, 
could also be conceived of as social.  This may well be the case in some 
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developed countries, but non-compliance with planning laws and regulations 
in residential settlements in sub-Saharan Africa, especially for the lower 
income groups, implies that such developments are shaped by forces 
outside of planning agendas. 
Adam and Watkins (2008) argue that having a regulatory framework provides 
certainty, which is valued by some in terms of securing economic 
developments.  This kind of planning could be conceived of as economic 
planning, which Taylor (1998) alludes to, which serves as a tool to secure 
economic growth.  Such planning would also likely be concerned with 
securing economies of scale, for example with regard to infrastructure 
provision (Adam and Watkins, 2008).  It is questionable as to how well this 
concept is applicable in sub-Saharan Africa, given that it often involves large 
amounts of capital outlay on the part of the state.  
Planning has been viewed as physical or spatial when its primary concern 
has been the physical environment and land use, including buildings and 
roads (Taylor, 1998; Healey et al., 1988; Hall, 2002).  It is such planning that 
took the ‘master plan’ or ‘blueprint’ approach, which visualised how a town or 
a region would look like at a future date, and used this to guide development 
(Taylor, 1998).  According to Watson (2008), such master plans are spatial 
plans which project how an urban area should be when the plan is 
actualised, usually over a period of 20 years.   
The British Town and Country Planning Act of 1947 was guided by the 
master plan approach (ibid.).  This is the legislation that has been adopted to 
underpin land use planning in countries colonised by Britain,, and is still 
influencing planning systems in most sub-Saharan African cities today 
(Watson, 2008; Watson, 2009; Berrisford, 2011a).  Such planning involves 
the formulation and implementation of spatial public policies which affect 
urban and regional development, zoning and land use practices (Taylor, 
1998; Watson, 2009).  Sandercock (2003) refers to planners as spatial 
police, who regulate not only land used but also the categories of people who 
might use that land.  Watson (2009) highlighted that such planning was 
viewed by early urban modernists (for example Le Corbusier) as a spatial 
tool for managing spatially defined territories and populations, with its main 
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concerns being order, harmony, formality and symmetry, or general 
aesthetics.  There are those who would disagree with Watson, pointing out 
the economic, social and political aspects of physical planning (Taylor, 1998; 
Hall, 2002; Healey and Shaw, 2006).  Taylor (1998) for example, reckoned 
that physical planning can also be conceived of as social, since the idea is to 
control the environment to result in the improved wellbeing of the population.  
However, it has been noted that the main preoccupation of planning has 
indeed been the built and natural environment (Hebbert, 1992; Taylor, 1998).  
This research finds out whether this has indeed been the case with regards 
to planning in Nairobi. 
There is acknowledgement that planning and politics are intertwined, and 
that planners need to participate effectively in political processes (Taylor, 
1998; Forester, 1980).  Taylor points out that land use planning involves 
state intervention in the property market, intervention determined by some 
political ideology.  He sees this as a form of political planning, which 
allocates land uses according to prevailing interests of different groups.  
Forester (1982) argued that if planners ignore those in power then they are 
rendered powerless, and lack of power frustrates the achievement of 
planning objectives.  He reckoned that political power or private economic 
power often influence planning initiatives.  In the same vein, Adam and 
Watkins (2008) noted how various groups and interests can influence (to 
their advantage) planning policies and their implementation.  Rydin, 2011, 
corroborates this, asserting that planning responds to political pressure over 
opportunities, losses and inequalities associated with urban change.  She 
reasons that where there are expected monetary returns following urban 
change, pressures arise to promote it, or to advocate for developments in 
particular areas.  This research explores the impact of political and economic 
forces on planning in Nairobi; to what extent have they shaped the built 
environment?  Has planning shaped the spatial distribution of residential 
developments by private developers? 
Pile, Brook and Mooney (1999) argue that ‘disorderly’ developments are the 
products of a capitalist economy and the normal operations of housing 
markets which mostly favour dominant groups.  Such developments leave 
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expansive and intensified ecological footprints11 (ibid.), a problem which, in 
an ideal scenario as created in Howard’s and Corbusier’s visions, would be 
solved by the orderly development of planned cities.  This entails intervention 
in market processes, thereby controlling land uses according to a 
development plan (ibid.).  For example, in 20th Century western cities (where 
the planning ideas for many commonwealth cities originated), land uses were 
separated, usually in hierarchical order in relation to accessibility to the city 
centre (Central Business Zone) so as to reduce impacts on each other 
(Healey, 2000).   
The Vancouver Action Plan (1976) noted that governments can use zoning 
and planning as instruments in controlling land use by the population.  
Indeed, planning is the state’s regulatory framework, which is directed 
towards influencing the spatial outcomes of urban development.  Healey et 
al. (1988) defined the planning system as a set of instruments and 
institutional arrangements that form a framework for land-use management.  
In the Global North, such systems have evolved in the context of changing 
social needs, political and economic regimes and environmental agendas.  
They have acquired references such as comprehensive planning, integrated 
planning, communicative (or collaborative) planning, among others (Healey 
et al., 1988; Adam and Watkins, 2008; Rydin, 2011).  However, Pethe et al. 
(2014) have pointed out that, whilst planning systems in developed cities 
have evolved beyond land use planning and zoning, many cities in the 
Global South still retain a master plan system.  Whilst conflict between 
planning and the market has resulted in planning reform in developed cities 
(Healey, 1992), the same cannot be said for cities in the Global South, where 
master plans effectively freeze legal land use for a period, even when the 
proposals are incompatible with economic realities (Pathe et al., 2014).  
Watson (2008) pointed out that those approaches have not been appropriate 
for cities of the Global South, and advocated a review of planning 
approaches for those cities (ibid.).  This research looks at whether planners 
in Nairobi have adapted their approach to planning, and what considerations 
have influenced any policy reviews. 
                                               
11
 It is worth noting that high-end developments could have higher ecological footprints than 
poorer developments 
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Arguably, without appropriate planning, implementation of planning laws and 
good practices, urban development cannot be sustained due to ensuing 
environmental issues (Tibaijuka, 2007).  Moreover, unplanned developments 
create other social and economic burdens, such as disease, crime, health 
and safety concerns, and socio-political upheavals (O’Sullivan, 2003).  
Planning for residential developments should aim to control such 
environmental impacts in the interests of all.  Sustainable Development, 
‘…development that improves the long-term health and human and 
ecological systems...’  (Brundtland Commission, 1987) entails planning which 
takes into account long-term human and ecological well-being, by having a 
longer-term perspective.  Planners therefore need to be concerned about the 
long term consequences of present actions (Wheeler, 2004).  For planning 
and environmental policies to be fair, they should also consider the equitable 
distribution of environmental ‘goods’, and equitable reactive responses to 
environmental ‘bads’ (Agyeman and Evans, 2004).  To this end, planners 
can guide developers using design guidelines (including zoning frameworks) 
and building codes that set appropriate standards in meeting human and 
ecological needs (ibid.).  Such planning would balance conflicting objectives 
in the economic, social, political and environmental arenas (Healey and 
Shaw, 2006).  However, it has been argued that plans are never neutral tools 
for spatial ordering, in that there are usually power imbalances, and the poor 
are usually at the losing end (Bridge and Watson, 2002).  This research 
explores the effectiveness of the planning framework in Nairobi in guiding 
residential developments for the middle income group. 
Roy (2005) points out that the state has the power to determine what is 
informal and what is not, power which is reproduced through …’the capacity 
to construct and reconstruct categories of legitimacy and illegitimacy…’ (p. 
149).  This suggests that normative positions within the planning regulatory 
framework reflect and create power for state agents.  This is resonant with 
planning systems that originated from the west, which gave central and local 
government powers of direction and implementation of land use and 
development policies.  However, Andersen et al. (2015) have refuted Roy’s 
(2005) assertion, arguing that non-state capacities and interests in urban 
development also influence land-use planning, when the state resources 
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needed to control rapid urban growth and the development activities of the 
private sector are limited.  Like Andersen et al. (ibid.), Adam and Watkins 
(2008) noted how groups with different interests, amid political controversy, 
may influence the direction and implementation of planning policy to their 
advantage.  They acknowledged the importance of bargaining and 
negotiation in the planning process, and suggest that the role of the state 
should be restricted to guiding and facilitating rather than controlling.  This 
suggestion affirms advice by The Vancouver Action Plan (UN-Habitat, 1976), 
that planning activities should promote and guide development rather than 
restrict or simply control it.  It is of interest to this research to find out how 
different interests in Nairobi have shaped policies and development reality on 
the ground.    
When and if the state has ‘the power’ to control development driven by the 
private sector, Friedmann (2008) argues that planners are faced with the 
dilemma of which variables to consider and which ones to ignore, suggesting 
that, more often than not, there is bias against demographic dynamics and 
economic performance (variables which are constantly changing and which 
planners cannot forecast).  Since they do not have control over such 
variables, planners tend to project images onto two-dimensional maps, 
ignoring demographic dynamics and economic performance since they do 
not have ready data, thus they are planning without facts (ibid.).  Pethe et al. 
(2014) have echoed this notion, pointing out that planning, in all its forms, 
cannot be complete because it is impossible to predict the future population, 
economy and requirements of a city.  This is an interesting observation, and 
this research looks at how planning in Nairobi has evolved in the context of 
population and economic changes. 
This section has established that the territorial dimension of planning 
includes demarcation of administrative boundaries to determine land use, 
development and provision of services (Healey et al., 1988; Taylor, 1998; 
Hall, 2002; Watson, 2009).  It has also acknowledged that planning systems 
are influential in shaping social, economic and environmental dimensions 
(Healey and Shaw, 2006).  Healey (1992) noted that in developed 
economies, planning reform takes into account market trends and thus 
planning responds to economic forces, overriding the fundamental friction 
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between planning and the market.  However, planning in sub-Saharan Africa 
has been accused of focusing more on the physical and spatial development 
control aspects rather than on the social and economic needs of the 
population or the economy (Berrisford, 2011b).  It is clear that the planning 
system is a core part of the state, which is given the formal authority to 
adjudicate over the use and development of land.  It is also clear that it is not 
a neutral system, but one which embodies the values of those who originally 
designed it (colonial planners), and those who have subsequently amended 
it.  In sub-Saharan Africa, suffice to say, the values and practices of this 
system might not be in tune with the needs of significant sections of the 
population.  Research, therefore, needs to be sensitive to the potential 
divergence between planning law (which is likely to be partially or selectively 
deployed), and actual practices of land development, which may embody 
different values and practices.  This research aims to find out whether non-
complying developments for the middle income group are a manifestation of 
defiance against a planning system that ignores the needs of the majority 
population.  As Berrisford (2011a) has also noted, although planning law is 
supposed to moderate and direct private interests in land development, in 
different African countries planning law represents the interests of the 
minority elite, a trend inherited from colonial days.  This affluent society, 
whose political influence is more concerned with protecting the quality of the 
enclaves where the elite live, may not be concerned about environmental 
justice and could be indifferent to exploitation of the poor and the 
environment, while condemning non-compliance by the lower income groups 
(ibid).  It is clear that the rest of the urban population, and their residential 
developers, have a different focus, as will become clear in the next section, 
which will review other research work done to explain informality in land 
development.  This research is not about non-compliance by the lower 
income groups, but rather about non-compliance by developers who provide 
housing for the middle income group.  It will be of interest to find out the 
motivation for such developers; are they concerned about housing provision 
for the lower (middle) income groups, or are their motivations solely a desire 
to enhance their wealth? 
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2.3.2 Informality in land delivery, administration and developments 
Rapid urbanisation, such as experienced in sub-Saharan Africa, generates 
competition for secure and serviced land, and as Payne (1997) noted, such 
competition renders such land more valuable.  As population in cities 
expands, so does the demand for land for development, in the cities and 
their peripheries.  And as the demand for land rises, so does the price; 
Payne (ibid) noted how land prices in some developing cities are at par, or 
even higher, than prices of land in developed cities.  This is relevant for this 
research because high land prices are likely to influence the actions (or non-
actions) of developers as they look to maximise profit from their investments. 
According to Payne (1997), private land ownership in developing countries is 
an imported concept, and mostly used in urban areas where it was 
introduced by colonial administrations.  This may well have been the case, 
but regardless, pride in land ownership and registration of individual property 
rights seems to have overtaken concepts of communal land ownership in 
many states in sub-Saharan Africa (Gitau, 1996; Gatabaki-Kamau and 
Karirah-Gitau, 2004; Musyoka, 2006).  As Payne (1997) correctly points out, 
private land ownership promotes the commodification of land for property 
markets, which normally ensure efficient use of land, for example, making it 
possible for rural land to be converted to urban land.  Competition for urban 
land increases the need to put it into more intensive and effective use.  
Indeed, Musyoka (2006) has noted the preference of private ownership of 
land, which enables participation in a commercial land market. 
Roy (2005) argues that informal urbanisation is a product of state regulatory 
logics, because the state has power to determine which forms of informality 
can be tolerated.  Payne’s (2001) research resonates with this; planning 
regulations are usually meant to curb incompatible land uses, as well as to 
prevent developments which are not in the public interest.  He highlighted 
that where land registers are not accurate, irregularities occur in land 
transfers, with transfers outside the formal systems.  For example, Payne 
(1997) noted that most land on the urban periphery in developing cities is not 
registered (because in pre-colonial eras this land was communal), thus 
making it difficult to determine the tenure status of owners.  This ultimately 
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affects land administration.  Integration of public land in the market through 
direct allocation also occurs, with irregular transfers by state agencies to 
private holders (ibid).  As noted in the literature review, state agents in Kenya 
have power to allocate land, and do not necessarily do so in an equitable 
way.  This is bound to have an effect on the planning system, and this 
research looks to find the effects.  Payne notes the difficulties faced by 
governments in controlling or regulating the land market, due to the high 
demand for urban land, as well as lack of commitment (to control or regulate) 
and low capacity to do so.  Furthermore, sustained demand ensures a good 
return on investments, which in turn attracts more investments, including 
from those seeking to launder black market money.  It is of interest to this 
research to find out which of these factors has impacted on land use 
management in Nairobi, and how this has contributed to non-compliance with 
building laws and regulations. 
Informality in housing development occurs not only when actual 
developments do not conform to legal requirements, but also when the 
developments are on land for which subdivision(s) have not been approved, 
or on land that does not belong to the developers (Gitau, 1996; Gatabaki-
Kamau and Karirah-Gitau, 2004).  Payne (1996) highlighted the fact that the 
degree of informality varies widely, ranging from informalities in land delivery 
to non-conformity with building standards, norms, regulations and 
procedures.  He noted that illegal subdivisions for commercial purposes 
create a different kind of tenure, which generates more irregularities in the 
actual developments.  Gatabaki-Kamau and Karirah-Gitau (2004) have 
echoed this, finding that informality kicks in when developments are on land 
that does not meet subdivision requirements, or when the actual 
developments have not been approved by the relevant authorities (ibid).  
Payne (2001) goes further to assert that illegal subdivisions have become 
the most common form of tenure in many developing cities, serving the 
demands of both low and middle income groups.  Illegal subdivisions avail 
land at more affordable prices to lower income groups, who then bypass 
unrealistic formal planning requirements and bureaucratic procedures, 
assisted by specialist development agents (Payne, 1997).  Given such a 
scenario, it is no wonder then that there are extensive ‘informalities’ in 
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developments on such land, if and when planning systems do not legitimise 
such tenure.  Such developments came about as a result of commercial 
transactions.   
Musyoka (2006) asserts that the laws on land tenure (and) subdivision, and 
commercialisation of land, have contributed to shortage of land in most urban 
areas.  This is more so for lower income groups.  Faced with unaffordable 
land, community groups sometimes come together and pool their resources 
to buy land.  As seen the literature review, in Kenya, such groups were 
initially land buying companies or cooperatives (formed of neighbourhood 
groups or affinity groups), based on self-help and cooperative principles from 
pre-colonial societies.  Such groups are ongoing in Kenya.  Freehold land 
purchased communally is then subdivided informally into proportionate 
shares according to individual investments, and individual owners are issued 
with share certificates.  The subdivisions are informal in that they do not 
comply with legislation (or regulations) relating to land transfer, registration 
and subdivision (Musyoka, 2006).  However, share certificates are 
recognised as proof of ownership in the property market (willing buyer, willing 
seller), and subdivisions often change hands from their original owners (ibid).  
By default, developments on illegal subdivisions are also considered illegal.  
Illegal commercial subdivisions result in illegal commercial developments, 
which may have permanent structures, but lack building permits (Payne, 
1997).  Payne noted that seasoned entrepreneurs know where they can get 
away with such developments (with impunity from public sector officials), and 
are quick to expand their investments in such areas.  Their success sets a 
trend.  This could explain the avalanche of non-complying developments in 
certain areas.    
According to the World Bank (1993), high building standards, large plot 
sizes, oversized roads and complicated procedures for securing land titles 
contribute to inefficiency in urban land use management.  This is echoed by 
Payne (2001), who asserted that the imposition of high standards with regard 
to, for example, floor ratio and plot setbacks means lower densities and 
higher costs for developers, which ultimately impact on the urban poor.  
Payne (2001) noted that local perceptions may not be at par with laws and 
regulations, and that realities on the ground suggest that people may be 
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willing to accept higher density developments, mixed land uses, and less 
space for roads.  If official standards are considered to be too high, people 
are excluded from the legal housing market, and are driven to substandard 
developments (ibid).  Also, Payne (1997) notes that unrealistic requirements 
and bureaucratic procedures create fertile ground for corruption, making 
informality in land an extra-legal domain.  In a study in Uganda, Goodfellow 
(2013) found that those in charge of land use management were abusing 
their power, authorising unsustainable land uses, for example developments 
on wetlands or sewerage lines, for self-serving interests.  This research 
reveals whether high standards have been a deterrent to developers in 
Nairobi, or whether they have found ways to negotiate with the expected 
standards. 
This section has highlighted that rapid urbanisation and commodification of 
land in urban areas has resulted in informalities in urban land supply.  
Debate within the literature has focused on irregularities in land allocations 
and subdivisions, as well as in developments thereon.  There are arguments 
that state difficulties in controlling the land market are to blame for 
informalities (Roy, 2005; Roy, 2009; Payne, 2001).  There are also 
arguments that unrealistic requirements and high standards in developments 
are the deterrent to compliance with planning laws and regulations (World 
Bank, 1993; Payne, 2001; Musyoka, 2006).  Such arguments imply differing 
perceptions between the law-givers who set requirements and enforce the 
standards, and the receivers who should respect the given requirements and 
standards; between planners and developers.  However, if, as Roy (2005) 
articulated, the state can determine what forms of informality to tolerate, then 
informality arising from non-compliance with laws and regulations by 
developers portrays permissiveness on the part of the state.  If, on the other 
hand, there is no leniency on the part of the state, it implies that developers 
have ways of negotiating with the system to bypass planning requirements.  
The argument that irregularities in subdivisions and allocations make urban 
land more affordable for lower income groups (Payne, 1997; Musyoka, 2006) 
is not supported by the reality of high cost multi-storied developments for 
middle income groups, which suggests that capital for investment is not a 
concern to some of the developers.  What, then, compels developers to 
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negotiate with the planning system?  This research aims to delve into 
perceptions of state agents as well as those of developers in order to gain 
insight into the phenomenon of non-compliance.   
2.3.3 Political economy drivers in planning and housing developments; 
the rise of informality 
This section reviews how political economy principles impact on housing 
development, with a view to understanding how market forces influence the 
operations of planning systems in Sub-Saharan Africa.  It highlights how 
planners are mandated to steer development trends.  It notes ‘negative’ 
powers of planners, as opposed to ‘positive’ powers, and how this limits their 
role in controlling urban growth.  It also notes that planners can use 
government policies on land management to influence the direction of 
developments.  Regarding developers, the section highlights how market 
forces drive developers towards meeting housing demand, motivated by a 
search for profit. 
Pickvance (1977), a renowned scholar on the political economic context of 
the market in which planning operates, argued that planning powers are 
limited, and that market forces largely determine urban development – that 
planning does not necessarily make any significant difference to the pattern 
of land development than would otherwise have materialised under the free 
market.  He argued that planning authorities generally have no ‘positive’ 
powers to ensure that any planned developments take place, that they only 
have ’negative’ powers to prevent development.  Campbell and Fainstein 
(1996) argue that limitations in the effectiveness of planning could be due to 
the fact that planners do not have the resources to deliver developments; 
rather they have to rely on either political goodwill from leaders, who have 
various agendas that often rank higher than planning interests, or private 
capital, which is driven by the search for private economic gain.  It could also 
be argued that, even when the state takes on a housing development role, 
the scope of developments is usually limited in comparison to provision by 
the private sector.  In such a scenario, planning might come up with plans, 
but private developers, who are guided by supply and demand and their own 
interests, would not necessarily share the planning vision.   
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Taylor (1998) acknowledged that planning authorities have the power to 
make a plan with land use allocations that would not otherwise have 
materialised in free market conditions, but like Pickvance, he was of the 
opinion that such a plan could be useless because developers would only 
follow it if it served their interests.  In anticipation of this, local authority plans 
ended up mirroring what developers found acceptable (ibid.).  Similarly, 
Rydin (2011) reckoned that in some cases plan making is a process of 
catching up with developments that have already taken place.  Although 
Taylor’s and Rydin’s observations were based on Britain, similar conclusions 
could well be drawn in sub-Saharan Africa, where the role of planning in 
development control is questionable given the extent of uncontrolled areas in 
the cities.   
There are arguments for state intervention to influence the direction of 
developments.  One way is by undertaking developments itself, but even in 
developed countries, this is usually limited due to inadequate resources 
(Taylor, 1998; Adam and Watkins, 2008; Rydin, 2011).  The situation is far 
more challenging in the Global South (Mwangi, 1997; Watson, 2009; Pethe 
et al., 2014, among others).  The state can also direct developments by 
provision of infrastructure, such as roads, sewage lines and water supply 
(Taylor, 1998).  These again require resources, but suffice to say, Global 
South cities are less well equipped than Northern ones.  State intervention 
could also involve financial incentives to developers, as has happened in 
some cases in developed cities (Adam and Watkins, 2008; Rydin, 2011). 
Government policies on land management have also been known to 
influence developments.  For example, by controlling the amount of land 
converted from rural to urban land (Taylor (1998) referred to this as ‘urban 
containment’), the outward spread of urban areas to surrounding areas is 
contained.  Such ‘urban containment’, when demand for land for building is 
high, means that the cost of available land and property increased (ibid.).  In 
such a scenario, state land policies fuel inflationary land prices (ibid.).  
However, that could be considered as a desirable cost of planning in that, by 
restricting urban spread, planning could be protecting rural land in the 
interests of all, such as for environmental reservation and agricultural 
production.  Indeed, there are conflicting views among academics, 
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researchers and developers regarding the necessity of regulation.  Radicals 
have argued against planning regulations, saying that not only do regulations 
slow down development (especially when the regulations are unrealistic and 
restrictive), but they also add to the costs; some advocate for market forces 
to be left alone to influence developments, whilst others reckon that unwritten 
social norms would regulate building practices anyway (Schilderman, 2002; 
Rydin, 2014).  However, such arguments have been discredited by evidence 
to the contrary; market forces have obviously failed to regulate building 
practices; spreading informality in settlements and widespread infrastructure 
problems are a testament to this (Kironde, 1992b; Arimah and Adeagbo, 
2000; Nwaka, 2005; Tibaijuka, 2007; Onyango and Olima, 2008; among 
others).  Even in western cities, planning has been faulted for restricting 
housing development and pushing up housing prices (Cheshire et al., 2012).  
However, there are those who advocate for regulations, arguing that 
uncontrolled developments would pose risks to health and safety 
(Schilderman, 1992).  Even in the western context, there are those who 
regard planning as a process that helps to create the kinds of places where 
people want to live, work, relax and invest, in other words ‘shaping places’ 
socially and environmentally (Adams and Watkins, 2008).  
Harvey (1982) showed how the production of the built environment is 
intertwined with production and consumption processes, and the ‘circuits of 
capital’ which interlink them.  He argued that commodification of the built 
environment paves the way for the circulation of capital between landowners, 
developers, builders, financial institutions and the state.  However, when 
capitalists buy and develop the land using their own money, landscapes 
emerge fashioned to the dictates of the market in which they are operating, 
and undermine the role of the state in spatial ordering (ibid.).  Other than 
market forces, Campbell and Fainstein (1996) pointed out that planners, 
unlike most other professions, do not have a monopoly on power over their 
area of work – their visions compete with interests of developers, residents 
and other influential groups of people.  This notion is backed up by Taylor 
(1998), who asserted that planning is always situated within a political 
economic context, which shapes and constrains its effectiveness.     
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So what are the driving forces for developers?  Becker (1978) inferred that 
human actors tend to engage in maximising behaviour, whatever the 
commodity.  With regards to landed property, Guy and Hanneberry (2008) 
affirm Becker, arguing that capitalism requires buildings to be produced 
profitably, and operations towards this are determined by how people 
interpret their positions within a given social system.  Healey (1991) asserts 
that the process of private property development is a passive reflection of the 
demands of industry, commerce, and households for accommodation.  
Healey (1992) points out that property investment is opportunity driven, and 
developers look for returns which reflect perceived risk-reward profiles.  
Adam and Watkins (2014) concur; they point out that developer behaviour is 
governed by market conditions, current and expected.  However, property 
investment calls for high levels of capital investment, from which substantial 
returns are realised in the long term (Healey, 1992).  Berry et al. (1993), 
echo this, pointing out that real estate assets realise high rates of returns on 
invested capital, providing value appreciation and protection against inflation.  
It is therefore not surprising that many developers emerge in periods of 
boom, when speculation in landed property seems more certain.  
Investments in property are not limited to local developers; Healey (1991) 
aptly observes, ‘globalization of real estate’ has led to international 
investment.  In sub-Saharan Africa the effects of international influence are 
evidenced in emerging visions for developments which, as noted by Watson 
(2013), mirror those in developed cities like Dubai, Singapore and Shanghai.  
Such visions are likely to be realised, if at all, only through investments by 
property developers from developed cities which have now reached 
saturation point in terms of urban land and development (ibid.).   
However, developers’ reaction to market forces is not without criticism.  Pure 
unadulterated greed (and sometimes ego) has been blamed for developers’ 
actions, with developers being labelled as predatory, profit driven and 
ruthless in their pursuits (McDonald & Sheridan, 2009).  McDonald and 
Sheridan revealed how in Ireland some developers bribed and convinced 
councillors to rezone land that was never meant for development (ibid.).  
Rydin, 2014, corroborates this, pointing out that developers are guided by 
effective demand, not need, and usually seek land at the right place and the 
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right price to maximise their profits. Such self-interest means that there is 
disregard for social justice and equity, with the ‘haves’ having unfair 
advantage and control over the ‘have nots’.  It will become evident in later 
chapters of this research that such practices are common in sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
Healey (1998) has noted widespread negative views among politicians and 
other public officials, who reason that since developers generate a lot of 
profit from their investments in real estate, they should contribute some of 
those profits to help counteract the adverse effects of their developments, for 
example towards provision of infrastructure and community facilities.  In 
reference to practices in Britain, Crook and Monk (2011) have defined this as 
planning gain, whereby planning policies enable planning authorities to 
negotiate with private developers who are seeking building approval for 
provision of physical and social infrastructure connected to their 
developments.  This research will reveal whether there is provision in the 
Kenyan planning system for capturing planning gain, or whether developers 
escape the net, to the detriment of neighbourhoods and residents. 
This section has looked at the constraints on planners operating within a 
market economy.  The literature has indicated that planners have de jure 
dominance over land and resources, with powers to implement ordered 
space in given jurisdictions.  However, plans do not necessarily precede de 
facto land use.  Planning powers have therefore been perceived as ‘negative’ 
in that they seek to prevent development.  The role of planners seems limited 
to implementing a predefined ‘rational planning order’, setting and trying to 
enact a vision, devoid of recognition of the ‘realpolitik’ of the political 
economy (Andersen et al., 2015:347).  In a capitalist setting, where 
developers’ investments are shaped by market forces, their realities and 
rationalities (and those of the population being provided for), and those of 
planning, are often mutually exclusive.  Resourceful developers might not be 
willling to accept guidance in their quest for profitable investment, and yet 
planning does not always have ‘positive’ powers to ensure development.  It is 
clear that, whatever their motivations, private property developers play an 
important role in shaping urban growth.  This research explores the powers 
of and constraints on planners and developers in shaping the built 
environment in Nairobi.  It looks at whether, on the one hand, planners are 
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reasonable and effective in their guidance, and on the other hand, whether 
developers are receptive of planning guidance.   
2.3.4 Corruption in governance 
 ‘If a country has laws and institutions, but these do not adequately constrain 
the state … corruption is likely to be pervasive since state custodians are not 
fully constrained by existing laws and hence, can easily abuse their public 
positions for private gain’ (Mbaku, 2010:71) 
A widespread system of informality is known to exist in African societies, and 
corruption is among the most rampant informal practices.  It is embedded in 
daily governance, and routine administrative practices foster and 
accommodate the practice (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, 2006).  This 
section looks at corruption in the context of urban development and planning.  
It also examines explanations for the nature of corruption and its prevalence, 
explores why corruption happens, and discusses why efforts to eradicate it 
are met with resistance. 
There is general consensus that corruption is the abuse of public power for 
private benefit; a practice that hinges on practices by people attempting to 
subvert or undermine existing rules in order to generate extra-legal income 
(Nye, 1967; Khan 1996; Friedrich, 2002; Bayart, 2009; Mbaku, 2010; 
Transparency International, 2015; among others).  Nye defines corruption as 
‘behaviour that deviates from the formal duties of a public role (elective or 
appointive) because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private 
clique) wealth or status gains’ (Nye 1967:416).  Similarly, Khan (1996) 
defines it as ‘...behaviour that deviates from the formal rules of conduct 
governing the actions of someone in a position of public authority because of 
private-regarding motives such as wealth, power, or status’ (p.12).  Both 
these definitions use the term ‘behaviour that deviates’ in their definition, 
which poses a problem when and where corruption tends to be the norm 
rather than the exception.  The literature for this research has revealed that 
corruption is rather common in African states, and can therefore not been 
seen as ‘behaviour that deviates’.  For this research, Friedrich’s (2002) 
definition of corruption makes most sense; ‘…corruption may therefore be 
said to exist whenever a power holder who is charged with doing certain 
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things, that is a responsible functionary or office holder, is by monetary or 
other rewards…. induced to take actions which favour whoever provides the 
reward and thereby damage the group or organisation to which the 
functionary belongs, specifically the government’ (p.15).  This is echoed by 
Transparency International (2015) in their definition ‘…the abuse of entrusted 
power for private gain. It can be classified as grand, petty and political…’.  
This definition encompasses anyone entrusted with power, from those in 
high offices, to low level officials.  It covers widespread and systematic 
corruption, which has become a basic mode of operation in some states. 
This definition is especially apt for this research project, because as Chabal 
and Daloz (1999) have noted, ‘…corruption is not just endemic but an 
integral part of the social fabric of life in the African continent’ (p.99).  This is 
echoed by other scholars, who concur that everyday corruption or petty 
corruption is part of the social landscape in Africa, indispensable for survival 
in post-colonial economies (Olivier de Sardan,1999; Bayart,2009).  Mbaku 
(2010) has noted that corruption is the biggest constraint to Africa’s 
development efforts.  Suffice to say, corruption in urban growth management 
systems impacts on the effectiveness of the systems in promoting and 
steering private developers.  This research looks to explore and understand 
the nature and extent of the impact of corruption on non-compliance with 
building laws and regulations.  
Types of corruption 
Blundo and Olivier de Sardan (2006) have coined the term ‘complex of 
corruption’ for ‘all practices involving the use of public office that are 
improper – in other words, illegal and/or illegitimate from the perspective of 
the regulations in force or from that of users – and give rise to undue 
personal gain’ (p. 6).  Such corruption includes practices such as nepotism, 
abuse of power, misappropriation, and influence-peddling, among others.  
This is echoed by Mbaku (2010), who identifies corruption as theft of public 
resources by civil servants, misuse of office for extra-legal income or other 
benefits, selective enforcement of government regulations in order to benefit 
the regulator (including exemptions from compliance with certain laws and 
regulations), illegal taxation for economic activity, and nepotism in the 
distribution of public goods/services and employment in government 
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agencies.  These recognitions sit well with this research in exploring the 
reasons for non-compliance with planning laws and regulations; are 
developers exempt from compliance?  Is there selective enforcement? Are 
planners abusing their power for personal gain?  According to Blundo and 
Olivier de Sardan (2006), amongst the basic forms of corruption is the 
payment of unwarranted fees for public services, where users of a public 
service are forced to pay for an otherwise free service or over and above the 
official fee to officials (‘overbilling’).  Alam (1989) noted that state regulators 
may exempt entrepreneurs from compliance with laws and regulations so as 
to reduce their costs, in exchange for proportionate monetary rewards.  
Moonlighting is another form of corruption, whereby public officials carry out 
private consultancy work whilst employed in the public service (Blundo and 
Olivier de Sardan, 2006).  Indeed, Gatabaki-Kamau and Karirah-Gitau (2004) 
found moonlighting activities among government surveyors in Nairobi.  In an 
urban planning system, either type of corruption is harmful in that the former 
undermines and delegitimises the system in the eyes of developers, whilst 
the latter is often outright theft and misappropriation of state resources. 
According to Blundo and Olivier de Sardan (2006), impunity, another form of 
corruption, mostly arises from clientelism.  This is echoed by Olivier de 
Sardan (2008).  Despite stigmatisation of corruption as an evil practice, 
impunity is enjoyed by those practicing it; there appear to be no sanctions for 
the guilty, or sustained campaigns against the practice.  Impunity can defeat 
attempts at reform in that individuals being sanctioned are protected in a 
clientelist network, with sanction threats being met with either interventions 
or threats, from peers or more senior actors, because sanctioning one user 
could pose a threat to the whole corrupt system (Blundo and Olivier de 
Sardan, 2006).  Goodfellow (2013) found that persistent political interference 
in Uganda impacted on the effectiveness of planning, with impunity extended 
to elite and popular groups who could give financial or electoral incentives to 
the politicians.  It is not just impunity from politicians that renders planning 
ineffective; where there is mistrust between service users and state officials, 
users are compelled to develop relationships with officials who can then 
protect them from obstacles in formal procedures (Blundo and Olivier de 
Sardan, 2006).  A user with a ‘contact’ in a department gets preferential and 
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personalised treatment, whereas anonymous users are easily excluded from 
public services.  In systems where impunity prevails over sanctions, 
implementation of laws and regulations is ridiculed; isolated implementation 
of laws and regulation is seen as a penalty for failure to show allegiance, or 
refusal to pay up, or any other motivations that have little to do with just 
enforcement (ibid).  Again this type of corruption could explain how 
developers get away with non-compliance with planning laws and 
regulations. 
Mbaku (2010) noted how civil servants implicated in corrupt practices rarely 
lose their jobs – they are more likely to lose their jobs if they opt out of 
corrupt practices.  Indeed, Blundo and Olivier de Sardan (2006) have noted 
that officials who would rather not engage in corruption or informal systems 
are usually powerless not to do so; staff who are reluctant to engage in 
corrupt behaviour are considered to be outside the norm.  This is more so 
when corrupt behaviour comes from above i.e. people in more powerful 
positions (ibid).  The practice raises the question of why laws and institutions 
do not conform to expectations, enabling public officials to collect bribes or 
‘rents’ from the public.  Bayley (1966) pointed out that bribery need not be in 
monetary form, but can have a non-pecuniary form, nevertheless still 
constituting an act of misusing authority for considerations of personal gain. 
Just as there are rules in formal practices, there are multiple rules in informal 
practices.  A study in Malawi revealed a ‘parallel order’, with a set of moral 
principles outside the official code of conduct in institutions (Anders, 2005).  
This is resonated by Mbaku (2010), who noted a parallel organisation within 
bureaucratic organisations, which values posts on their ability to generate 
extra-legal income.  Negotiation, with regard to the money being paid, and 
also with regard to the rules to be applied or ignored, is part and parcel of 
corrupt transactions; the practice generates a language for the informal 
practices (Olivier de Sardan, 2008; Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, 2006).  
State officials and auxiliary administrative staff often function as a team in 
corrupt practices, creating a horizontal partnership: excluding colleagues 
from extra-legal transactions would put the corrupt officials at risk of being 
denounced by adversaries, disappointed colleagues, or envious and jealous 
people in their circles (Mbaku, 2010).  Auxiliary staff are augmented by 
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administrative brokers or canvassers of clients, who help by accelerating 
procedures or by preventing imposition of sanctions (ibid).  Brokers reassure 
users because they are confident in their knowledge of local professional 
culture and they remain in place even when there is turnover of officials 
(ibid).  They contribute to the growth of the extra-legal practices by blurring 
the boundaries between the formal administrative practices and informal 
practices, and by making it difficult to expose extra-legal transactions 
between state officials and the public (ibid).  Peiffer and Rose (2014), noted 
that corruption at the top (grand corruption) has hidden mechanisms 
operated by high officials, and is responsible for draining public resources by 
a ‘state elite’.  This research explores the interplay between planners and 
developers in Nairobi, and the nature of corruption in the planning system.  
Why corruption happens 
Mbaku (2010) argues that the imposition of laws and institutions inherited 
from European colonists have somehow contributed to corrupt practices in 
that citizens do not respect them as legitimate tools because they do not 
necessarily understand them, were not involved in their formulation, and they 
are not compatible with their belief systems.  Also, if such laws are vague 
and unclear, they are easily manipulated by civil servants to enhance 
personal gain (ibid).  This echoes Tyler (1990), who found that people did not 
comply with laws if they found them, or their enforcement, to be unfair.  
Compliance is further undermined if the government does not have the 
capacity to enforce the laws (Mbaku, 2010).   
Mbaku (2010) sees corruption as post-constitutional opportunism, and places 
the public sector at the heart of corruption in African states.  Practices may 
have elements of bureaucratic corruption, involving misuse of public office for 
personal gain, as well as political corruption, involving subversion of laws 
and institutions to advance political agendas (Mbaku, 2010).  Bureaucratic or 
petty corruption can therefore be curbed by political goodwill and political 
ability to implement and enforce regulations, but when the systems are 
corrupt, the formal legal framework of the state is ineffective.  Mbaku (2010) 
points out that it is not unusual for civil servants to dedicate more time 
towards generating extra-legal income, than on their regular employment.  
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This undermines the interests of the state, at times undermining the very 
regulations they should be enforcing.  Often, bureaucratic and political 
corruption are interlinked, with those in political power having access to 
public office resources and misusing them to enrich themselves and their 
supporters (ibid).   
Blundo and Olivier de Sardan (2006) have noted that the public service in 
Africa is ‘oversized’, whilst Diamond (1987) refers to it as the ‘swollen state’.  
Both are referring to the excessive number of administrative personnel in 
some government departments.  According to Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 
(2006), there was a rapid increase in administrative employees in the post-
colonial period, and by the 1980s, some countries had as many as three 
times the number of employees as in the 1960s.  According to Diamond 
(ibid), the ‘swollen state’ results in systematic political corruption, which 
ensures survival of this clientelistic system, as office holders can allocate 
goods and resources to their ‘clients’ for personal gain.  Also, over 
employment of unproductive civil servants has somewhat contributed to 
corrupt practices, as lowly paid employees seek to meet the gap between 
their needs and their official incomes from the state (Price, 1975). 
Mbaku (2010) noted that government regulations generate high transaction 
costs, compelling entrepreneurs to avoid the formal requirements, or to pay 
bribes with a view to minimising their costs and maximising their profits.  
Olivier de Sardan (1999) asserts that, although corruption is sometimes due 
to ignorance of users, in some cases it is not due to ignorance, but rather 
calculated to exploit gaps and weakness in regulations.  He points out that 
those practicing corruption auto-legitimise their behaviour by giving excuses, 
for example lengthy processes, loss of money, or even the fact that 
everybody else engages in corrupt practices. 
Poor working conditions and low salaries have also been cited as the cause 
of corruption in the civil service (Price, 1975; Olivier de Sardan, 1999; Blundo 
and Olivier de Sardan, 2006; Bayart, 2009; among others).  This compels 
civil servants to look for means of supplementing their income, to meet their 
needs, which are sometimes compounded by demands from extended 
families and expectations of social status (Price, 1975; Mbaku, 2010).   
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However, it has been noted that corruption is not necessary due to low 
earnings and that relatively wealthy civil servants and politicians in positions 
of power are among the most corrupt in some states (Mbaku, 2010).   
Whilst corruption may be due to ignorance on the part of users, the same 
cannot be said of the state agents; good knowledge of the relevant 
information on the part of the officials facilitates manipulation of laws and 
regulations (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, 2006).  A study in three African 
countries revealed that the laws and regulations often leave scope for 
discretionary powers by state officials; if a fraudulent act is modest, for 
example, it is not unusual for state officials to turn a blind eye (ibid).  There 
are clearly unequal power relationships between the users of public services 
and public officials, which are compounded by a lack of information available 
to users, as well as selective application of regulations (ibid).  Blundo and 
Olivier de Sardan (2006) highlighted classification of government 
employment posts, by state officials, into ‘lucrative’ posts and ‘dry’ posts.  
‘Lucrative’ posts give contact with users and provide access to many 
profitable transactions, and therefore rapid accumulation of wealth.  Staff 
compete for such posts. ‘Dry’ posts, on the other hand, have fewer 
opportunities for earning extra-legal income; officials in such posts are easily 
overlooked by the hierarchy, and such posts are seen to be a form of 
punishment (ibid). 
State officials have the power to control the speed and duration of interaction 
with users, and this fact is easily exploited in corrupt negotiations.   For 
example, state officials have been known to create bottlenecks and elongate 
queues, or hijack resources so that they can offer the users services 
informally, for extra-legal payments (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, 2006).  
With regard to planning systems, such practices are likely to frustrate 
developers and compel them to disregard the formal processes.  Such 
corruption compromises the integrity of civil servants and generates mistrust 
of public sector employees, who have been known to demand payments for 
regular services which should be provided free (ibid; Bayart, 2009).  Mbaku 
(2010) resonates this, noting that corruption ‘can force the masses to lose 
respect for and interest in the government and its institutions’ (p 108).  
Elimination of contact with the public, for example by computerising some 
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routine activities like issuance of permits, therefore has potential to make 
public services more transparent.  However, there are those who would 
rather maintain the status quo, because of personal benefits (Bayart, 2009; 
Mbaku, 2010). 
In Nigeria, an anti-corruption programme found ‘professionalism and 
efficiency in public service has been replaced by indiscipline, laziness, 
excessive arrogance by civil servants, nepotism, tribalism, absenteeism, and 
mediocrity’ (Mbaku, 2010).  Indeed, incompetency and inefficiency in African 
states have been placed at the heart of corruption in these states (ibid).  
Mbaku (2010) argues that in order to ensure sustainable economic growth, it 
is important for the civil service to be responsive to the needs of 
entrepreneurs, who are critical for wealth creation and economic growth.  
This calls for recruitment of civil servants based on their competencies rather 
than corrupt practices (ibid).   
Blundo and Olivier de Sardan (2006) have noted that civil servants are not 
sorely to blame for corruption, but the users of public service are equally to 
blame for corrupt relationships, with participants often transforming such 
relationships into social relationships of a ‘clientelist’ nature.  Corruption 
results from a mutual agreement, benefiting both sides at the expense of a 
third party, usually the state.  Mbaku (2010) has echoed this, asserting that if 
private citizens did not contribute to the culture of corruption in African 
countries, corruption would be limited to ‘private corruption’ (misuse of power 
for personal gain), but as it is, payments to civil servants by entrepreneurs 
are the highest source of extra-legal income for civil servants.  Mbaku (2010) 
points out that efforts to eradicate bureaucratic corruption need to address 
both the sides of the bribe giver and the bribe taker.  This calls for 
enforcement and prosecution, as well as prevention and education.  
Fighting corruption 
Social science scholars have highlighted how institutional arrangements in 
African states are ineffective in constraining state custodians and politicians 
in their engagement with opportunistic behaviour, and in promoting 
entrepreneurship and wealth creation (Olivier de Sardan,1999; Bayart, 2009; 
Mbaku, 2010).  Corruption especially thrives in government departments 
71 
 
which have been impacted by national financial crises, or which are suffering 
from institutional weaknesses; such departments have various 
dysfunctionalities (Olivier de Sardan, 1999; Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, 
2006).  In that context, interventions, for example by brokers or contacts, in 
favour of individuals become the norm, and in the process corruption 
becomes commodified (Olivier de Sardan, 1999).  Indeed, Mbaku (2010) 
asserts that corruption is an outcome of a market which has structures and 
rules, determined by those participating in the market. Olivier de Sardan 
(1999) points out that the more the practice develops, the more it becomes 
part and parcel of social habits, creating a moral economy of corruption.  The 
resulting corruption culture is difficult to retreat from.  When leaders and 
others in powerful positions are equally entangled in corrupt practices, it 
becomes difficult to promote anti-corruption measures.  Mbaku (2010), points 
out that corruption clean-up programmes can only be effective if they have 
the support of leaders (political goodwill), and institutional arrangements to 
constrain state custodians from corrupt practices; when civil servants and 
politicians adhere to laws and regulations and promote effective public 
policies, they increase state legitimacy.  Effective institutions can promote 
good economic policies, and enhance the operation of markets for maximum 
economic growth (Mbaku, 2010; Hope and Chikulo, 2000).  Only then can 
citizens be convinced to participate in a corruption clean-up.  This research 
looks at what institutional reforms have been put in place to combat 
corruption in Nairobi. 
In the face of conflicting interests, such as between planners and developers, 
the legal system, as Tyler (1998) noted, is heavily dependent on voluntary 
compliance with the laws; government actors have limited ability to compel 
people to obey the law, even when the authorities have the power to reward 
or punish.  If the legal rules and decisions are easily ignored and do not 
influence the actions of those to whom they are directed, then the effective 
functions of the authorities are undermined (Tyler, 1990).  Voluntary 
compliance calls for trust in the institutions, and between citizens and 
government actors.  As Braithwaite and Levi (1998) noted, citizens are more 
likely to comply with legal dictates when they perceive the actions of the 
authorities to be fair and legitimate.  Braithwaite (1998) argued that 
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awareness of and capacity to act in the interest of others, coupled with 
regularity and predictability of action, can enhance trust in institutional 
structures.  Other scholars have echoed this, asserting that trust in 
institutional structures is essential, and that strong enforceable laws and trust 
reinforce each other towards good governance (Blackburn, 1998; Braithwaite 
and Levi, 1998).  Braithwaite and Levi (1998) pointed out that quality of 
governance reflects the quality of laws, and trust can ease coordination 
among citizens and government actors, reduce transaction costs and compel 
compliance with the laws.  Such trust involves faith in professionals 
implicated in the operations of the institutions; professionals of integrity, 
bound by a strong code of ethics which sets behavioural norms to guide 
them in exercising responsibility in their roles (Howe and Kaufman, 1979).  
Braithwaite and Levi (1998) point out that, once trust in the state has been 
destroyed, rebuilding it requires phenomenal efforts, requiring citizens’ help 
to give them ownership of policies.  Public choice theory advocates 
institutional reforms that embrace participatory approaches (approaches that 
are people-driven, bottom-up and inclusive) – this would result in governance 
structures that promote wealth creation and minimise opportunist behaviours, 
such as corruption.  According to Transparency International (2000), this 
entails rooting out of entrenched groups who would rather retain the status 
quo, realistic and achievable goals, coordinated and comprehensive reforms, 
establishment of institutional mechanisms that can outlive the leaders of the 
reforms, and inclusion of civil society and the private sector in the reform 
process.  It also calls for corruption to be ‘high risk’ and ‘low profit’, with high 
risk of detection and appropriate penalties.  Also, no one should be above 
the law or ‘untouchable’, otherwise reforms lose legitimacy.  This research 
explores the element of trust between planners and developers in Nairobi.  
This section has indicated that corruption in governance is an informal 
collaboration between state agents and the public, which undermines the 
functionality of government systems.  It has indicated that corruption is a 
complex informal system lurking under the formal system, a mode of 
governance that works according to its own moral compasses and ethical 
codes.  There are allegations in the literature that imposition of inherited laws 
and institutions promotes corruption (Tyler, 1990; Mbaku, 2010).  This is 
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further aggravated by political influence, that not only advances a ‘swollen’ or 
‘oversized’ state, but also fosters impunity under clientelism practices, 
alluded to by Blundo and Olivier de Sardan (2006).  However, it is also 
acknowledged that corrupt transactions are by mutual agreement by the 
givers and the takers, an outcome of a market with informally developed 
structures (Anders, 2005; Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, 2006; Olivier de 
Sardan, 2008; Mbaku, 2010).  The literature conceptualises informality as a 
mode of governance which permeates all government institutions, and which 
pervades most transactions within those institutions.  With such a concept in 
mind, this research considers whether non-compliance with planning laws 
and regulations can be understood not as the individual acts of those ‘short-
circuiting’ planning regulation, but rather as a systemic effect of governance 
practices that deliberately produce ‘grey areas’, within which there are 
possibilities for future developments of uncertain legal status.  It therefore 
investigates the characteristics of the relationships between planners and 
developers; their interactions and their perceptions of issues, which lead to 
non-compliance with planning laws and regulations.  
 
2.4 Conclusion  
‘Human settlements shall be planned, developed and improved in a manner 
that takes full account of sustainable development principles [….] 
Sustainable human settlements development ensures economic 
development, employment opportunities, social progress, in harmony with 
the environment.’ Habitat Agenda (UN-Habitat,1996. Chapter II:29) 
The expectation of the Habitat Agenda quoted is a tall order, especially for 
sub-Saharan Africa, given the magnitude of the problems in its cities, and the 
perverse impacts of planning.  As seen in this chapter, planning for sub-
Saharan Africa, which was adopted from the Global North, has been mainly 
spatially oriented, concerned with the orderliness of the physical environment 
in cities (Watson, 2008; Watson, 2009; Berrisford, 2011a).  It has also been 
influenced by political and other vested interests (Schilderman, 2002).  
These influences, coupled with limited resources and poor administrative 
systems, have greatly undermined the role of planning in those cities 
(Rakodi, 2001; Schilderman, 2002; Anyamba, 2011).  It also became 
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apparent that, although planning and planning systems in the Global North 
have evolved in the context of changing social, economic, political and 
environmental arenas, the same cannot be said about the Global South.  
Such systems were developed in different contexts in the Global North, and 
have thus failed to address the problems of a developing City like Nairobi, 
where there is a split between formal and informal settlements (Onyango and 
Olima, 2008; Watson,2009; Anyamba, 2011, etc) and the de facto standards 
of most developments are contrary to the de jure standards of planners’ 
normative views.   
There is general consensus that planning systems in sub-Saharan Africa 
need to be reviewed (Kironde 1992a; Nwaka, 2005; UN-Habitat, 2009; 
Watson, 2009; Berrisford, 2011a).  The relevance of the laws and regulations 
has been questioned, with terms such as ‘wasteful zoning’ (Nwaka, 2005) 
being used to analyse them.  To put this in Berrisford’s words, ‘the underlying 
approaches towards planning and understandings of planning law 
themselves need to change before the laws can be revised’ - new planning 
laws in themselves will not be effective unless they reflect appropriate 
planning visions and objectives in the context of needs (Berrisford 2011b: 
237).  Whilst the role of planning might have evolved in the countries of origin 
to take into account other factors like economic growth, or spatial justice to 
balance other inequalities, planning systems in sub-Saharan Africa are still 
caught up in the inherited spatial planning systems.  These systems (and 
their effects) are investigated in Nairobi by this research. 
To give theoretical context to why there is non-compliance with planning laws 
and regulations by developers for the middle income group, the chapter has 
noted different conceptualisations of planning, and how they may (or may 
not) be influential in planning in sub-Saharan Africa.  Such concepts include 
social planning, economic planning, physical or spatial planning.  It was 
noted that planning in most sub-Saharan Africa has been based on the 
British Town and Country Planning Act of 1947, which is fundamentally 
spatial, using zoning tools to control land use.  However, freezing land use in 
the master planning approach makes the plans incompatible with realities on 
the ground.  It was also noted that informalities in land delivery, 
administration and developments have an impact on the effectiveness of 
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land use control.  Commodification of land (Payne1997) creates a 
competitive market, in which efforts to maximise profitability lead to informal 
practices in subdivisions and developments.  The impact of politics on 
planning was also highlighted, and how conflicting interests can exert 
pressure to influence planning policies and systems.  This chapter has also 
reviewed some political economy drivers in planning and housing 
development, highlighting the contestations that arise when, in the face of 
‘negative’ powers of the state, private capital rises to meet the demands of 
the market in housing provision.  It was established that private developers 
are interested in maximising their returns (Harvey, 1982; Healey et al., 1988; 
Adams and Watkins, 2014).  In doing this, they are not averse to 
undermining the state in its planning role (Harvey, 1982).  It does not help 
matters that state agents (planners) are easily compromised by their pursuit 
of extra-legal gains (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, 2006; Bayart, 2009; 
Mbaku, 2010).  Informal collaboration between state agents and citizens 
breeds mistrust between them, and undermines the formal functions of state 
institutions and agencies. Ultimately, corruption in governance renders the 
functions of the state ineffective (Tyler, 1990 and 1998).   
It is apparent that non-compliance with planning regulations is costly to 
various actors; for example, there are costs to the general population due to 
environmental degradation and costs to developers in terms of bribes to 
corrupt officials.  Planning systems need to devise ways of expediting access 
to land and housing for the urban poor, so that they are not pressured to 
operate outside the laws and regulations.  For the purposes of this research, 
the overarching question that remains is; ‘how does the planning system 
actually operate, and what does this tell us about the mismatch between 
formal and informal practices?’ 
The World Urban Forum 7 (Un-Habitat, 2011) recommended adaptation of 
more meaningful spatial planning strategies, which involve stakeholders in 
formulation and implementation of policies that affect their lives, in 
recognition that effective settlements policies require joint-working between 
the government and the general populace.  According to Berrisford (2011a), 
good planning regulations would be proportional and appropriate to the risks 
posed (at the same time identifying and minimising the costs of 
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enforcement).  This might entail a review of existing laws and regulations to 
increase their relevance, as well as review of enforcement resources, 
including the supply of planners.  In good planning there would also be 
accountability, consistency and transparency, which would minimise 
impunity, and ambiguity, ensuring that the laws are fair and clear to all (ibid.).  
Such planning would embrace ‘the economic, the social, the environment’, 
being sensitive and imaginative in projecting future standards as well as in 
dealing with existing issues (ibid., p. 227).  This echoes Healey (1992), who 
advocated for planning which is responsive to economic forces.  In the same 
vein, guidelines by UN-Habitat (2015b) put emphasis on transparency, 
flexibility and provision for enforcement.  Watson (2005) advocated for 
planning to work with informality and for this, planners will need to envisage 
cities as complex, heterogeneous and fluid.  This, indeed, would seem like a 
desirable approach for the majority of the population in cities like Nairobi.  
There are criteria which can be used to judge a ‘good’ planning framework..  
A good planning framework should, for example; 
 Be proportional to the needs and risks posed (Berrisford, 
2011a) 
 Evolve in the context of changing economic forces (Healey, 
1992)  
 Understand the pressures and interests faced by relevant 
stakeholders (Berrisford, 2011a) 
 Be enforceable, accountable and transparent (UN-Habitat, 
2015b; Transparency International, 2000).   
 Have appropriate partnerships involving all relevant 
stakeholders (UN-Habitat, 2015b; Transparency International, 
2000) 
 Work with informality (Watson, 2005) 
 Foster trust in institutions, and between citizens and 
government actors (Blackburn, 1998; Braithwaite and Levi, 
1998) 
Such a system in sub-Saharan Africa would set appropriate planning and 
building standards, deliver effective land management, and avoid corruption 
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and poor governance.  These are some of the parameters which are 
employed to guide this research in the quest for answers with regards to 
non-compliance.  Against this framework, this research gauges whether the 
above recommendations have been taken forward in Nairobi. The purpose of 
this research is to ask why the above criteria may not be met in practice. 
Chapter 4 evaluates the evolution of the Nairobi master plan and relevant 
legislation, and their operations to date (why they have not been effective 
thus far).  It also considers planned reviews of the same, and the hopes 
being pinned on the reviews.  Chapter 5 covers the institutions involved in 
planning, the processes of implementation and enforcement, staffing 
structure and capacity, and land registration and regularisation processes.  
The chapter answers the question; ‘Do planners have structures to 
implement the laws and regulations and monitor adherence to them?’  
Chapter 6 explores problems in the actual application of the planning system, 
from the perspective of both planners and developers.  Chapter 7 expands 
on problems with governance of the planning system, whilst Chapter 8 looks 
at problems in practice in developments.  The three chapters go towards 
answering the questions:  
 What challenges do urban planners face in implementing planning 
laws and regulations, and monitoring practices in housing 
developments for the middle income group?  
 What challenges do urban property developers face in adhering to the 
relevant laws and regulations in housing developments for the middle 
income group?  
 What are the characteristics of the relationships between planners 
and developers, and why do they foster non-compliance? 
Chapter 9 is the concluding chapter.  It culminates in an argument that non-
compliance with planning laws and regulations by developers for the middle 
income group does not necessarily result in inappropriate housing 
developments, and that planners would do well to support the efforts of these 
developers with a view to meeting housing demand by the middle income 
group. 
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It is clear that obtaining answers to the above questions requires interaction 
with both planners and developers.  Chapter 3 sets out how this interaction 
was designed and cultivated to generate comprehensive data for the 
research. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
‘…Then you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free…’ (The Bible, 
John 8:32)  
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 revealed that there is a gap in the knowledge needed to discern 
why there is non-compliance with planning laws and regulations in sub-
Saharan Africa.  It has been acknowledged that inappropriate concepts have 
resulted in informality in developments (Okpala, 1987; Kironde, 1992b; 
Watson, 2009; Watson, 2011; Nguluma, 2003).  These have left the relevant 
policies open to abuse by developers (Rakodi, 1995; Rakodi, 2001; UN-
Habitat, 2003).  The World Urban Forum 7 (Un-Habitat, 2011) recommended 
adaptation of spatial planning polices to suit reality on the ground.  Similarly, 
Berrisford (2011) has highlighted the need to review approaches to planning 
in the context of housing needs.  He has acknowledged that although 
‘…systems of planning law are necessary to provide a framework of rules to 
mediate and regulate competing pressures and interests…’ (Berrisford, 
2011a: 211), it is important to understand what pressures and interests are 
faced by relevant stakeholders before any reviews or reforms of the planning 
laws and regulations are considered (ibid.).  This research is an effort to 
understand those pressures and interests in Nairobi.  It looks beneath the 
surface to explore what is lacking with regards to planning laws which affect 
housing developments for the middle income group, and why so far they 
have been driven to contravene by-laws and regulations.   
 
3.2 Understanding interactions between planners and residential 
developers for the middle income group in Nairobi: an interpretive 
approach 
Friedmann (2008) has argued that the amount and the type of ‘knowledge’ 
needed for planning is not yet known, and that planners’ professional 
knowledge is based on very limited understanding of the urban complex, 
thus they tend to develop ‘abstract’ models of reality.  Answers to the main 
question for this research (why is there non-compliance with planning laws 
and regulations by developers for the middle income group?) aim to provide 
new knowledge to contribute to more effective planning.  The epistemological 
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position of this thesis is that meaningful data to ‘construct’ knowledge for 
planning can be generated by talking interactively with developers and 
planners, who are able to reflect on the challenges posed by the current 
planning system.  The ontological position is that perceptions of the planning 
system by planners and developers partially shape the impact of the system 
on residential developments.    
According to Kitchin and Tate (2000) ‘...the researcher’s job is to seek to 
understand the process of making the world meaningful as it is these 
processes by which we come to know, and behave in, places...’ (p. 12). The 
search for ‘truth’ in this case involves an exploration of everyday interactions 
between planners and developers.  The research aims to uncover the 
perceptions of planners with regards to limitations and gaps within the 
present planning system, the obstacles they face in implementing and 
enforcing the planning laws and regulations, how they monitor 
implementation of the laws and regulations, and what changes to the 
planning system might be necessary.  With regard to developers, the 
research delves into what developers’ perceptions of the planning system 
are, whether non-compliance on their part is accidental or intentional, and 
how, in their view, the planning system could be improved.   
The research adopts an interpretivist approach, which argues that reality 
cannot be objectively determined, and that there is greater opportunity to 
understand the perceptions people have by placing them in their social 
contexts (Kelliher, 2005).  Interpretivism presumes a qualitative approach to 
gaining knowledge and information, which is believed to provide more in-
depth contextual knowledge.  The reason for using this approach is because 
qualitative research has been found to be useful for understanding issues in 
which processes and connections are important (Peattie, 1983).  Knowledge 
in this research is contextual, situational and interactional, in that planners 
and developers relate their own experiences and interactions.   
It has been argued that interpretive research cannot be generalised i.e. 
findings from such a research cannot be generally applied outside the 
specifics of the situation studied (Williams, 2000; Robson, 2002).  However, 
Williams (2000) acknowledges that generalisation is inevitable even in 
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qualitative, interpretive research; he argues that interpretivists do generalise, 
although they will not admit it, instead using terms such as ‘external validity’, 
‘transferability’ or ‘conformability’ (p. 210).  Fossey et al. (2002) have 
asserted that the applicability of findings to different settings depends on the 
contextual knowledge by people who want to apply the findings; it could thus 
be said that applicability of the findings of this research to other cities in sub-
Saharan Africa would depend on the contextual knowledge of researchers in 
those countries.   
This research looks to use the data collected to explain the behaviour of both 
planners and developers with regards to the application and implementation 
of planning regulations.  Fossey et al. (2002) have asserted that research 
‘...should illuminate the subjective meanings of the phenomena, or social 
world, being studied, but which should also place the findings in context so 
as to represent the real world of those studied and in which their lived 
experiences are embedded...’ (p.730).  The acquired data is used to link the 
research with previous research findings (thus maintaining continuity), and to 
establish new knowledge and explanatory concepts, stimulating further 
research in the process.   
 
3.3 Use of qualitative methods in exploring interactions between urban 
planners and residential developers is Nairobi 
3.3.1 Research Design  
According to De Vaus et al. (2001), the function of research design is to 
ensure that the evidence obtained enables us to answer the initial question 
as unambiguously as possible (p.9).  Similarly, Kothari (2009) has noted how 
a good research design is not only appropriate, efficient and economical, but 
also that it yields maximum information.  At the same time, such a design 
would give opportunity to consider different aspects of a problem.  This 
entails having a clear picture of the research objectives.  In its conclusion, 
Chapter 2 clarified the gaps in knowledge for effective planning and what 
questions need to be answered in order to plug those gaps.  These are the 
questions being taken forward by this research.  The objectives and related 
questions of this research are detailed in table 1. 
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Table 1: Research objectives and related questions (Author, 2013) 
Research Objectives Related Questions 
1. To investigate 
the challenges 
met by planners 
in implementing 
and enforcing 
planning laws 
and regulations 
 What are the perceived limitations of, and gaps 
within, the present planning laws and 
regulations as they relate to residential 
developments? 
 What obstacles do planners face in 
implementing and enforcing the planning laws 
and regulations?  
 Do planners have structures to implement the 
laws and regulations and monitor adherence to 
them? 
 Why are contraventions by housing developers 
for the middle income group tolerated by 
planners?  
 Is there evidence that planning regulators are 
flouting their own laws and regulations, and if 
so, in what circumstances and why?  
 
2. To investigate 
the challenges 
met by 
developers 
 What are developers’ perceptions of the 
limitations and/or gaps in the present planning 
laws and regulations? 
 What obstacles do developers face in adhering 
to the planning regulations? 
 Is non-compliance deliberate or accidental?   
 Why do housing developers get away with non-
compliance?  
 Do they actually get away with it or there are 
other costs? 
 
3. To explore the 
characteristics 
of the 
relationships 
between 
planners and 
developers, and 
 In what ways do developers interact with 
planners?  
 At what stage do planners and developers first 
come into contact with regards to any particular 
development?   
 What are the working relationships between 
developers and planners like?  
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examine why 
they foster non-
compliance 
 Are there issues of trust between planners and 
developers?  
 
 
Having clarified the objectives, the research design guides the researcher in 
case study selection, sampling, methods of data collection, as well as ethical 
issues (De Vaus et al., 2001; Kitchin and Tate, 2000).   
Section 3.3.2 is therefore about case study selection.  O’Neill (2001) 
identified that stakeholders’ interests can be brought into a process through 
representation (in case studies) by those with knowledge and expertise, and 
whose judgement can be accepted in representing others with shared 
‘epistemic values’ (p.490).  With regard to case studies, Williams (2000) has 
stressed that although case studies are chosen according to their relevance 
to the research, it is important to select representative examples within the 
case study on the basis of their appropriateness for the research.  This 
research used an ‘embedded design’, in which relevant cases across 
different middle income areas in Nairobi were explored individually to build 
an overall picture.  This was with a view to minimising concerns regarding 
validity, reliability and generalisation, which might arise in the case of a 
single study (Eisenhardt, 1989).  The section rationalises why and how the 
case study area(s) were selected.   
Section 3.3.3 is about sampling and details how participant samples of 
planners and developers were derived.  The research took into account time 
and financial constraints, and went for quality of sample rather than quantity, 
carefully selecting purposeful informants who could give maximum and 
relevant information.  Kothari (2009) advises that an optimum sample size is 
neither too small nor too large, and should fulfil requirements of efficiency, 
representativeness, reliability and flexibility.  Kitchin and Tate (2000) have 
noted that it is possible for a smaller, well designed sample, to give adequate 
information.  Baxter and Eyles (2004) have echoed this, arguing that a 
sample size can be determined by the need to involve as many experiences 
as are necessary without getting to saturation or redundancy of themes, and 
that credibility need not be threatened by low sample sizes.  Bryman (2012) 
makes similar arguments, and also points out that the researcher cannot 
84 
 
know at the outset how many cases will be needed for data collection. 
Sampling for this research was therefore purposeful, aimed at revealing the 
full range of potentially important perceptions without imposing the hardships 
of endless data gathering.   
Section 3.3.4 discusses the methods used for this research.  Rowley (2002) 
has noted that case study research uses various sources of information, 
such as documents, interviews and observations, which are more than a 
researcher would get in a historical study or from an experiment, and 
analysis of the sub-units helps in achieving a holistic perspective.  To meet 
the objectives of this research, a combination of methods was used for 
maximum data collection, including closed and open-ended questionnaires to 
developers, qualitative interviewing of planners and developers, examination 
of relevant documents in planning offices and site visits for observations.  
The section also elaborates on how the methods of data collection were 
applied on the ground, including problems encountered while using those 
methods. Table 2 expands on the research questions, information required, 
and the relevant sources of data towards meeting the research objectives. 
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Table 2: Mapping of research questions and information required (Author, 2014) 
    
Main Research 
Question 
Mid-level 
Research 
Questions 
Sub-questions Information required Relevant interview/document 
Why is there non-
compliance with 
planning laws and 
regulations by 
developers of middle 
income group 
housing 
What challenges 
do urban planners 
face in 
implementing 
planning laws and 
regulations? 
What are the perceived 
limitations of, and gaps 
within, the present planning 
laws and regulations as they 
relate to residential 
developments? (mostly for 
senior planners) 
 
Planners’ perceptions of 
limitations and gaps 
 
What goes into formulation of 
planning laws and 
regulations? 
 
Shortcomings of the present 
planning system 
 
 
 
Interviews with consultants at the 
University, Estate director at NSSF, 
Deputy Director 
 
Interview with Chief Admin 
 
Interviews with frontline planners and 
Assistant Directors 
 
Interview with County Minister 
 
Interview with Ex Planner  
 
Documents in planning offices 
 
Why hasn’t the planning 
system been changed to 
improve the quantity and/or 
quality of housing for middle 
income groups? 
 
Hindrances to review of the 
planning system 
 
Interviews with frontline planners, 
private planners and consultants, 
Assistant Directors and Deputy 
Director, Chief Admin and County 
Minister 
Do planners have structures 
to monitor the 
implementation of and 
adherence to planning laws 
and regulations?  
 
Processes of monitoring: what 
follows an admission for 
planning approval?   
 
Staffing capacity to deal with 
applications 
 
Governance issues: authority, 
administration processes, 
institutional networks  
Interview with Chief Admin 
 
Interviews with front line planners and 
Assistant Directors 
 
Interviews with Architects  
 
Interviews with developers – re 
timeframes for approval 
 
Interviews with – re un approved 
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developments 
 
 
Interviews with developers/developers’ 
agents e.g. architects 
 
Interviews with frontline planners and 
assistant directors 
 
County Procedures for Approval  
 
County Zoning Ordinance 
In what circumstances are 
contraventions by housing 
developers tolerated? 
 
Reasons for turning a blind 
eye 
Interviews with Deputy Director and 
County Minister 
 
Interviews with planners and Assistant 
Directors 
 
Interviews with land registrars at Ardhi 
House 
 
The PPA, among other legislations 
Is there evidence that 
planners are flouting their 
own laws? 
 
Reasons for turning a blind 
eye 
 
Conflicting interests amongst 
planning professionals 
 
Interviews with Assistant Director   
 
Interview with frontline planners 
 
Documents in planning offices   
    
What challenges 
do urban 
developers face in 
adhering to 
planning laws and 
regulations? 
What are developers’ 
perceptions of the limitations 
and/or gaps in the present 
planning laws and 
regulations? 
 
Developers perceptions of 
limitations and gaps 
 
 
Interviews with developers and 
developers’ agents 
 
Questionnaires to developers and their 
agents 
What obstacles do 
developers face in adhering 
to the planning regulations? 
Process for approval of 
applications: what follows an 
admission for planning 
Interviews with private architects   
 
Interviews with Deputy Director, 
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 approval? 
 
At what stage do planners and 
developers first come into 
contact with regards to any 
particular development?   
 
In what ways do developers 
interact with planners during 
the development process?  
 
Length of time for approval 
process in relation to 
expectations 
 
Assistant Directors and frontline 
planners 
 
Interviews with developers  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Questionnaires to developers and their 
agents 
Is non-compliance deliberate 
or accidental?  
  
Awareness of and familiarity 
with the planning application 
process 
 
Various forms of conflicting 
interests 
 
 
 
Interviews with developers, Assistant 
Directors and planners, consultants, 
land registrars 
Why do housing developers 
get away with non-
compliance?  
 
Level of engagement with 
planning regulators  
 
Application of due process by 
planning officials 
Interviews with developers and 
developers’ agents  
 
Interviews with planners 
Do they actually get away 
with non-compliance or are 
there other costs? 
 
Sanctions for unapproved 
developments 
Interviews with Assistant Directors, 
developers and developers’ agents 
Documents in planning offices 
    
What are the 
characteristics of 
the relationship 
between planners 
and developers, 
Are there issues of trust 
between planners and 
developers?  
 
What are the working 
relationships between 
developers and planners like?  
 
Corruption issues 
Interviews with developers and their 
agents (architects, contractor) 
 
Interviews with all planners and 
developers 
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and why do they 
foster non-
compliance? 
 
Governance issues 
 
Questionnaires  
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With a clear map of what information was needed and from what sources, 
Section 3.3.5 of this chapter gives the fieldwork schedule.  It indicates when 
the data was collected, and how long it took to gather the data needed for 
the research.   
Analysis of the acquired data is covered in section 3.4.  Whilst experienced 
researchers might consider qualitative data analysis as an art which is mostly 
an inductive and open-ended process, Kitchin and Tate (2000) have warned 
that a structured series of steps in coding, analysis and interpretation of 
qualitative data might be most appropriate for beginner researchers, as it 
gives a clear set of guidelines for analysing data and helps to lend rigour to 
the research (ibid.).  Finlay (2006) takes the same view, asserting that the 
use of explicit criteria in evaluation of data adds to the transparency of the 
research, and enables readers to understand the values and interests of the 
researcher.  The section elaborates on the methods used to analyse data, 
and the challenges therein.   
Section 3.5 looks at ethical issues that arose in the research.  About ethical 
issues, Kitchin and Tate (2000) have advised how research on sensitive 
issues that might have broad social and ethical implications should be 
approached cautiously and sensitively.  This research is investigating a 
sensitive topic (non-compliance) which could potentially have implications for 
participants.  The section will show that potential problems were pre-empted 
by thoughtful insight in the course of the fieldwork.  In conclusion, the chapter 
highlights the feat of gathering adequate data on such a sensitive topic.   
3.3.2 Case study selection 
Nairobi was chosen as a case study to represent the fast growing cities in 
sub-Saharan Africa which are struggling with non-compliance with planning 
laws and regulations, and informality in middle income settlements.   
Since the majority of middle income group households, as will be revealed in 
Chapter 4.2, are in rental housing, this research defines the middle income 
group based on their spending power in rental housing.  With regard to rental 
housing, this tenure is dictated by affordability, and affordability also 
determines neighbourhood conditions, including safety, infrastructure 
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provision and amenities.  The Housing Survey 2012/13 indicated that Nairobi 
residents spent an average of 40.8% of their household income on house 
rents (KNBS, 2013).  The monthly rent for a room in a slum area or other low 
density informal housing is about KSh1,500 to KSh2,000 ($17 to $23).  
Monthly rents in the apartment blocks under study range from about 
KSh3,500 ($40) for a room in a tenement (accommodation comprises rooms 
in a block, with communal bathrooms), to well over KSh 50,000 ($575) in a 
self-contained apartment in a respectable neighbourhood.  Monthly rent in 
the more affluent locations in the city, for self-contained apartments as well 
as for low density accommodation, is well over KSh100,000 ($1,149).   
The above rent levels imply that for a household to spend 40.8% of their 
income on KSh3, 500 rent for a room in a tenement, their total household 
expenditure would be about KSh 8,600 ($99).  Even following the UN-Habitat 
rule for affordable housing costing 20% to 30% of a household’s expenditure 
(UN-Habitat, 2011), it would mean that the middle income band would start 
at about KSh 12,000 ($138), and would be less restricted than the 24% of 
the population given by KNBS based on 2005 statistics.  This research will 
therefore define the middle income group as the segment of population with 
incomes above KSh8, 600 and able to afford monthly rents of KSh3,500 and 
above.  The top end of this scale would be those earning about KSh300, 
000, able to afford rents of up to 30% of their income in the more affluent 
areas.  The lower end of the middle-income group live in poorer 
neighbourhoods, with inadequate infrastructure and amenities, whilst the 
upper end is in better locations.  This is the segment of population that 
ensures that a developer who puts up apartments in certain areas has a 
captive market for his units – it explains the many new apartment blocks and 
housing developments that are being built in and around the city, ranging 
from blocks with shared facilities to blocks with self-contained units.   
For the middle income group in Nairobi, there are two main types of rental 
accommodation; high rise apartment blocks with self-contained units, and 
apartment blocks with shared facilities (toilets and bathrooms), otherwise 
referred to as tenements.  Indeed, the Kenyan Minister for Lands, Housing 
and Urban Development (while releasing the National Housing Survey 
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2012/2013), asserted that more than 75 per cent of the buildings under 
construction in urban areas are high-rise flats for rent, which is indicative of 
demand (Business Daily, 5th May 2015). The research wanted to sample 
developers across the two types of rental developments because there are 
non-compliance issues in both types of developments. 
Nairobi is divided into 8 divisions (see Map1), which are then subdivided into 
locations.  Developments for the low and middle income groups are 
predominantly towards the east of the city, otherwise known as Eastlands, 
and also along Thika Road.  In Eastlands, such developments are found in 
Embakasi Division, including Kariobangi South, Dandora, Kayole, Umoja and 
Embakasi locations.  In the Thika Road area, such developments are 
predominant in Kasarani, Roysambu, Zimmerman, Ruaraka and Githurai 
(see Map 2 and Table 3).  Developments in these areas range from low end 
middle income tenements (high rise blocks of rooms with communal 
bathrooms and water supply as found in Pipeline, Embakasi) to middle end 
self-contained apartments.  The apartment blocks go as high as 9 floors.  
Rents in such developments range from KSh 3,500 per month for a single 
room in a block to about KSh 50,000 per month for a self-contained unit12.  
These areas are mostly outside the boundaries of the original Nairobi master 
plan.    
The research also spanned developments for the high end middle income 
group in Nairobi.  Such developments are mostly to the West of the City, in 
areas such as Westlands, Kilimani, Kileleshwa, Lavington and Parklands.  In 
those areas, many single dwelling, low density developments on half acre 
plots, have been replaced with multiple apartment blocks.  Rental 
developments in these areas are mostly self-contained apartment blocks for 
the high end middle income group, and rents are well over KSh 50,000 
($575) per calendar month for a 2 bed-roomed self-contained unit.   
                                               
12
 This equates to about $57 - $575 a month, which is rather a high amount considering that 
the income range for this group is KSh 23,672 – KSh 119,999 ($272 - $1,379) (KNBS, 2005) 
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Map 1: Map of Nairobi Divisions (Author, 2015) 
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 Low and middle end developments for the middle income group (outside the master plan area) 
High end developments for the middle income group 
Former Site and Service Scheme areas (discussed in later chapters). 
 
 
Map 2: Predominant middle income residential areas (Author - adapted from 
google maps) 
 
Table 3: Middle income areas in Nairobi (Author, 2015) 
No. in 
map 1 
Constituencies Locations 
1 Embakasi Mwiki, Ruai, Njiru, Kariobangi South, Dandora, 
Kayole, Umoja, Embakasi, Mukuru 
2 Kasarani Kahawa, Githurai, Roysambu, Kasarani, Ruaraka, 
Kariobangi, Korogocho,  
3 Westlands Highridge, Kitisuru, Kangemi, Parklands, Kileleshwa, 
Kilimani 
4 Dagoretti  Uthiru/Ruthimitu, Mutuini, Waithaka, Kawangware, 
Riruta, Woodley, Kenyatta Golf Course  
5 Langata Karen, Langata, Sarangombe, Kibera, Laini Saba, 
Nairobi West, Mugumoini  
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The other aspect of the research was aimed at practices in the planning 
offices.  This required visits to planning offices at City Hall and other 
government offices associated with the planning system, such as the Ministry 
of Lands, Housing and Urban Development offices at Ardhi House, as well 
as visits to private consultants in their offices.   
3.3.3 Sampling 
This section covers the selection of participants.  In total, there were 
qualitative interviews with 44 participants, comprising 14 planners, 4 planning 
consultants, 4 relevant government agents, and 22 developers (or their 
agents).  Senior planners and front line planners alike were important to the 
findings, as well as sample developers from representative areas.  Table 4 
gives details of participant samples.   
Table 4: Mapping of Qualitative Interviews Participants (Author, 2014) 
 Participants Target Actual  Breakdown % of 
Target 
Comments 
Senior 
Planners 
7 
 
8 1 county 
Minister 
 
1 Deputy 
Director 
 
6 Assistant 
Directors 
114% The Deputy Director 
was chosen instead of 
the Director because 
he had more 
experience in the 
planning department, 
both as a front line 
planner and as a senior 
planner. 
 
1 of the Assistant 
Directors left 
employment after my 
1st field visit, and I got 
to interview his 
replacement during my 
2nd field visit. 
Operational 
Staff 
8 4 2 physical 
Planners – 
City Hall 
 
1 Physical 
Planner 
(Ministry) 
 
1 Chief 
Administration 
Worker 
(Planning) 
 
50% The Assistant Directors 
were acting up in their 
posts, and had 
previously been 
operational staff; they 
therefore could talk 
about experiences of 
operational staff and it 
was not necessary to 
interview more 
operational staff as 
data was getting 
saturated. 
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Ex Planners 
 
1 2  Ex-operations 
– City Hall 
 
Ex- 
operations 
Housing 
Development 
Department 
(HDD) 
200% The 1st Ex-planner 
introduced the 2nd one.  
It was useful to have 
data in relation to 
operations at City Hall 
and field operations. 
Developers & 
Developers’ 
Agents (those 
engaging with 
the Planning 
Process 
 
 
15 16 6 Developers 
(1 foreign) 
 
5 Architects 
 
5 Physical 
Planners 
107% Developers’ agents 
proved to be invaluable 
because most 
developers who 
engage with the 
planning process 
delegate to their agents 
and are not actually 
involved in the planning 
approval process apart 
from making necessary 
payment.  Kenya 
Property Developers’ 
Association (KPDA) 
members were not 
readily available and 
are yet to be 
interviewed, and this 
might generate new 
data. 
 
Developers 
and 
Developers 
Agents (those 
not engaging 
with the 
Planning 
Process) 
10 6 5 Developers 
 
1 Contractor 
60% It was difficult to get 
access to this category 
of developers because 
there were no records 
of them in government 
offices – mostly relied 
on word of mouth from 
friends and 
acquaintances 
Planning 
Consultants 
 
4 4 2 Professors 
– U0N 
 
1 Planning 
Lecturer – 
UoN 
 
1 Director – 
(Kenya 
Institute of 
Public Policy 
Research and 
Analysis 
(KIPPRA) 
100% These participants had 
qualitative data on the 
new Master Plan and 
new legislation  
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Other 
Government 
Agents 
4 4 4 Land 
Registrars 
 
1 Estate 
Director 
 
1 Estate 
Officer 
 
1 Structural 
Engineer 
 
1 Public 
Health Officer 
100% Land Registrars gave 
data on Land Use 
Management; officials 
of the estate office 
gave data on the new 
legislation (including 
their views of the built 
environment bill). 
 
      
Total 
 
49 44  90%  
 
3.3.3.1 Sampling planners 
With regards to planners, the aim of the sample selection was to get 
representation of senior planning officials who are involved in policy making 
and reviews, as well as front line planning officials who cover operational 
processes of the approval system.  According to AAK (2011), there are 31 
Physical Planners in Nairobi, 11 Public Health Officers, 33 Engineers, 18 
Surveyors, 6 Architects and 33 Landscape Architects.13The chief 
administrator for the planning department advised that there are 18 qualified 
staff in development control, 4 qualified enforcement staff, 5 qualified staff in 
forward planning, 5 qualified staff in policy and implementation, and 4 
qualified staff in research.  Qualifications range from degrees to HND.  The 
rest of the staff in those sections (who are the majority) do not have formal 
qualifications but are involved in administration tasks, landscaping and 
enforcement tasks.   
With regards to the senior professionals, samples were purposeful in that the 
heads of identified departments were targeted.  Interviews were carried out 
with the County Minister for Planning, Lands and Urban Development, the 
Deputy Director of County Planning, and Assistant Directors for relevant 
                                               
13
 The AAK report referred to landscape architects, but from the field visit it was established 
that these are not actually qualified architects – they are just landscape assistants and not 
technical staff.  Also, the AAK figures incorporated staff at the Ministry of Lands, Housing 
and Urban Planning. County staffing figures were given by the chief administrator for this 
research, and these figures will be highlighted in Chapter 5. 
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sections of the county planning department (development control, 
enforcement, forward planning, policy implementation and research 
sections).  These senior professionals were important participants in this 
research because they were best placed to shed light on issues of 
governance and authority, as well as hindrances to effective reforms of the 
planning system.    
For operational professionals, a cross-section of those allocated to the 
processing of applications in different sections of the planning department 
were interviewed.  It turned out that the Assistant Directors had been 
operational planners for a number of years, and were only acting up in their 
present positions; they were therefore able to give perspectives and 
experiences as frontline planners, as well as Assistant Directors.  A few 
frontline planners were also interviewed, including a structural engineer, 
which enabled generation of more holistic data in relation to implementation 
and enforcement difficulties, and their perceptions of what would make a 
workable planning system.  Introductions were also made to two retired 
planning officials, who talked freely about their experiences of the planning 
systems without fear of recrimination or incrimination.  Interviews with front 
line planners were stopped when subsequent interviews did not seem to be 
adding value to existing data from previous interviews.   
Apart from planners, other government agents who are implicated in urban 
land administration and planning, such as Land Registrars in the ministry of 
Lands, Housing and Urban Planning, also contributed invaluable data to the 
research.  Private planning consultants, amongst them professors at the 
University of Nairobi, and a director at the Kenya Institute of Public Policy 
Research and Analysis (KIPPRA), who are consulted by the government in 
relation to the master plan, planning policy and legislation reviews, were an 
invaluable source of relevant data.   
3.3.3.2 Sampling developers 
It was quite a challenge to get developer participants considering that the 
research was investigating non-compliance with planning regulations, which 
made culprits potentially vulnerable to incrimination.  However, by using a 
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combination of recruitment methods (detailed in 3.3.4), it became possible to 
develop a sample of developers willing to talk about their experiences and 
perceptions of the planning system.  The sample was aimed at getting 
developers of apartment blocks for the middle income group being 
considered in this research.  It was important for the samples to reflect 
developers in areas which could not have obtained planning approval due to 
lack of title deeds, as well as in areas where land was titled and owners 
might have obtained planning approval.  The proportion of samples for the 
different groups did not necessarily have to be equal, but they had to 
generate enough data to answer the relevant research questions.   
Kothari advises that the actual number in a sample will depend on the size of 
the target population, but for this research it was difficult to determine the 
size of the target population of developers because it transpired that the 
majority of developers for the middle income group do not engage with the 
planning system – according to estimates by planners, for every 30 
developers seeking planning approval, 70 other developers were building 
without going through the approval system.  Records of applications for 
approval for apartment blocks in middle income areas which were processed 
between 2009 and 2013 were acquired from the planning offices at the onset 
of fieldwork in the first field visit.  The applications listed the developers and 
their architects, the size of the land to be developed, the type of 
developments, the locality, submission fee and conditions for approval.  Only 
applications for rental apartment blocks were examined.  However, this was 
not a true representation of development activity for the middle income 
group, in that most developers in and for this group, according to planning 
officials and other professional people involved in development, do not 
engage with the planning approval process.    
It was soon clear that records in the county office could not give access to 
developers directly since only their postal address was listed, without a 
contact number.  It would have taken at least a month to get access, in that 
letters would have had to be posted to their address, which could take 
weeks, and even then there would have been no guarantee that the 
developers would have responded.  It was easier to follow the architects, 
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who were easier to find using the internet or yellow pages.  Going through 
architects proved useful in that they could be interviewed as the developers’ 
agents, and they could also refer developers for interviews.    
Sampling developers who by-passed approvals posed a challenge in that 
there were no official records; official information on such developments, if 
any, is limited, and only recently is the county government devising a 
process (regularisation) to net such developers.  Visits to development sites 
usually yielded agents like foremen and caretakers, who were mostly 
unaware of the official status of those developments, suspicious, reluctant or 
very vague with regards to the planning process.   
A total of 22 in-depth interviews were carried out with developers or 
developers’ agents.  This sample included developers who have engaged 
with the planning system, and those who have not.  In-depth interviews with 
developers were stopped when additional developers stopped generating 
new data.   
3.3.4 Research Methods and Data Collection 
As mentioned, in the research design, the research used a combination of 
primary and secondary sources of data.  Information was gathered from 
policy documents and official documents in the planning office, as well as 
from interviews with senior planners, frontline planners and developers.  With 
regard to developers, questionnaires were used to recruit an optimum 
sample for qualitative interviews.  Information from the planning office, 
coupled with triangulation of information from the different sources (in this 
research planners, developers and official documents), corroborated the 
findings, and helped to give a holistic perspective on the phenomenon of 
non-compliance with planning regulations in Nairobi.  
  
3.3.4.1 Questionnaire surveys 
According to Patton (2001), using questionnaires minimises variations 
among interviewers, but interviewees are still able to respond in their own 
words.  McLafferty (2010) points out that a face-to-face interview gives an 
opportunity to clarify vague responses and probe for hidden meanings, and 
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that such interviews result in more meaningful answers, as well as a higher 
rate of response.  For this research face-to-face interviews were the most 
effective as opposed to other methods of administering the survey.  Table 5 
gives details of participant samples for questionnaires. 
 
Table 5: Mapping of Questionnaires' participants (Author, 2014) 
Participants Target Actual Breakdown 
of 
participants 
Comments 
Developers 
and 
Developers’ 
Agents 
engaging with 
the Planning 
Process 
40 50 8 Developers 
 
42 Developers’ 
Agents 
It was easier to get access to 
developers’ agents than to 
developers.  These included 
architects, draftsmen, 
physical planners, 
contractors and foremen. 
KPDA 
Developers 
2 1 1 KPDA 
representative 
 
Developers 
and 
Developers’ 
Agents not 
engaging with 
Planning 
Process  
38 11 10 Developers 
 
1 Developers’ 
Agent (a 
contractor) 
Some developers and agents 
engage with the process for 
some developments but not 
for others (depending on the 
area) 
     
Total 80 61  Some of the developers’ 
agents e.g. draftsmen and 
foremen, might have been 
ignorant of the fact, or were 
misrepresenting about 
engaging with the Planning 
System  
 
To maximise the use of available time, a Masters planning student at the 
local university who had experience of administering questionnaires for other 
researchers was recruited as a research assistant.  He canvassed middle 
income development areas in search of developers or their agents, to whom 
to administer questionnaires.  He visited sites in close proximity on any given 
day so as to minimise travel time and expenses, and the research strived to 
arrange follow-up interviews in more central and convenient locations.  This 
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did not always work out as planned, but on the whole the strategy was 
effective.  Questionnaires were administered by both the researcher and the 
research assistant, but mostly by the research assistant.  Structured 
questions were used to gather socio-economic data, for example; what type 
of developments and target population? How long did the planning 
application process take?  What contractors do they employ?  (See Appendix 
3 for questionnaire).  
61 questionnaires made up of structured questions and semi structured 
questions were administered to developers and their agents.  After 
examining responses to the questionnaires to determine which ones were 
worth following up for more in-depth experiences, this sample of developers 
was sieved to form a purposeful or deliberate sample (Kothari, 2009) – 
developers who represented different areas and, types of developments and 
who were willing to participate in in-depth interviews.  Word of mouth from 
developers’ agents, friends and acquaintances also generated some 
developers relevant to the research, and these proved to be the most open 
and informative because there was an element of trust. With regards to these 
developers recruited directly into the research project, the questionnaire was 
not necessarily administered; it was only used as a guide to getting relevant 
information, but interviews were mostly led by interviewees’ responses, using 
the questionnaire as a rough guide so as not to miss out on any relevant 
information.   
As Mason (2001) pointed out, preparing questionnaires is time consuming in 
that a great deal of preparation is needed to ensure that questions to 
respondents will generate relevant information and data for the research 
question.  After a questionnaire was drafted, it was piloted among known 
developer contacts, who were asked to give feedback regarding the 
questionnaire.  This exercise not only identified questions which were 
considered ineffective and/or unnecessary, but also helped to generate more 
meaningful questions.   An induction meeting with the research assistant also 
helped in further refining the questionnaire, following a discussion on 
envisaged difficulties in administering certain questions.   
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Some developers and developers’ agents, such as foremen and caretakers, 
were not fluent in the use of the English language, and used the national 
language (Swahili).  Luckily the researcher and the research assistant were 
both fluent in the national language.  To avoid misunderstanding and 
misinterpretation, simple language was used, giving easy to understand 
questions.   The research assistant’s skill in paraphrasing and explaining 
questions using the national language was rather impressive – he had a 
better grasp and command of the local slang. 
Although the questionnaires yielded some data, most participants were 
reluctant to also give in-depth interviews.  On several occasions, the 
research assistant was asked to leave the questionnaires and collect them 
later, some of which never materialised.  Others gave very brief responses, 
and did not give much data in the open ended questions.  It was very 
frustrating when the research assistant returned with good quality interviews, 
which could not be followed up because the respondents had expressed they 
did not wish to participate further, and had declined to give contact numbers.  
Even more frustrating was when the research assistant returned good 
interviews with contact numbers for follow-up, but arranging a follow-up 
interview became a struggle.   
3.3.4.2 Semi-structured interviews 
Peattie (1983) and Kumar (2010) have made a case for using unstructured 
interviews within a qualitative approach to researching differing views of 
issues or problems by members of a community.  Charmaz (2006) has 
advised that for a grounded theory research, a few broad, open-ended and 
non-judgemental questions are helpful in getting the most out of participants 
in terms of inviting detailed discussions of a topic; the researcher can guide 
the structure of the interview by inviting reflections and clarification from the 
interviewees.  Like Charmaz, Mason (2002) advises that the researcher can 
take cues from ongoing dialogue with interviewees about what to ask them 
next, and this was indeed helpful in maximising information extracted from 
the senior planners, land administrators and consultants.   
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Primary data was gathered through in-depth interviews with planners (who 
make and apply the laws and regulations) and developers (who are subject 
to the rules and regulations).  The researcher carried out all in-depth 
interviews with participants.  Senior planners were interviewed towards the 
end of the field visit, which gave opportunity to clarify and query issues that 
had been raised by front line planners as well as developers and developers’ 
agents.  The respondents were able to tell, in their own words, their 
experiences or stories of how the processes work.  The research categorised 
the interviews as follows;  
 Senior planners, people who are in positions of authority in the 
planning department, were interviewed with a view to getting their 
perspective on what the system aims to control and why, in their eyes, 
it fails.  They were able to give an overview of the planning policy 
frameworks and their implementation; their view of inherited planning 
laws, shortcomings of the present planning system and how it could 
be improved, how planning legislation reviews come to be, and how 
these reviews could be made more effective.   
 
 Operational Planners, on the other hand, had practical experience of 
implementing and monitoring planning laws and regulations.  They 
were able to advise on what they find challenging in interactions with 
developers.  They were able to answer questions relating to ‘the blind 
eye syndrome’ – whether there are circumstances in which they feel 
compelled to ignore regulatory abuse.  Also from a practical point of 
view, they were able to point out in which areas the planning system is 
lacking, and what changes might be necessary.   
 
 Interviews with developers and developers’ agents were aimed at 
looking beneath the service as to why developers choose to ignore 
some regulations (which regulations they do not find sensible), and 
also the consequences of their actions.  Following on from the 
literature review, issues of restrictive planning laws and building 
standards were explored, as well as issues of trust and corruption.   
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 To answer the question of whether there was room for manoeuvre 
and how the system could be reviewed in consideration of the 
changing needs of the population, it was especially of interest to 
review debates surrounding proposed new planning legislation (the 
Built Environment Bill 2012, the National Building Regulations 2012, 
and the National Building Maintenance Policy 2012) by politicians and 
relevant professionals.  Information about this came from unexpected 
sources; an independent consultant at the University of Nairobi, and 
one of the directors at the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban 
Planning, where the debate originated.  This shed some light on what 
insights there are in how the planning system could be steered 
towards better enforcement by planners, and better adherence by 
developers. 
 
At the onset of the field visit, contact was made with an Assistant Director in 
Development Control to introduce the project; this helped in that the 
Assistant Director in turn introduced the project to the Deputy Director of City 
Planning and to other colleagues – operational staff trusted the judgement of 
the seniors and were therefore very cooperative in extending assistance.  
The willingness of participants to give their valuable time was really 
humbling, including the County Minister who spent about one hour (with 
minimal interruptions) in an interview.    
Before the trip to the field, expectations were to conduct two in-depth 
interviews a day, at most three.  What hadn’t been factored in were 
impromptu interviews from unexpected and unscheduled sources, and 
rearrangement of appointments to accommodate participants’ changing 
schedules.  There were some frustrating days when appointments were 
cancelled at short notice, or delayed appointments that meant that 
subsequent ones got messed up or cancelled.  On one particular day there 
were no interviews at all, but this was taken as an opportunity to go through 
documents at the planning offices.  And there were those days that gave 
more than had been planned for; on two days there were six interviews, as 
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opposed to the three in the field calendar.  It was not unusual to have a first 
interview of the day at 7.00am (especially with the senior planners), or to 
have interviews over breakfast or lunch, and to have interviews ending at 
7.00pm in the evening; one interview with a contractor, which was an 
impromptu interview, happened 8.00pm in the evening.  On such days, 
having a recorder that worked was really appreciated because it would have 
been difficult to keep pace with note taking.  It was necessary to be aware of 
the effects of such impromptu interviews on the overall sample of 
respondents: both to ensure appropriate spread of interviewees (to ensure 
that these had been recruited into the project through a variety of initial 
contacts) and to ensure that there wasn’t undue repetition. 
Although it was much easier to get appointments with planners at City Hall 
than it was with developers, developers were more flexible with 
appointments, and there were two interviews on weekends and two on a 
public holiday.  There were also two telephone interviews with developers, 
which presented difficulties in recording, but they did generate some useful 
data.  On two occasions it was necessary to travel to satellite towns to meet 
with developers.   
Arranging interviews with lecturers was a bit difficult because it had to be on 
certain days, and around their lectures and other commitments; one 
interview went beyond 7.00pm, whilst another key professor was really 
rushed between consultation meetings and field work outside Nairobi – it was 
indeed fortunate to get 25 minutes of his time. 
A tape recorder was used at interviews.  Although on the whole the request 
to record interviews was well received, two developers did not wish to have 
their interviews recorded, and it was important to take comprehensive notes.  
Even when recording, hand written notes were taken, either during the 
interview or immediately after, in case there were malfunctions with the tape 
recorder (during or after the interviews).  Notes helped in that some of the 
interviews were carried out in noisy cafes or thin walled offices, and as a 
result, recordings had a lot of background noise.  One recording in an 
architect’s office was full of banging noises from construction work 
106 
 
(incremental building in the block he was operating in).   Also, some 
respondents, though audible during the interviews, sounded muffled in the 
recordings, and notes helped to fill in the gaps.   
There was awareness that a lot of skill and energy is needed to carry out the 
interviews, and that transcription of recordings would undoubtedly be 
laborious.   Jackson (2001) reckons that each one-hour interview needs six 
to seven hours for transcription; the whole exercise of transcribing interviews 
generates overwhelming amount of data and transcripts.  Jackson (2001) 
was right – transcribing was indeed laborious, especially in the early days, 
when an eight-hour day (or longer) would be spent transcribing a 40 minute 
interview.  Transcription Buddy (a transcription software), and experience 
over time, did make the task easier. 
3.3.4.3 Examination of planning documents 
Secondary data was gathered from various sources.  At the planning offices, 
access was given to planning applications and minutes of past planning 
committee meetings where approvals are determined.  Time spent in the 
planning offices going through the documents gave the additional advantage 
of being privy to conversations in the planning offices, which proved 
informative for the research.  Different departments that dealt with 
applications, and time spans for processing applications, were also noted. 
Examining this data helped to establish what the planning regulations and 
procedures actually stipulate, with a view to answering the question as to 
whether planners are flouting their own laws.  Also used was information 
derived in other relevant case studies in Nairobi (by different authors), 
including literature from books, journals and other publications.   Websites, 
including those of government, civil society, and professional bodies, were 
also a good source of information.   
Minutes of planning committee meetings, as well as other council meetings, 
are amalgamated into publications, three or four months at a time.  There 
were shelves holding volume upon volume of these publications, going back 
over many years, which was rather intimidating.  McLafferty (2010) noted 
how government data sources in most developing countries are often of poor 
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quality and out of date; this to some extent was the case in the Nairobi 
physical planning offices - publications were not arranged chronologically 
and it was necessary to go through several shelves to locate relevant 
documents.  The research homed in on publications from 2006 to 2012 
(2013 was not yet available).  Prior to the field visit, enquiries had been 
made, by phone and email to friends in Nairobi who had experience of 
research in government offices, about how long it would realistically take to 
get hold of relevant documents, so as to make tangible arrangements.  The 
advice was that, as long as there was a named contact person amongst the 
senior planners, this would not be a problem.  On the third day after arriving 
in Nairobi, introduction was made by a friend to one of the Assistant 
Directors in the planning department.  The Assistant Director, after 
introduction of the project to him, proved very helpful by instructing a 
secretary to avail data and access to planning documents for the research.  
3.3.4.4 Site visits 
The research involved visits to various housing development sites for the 
middle income group.  Visual observations were made on how the plots are 
utilised (including plot coverage and zoning implications), provision of 
infrastructure, and general application of by-laws.  These observations 
helped in guiding the unstructured and semi-structured interviews with 
planners and developers.  Although the main role of the research assistant 
was to administer questionnaires to developers across the study areas, he 
accompanied some site visits.  He was confident and knowledgeable about 
most areas in Nairobi, which was important for site visits. 
It was difficult travelling to sites using public transport, the only available 
means of transport during the working hours.  During off peak hours, trade 
for the matatus (multi passenger taxis) is slow, and a journey of normally 10 
minutes could take more than 1 hour during such times.  It did not help 
matters that October was a hot and dusty month, and prolonged journeys in 
the matatus were quite testing.  Daily travel between areas was therefore 
minimised (mostly for the research assistant) by visiting sites or conducting 
interviews within close proximity on any given day.  Although there was the 
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occasional need to revisit a certain area, for example to collect 
questionnaires which had been left with developers, this arrangement proved 
to be quite time and cost efficient.  Once the research assistant had 
completed questionnaires, any follow-up interviews were arranged in more 
convenient locations in the city centre.  Some developers, though they had 
given their contact numbers for follow-up, ended up being unavailable for 
face to face interviews, and a couple of them opted for telephone follow-up 
interviews. 
It was difficult to gain access to owners of properties, especially completed 
and tenanted developments.  Owners of such developments are not 
necessarily local to the development.  Also, it appears to be common 
practice to secure construction sites with a gated masonry fence at the onset 
of construction works, and this limited visual as well as physical access, 
especially when there were no builders on site.  
For necessary visits to rough neighbourhoods, the research assistant mostly 
solicited the company of a peer, whilst the researcher requested the 
company of the research assistant on such visits.  Also, all visits to 
development projects were done in daylight hours.  The researcher and 
research assistant(s) exchanged a daily schedule of visits, and 
communicated by phone in the course of the day and at the end of the day.   
3.3.5 Fieldwork schedule 
Field work for this research was done in two phases; the first phase of field 
work in Nairobi started in October 2013, and this visit lasted for one month.  
The second visit was made in June/July 2014, and it lasted for three and half 
weeks.  A lot of preparation was done before going to the field, including 
sourcing a research assistant, a contact in the planning office, and extensive 
use of printed material.  This enabled maximum use of time in the field.   
Also, the city was familiar due to previous residency and regular visits 
thereafter, during which property development patterns had been observed.  
A lot of tacit knowledge allowed practical competence in terms of ‘getting 
things done’ quickly.  These factors enabled a significant amount of primary 
data collection within two relatively short field visits. 
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The bulk of fieldwork, including recruitment of developers for the 
questionnaire and most qualitative interviews, was done during the first field 
visit.  In the second field visit, in-depth follow-up interviews were held with 
two developers who had been going through the planning approval process 
in the first field visit, and one developers’ agent who had experience of the 
regularisation process.  Also, no KPDA members were interviewed in the first 
visit – it turned out that they are not as well-known as had been implied.  
However, the Chief Executive Officer of the organisation was successfully 
sought out for an in-depth interview during the second field visit.  The 
interview was aimed at clarifying requirements for KPDA membership, their 
views of the planning system as it stands, and their ideas for improvement 
and collaboration.  In the second field visit, there were also in-depth follow-up 
interviews with two senior planners regarding the regularisation process, and 
progress with the master plan, as well as progress in staff re-structuring. 
The gap between the first field visit and the second field visit allowed time to 
analyse data from the first field visit and to clarify where the gaps in data 
were. (See Appendix 4 for schedule of first fieldwork). 
 
3.4 Qualitative data analysis 
The data collected for this research were analysed systematically with a view 
to arriving at a grounded theory about the phenomenon of non-compliance 
with planning regulations.  From data analysis, the research aimed to answer 
questions relating to perceived obstacles by planners in the implementation 
and enforcement of planning laws and regulations, perceived obstacles by 
developers in adhering to the planning laws and regulations, perceived gaps 
and limitations of the current planning system, as well as perceived solutions.  
Data collected in the Physical Planning departments was useful in 
determining the number of, for example, planning applications within the 
scope of the research, as well as time spans for processing applications, and 
this was used to reinforce other qualitative data from the interviews.    
With regards to semi-structured interview transcripts and questionnaire 
surveys, themes in the interviews were identified and categorised and 
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integrated into the report.  The transcripts were coded manually, employing 
some elements of NVivo computer package.  Kitchin and Tate (2000) have 
warned of how the coding task is difficult where open questions have been 
used, thus calling the need for a coding frame and coding book (See Figure 
3 for an example of a coding frame used).  This was applied to semi-
structured interviews used in this research since they had open-ended 
questions. 
 
Figure 3: Example of coding tree used (Author, 2014) 
 
3.5 Ethical issues  
To avoid misrepresentation or inaccuracy in findings, a case study database 
was created, which included case notes, documents collected from planning 
offices, transcripts of interviews, and analysis of the evidence.  A chain of 
evidence was maintained; the report would make clear what sections of the 
case study databases were being used, by appropriate citation of documents 
and interviews. 
It was amazing that some participants were openly giving names of people 
who could be implicated in corruption and impunity issues.  However, it was 
quickly pointed out that the project report would not give any individual’s 
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name and would retain anonymity.  Besides, the research was not looking to 
evidence or witness first-hand any such action, therefore all information was, 
in legal terms, hearsay.  Although such findings were analytically useful in 
generating an understanding of the processes through which corrupt 
behaviour occurred, it was not a legal requirement for the research to 
attempt to intervene in individual alleged acts of corruption.  Besides, it was 
ethically inappropriate to do so, as this would have undermined the trust 
through which a more in-depth understanding of how the planning system 
could be improved could be gained. 
For both developers and planners, oversight could have occurred with 
regards to consent, for example by assuming consent; to avoid overlooking 
this, consent forms were used, and there was a standard introduction 
regarding what information was being sought, and what it would be used for.  
No pressure was exerted on the participants.  All planners, lecturers, land 
registrars and other private professionals signed consent forms, but some 
developers’ agents, especially on construction sites, declined to sign the 
consent forms, although they were willing to answer the questions.  Also, at 
the outset participants were advised of the intention to record interviews, 
giving them the option of opting out of recorded interviews, or of stopping 
recording at any time during the interview.  Some participants needed 
reassurance about the recording being used for research purposes only, but 
on the whole most participants agreed to be recorded – only two participants 
opted out.    
With regards to data analysis and interpretation, the research acknowledges 
that it would have been possible to jump to premature conclusions.  To avoid 
this, coding was used to build up interpretation through a series of stages so 
as to make the analysis more systematic.  This was to deter accusations of 
‘cherry picking’ (Jackson, 2001).   
There was awareness that no one was going to incriminate themselves by 
answering questions about this sensitive topic; both planners and developers 
could have been wary of answering questions regarding non-compliance, 
since they would in effect be in contravention of laws and regulations, which 
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is a sanction-able offence.  Confidentiality was therefore promised at the 
onset to minimise anxiety, reassuring participants that the research was for 
academic purposes only – that it was not spying on them, but was rather 
aimed at exploring how the system could be improved in future in the interest 
of both planners and developers.  An interview with a foreign developer also 
lent another perspective on the process, but after much reassurance that the 
project was only for academic purposes.   
Due to the sensitive nature of the subject, there was awareness that there 
could have been potential issues of personal safety for both the researcher 
and the research assistant in the course of fieldwork.  For this reason, 
questions were phrased tactfully, such that research questions could be 
answered without aggravating the participants.  For example, it could be 
inferred from an interview whether non-compliance was deliberate or 
accidental, without asking the question directly.  Mock interviews were done 
with friends to get a feel of which questions were effective in gathering 
maximum data, and to explore how questions could be sensitively and 
tactfully worded.  The research was also not interested in sources of funds 
for developments, which was potentially another volatile topic, but rather on 
developers’ experiences of the planning application process. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
Whilst most researchers on non-compliance issues and informality in sub-
Saharan Africa have looked at micro localised areas (for example Kironde, 
1992a; Arimah and Adeagbo, 2000; Rukwaro and Olima, 2003; Anyamba, 
2011), this research was citywide, encompassing predominantly middle-
income areas in Nairobi.   
This research relied mostly on qualitative data from participants, which 
presented a significant methodological problem about how to identify, select 
and recruit participants (planners and developers alike) willing to think/reflect 
on a difficult and sensitive topic, and on their own practice.  Whilst 
researchers (as cited above) have used surveys and/or observations, this 
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research went further and engaged at a deeper level with carefully chosen 
participants for their lived experiences.   
It was especially a challenge to generate a sample of developers, 
considering that the research was investigating non-compliance issues.  As 
Kitchin and Tate (2000) noted, a study with potential consequences or 
implications for the participants is a sensitive one that requires a cautious 
approach.  However, by using a combination of recruitment methods and 
reassurances of maintaining confidentiality, the research developed 
adequate samples to address the research questions.  This chapter has 
discussed how the samples were derived, research methods and the 
different ways in which data was collected, problems faced in data collection, 
how the data was analysed, as well as ethical issues in the research.  
The methodology used helped to add to knowledge and understanding about 
non-compliance with planning regulations, as will be evidenced in the 
empirical chapters, and in so doing helped to get closer to identifying how 
this phenomenon can be addressed in sub-Saharan Africa..  The next 
chapter will focus on the planning system for Nairobi in the context of 
housing need; the evolution of planning policies and the non-effectiveness of 
the system to date.   
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Chapter 4:  Overview of the planning system and its (non)effectiveness 
in Nairobi; a historical perspective 
 ‘Maybe one day Nairobi will be laid out with tarred roads, with avenues of 
flowering trees, flanked by noble buildings; with open spaces and stately 
squares; a cathedral worthy of faith and country; museums and galleries of 
art; theatres and public offices. And it is fair to say that the Government and 
the Municipality have already bravely tackled the problem and that a town-
plan ambitious enough to turn Nairobi into a thing of beauty has been slowly 
worked out, and much has already been done. But until that plan has borne 
fruit, Nairobi must remain what she was then, a slatternly creature, unfit to 
queen it over so lovely a country’ (Dutton, 1929) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Nairobi is the capital city of Kenya.  It is also the largest city in the country.  
The Nairobi City County (formerly Nairobi City Council until 2010 when it 
changed in accordance with the new Constitution of Kenya 2010), is the 
governing authority over the entire city.  In 2008, the Ministry of Nairobi 
Metropolitan Development14 revealed a vision for a wider Nairobi 
Metropolitan Region (NMR), which covers approximately 32,000 square 
kilometres, including Nairobi City County.  The NMR covers 15 local authority 
areas, namely the City County of Nairobi (684 km2); the County Councils of 
Kiambu, Olkejuado, Masaku and Thika; Municipal Councils of Ruiru, Thika, 
Kiambu, Limuru, Mavoko, and Machakos; and Town Councils of Karuri, 
Kikuyu, Kajiado, and Kangundo (Republic of Kenya, 2008a) (see map 3).  
This is in line with Kenya Vision 2030 which aims to make Nairobi ‘a World 
Class African Metropolis’.  To this end the ministry released “Nairobi Metro 
2030: A World Class African Metropolis”, in which it laid out its strategy for 
realising that vision.  This is work in progress. 
                                               
14
 This ministry is no longer in existence. It is now a directorate of Urban Development in the 
Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development under the new Constitution 2010. 
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Map 3: Map of the Nairobi Metropolitan Region as identified by the Kenyan 
government (Ministry of Metropolitan Development, 2008) 
 
This research, however, is only about Nairobi City County and its eight 
divisions, as explained in Chapter 3.  Like Dutton (1929), other urban 
planners of colonial Nairobi predicted that their blue-prints would become 
‘The Plan of the Citizen of Nairobi’ (Slaughter, 2004).  It would appear that 
they were right, despite the different contexts and changing needs of the city.  
Several authors have asserted that the urban problems facing Nairobi today 
are rooted in their historic policies; they have argued that planning problems 
in Nairobi today are enhanced by the fact that planners are using borrowed 
and outdated concepts, rules, regulations and procedures which were 
imposed by the colonial masters (Slaughter, 2004; Otiso, 2005; Oyugi and 
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K’Akumu, 2007; Tibaijuka, 2007).  Indeed, the imprint of British urban 
planning and architecture is scattered across the whole city, five decades 
after independence.  But whilst medieval planning and architecture can be 
valued as a city’s heritage in developed cities like London, there are far 
greater concerns for planners in developing cities in the context of unmet 
housing need.   
This chapter gives an overview of the planning system in Nairobi, covering its 
evolution and its impact (or lack of) in controlling development in the city in 
the context of unmet housing need.  It aims to answer the question ‘Where 
has the existing planning system gone wrong?’  The chapter therefore starts 
in section 4.2 by reviewing (unmet) housing need in Nairobi, and the 
consequences of this with regards to middle income developments.  It is not 
surprising that unmet housing need has attracted private investors to fill the 
gap.  What is surprising is that such investors seem to have been given a 
free reign, with serious repercussions in some cases.   Section 4.3 reviews 
literature on land tenure and land use management, with a view to providing 
a backdrop to non-compliance issues in land development.  The chapter then 
highlights in section 4.4 the institutions that are supposed to guide the 
implementation of the planning framework.  Section 4.5 gives a historical 
overview of the planning framework to date, including the master plans and 
planning legislation, and why these failed in controlling developments.  
Section 4.6 discusses the new master plan and new legislation, and the 
hopes being pinned on them.  The chapter will make clear the scale of the 
housing challenge, and the institutional and legislative framework for 
planning.  By doing so, it gives context to the views of planners and 
developers regarding the planning system.    
 
4.2 (Unmet) housing need and non-compliance in middle-income 
developments in Nairobi 
Nairobi has grown rapidly since independence; it is currently the 12th largest 
city in Africa, with the largest population of any East African city.  It has 
experienced one of the highest growth rates of any city in Africa.  Its 
population as of 2009 was 3,138,369 (Kenya Central Bureau of Statistics, 
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2009).  With a growth rate of 4.1% per year, it is estimated that its population 
will reach 5 million by 2025 (see Figure 4 for Nairobi’s population trend).  As 
well as natural population growth15, Nairobi’s population growth is driven by 
rural-urban migration, as immigrants flock in search of better economic 
prospects (NEMA, 2003; Mitullah, 2003).  There is also a build-up of 
migrants from neighbouring countries like Somalia.   
A study by the Department of Resource Surveys and Remote Sensing 
(DRSRS 1994) identified that of the eight major land use classes in Nairobi16, 
residential land use had the second highest percentage of 25.22%, catering 
for a population of about 1.8 million.  Open land constituted the largest land 
use of 28.55%.  It could be considered short-sightedness that residential land 
was not the largest category of land use, and as a result the de facto land 
use could partly be the result of an inadequate allocation of land for housing.  
 
 
Figure 4: Nairobi population trends since 1921 (Author, 2015) 
                                               
15
 Kenya’s rate of natural increase was estimated to be 2.8% per annum in 2014 
(IndexMundi, 2014) 
16
 The other land uses are industrial/commercial/service centres, administration and 
commercial (CBD), infrastructure, recreation, water bodies and riverine areas, urban 
agriculture and open lands.  
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The public and formal sectors have not facilitated production of enough units 
to meet the demand for housing by the population to date.  In 2004, urban 
housing needs in Kenya were estimated at 150,000 per year, whilst only 
30,000 units were being built - a shortfall of 120,000 units (Kusienya, 2004; 
Kenya National Housing Policy, 2004).  Suffice to say that Nairobi, being the 
capital and the regional hub, bears the brunt of that shortfall.  Today, the 
population of the city is much higher; it may not have doubled in size in10 
years as predicted (Un-Habitat, 2007), but from census reports it still 
increased by about 1 million; from about 2.1 million in 1999 to about 3.1 
million in 2009 – and population growth is still much higher than housing 
provision.  The Kenya Vision 2030 development programme had committed 
to increase the current annual urban housing production from 35,000 in 2007 
to over 200,00017  housing units by 2012, but only about 100,000 housing 
units were claimed to have been produced in 2012 (Hon President Mwai 
Kibaki, 2012).  This however, is contradicted by a report published by KPDA, 
which revealed that new construction in 2013 had fallen to 7.5% (15,000 
units)18 of the government target of 200,000 units per year, leaving a shortfall 
of 185,000 units (KPDA, 2013).  KPDA figures are more realistic, but they did 
not offer any explanation for the discrepancies in government figures.  
Deficits in housing supply have caused an expansion of informality in 
housing as well as poor standards of construction, as owners are compelled 
to provide affordable housing for themselves, and developers out to 
maximise profits capitalise on unmet housing demand (Obudho, 1997a; 
Gatabaki-Kamau and Karirah-Gitau (2004); Anyamba, 2011; among others).   
Regulations are flouted by property developers for the rental market, who are 
assured of demand for such dwellings by a large section of the urban 
population (Anyamba, 2011).  Obudho (1997a) found that developers had 
put up high rise developments and extensions against legal guidelines.  
Other scholars have echoed this, observing that numerous developments 
                                               
17
 Reports in relation to these are vague, and the figures may well relate to national urban 
housing provision, not just Nairobi 
18
 Of this 7.5%, 90% were apartments for middle income housing, with developers following 
market demand. 
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have informalities, including discrepancies with regards to ground coverage 
and plot ratios (Onyango and Olima, 2008; Anyamba, 2011).   
Mwangi (1997) attributed non-compliance with building laws and regulations 
to the fact that not all developers sought approval for their developments – in 
two case studies, he revealed that only about 50% of developers had 
submitted plans for approval.  Another argument is that the 
application/approval processes can take an indeterminate length of time due 
to inefficiencies within the planning offices, which discourages some 
developers from following the formal processes for obtaining development 
approvals – this results in unplanned developments, financial losses to the 
economy, and also loss of revenue to the government (Mwangi, 2007).    
There have been allegations in the local press of developers having two sets 
of architectural plans, one which complies with regulations and is approved, 
and the other ‘live’ one that disregards regulations (BUILDesign.co.ke, 13 
January 2013).  Such developments are usually in contravention of 
regulations.  In Nairobi, safety issues have been evidenced by collapsing 
buildings (see Figure 5); the local press is rife with such reports, for example 
a building that collapsed because the developer added 3 floors to the 
approved 5, buildings collapsing due to poor beams and columns, collapse 
due to poor workmanship and due to building on waterlogged sites without 
proper specifications (Daily Nation, 8 December 2012; Standard Media 19 
December 2014, Daily Nation 1 January 2015, among others).  
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Figure 5: Collapsing buildings in Nairobi (the-star.co.ke, 2015) 
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4.3 Land tenure and issues with land use management in Nairobi 
In Kenya, the Registration of Titles Act (Chapter 281) empowered the 
Commissioner of Lands to dispose of all land under his jurisdiction.  Prior to 
2012 (when legal reviews led to the repeal of some laws, as will be revealed 
in Chapter 4.6), the Commissioner of Lands and the president of Kenya 
could allocate land to private individuals, groups, institutions or corporate 
bodies (Republic of Kenya, 1991).  Such allocations were supposed to be 
above board, with public advertisements of available land, and open to all 
people to apply.  However, in reality most people did not have access to 
such land, either because of ignorance about its availability, or because of 
abuse of power in the allocation process.  As a result, the land ended up the 
hands of those in positions of great wealth and/or power, or their cronies 
(Musyoka, 2006).  Olima (1997) asserted that poor urban land management 
had resulted in problems such as double and multiple plot allocations, 
irregular land allocations (land grabbing), re-allocation of plots, sale of plots 
and land speculation, problems which raise the issue of the adequacy of the 
cadastral systems in the country.  He concluded that urban land 
management in Kenya seemed to favour the socially, politically and 
economically powerful, and noted that the government turned a blind eye or 
was slow to act on irregularities and deficiencies in the practices of such 
people.  It is of interest to this research to find out how irregularities in land 
allocation and administration have impacted on urban growth management in 
Nairobi, and why such irregularities have been tolerated.    
After independence in Kenya, the government invited citizens to buy farms 
from Europeans.  This entailed subdivision of most farms, although in some 
cases farms were bought intact by individuals or land buying groups 
(Musyoka, 2006).  Some land buying groups were comprised of 
community/neighbourhood groups, cooperatives, or other affinity groups.  
Such groups enable members to get shares in land (sometimes 
incrementally), which they could not have afforded to buy individually.   
Members are issued with share certificates, which can be converted into 
titles through the formal land registration process.  Whilst some members 
buy into the schemes with a view to developing their land, others are merely 
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speculators (ibid).  The idea of land-buying companies originated with the 
formation of such groups.  However, most land buying companies in the 
present day are commercially oriented.  They informally and irregularly 
subdivide their land and distribute it among members (who are then free to 
trade their shares) or sell excess land in the open property market (Rutten, 
1992; Yahya, 2002; Musyoka, 2006).  Surveying and subdivision of such 
land is supported by quasi-professionals, but has resulted in unplanned 
neighbourhoods (UNCHS, 1991; Musyoka, 2006).  Musyoka (2006) notes 
that land outside municipal boundaries cannot be subdivided officially for 
urban use.  Because boundaries do not keep pace with urban growth and it 
is possible to purchase farms at relatively lose cost, there are extensive 
illegal subdivisions in areas outside the official city boundaries, for example 
in Nairobi (as will be revealed in Chapter 5).  The subdivisions are informal in 
that they do not comply with legislations (or regulations) relating to land 
transfer, registration and subdivision (ibid).  Developments on illegal 
subdivisions are inevitably also considered illegal.      
In Kenya, the local authority is responsible for the provision of infrastructure 
within its boundaries (Musyoka, 2006).  In most cases, the local authorities 
impose a caveat on subdivisions, which requires freeholders to provide 
infrastructure prior to being issued with subdivision approval (ibid).  However, 
due to the costs involved, the reality is that most land is subdivided 
(informally) and sold on before infrastructure is provided (ibid).  It does not 
help matters that there is no follow-up, monitoring and enforcement of such 
requirements.  Given the costs of infrastructure development, it is not 
surprising that there are many developments with poor provision, especially 
when the onus is on investor developers looking to maximise their profits. 
Gatabaki-Kamau and Karirah-Gitau (2004) highlighted the shortage of 
affordable serviced land for residential developments in Nairobi, prompting 
developments which are considered ‘informal’, especially in areas outside 
the formal city boundaries, which were formerly agricultural.  This is echoed 
by K’Akumu and Olima (2007), who report inequitable access to serviced 
urban land.   
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There are arguments that developers were able to put up unauthorised high-
rise blocks and extensions because the process of land allocation was 
fraught with corruption and disregard for regulations and planning standards 
(Obudho 1997a; Mwangi and Nyika 2010).  Indeed, Gatabaki-Kamau and 
Karirah-Gitau (2004) found that in Zimmerman, state agents conceded to 
pressure from developers and politicians with vested interests and lifted a 
demolition order on non-complying developments.  In effect, those who felt 
excluded from the formal housing market influenced government policies on 
land and housing development (ibid).  This served to open doors for more 
non-complying developments in the area, a trend that has been replicated in 
other parts of the city. 
This research set out to find out why the Nairobi county government has 
allowed developments that do not conform to planning regulations.  The 
county has institutions that are mandated to control developments, as will be 
revealed in the following section. 
 
4.4 Institutions involved in planning 
There are several institutions that administer different elements of legislation 
which affect urban development control.  For example, the Ministry of Roads 
is responsible for all road works, the Ministry of Public Health is responsible 
for all public health, including occupational health and safety, and local 
authorities are responsible for approving planning applications in their areas.  
The activities of these institutions are not coordinated under any single 
framework, and as a result there arises duplication of roles and confusion for 
developers.  Nevertheless, there are two main players in the approval of 
developments in Nairobi County, namely the Ministry of Lands, Housing and 
Urban Development, and Nairobi City County. 
4.4.1 The Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development 
The Ministry is responsible for the provision of policy direction and 
coordination of all matters relating to land, housing and urban development.  
Until 2012, the Commissioner of Lands, who fell under the former Ministry of 
Lands and Housing, was responsible for land administration in the country, 
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facilitating the application of the Registration of Titles Act (Chapter 281, 
revised 2010), under which all land registration in the country was done.  
Registration of Titles Act (RTA) was supported by the Registered Land Act 
(RLA) (Chapter 300, revised 2010), which facilitates the formation of 
leaseholds.  In 2012, guided by the new Kenyan Constitution 2010, both the 
RTA and the RLA were repealed under new laws, namely the Land 
Registration Act 2012, the Land Act 2012, and the National Land 
Commission Act 2012 (see Appendix 1).  The Commissioner of Lands was 
replaced by the newly formed National Land Commission, which aimed to 
devolve land administration responsibilities to different counties, with a view 
to addressing malfunctions in land administration in the country.   
The Physical Planning Department of the ministry oversees physical 
planning and implementation in the country.  It is also responsible for the 
preparation and approval of urban master plans and planning strategies, as 
well as provision of technical support and resources in relation to planning, a 
role which previously fell under the Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan 
Development, which was dissolved by the new constitution.  However, it is 
worth noting that, although the Ministry of Lands Housing and Urban 
Development oversees physical planning in the city, the power to enforce 
development control lies with the city county, not the ministry.    
4.4.2 Nairobi City County 
The Nairobi City County, which has 17 sub-counties under its jurisdiction, 
has the mandate to control developments within its boundaries.  The county 
government is responsible for preparation of spatial plans, development and 
enforcement of planning and zoning regulations, and infrastructure 
development in the city.  Planners are charged with the stewardship of 
developing and enforcing planning laws and regulations, and planning 
legislation (outlined in Appendix 1) has given them a guiding framework; the 
problem, therefore, appears to be implementation, enforcement and 
monitoring of the given regulations.   
The County Government Act 2012 directs the county governor to submit 
county plans and policies to the county assembly for approval, and holds the 
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seat holder accountable for the management and use of county resources.  
The county assembly approves county development planning, and the 
budget and expenditure of the county.  The county governor is also entrusted 
with promoting and facilitating public participation in the development of 
policies and plans.  The county executive committee is supposed to monitor 
the process of planning, formulation and adoption of the integrated 
development plan within the county.  The county Minister for Planning, Lands 
and Housing, is entrusted with the supervision of the county’s planning 
department. 
So with these institutions in place, why have systemic problems arisen within 
the planning system?  This will be established in the following section, which 
reviews how the inherited planning concepts and guidelines have evolved 
over the years. 
 
4.5 The Planning framework to date 
4.5.1 The Nairobi master plans 
In Chapter 2 it became clear that the master plans adopted for African cities 
are often out of context, unrealistic, and fail to meet the needs of the 
population (UN-Habitat, 1996; Otiso, 2005; Gandy, 2009; among others).  
This section will review the plans that have influenced developments in 
Nairobi to date, and in what ways they have failed to meet expectations.   
4.5.1.1 The 1927 (master) plan 
The first urban plan for Nairobi, the 1927 Nairobi plan, was commissioned in 
1926 while Kenya was still a British colony (see Map 4).  Before this plan, 
planning in Nairobi was done on an ad hoc basis (Obudho, 1997a).  This 
plan aimed to recommend zoning arrangements, to give guidelines for 
residential, industrial and other public purposes.  The plan has been labelled 
a settler master plan, put in place to segregate the European settlers from 
the natives and the Asians; the Europeans were allocated 90% of the land, 
leaving 10% to be shared by everyone else (Vogel, 2008).  This plan was 
linked to a budget, and the settlers did what they had to do to make orderly 
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and serviced settlements for themselves.  It was not really a master plan, but 
rather an attempt to furnish the settlers with a monumental administrative 
centre.  
 
African Use        Asian Use      European Use       Roads               Railway line 
 
Map 4: The Plan of Nairobi as depicted in the 1927 Master Plan (Source: 
Vogel, 2008) 
 
4.5.1.2 The 1948 master plan 
In 1948 a master plan was put in place to give guidelines for the next 20 
years (White, Silbermann and Anderson, 1948).  The plan was prepared by a 
team of South African and British Planners, based on the principles of 
Howard’s garden city concept.  That master plan is the basis for the current 
statutory planning rules and regulations.  It is responsible for the present 
layout of Nairobi’s industrial area, and some residential areas.  It was 
characterised by provision for boulevards and generous sidewalks, as well 
as landscaped roundabouts, parklands, forest reserves and riparian 
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reserves, the effects of which are still evidenced today in some affluent 
locations like Karen to the west of Nairobi and the Central Business District 
(CBD) (see Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6: A view of Nairobi from the top of the Conference Centre tower 
(Geographical Association, 2006) 
 
The 1948 Nairobi Master Plan has been referred to as a plan for a colonial 
capital (Silberman et al., 1948).  The British colonial authorities used the ‘one 
size fits all’ approach which UN-Habitat (1996) cautioned against, when in 
1948 they commissioned a master plan for the Colonial Capital, from which a 
blueprint for Nairobi was developed.  They used their experience from 
planning in South Africa and concepts of British sociology and racialized 
space (which had been used for racial segregation), in Nairobi; this plan was 
modelled on the British town and country planning (Slaughter, 2004).  The 
ideas espoused in Howard’s Garden City movement seem to have been 
hybridised to facilitate racial segregation. The plan classified Nairobi into 
zones, aiming to make the city more attractive to investors.  The zones 
included the Kenya Centre, Business and Commerce, Light industry and 
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heavy industry, residential (for the settlers), noxious industry (in the Eastland 
area), official housing (state provided housing for indigenous people in the 
Eastland area near the industries), reserve for official housing, railway line 
area and open spaces.  As uncovered previously in the literature review, this 
resulted in marginalisation of the majority of the urban population, and 
propagation of informality in the city’s periphery (Tibaijuka, 2007).  The 
structure plan was financed by the British, and infrastructure like sewers and 
roads were put in place for the colonial capital (see Map 5).   
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Map 5: The Plan of Nairobi as depicted in the 1948 Master Plan. (Source: 
Vogel, 2008) 
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The 1948 master plan only covered an area which extended to the outer ring 
road on the east side (see map 6).   
 
Map 6: Map of Nairobi showing Outer Ring Road. (Source: Ministry of Lands, 
Housing and Urban Development, 2015) 
 
According to Oyugi and K’Akumu (2007), the 1948 master plan became 
irrelevant soon after independence due to changes in political and social 
variables; there was less emphasis on its implementation after the end of 
colonial rule.    
4.5.1.3 The Nairobi Metropolitan Growth Strategy 1973 
After independence, the government developed a second plan in 1973, the 
Nairobi Metropolitan Growth Strategy.  Although not a master plan, the 
strategy was supposed to address physical planning and urban development 
of the city up to the year 2000.  It aimed at maximising land use in the CBD, 
utilising existing infrastructure and public services, harmonising the 
haphazard zoning system, creating a balanced urban environment, and 
creating incentives for development and redevelopment of derelict areas in 
the CBD (Nairobi Urban Study Group, 1973).  It anticipated that the city 
would grow eastwards, and that infrastructure would be developed by the 
public sector; being expanded to the areas in the direction in which the city 
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was predicted to grow.  Indeed, as well as site and service schemes19 like 
Umoja, Kayole and Dandora, and the Komarock project which was fully 
facilitated by the Housing Finance Corporation of Kenya (HFCK), most of the 
developed areas to the east of the outer ring road were outside the 1948 
master plan area.   
The 1973 Growth Strategy was driven by donors – the World Bank and 
United Nations in partnership with Nairobi City Council and the Kenyan 
Government (Anyamba, 2004), who identified areas for improvement, such 
as water supply, sewers and roads.  The development projects were left to 
the city council to manage within a certain funding allocation by the donors, 
but it turned out that allocation of funds was never adequate.  For example, 
with regards to water supply, efforts were made to secure funding for 
infrastructure from the World Bank in schemes such as 1st The Nairobi Water 
Supply Project (1972 -76), the 2nd Water Supply Project (1978-84) and the 
3rd Nairobi Water Project (1989-2010) (ADB/ADF, 1998), but this provision 
was outstripped by unprecedented demand in the fast expanding urban 
areas.  The plan was too ambitious – it made laudable promises but it was 
not any more effective a plan than the master plan before it.  Indeed, by 
1985, expenditure for the growth strategy was expected to be KSh8 million 
(about $91,954) for capital outlay, and KSh22 million (about $252,873) for 
recurrent expenditures, but by then the city was already in debt (Vogel, 
2008).  That was quite a low per capita provision, even for 1985, given that 
the population of Nairobi was already 827,775 in the 1979 census. 
With regards to roads, infrastructure agencies such as KURA (Kenya Urban 
Roads Authority) and KeNHA (Kenya National Highways Authority), formed 
after the Kenya Roads Act 2007, and who were getting government funding 
(from donors, namely the Nordic Development Fund and the World Bank) for 
the expansion and improvement of roads, started improving the road 
networks in 2009.  According to the Kenya Roads Board (2013), the 
government prepared a five-year Road Sector Investment Programme 
                                               
19
 The World Bank had funded these schemes in the mid-1970s after Kenya attained 
independence in 1963 (apart from Umoja Inner Core which was funded by USAID) with the 
intention of delivering affordable housing to low income households. 
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(RSIP) running from 2010 to 2014, comprised of maintenance and 
improvement works.  Other initiatives such as an oil levy were also meant to 
supplement funding efforts for the improvement of roads; the government 
increased the fuel levy by KSh2.00 in 2008, with a view to raising bridging 
funds for the deficit (Kenya Roads Board, 2013).20 However, the budget for 
the backlog of maintenance works (nationally, in 2008) was estimated at 
KSh230 billion, and some works in urban areas (estimated at KSh27 billion) 
had to be deferred due to lack of funds (ibid.).  As a result, the surface was 
barely scratched with regards to the vast residential areas of Nairobi.  In fact, 
it is only in the last few years that major road networks in the city have been 
overhauled, and even now, residential areas are still in dire need of 
transportation networks.   
The Nairobi Metropolitan Strategy 1973 did a comprehensive analysis of the 
city, including laudable recommendations, such as formulation of realistic 
housing programmes and upgrading of infrastructure (Owuor and Mbatia, 
2012).  However, at the time most of the city areas were empty, and the 
strategy’s authors did not foresee that informal infill developments, contrary 
to planning laws and regulations, would occur.  Most of Nairobi was planned 
for low density, single dwelling units, with infrastructure to suit.  Areas like 
Kileleshwa and Kilimani are now changing from low density to high density 
developments, without reciprocal upgrades in road capacities, sewer 
networks and water supply facilities.  This is overstretching infrastructure in 
those areas.  This scenario is duplicated in the Eastlands and along Thika 
Road, but on a larger scale. This is hardly surprising, given that developers 
were left to cater for themselves with regard to basic infrastructure - the 
areas are crying out for intervention in the provision of a better environment 
and infrastructure, as evidenced by overflowing sewers, poor drainage, 
questionable road sizes and water supply issues (see Figure 7 for an 
example of drainage issues).  As noted in Chapter 2, commercial developers 
are out to maximise profit and are not concerned with the consequences, 
                                               
20
 The Road Maintenance Levy Fund Act 1994 (revised 2012) facilitates the imposition of a 
road maintenance levy on petroleum fuels used by motorised road users.  
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especially when they do not live in the areas in which they build (Rakodi, 
1995; UN-Habitat, 2003). 
 
 
Figure 7: Drainage problems in Eastlands (Author, 2014) 
 
So what went wrong with the master plans?  The UN-Habitat Global Report 
on Human Settlements (1996) had warned that traditional planning could not 
cope with land use control in southern countries due to inadequate levels of 
enforcement, and this was proved right in Nairobi.  Opiyo (2009) argued that 
the reasons the previous plans failed is because they were economically and 
bureaucratically driven, not giving much consideration to the needs and 
aspirations of the inhabitants.  The rate of population growth was higher than 
the rate at which serviced land was being availed to developers, and 
speculation by land owners was rife; to the east side were ranches, and the 
owners subdivided the land in anticipation of the predicted growth towards 
the east.  Speculators bought most of the coffee estates and subdivided 
them; the market dictated the expansion of the city towards these areas.  
These areas, which are predominantly for the middle income people, have 
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metamorphosed differently to what was envisaged – development is 
effectively out of control. 
Nairobi is also said to be still under the influence of outdated by-laws which 
are out of context and unrealistic, including those relating to construction 
materials, plot coverage stipulations, room sizes, lighting and ventilation 
provision of utilities, as well of change of use to accommodate household 
needs (Obudho, 1987; Obudho, 1997b; Syagga, 2001).  The following 
section will highlight the planning legislation that has guided the city to date. 
4.5.2 Legislation that guides planning 
There are several pieces of legislation and policy documents that have 
guided the planning system in Nairobi to date.  The Constitution of Kenya 
(revised 2010) provides the backdrop to all this legislation.  However, 
multiplicity of legislation, as well as institutions involved in the planning 
system, leave room for misinterpretation and adaptation (Kimani and 
Musungu, 2010).  Some of these issues were taken into consideration during 
the Constitution’s recent review (enacted in 2010).    
The main laws relevant to planning are covered in Appendix 1, though not 
exhaustively.  These include; 
 The Physical Planning Act 1996 (revised 2009) 
 City Council of Nairobi (CCN) Development Ordinances and Zones 
2004 
 The Building Code 1968 
 Urban Areas and Cities Act 2012 (Chapter 275\0 
 The Sectional Properties Act 1987 
Each of the above is now described briefly in turn. 
4.5.2.1 The Physical Planning Act 1996 (Revised 2009) 
This legislation empowers local authorities to control land use and 
development in their jurisdiction.  It gives local authorities mandates to 
prepare and implement physical development plans, and to formulate and 
implement zoning by-laws for their areas.  The legislation also gives 
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guidelines for the subdivision of land (or existing plots) into smaller areas, as 
well as extension of leases.   Section 29 of the Act gives local authorities the 
mandate to control the use and development of land and buildings under 
their jurisdiction, including tackling issues related to poor infrastructure, 
poverty, environmental degradation and declining urban areas.  This Act only 
came into being in 1996; before that there was no comprehensive reference 
for planners.  Although masterplans and visions for the city’s development 
were being put forward before 1996, they were more visionary than strategic, 
and the Physical Planning Act is more comprehensive in that it provides for 
both physical planning and development control.  There were therefore no 
strategic guidelines to direct urban growth for the city before the Act, and 
planners were for the most part disempowered.  It has been alleged by the 
Architectural Association of Kenya (AAK) that 65% of the buildings in Nairobi 
are sub-standard and unapproved, implying that their developers and the 
planning department do not comply with the Act (AAK, 2011).  Poor 
enforcement under the Physical Planning Act has been attributed to impunity 
and corruption with regards to enforcement officers, as well as limited 
manpower within the council offices; thinly spread site inspectors mean that 
developers easily get away with non-compliance with planning regulations 
(Kimani and Musungu, 2010).  This research will investigate reasons for 
shortcomings in enforcement and give findings in Chapters 6 and 7.  
4.5.2.2 City Council of Nairobi (CCN) Development Ordinances and 
Zones, 2004 
These ordinances expand on the provisions of the Physical Planning Act.  
The county’s planning ordinances divide the city into 20 planning zones, 
giving guidelines for development in different zones and their geographical 
areas.  They cover the ground coverage ratios and plot ratios acceptable in 
each zone, types of developments allowed, minimum plot sizes, and general 
policy issues.  The areas covered by this research have been designated 
residential zoning, with mixed developments; flats, maisonettes and 
bungalows.  The minimum plot size allowed is 0.05 of a hectare, and ground 
coverage in these developments ranges from 35% to 50% (in areas 
classified as high density), with plot ratios mostly 75%.  The ordinances are 
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clear in their stipulations and the guidelines look good on paper, but the 
reality on the ground in these areas is rather different, with regards to ground 
coverage, plot sizes and plot ratios, as will become clear in Chapter 6. 
4.5.2.3 The Building Code 1968  
The building code stipulates the standard specifications of buildings and 
gives guidelines on the quality of building materials, requiring developers to 
submit a planning application to the local authority for scrutiny before 
commencement of construction works.  The building by-laws were adapted 
from the 1932 British Planning Act and the 1932 United Kingdom Town 
Planning Ordinance in 1968 (Akatch, 1998).  Although some amendments 
have been made and incorporated in the by-laws over the years, most of the 
code has retained the original stipulations.  Agevi (1999) noted that the 
planners, who were British at the time, adopted by-laws from the United 
Kingdom, and just substituted ‘Nairobi’ for, for example, Blackburn (in the 
UK), not taking into consideration differences in climate.  For example, the 
by-laws stipulated that roofs should be strong enough to withstand six inches 
of snow, and this was not noted or corrected until the 1970s (Agevi, 1999). 
4.5.2.4 Urban Areas and Cities Act 2012 (Chapter 275)  
This Act was drawn up following the new Constitution 2010. It repealed the 
Local Government Act (Chapter 265).  Among other things, the legislation 
provides stipulations for provision of infrastructural facilities, including roads, 
sewerage, waste disposal system and street lighting.  It requires that urban 
areas have the capability to effectively deliver essential services.  Unlike its 
predecessor, it promotes public participation in the running and management 
of urban areas, advocating that citizens are enabled to express their views 
about the management of their urban areas and can gain access to relevant 
information.  
4.5.2.5 The Sectional Properties Act 1987 
This Act facilitates the division of buildings into units to be owned by different 
proprietors and its enactment appears to have contributed to the 
development chaos in Nairobi.  Whilst most areas were zoned for low rise 
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buildings, developers applied this Act and built high rise developments in the 
city, undermining the zoning regulations.  In areas like Kileleshwa, Kilimani 
and Lavington, apartment blocks have been erected on empty land, 
replacing the original low rise dwellings.  Such land is privately owned by 
individuals or corporates. The government has also itself flouted these laws, 
for example in the publicly initiated project of Nyayo Highrise in Kibera in 
1990, in which the government allocated apartments to different owners – 
this was before reviewing zoning stipulations for the area.  This implies that 
planners are breaking their own laws in allowing such developments; that in 
such instances they find the laws, for example zoning plot ratio requirements, 
unrealistic, and thus choose to ignore them.  Although, as established in 
Chapter 2, housing provision is often regarded as a public sector role, legal 
frameworks relating to land use, building codes and land ownership are all 
interlinked and cognate to each other.  Planners are implicated, in that they 
have a role to play in controlling all developments, which in this case appears 
to have been overlooked. 
Individually, the laws outlined above are clear in their stipulations, but they 
are either being ignored, or they are not being implemented.  In addition, 
there is overlap of jurisdiction between the different statutes, and there is not 
a single comprehensive and integrated framework to guide the building 
industry - the planning laws are fragmented, with different pieces of 
legislation dictating similar obligations, but being governed by different 
institutions or departments.  Berrisford (2011a) pointed out that good 
planning regulations would be relevant and have enough resources for 
enforcement, but clearly this has not been the case in Nairobi.  There has not 
been accountability, consistency or transparency, and going forward the 
situation calls for more imaginative practices.  
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4.6 The planning vision; going forward 
‘…. the challenge is to develop more inclusive and effective forms of 
planning, rather than to give up on it all together’ (Goodfellow, 2013:84) 
4.6.1 Introduction  
Having reviewed the planning framework to date for Nairobi and its 
ineffectiveness to control developments in Chapter 4.4, this section will 
review reforms in the planning framework, and whether there have been any 
lessons learnt from the failures of previous planning guidelines.   
The main objective of the Kenya Vision 2030 programme was to help 
transform Kenya into a “middle-income country providing a high quality life to 
all its citizens by the year 2030”, and as noted in Chapter 2.4.6, the World 
Bank declared it a middle income country in 2014.  With regards to planning, 
the programme asserted that presently the country’s cities and towns are 
poorly planned and acknowledged the need to initiate high quality urban 
planning in order to facilitate ‘…decent and high quality urban livelihoods...’ 
by rapid build-up of urban planning and implementation capacity.  The new 
Constitution of Kenya 2010 has given new powers to county governments 
with regards to planning issues.  Two new pieces of legislation, namely the 
County Government Act 2012 and the Urban Areas and Cities Act 2011, give 
guidelines on how to engage with planning; facilitating political support for 
the planning system, as well as funding which is tied to implementation of 
local plans.  This could potentially right the errors of the past system, which 
did not link plans to funding.    
4.6.2 The new master plan  
In 2007, UNEP prepared a state of the environment report for Nairobi (City of 
Nairobi Environment Outlook).  The report provided a baseline with respect 
to which environmental issues in all development and planning activities 
could be assessed.  The report highlighted how overcrowding in poor 
neighbourhoods was causing environmental health problems.  Following this, 
Kenya Vision 2030, the country’s development programme for the period 
2008 to 2030, included housing and urbanisation in its aims.  On the back of 
this was formed the Nairobi Metropolitan Development Plan in 2008, which 
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gave birth to the Nairobi Metropolitan Region 2030 Plan (NMR 2030) or 
Nairobi Metro 2030.  Its goals included development and enforcement of 
zoning regulations, and preparation of a spatial plan for the metropolitan 
area.  The Nairobi Metro 2030 (incorporating some recommendations in the 
Spatial Planning Concept for the city which was prepared in 2013) evolved 
into the present Nairobi Integrated Urban Development Master Plan 
(NIUPLAN) 2014 - 2030.  NIUPLAN, however, is for Nairobi City County – it 
does not extend to the wider Nairobi Metropolitan Region which includes 
other counties and municipalities (see Map 7).  However, as seen in Chapter 
4.3.1, the Physical Planning Department in the Ministry of Lands, Housing 
and Urban Development has overall responsibility for urban development in 
Kenya, and oversees operations of all counties with regard to development 
plans. 
 
 
Map 7: Area covered by the new master plan:  Source JICA, 2014 
NIUPLAN’s objectives are to ensure spatial order for physical investments, 
enhance the quality of life for inhabitants, guide investments by providing 
location criteria, and embrace the evolving urban policy regime by integrating 
social, economic, environmental and political issues under one unitary 
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framework.  It seeks to integrate all the existing sectoral plans in the city, 
such as the water, solid waste management, energy and electric power 
subsector plans, and align them to Kenya Vision 2030, thereby providing a 
framework for coordinating urban development.  The new master plan is 
ambitious; it aims to address the issue of extensive housing demand in the 
city by proposing, for example, densification and decentralisation of hubs.  
According to the NIUPLAN website, the plan was completed in May 2014, 
and validated in September 2014 (the public were invited to a validation 
event). 
In developing NMR 2030 and NIUPLAN, the government took a consultative 
approach, involving a range of stakeholders in developing the programme.  
The government expressed expectations of transformations in the city’s 
governance systems, with increased transparency and accountability.  
Scoping meetings as well as follow-up meetings were held in different wards 
in Nairobi to get the public’s input towards a Strategic Environmental 
Assessment (SEA) for an integrated plan.  Consulting stakeholders regarding 
the new master plan is in line with recommendations of the World Urban 
Forum 7 (Un-Habitat, 2011) on consultation, and can be seen as a step in 
the right direction.  According to the minutes21 of those meetings, the public 
obliged; they recapped neighbourhood issues in their wards, gave their views 
on proposed sector plans, and presented a wish list for improvement 
programmes in their areas.  With regards to development, pleas for changes 
ranged from eradication of land grabbing, rehabilitation and construction of 
roads, and improvement in sewerage connections, to the beautification of 
neighbourhoods.  Planners and their consultants listened and took notes, but 
also highlighted the need for continued joint-working between them and the 
public.  As to how well they listened and how well the plan will be 
implemented, this will be judged by history depending on the effectiveness of 
the plan on the ground in the years to come.  NIUPLAN was drawn up to 
reflect what was actually happening on the ground, in areas like Eastlands 
and Kasarani, as well as other areas like Kayole and Kamunyu that had not 
                                               
21
 Minutes are available on the Nairobi Master Plan website - 
http://citymasterplan.nairobi.go.ke/ 
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been considered in the previous master plan.  That may be well and good, 
but for the plan to be actualised in giving directions and guidelines, to 
succeed where its predecessor had failed, it needs to be followed by a more 
detailed local physical development plan, incorporating a review of the 
present zoning ordinances.    
In drawing up these local plans, they need to be realistic and conscious of 
the needs of recipients.  Modern plans in sub-Saharan Africa have been 
criticised for being overly fanciful and inappropriate, such as the new master 
plan for Kigali in Rwanda, which was created by an international architectural 
and engineering company; it has glass-box towers and replicas of 
skyscrapers in developed cities like London, which are highly inappropriate 
considering that 80% of Kigali’s residents live in informal settlements 
(Watson, 2013).  Likewise, in Luanda in Angola, the Chinese built tower 
blocks 20km south of the city, which the locals have difficulties accessing 
due to cost and distance (ibid.).  In Kenya, in 2013, the Japanese (Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA)) took a lead in drawing up the new 
Nairobi master plan.   
UN-Habitat (2015b), has urged local authorities to ‘effectively supervise 
professionals and private companies contracted for urban and territorial 
preparation, in order to ensure the alignment of plans with local political 
visions, national policies and international principles…’  (p.11). It is up to the 
local planners to rein in presented ideas if they envisage them to be 
unrealistic for local needs.  The questions they should be asking include: 
what is in it for these foreign partners – whose interests are they 
representing?  Are they marketers selling dreams and fantasies, and is their 
transference of experiences and best practices appropriate or applicable for 
the population of Nairobi?  It would be naïve to ignore political forces at play, 
and economic drivers, both local and international22, but whilst political and 
economic elites are progressing their agendas, planners are ethically bound 
to steer urban transformation, and are ultimately held responsible for it.  This 
                                               
22
 The Japanese and Chinese are said to be ‘taking over’ Nairobi, among other cities, in 
terms of private capital investments as well as government commissioned projects such as 
roads (The Economist, 2011; The World Bank, 2015; IFC, 2015). 
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plan is still very new and only time will tell about its effectiveness.  What will 
the city say about the plan and the planners in years to come? 
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Figure 8: Master Plan Timeline for Nairobi (Author, 2015) 
 
4.6.3 New legislation 
For the most part, the previous by-laws and regulations did not work for the 
urban population.  One outcome has been the revolt by developers, and the 
negative consequences thereof.  For example, the review of the 1968 
building code was initiated in 1996, following complaints by the Kenya 
Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA), when the government commissioned an 
enquiry23 into the collapse of a supermarket building in Nairobi in which 
about 10 people died (the Sunbeam disaster).      
The Kenya Vision 2030 programme prompted the release of new laws aimed 
at regulating the housing industry, namely the National Building Regulations 
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 The Mutiso Commission of enquiry 
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2012 and the National Building Maintenance Policy 201224.  Initially, the 
review was to encompass planning as well as building laws, to draw up 
Planning and Building Regulations under the National Planning and Building 
Authority, but this was later changed to National Building Regulations 
approved in 2012 (and now under the National Building Authority of Kenya) 
after disagreements with planners, who argued that they did not need a new 
law besides the Physical Planning Act (which had been revised in 1996).  
Planning issues and building issues impact on each other, and the idea 
behind the Building (and Planning) Authority was to govern and monitor all 
professionals under the same institutional framework.  The National Building 
Regulations 2012 (under the National Building Authority of Kenya) are meant 
to regulate the building industry in the whole country, and like other counties, 
Nairobi County is bound to adhere to the guidelines.  The Ministry of 
Housing, Lands and Urban Development has overall jurisdiction over these 
laws. 
The new laws, according to the Housing Minister, were intended to establish 
a harmonised institutional framework structure– setting standards for 
registration, certification, maintenance, water, power, safety and health 
(Minister for Housing, 2012).  The Built Environment Bill 201225 and the 
Building Surveyors Bill 2012, were also a product of this review.  To oversee 
the construction industry and coordinate its development, the National 
Construction Authority Act 2011 was also enacted.  The National 
Construction Authority (NCA) is a state corporation established under this 
Act to regulate contractors, provide relevant training to them and ensure 
quality assurance in the industry.  Although its legislation was enacted in 
2011, its operational guidelines are a work in progress, and the National 
Construction Authority Regulations, for example, have only been effective 
from June 2014.  The Building Code is also being revised, to take into 
                                               
 
 
25 The Built Environment Bill was passed by cabinet in 2012, but at the time of writing (July 
2015) it had not been approved by parliament. 
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consideration locally available materials and the latest building technology, 
with a view to reducing construction costs.  
The changes proposed in the new laws could potentially consolidate the 
functions of various institutions under one body, which would enhance 
coordination and implementation of the planning framework.  However, lack 
of consensus about the Building Authority indicates that there is already 
disharmony amongst the professionals involved in the formulation of the new 
laws, which could result in further fragmented laws, undermining the very 
purpose they are supposed to serve.  Berrisford (2011b) advised that new 
planning laws can only be effective when they put their objectives in the 
context of needs - ‘the underlying approaches towards planning and 
understandings of planning law themselves needs to change’ (pp 237).  
Revision of the Building Code could therefore be seen to be a step in the 
right direction, with the NCA demanding accountability from building 
contractors.   
However, a question arises as to whether the good intentions of the new 
laws, like the good intentions of their predecessors, will be realised; could the 
impediments to previous laws encroach on the new laws?  The new laws are 
seen to be a way of regulating the actions of developers, who are seen to be 
way ahead of planning, by streamlining the planning and building industry 
(Kimani and Musungu, 2010), but there are no guarantees that what the Acts 
stipulate will be adhered to, and they could be as ineffective as their 
predecessors unless measures are taken to address detrimental governance 
practices that may hinder their implementation.    
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 Figure 9: Timeline for planning-related legislation (Author, 2015) 
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4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed unmet housing need in Nairobi.  This is an 
ongoing problem due to rapid increase in the urban population, resulting in a 
widening gap between housing provision and demand.  In the face of unmet 
housing need, development control has not been effective, and non-
compliance with building laws and regulations by developers continues 
unchecked.  The chapter also reviewed issues with land tenure and land use 
management, which form bases for informality in land development. 
The chapter identified the two main institutions that are supposed to guide 
the implementation of the planning framework, namely the Ministry of Lands, 
Housing and Urban Development, and the Nairobi City County. 
UNCHS (1999) had noted how fragmentation in local government and 
planning institutions negatively impacts on institutional coordination of 
planning functions; ambiguous demarcation of responsibilities and conflicting 
interests pose constraints on development control.  Indeed, it is bewildering 
that, other than the county planning department, there is another Physical 
Planning Department in the Ministry that controls development in Nairobi.  
Although this department oversees physical planning for the whole country, it 
has officers who are designated as responsible for the Nairobi City County.  
It will become clear, in Chapter 6, that the Nairobi county’s planning 
department lacks full planning powers, and that there is poor joint-working 
with colleagues at the Ministry. 
A plan is just a plan until it is implemented and enforced, but evidently, the 
planning framework in Nairobi has not been actioned to fulfil all its aims and 
functions.  The Nairobi master plan of 1948 and the follow-up Metropolitan 
Growth Strategy of 1973 were not realised within their timeframes and many 
developing areas in the city were therefore unplanned.  Turner, 1945, was of 
the view that a town’s blue-print (master plan) would be realised or 
completed in 20 – 30 years, but clearly this did not apply in Nairobi – this 
research concurs with reports by other scholars (for example Oyugi and 
K’Akumu, 2007). Evidently the last master plans were outgrown by demand 
for urban occupation, which was underestimated at their inception.  It is also 
worth noting that the last master plan expired in the year 2000, thus Nairobi 
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has been operating without a master plan since then.  It might be assumed 
that the most relevant master plan is effective until another one has been 
approved, but this is not reassuring, considering that the last one was not 
realised.  It has not helped matters that the Building Code, which was 
adapted from the British one, has not been reviewed since 1968.  As it is 
now, Nairobi does boast some beauty, but this is only enjoyed by high 
income groups who can afford housing in affluent areas.  It is a beauty that is 
not shared by the majority of the urban population, who, to the contrary, 
cannot afford the luxury of boulevards and generous sidewalks (see Figure 
10).    
 
 
Figure 10: What sidewalks?  A streetscape in Eastlands, Nairobi (Author, 
2014) 
 
A question arises why (after at least two major post-colonial development 
planning exercises) outdated policies are still being used.  For example, the 
Building Code is presently under a comprehensive review for the first time 
since its inception, affirming what Berrisford (2011a) and Watson (2011) 
noted; that some planning-related laws have not been revised over the last 
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50 years.  In the Kenya case it has been more than 50 years without a 
review of the Building Code.  Other legislation in support of planning efforts 
was developed much later, and there are reforms in progress.  In particular, 
the Kenya Vision 2030 programme prompted the formulation of new laws 
(some of which are still in draft stage) aimed at regulating the housing 
industry and enhancing the performance of the planning system.  Also, a 
new master plan was developed and became live in 2014.  There has been a 
flurry of activity in recent years with regards to the master plan, as well as 
legislative reviews, as evidenced in the timelines (see Figures 8 and 9), in an 
effort to enhance the effectiveness of the planning framework.     
The following chapter will evaluate how the planning framework in Nairobi 
has been applied, answering the question ‘Do planners have structures to 
implement planning laws and regulations and monitor adherence to them?’.  
This will then be following by empirical chapters aimed at answering the 
questions; ‘What challenges do planners and developers face in the 
application of planning laws and regulations?’, and ‘What are the 
characteristics of the relationships between planners and developers, and 
why do they foster non-compliance?’.  The chapters provide a review of the 
planning framework and issues with its implementation in practice.   
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 Chapter 5: Application of the planning framework in Nairobi 
‘…. each local authority shall have the power — to prohibit or control the use 
and development of land and buildings in the interests of proper and orderly 
development of its area…’ (Physical Planning Act Chapter 286 (Revised 
edition 2010); Part V)  
 
5.1 Introduction 
Having looked at the planning framework in Chapter 4, this chapter will give 
an outline of the processes and operational procedures involved in planning, 
and how they are supposed to work in Nairobi.  It expands on how the 
planning authority implements and enforces planning laws and regulations, 
identifying the staffing resources available as well as the processes involved.  
It provides answers to the question ‘Do planners have structures to 
implement planning laws and regulations and monitor adherence to them?’  It 
does so in order to provide information on the context in which the planners 
and developers face challenges in implementing laws and regulations.  It will 
lay the backdrop of the rest of the research, in that for there to be non-
compliance, there has to be a system that is being ignored or bypassed.  
Section 5.2 covers the implementation and enforcement processes, including 
the structure of the Planning Department in Nairobi, and staff and staffing 
structures in it.  It also describes the process of building approval as well as 
the relevant fees.  The section is descriptive to start with, but it goes on to 
use empirical material from the study.  Section 5.3 is about land 
administration in Nairobi. It covers the process of registration, and reveals 
how land buying companies contribute to registration problems.  Section 5.4 
discusses the new regularisation of development process. 
Material for this chapter was derived from county documents, government 
websites, and interviews with participants, particularly planners and planning 
consultants.   All participants have been given codes to preserve anonymity 
(see table 6 for codes);   
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Table 6: Participant codes (Author, 2014) 
Participants 
 
Code 
Senior Planners 
 
SP 
Operational Planners 
 
OP 
Planning Consultants/Advisors/Other government agents 
 
PA 
Developers 
 
DV 
Developers’ Agents 
 
DVA 
 
5.2 Implementation and enforcement 
5.2.1 Introduction 
With the existing legislation in place, one would not expect to see 
neighbourhoods in high density development areas characterised by poor 
drainage, poor sanitation, poor access and general environmental 
degradation.  But all too often, such would be familiar sights.  There is a 
perception that the reason local authorities fail in their supervisory role is 
mainly due to limited resources; in 2009, a statement by the Director of 
Planning at the City Council of Nairobi (as reported in the local press) 
claimed that there were only 20 building inspectors for the whole of Nairobi 
(Daily Nation, 24 July 2009).  It is alleged that this low provision of human 
resources, coupled with ineptitude and inefficiency by the planning 
professionals, contributes to easy entry into the construction industry by 
unqualified people, for example, to developers using contractors who cannot 
interpret or understand building plans (the Star newspaper, 20 June 2012).   
An architect quoted in the newspaper claimed that investigations into 
collapsing buildings in Kenya revealed that none of those buildings had 
registered architects or engineers (ibid.).  From local press reports in Nairobi 
(Business Daily Africa 17 December 2014; Standard media, 19 December 
2014; Daily Nation, 21 December 2014; Daily Nation 5 January 2015, among 
others), it appears that it takes collapsed buildings to galvanise public 
planning officials into action, with promises of conducting quality checks on 
buildings and threats of demolition; a classic case of too little, too late.  This 
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suggests negligence with regards to inspections by planning officials, during 
and after the construction.  Before the perceptions of planners and 
developers can be put forward, it is important to look at the systems for 
implementation and enforcement in Nairobi.  The following section lays out 
the different sections in the planning department in Nairobi, and their roles. 
5.2.2 Sections of the County Planning Department 
The county planning department has eight sections; Central Administration, 
Urban Design Development, Land Survey, Forward Planning, Development 
Control, Research, Policy Implementation, and Enforcement.  The first three 
sections are not directly involved in planning application approval – they are 
either in the background i.e. administration, or fulfilling different functions 
alongside the planning approval sections.  The functions of the remaining 
five sections are detailed here26.  
i) Research and Development: This section is responsible for looking 
into emerging urban needs, challenges and trends in the city, and 
making recommendations for forward planning and enforcement.    
ii) Forward Planning: This section looks ahead and develops policies to 
guide development in the county.  Its main role is policy review and 
formulation.  It also advises the other sections of the department on 
policy issues, using policy instruments such as the development 
ordinances, and other planning legislation. 
iii) Policy Implementation: This section implements what forward 
planning has recommended.  It is in charge of development 
application evaluations, and recommendations for approval in regards 
to change of use, extension of leases, land subdivisions and 
amalgamations.  As noted in section 4.5.1.3, most of Nairobi was 
zoned for single dwellings, so to develop apartment blocks owners 
have to apply to this section, through a physical planner, for change of 
use from a single dwelling to multiple dwellings.  Lease extensions are 
also done using a private physical planner.  The private and county 
physical planners are guided by the provisions of the Physical 
                                               
26
 Information for this section was derived from interviews with participants, and from 
departmental publications. 
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Planning Act 1996 (revised 2009) in their assessments.  The section 
vets applications with regards to policy issues before endorsing them 
for development approval.  
iv) Development Control: This section is the first point of call for all 
building plan approvals (building or construction permits); once 
approval for change of use (facilitated by the policy implementation 
team) has been granted, it processes and approves all applications for 
development.  It receives architectural drawings which are submitted 
by architects, to ensure that they comply with planning and by-law 
requirements.  The architects in this section are guided by the Building 
Code 1968 and the zoning regulations in their assessment of 
development applications. The process also involves consulting other 
relevant department sections, such as the Nairobi Water Company, 
and Public Health Department, who evaluate the applications to 
assess whether the developments are in compliance with the Public 
Health Act and other relevant public health requirements.  Other 
departments that are consulted include the city engineers, for example 
the engineer in charge of roads to ensure that new developments are 
well connected, and the engineer in charge of structural implications.  
For commercial developments, the chief fire officer is also consulted 
to ensure that all the designs have taken into account fire safety 
issues and measures.  A structural engineer is also required to submit 
structural drawings of the development, which have to be approved 
before a building permit is granted. 
v) Enforcement:  This section monitors developments and enforces 
planning requirements.  It is supposed to do inspections, penalise 
illegal practices, as well as issue occupation certificates.  This entails 
checking whether approved developments are implemented 
appropriately on the ground.  It also entails checking or monitoring 
construction works which are taking part on the ground without 
approval so that action can be taken within the law, specifically the 
Physical Planning Act.  The 20 building inspectors mentioned in 
Chapter 5.2.1 are affiliated to this section, which is dependent on the 
enforcement arm of the county council, comprised of county askaris 
152 
 
(policemen) who are responsible for the provision of security and 
enforcement in the City.  The duties of the askaris range from removal 
of illegal structures, and environmental enforcement, to acting as 
traffic wardens.    
The planning department has clear guidelines regarding how to make an 
application for a development; who needs to make an application, to which 
section applications and/or enquiries should be directed, the documents 
needed, and the fees required.  Common requirements in all forms of 
development applications, be they new buildings, alterations, subdivisions or 
change of use, include an outline of the proposed development, a survey 
plan, ownership documents, and proof of rates payments to the county. 
Conditions for approval are listed in the report form that is used by the 
different sections of the Planning Department, which gives room for 
comments and/or objections to an application (see Appendix 2). 
5.2.3 Staff and Staffing Structure in the Planning Department  
The planning profession in Kenya came rather late in the day, and this could 
be seen to add to its other shortcomings.  It would appear that, before the 
Physical Planning Act came into being in 1996, it was not very clear who was 
undertaking the functions of planning, and various professionals, for example 
surveyors and engineers, were fulfilling the role.  This was indeed the case in 
other local authorities and municipalities in Kenya, which did not have an 
established planning department like Nairobi, until 2007 when they started 
employing planners (interview PA16). 
Allegedly, the Nairobi County Planning Department has got a myriad of staff 
who are not serving their purpose, and continuously drain the county’s 
resources in payroll (interviews OP3, SP6, SP7, SP5).  It was the opinion of 
one respondent that the number of unqualified staff far outweighs qualified 
staff27 (interview OP3); the departmental sections are bottom heavy with 
unqualified staff whose roles and responsibilities are vague, if not undefined.  
At the time of this research, out of 110 staff in the 5 planning sections 
                                               
27
 Qualifications in terms of relevant degrees, diplomas or certificates 
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(Research and Development, Forward Planning, Policy Implementation, 
Development Control and Enforcement), only 36 staff members were 
qualified planners - the rest were clerical staff, messengers or landscape 
assistants (interview OP3).  The problems have spanned the years, plaguing 
past and present planning offices.  According to a retired planner who was in 
employment during the Site and Service Schemes projects, more often than 
not he was supervising vast areas like Kayole, Dandora and Umoja, alone 
(interview OPX4).  It is not unusual in any organisation to have a relatively 
low proportion of experts in comparison to total staff, but the structure and 
nature of the tasks assigned could determine the efficiency of the 
organisation, in this case the planning office. 
Ambiguity in roles and responsibilities of staffing section will be explored 
further in Chapter 6.  Figure 11 shows the staffing structure in the Planning 
Department in the different sections, whilst Table 7 gives the breakdown of 
staff in the different sections of the department; 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Staffing structure, Planning Department (Author: Interview with 
Chief Administration Officer, October 2013) 
County Minister for 
Lands, Planning and 
Housing 
City Planning 
Director 
Deputy Director City 
Planning 
Assistant Director 
Research and 
Development 
17 Staff 
Assistant Director 
Forward Planning 
 27 Staff 
Assistant Director 
Policy 
Implementation 
 17 Staff 
Assistant Director 
Development 
Control 
34 Staff 
Assistant Director 
Enforcement 
27 Staff 
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Table 7:  Sectional breakdown of staff (Author: Interview with Chief 
Administration Officer, October 2013) 
 
Planning 
Section 
Total 
No. 
of 
staff 
No. of 
Qualified 
Staff 
Breakdown of 
qualified staff 
No. of 
Unqualified 
Staff 
Research and 
Development 
17 4  
 
 2 Planners 
 1 Surveyor 
 1 Development 
Control Officer 
13 – clerical 
officers, 
landscape 
assistants, 
secretaries, 
etc. 
Forward 
Planning 
15 5  5 Planners 10 – 
landscape 
assistants, 
clerical 
officers, 
messengers 
Policy 
Implementation 
17 5  2 Planners 
 2 Development 
Control Officers 
 1 Procurement 
Officer 
12 – clerical 
officers, 
secretaries, 
etc. 
Development 
Control 
34 18  4 Planners 
 12 DCO128 
 2 DCO2 
 
16 – clerical 
officers, 
secretaries, 
etc. 
Enforcement 27 4  Enforcement 
Officers scale 
10 
23 – city 
askaris 
(policemen) 
 
According to planners, most of the unqualified staff were employed in the 
1980s, at a time when political influence and interference promoted nepotism 
in most government agencies (interviews SP2, OP3, SP7).  In the same era, 
ward offices were created in the different county wards, again driven by 
political agendas and vested interests.  When the main county offices 
became saturated with staff (secretaries, typists, messengers and other non-
technical staff), those in leadership created the ward offices, so that they 
                                               
28
 DC01 and DC02 – Development Control Officer Level 1 and Level 2. 
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could bring more people into employment.    
It would appear that employment of staff was supply driven, not demand 
driven, and the local authority struggled to pay them (OP3, SP2).  As a 
result, an embargo on employment was put in place by the Ministry of Local 
Government in 1981 (World Bank,1992), which unfortunately meant that 
qualified staff could not be hired and the different planning sections had to 
make do with whatever staff they had at their disposal at the time.  Also, 
there was no undergraduate degree course in urban planning in local 
universities until 2003, when an undergraduate course in Urban and 
Regional Planning was introduced at the University of Nairobi – although the 
university had offered a two year master’s degree in Urban Planning since 
197429, the initial qualifications of those enrolling on this course were in other 
disciplines (interview DV9).  Although this is not a rare occurrence in 
planning globally, it would appear that not enough qualified planners were 
being generated by the education and training system in Kenya. 
For example, a retired county planner felt that the council does not have 
enough mid-level officers: 
The officers I was working with in the 70, 80s, the council has not 
employed more skilled technical staff.  You know they need inspectors 
from mid-level colleges, polytechnics - who have diplomas or higher 
diplomas from these particular fields, engineers from the University of 
Nairobi, and architects, the planners; I think they don’t even have 20% 
of what they need.  That one I can positively say because I know the 
people I was working with and I know they’ve not employed more.  
There is acute shortage (interview OPX4). 
 
There may well be acute staffing shortage but, as noted in the literature 
review in section 2.2.5 (UNCHS, 1999; Anyamba, 2005), the situation in 
Nairobi is not unique; inadequate qualified manpower to enforce planning 
regulations is a serious problem in most African cities.  This sentiment was 
                                               
29
 The University of Nairobi introduced the Department of Urban and Regional Planning in 
1971, when it started offering a one-year diploma certificate in planning.  The two year 
masters’ programme started in 1974. 
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echoed by planners in the planning department in Nairobi, and the effects of 
this on planning will be discussed further in Chapter 6. 
5.2.4 Process of building Plan approval 
Prior to development works, developers are supposed to get a construction 
or building permit from the relevant Local Authority (see section 5.2.2 under 
development control), which is empowered by all the other relevant 
institutions to process applications; the permit is considered as essential 
physical planning tool for promoting and protecting amenity and the built 
environment in the best interests of the urban population.   
In Nairobi, applications for building permits are submitted to the Nairobi City 
County of (NCC) by developers’ agents, usually architects or physical 
planners.   According to NCC’s Development Control, Monitoring and 
Enforcement Service Charter, each department involved is expected to take 
at most three days to process the relevant section of the application for their 
department, and to grant building permits or advise on areas which need 
revision.  Resubmissions after comments on the architectural drawings have 
been complied with are expected within 14 days. The application is then 
forwarded to the Technical Committee, which normally convenes twice a 
week.  Before 2008, approvals were being issued by NCC, but this 
responsibility was transferred to the Technical Committee with a view to 
easing the backlog. 
After approval of the architectural plans and drawings by the Technical 
Committee, the application then progresses to the NCC, together with 
structural drawings.  Before the final approval is given by NCC, a report is 
required from National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) 
regarding the environmental impact of the development.  According to NCC 
Service Charter (Development Control, Monitoring and Enforcement 
Sections), this should be achieved within a week.  See Figure 12 for the 
approval application process. 
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Figure 12: Approval Application Process (Author; Information from participant 
interviews) 
Planning 
Application 
submission 
•The application is submitted with all the required documents to development control.  Such 
documents include survey plans, proof of ownership and receipts for county rates payments (in 
relation to the development) 
•The submission is done a prescribed form.  The department advises applicants to use qualified 
professionals, such as a Registered Architect for building  plans, or a planner for change of use. 
•An assessment of fee based on plinth area of development  is done  and  an invoice issued.   
Circulation 
•The development plans are circulated to different sections in the department; Roads, Forward 
Planning, Research, Housing  Development, Structural, Valuation, Water  
•The different sections write their comments 
Feedback/commen
ts 
•Feedback and advise to person who submitted 
 
Submission of 
structural Plans  
•Details of architectural drawing are cross-referenced with structural plans 
•Plans are returned with comments to the person who submitted 
Technical 
Committee 
•The proposal is presented at the technical committee, which holds court fortnightly. 
Approval 
•Subject to meeting all requirements the development application is approved. 
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The Service Charter of the Development Control, Monitoring and 
Enforcements Sections promises to advise developers/architects on building 
regulations and planning policies, and carry out quality assurance 
inspections in liaison with relevant county departments – they promise to 
carry out inspections of on-going approved building works, and to monitor 
development activities to check compliance with the building regulations.  
The Service Charter also states that these sections will undertake 
enforcement action against illegal developments and issue occupation 
certificates to buildings that fully comply with development requirements.  
The whole process of approval, from the date of application, should ideally 
take 30 days, according to the Service Charter.  It all looks good on paper, 
but the reality, according to developers (which will be discussed further in 
Chapter 7) is rather different; this research, in corroboration of the literature 
review (Mwangi, 2007; AAK, 2011), found that the approval process could 
take indeterminate period of time.  
5.2.5 Application fees for planning approval 
Prior to October 2013, building permit charges were assigned on a 
graduated scale per every 50 square metres, ranging from KSh1,200 (about 
$14) for 0 to 46 square metres to KSh9,930 (about $114) for 855 to 930 
square metres for domestic class developments.  These fees were not based 
on the value of the development, but on the area covered.  However, from 
October 2013 and in line with the new Financial Act 2013, submission 
charges for New Domestic Class housing developments were revised and 
consolidated to rates ranging from 1.1% to 1.5% of the total value of the 
proposed construction based on the prevailing Joint Building Council rates, 
on a downward sliding scale – smaller developments attracting the higher 
percentage.  For developments with a type plan30, there is a flat rate of 
1.25% of the total cost of individual developments.  For the type of 
developments being covered in this research, submission charges presently 
would be 1.1% to 1.25%.  The approval expires after two years, after which a 
fee is charged for a renewal application of KSh 10,000 (about $115) per 
                                               
30
 A building plan designed for use by many people in a particular residential 
scheme/development 
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dwelling.  The value of the construction is evaluated under the Joint Building 
Council rates, not any valuation given by the developer. 
Some areas within Nairobi County are considered as Special Density Areas, 
and these attract different submission rates.  These areas include former site 
and service schemes to the east of Nairobi (outside the master plan area), 
namely Kayole, Dandora, Mathare North, Huruma and Umoja, and other 
informal settlements in Eastlands.  For these Special Density Areas, 
submission rates range from 0.75% to 1.1%, again on a downward sliding 
scale.  Any approval renewals are charged at KSh750 per square metre. 
Originally the intentions of the differential rates were to promote 
developments in the low income site and service schemes, but differential 
rates seem to have been carried forward in reviews even after site and 
service schemes were overtaken by other commercial developments.    
A senior planner disclosed that in the financial year 2012/2013, the 
department generated KSh1 billion, but expectations for the next financial 
year have gone up KSh4 billion for the sector of urban planning, housing and 
lands; they need the money to implement the new master plan and to build 
capacity in the department:   
….as we go forward we’ll be able to have an increase because our 
sector in the last financial year was able to generate about one billion 
shillings to the county’s coffers.  This time with an expanded mandate 
we’re expected to generate almost four billion shillings, to be earned 
through the sector of urban planning, housing and lands.  So we’re 
hoping that we’ll be able to do better because we’ll need more money 
to build capacity and to implement…. (Interview SP2) 
Unfortunately for developers, the county has to generate this money from 
somewhere.  Chapter 8 will give some insight into the effects of this increase 
in charges to developers and developments. 
The planning framework is supposed to be supported and complemented by 
land administration– planning and urban land administration are intertwined, 
with development control relying heavily on effective land administration.  
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The following section will therefore look at land administration in Nairobi. 
 
5.3 Land administration in Nairobi 
5.3.1 Introduction 
Like Olima (1997), this research found poor land use management has 
contributed to development control challenges - it has been a contributory 
factor to non-compliance with planning laws and regulations.  For one, 
classification of land use in the city is very vague, and this has given room for 
discretionary interpretation, for example with regards to mixed developments 
(residential and commercial units) in residential areas.  It is not unusual, for 
example, to find commercial units on the ground floor of a residential unit, 
despite the land being classified as solely residential.  Although the 
Constitution of Kenya provides a skeletal framework for land administration 
purposes, it has not been reinforced with holistic and detailed policies to 
guide development.  According to planners, lack of clarity in policies has led 
to misinterpretation by developers, thus adding to their (planners’) 
frustrations.  A planner expressed: 
.... what exactly is in that zone, like the size of the apartments… you 
see when you have a clear policy that whoever comes knows, for 
example this is a phone you can’t call it any other name (interview 
SP5). 
Secondly, some areas like Ruai in the far east of Nairobi were not even 
planned and developers there do not have title deeds.  Developers bought 
land mostly from land buying companies, and such parcels of land have not 
gone through the complete land registration process for issuance of title, and 
have completely bypassed the planning approval process.  Although the 
planners can issue notices for non-compliance to such developers, they are 
not able to inspect developments for non-compliance since they do not have 
a blue print to cross-check them against – such a blue-print would have been 
produced during the approval process.  As a senior planner explained:  
… you can only issue a notice to a development which is not 
approved; there’s no time you can inspect it for compliance.  What I’m 
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saying is, what you have not approved you cannot inspect for 
compliance – you can only issue a notice against it (interview SP1). 
In such a case there would the element of illegal change of land use (thus 
making the whole development illegal), and planners are well within their 
rights in giving the developers notice to stop development.  This deficit in the 
land administration process in Nairobi has been a source of frustration for 
both planners and developers.  UNCHS (1999) highlighted poor coordination 
of physical planning and development activities in African cities as one of the 
constraints on development control.  The next section will cover the land 
registration process, and legal loopholes that have an impact on compliance 
by developers.  It will draw on procedural processes as depicted by land 
administrators in Nairobi.   
5.3.2 The Land Registration Process in Nairobi 
The land registration process has been perceived as elongated and 
bureaucratic, and has been a source of frustration for developers.  This 
section will look at what is involved in getting proof of land ownership (see 
Figure 13 for a summarised version). 
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Figure 13: The land registration process (Author: Information from participant 
interviews) 
Preparation for 
Subdivision of 
freehold land 
• The freehold could be owned by a land buying company 
•A private Physical Planner prepares a plan guided by zoning regulations - they prepare a planning brief to justify the subdivision 
• The planners consults all the relevant bodies like National Environment  Management  Authority (NEMA), and gazettes the 
intention to subdivide. 
Submission to the 
Planning 
Department 
• The Physical Planners submits to the county council on a PP2 form.  
Circulation 
• The application is circulated to relevant authorities, e.g. Ministry of  Agriculture, Public Health, Director of Survey, Ministry of 
Lands (Land Registry),  Director of Physical Planning, and Environment. 
• The different departments give their comments and return the documents to the council on a PPA2 form 
• The documents are then returned back to the Physical Planner 
Verification 
• The Land Registry receive the comments and check and clarify ownership - ensure land is not public utility land, and that it was 
legitimately acquired. 
• The Land Registry give provisional approval, subject to council approval 
• If council approves the  land owner (title holder) is given final approval to subdivide by the Land Registry 
Subdivision 
•  A private Registered Surveyor demarcates the land 
• The  plans is forwarded to the Director of Survey to check bearing and approved subdivisions. 
Proof of ownership 
• The owner gets a Registered Index Map showing plots and their numbers 
• The owner gets a subdivision certificate 
Registration 
• The new owner takes the documents to Ministry of Lands (Land Registrar) to get a certificate of title, or a lease 
•A technical committee holds court and to discuss applications for titles  
• If all is legit the certificate of title or lease document is signed  by the Commissioner of Lands  and the Chief Land Registrar. 
• File goes for final audit in accounts department e.g. certificate of stamp duty 
•Owner is invited to settle the account and collect ownership document 
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In an effort to resolve land administration issues, the Constitution of Kenya 
directed the enactment of the Land Commission Act 2012.  This Act is aimed 
at empowering the newly formed National Land Commission (NLC) to, 
among other things, ‘manage public land on behalf of the national and county 
governments’, ‘monitor and have oversight responsibilities over land use 
planning throughout the country’ and ‘monitor the registration of all rights and 
interests in land’, recommending appropriate redress when called for.  The 
NLC took over all the functions which had been held by the former 
commissioner of lands.  However, since its formation, there has been 
squabbling with the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, 
regarding its powers and remit; it appears that there are no clear boundaries 
between the functions of the Land Commission and those of the Ministry.  
Land registrars in the Ministry felt that issuance of titles should remain the 
remit of the Ministry, and that the National Land Commission should be like 
an independent consultant, guiding the Ministry of Lands, Housing and 
Urban Development: 
…the land titles have crown of the government, not the Commission’s 
…The Commission should come up with [an] enabling Act of 
Parliament on how to deal with, for example, illegal acquisitions.  The 
Commission is supposed to be an arbiter between the government 
ministry and the public.  The Commission should be advisory – it can 
come up with the right mechanisms.  If the public complain regarding 
the ministry, then the Commissioner can arbitrate but they can’t 
arbitrate if they are the ones issuing titles (interview PA8). 
However, colleagues in the newly formed Land Commission begged to differ: 
The National Land Commission is responsible for titles, as they [the 
NLC] create leases – it’s part of land administration….  Court 
proceedings are starting tomorrow31 to determine who signs titles.  No 
idea how long it will take.... (Interview PA5)  
                                               
31
 Court proceedings were to start on 23
rd
 July 2014.  
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Not only can the Land Commission not arbitrate between the government 
and the public, but it does not inspire the confidence of the public if its role is 
questionable from the onset; there is need for clear and unambiguous 
boundaries, measurable and reviewable assignments, as well as 
accountability systems, for both the Ministry and the Land Commission32. 
One is left to wonder why it matters so much who signs the titles, since they 
are both government agents.  PA8 thought the power struggle was linked to 
corrupt practices, or envisaged benefits of taking the lead: 
The problem is just somebody thinking, ’there’s this piece of meat, I 
have a feeling Mary will eat more than myself…’ (Interview PA8) 
PA8 was echoed by PA2: 
…. The fear, I think, is just that control – it’s just about power and who 
administers land in Kenya and who plans land in Kenya…. But here 
it’s an issue of ‘if we bring you on board in our decision making, you’re 
going to influence us in this way’, and people probably don’t want that.  
You see when you act in isolation your position goes but when you act 
in a corporate it’s not your position that goes – you probably have to 
do an election, or you vote to agree a position…. (Interview PA8) 
PA8 implied that there are self-serving interests motivating those seeking 
positions of power, and they would prefer to be in total control, making all 
important decisions, without consulting others.  The dispute between the 
ministry and the Land Commission impacted on planning matters in that, 
while the two were squabbling, the issue of title deeds was put on hold – 
nobody was signing titles for well over one year, which meant that aspiring 
developers either had to halt their application for development approval, or 
bypass the approval process.  In the course of this research, a case was filed 
with the court, to decide who among the two is responsible for signing title 
                                               
32
 As of February 2015 the National Land Commission and the Ministry of Lands, Housing 
and Urban Development were waiting to go to the supreme court for a ruling regarding their 
mandates, after all reconciliation efforts had failed. That is more than 2 years after the 
formation of the commission in 2012, during which time the issuance of title deeds has been 
on hold.  Although in late 2014 issuance commenced (by the ministry amidst squabbles with 
the commission), the titles are apparently questionable and have been rejected in some 
instances by some financial institutions (DVA13) 
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deeds – because each was claiming legal mandate in land adjudication 
matters and issuance of title deeds. Such a squabble is the wrangling 
between leaders alluded to by UNCHS (1999), which handicaps efficiency in 
local authorities.  The intentions of the Land Commission Act 2012, and the 
National Land Commission are noble, but as will be seen in Chapter 6, there 
are controversies surrounding their administration, and as a result they have 
not yet taken root towards straightening out land administration issues in 
Nairobi.   
The following section will look at how land buying companies, originally 
formed to aid the transfer of land from Europeans to the natives, contribute to 
land administration problems, and thus to non-compliance issues in 
developments. 
5.3.3 Land buying companies in Nairobi and the registration process 
Most of Nairobi is unplanned, as most of the area covered by Nairobi now 
was outside the original master plan.  Most of this area, especially towards 
the East of Nairobi, had been ranches in the colonial era.  As noted by Yahya 
(2002) and Musyoka (2006), land buying companies acquired such land and 
subdivided it into plots, and these areas are now an integral part of Nairobi.  
While the company’s purchase is legal and it can obtain a title deed, the 
subsequent subdivision is not approved and individual plot owners cannot 
obtain titles. The issue of land buying companies and their contribution to the 
planning chaos has come up a lot during this research and this section will 
look at the registration process when land buying companies are involved.    
One issue that was uncovered by this study is the contribution of a lack of 
title deeds in unplanned areas of the city to non-compliance – a major 
unplugged legal loophole that is known by planners and developers, and that 
continues to deter the intentions of the planning framework.  Without title 
deeds, developers of such land are not able to seek development approval.  
According to planners, it is not until recently (perceived to be between 2006 
and 2008) that the county conceded, potentially allowing share certificates33 
                                               
33
 Share certificates are certificates issued by the freehold title holders of land to certify that 
the holder has bought a share (or a piece) of the freehold as indicated in the certificate. 
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(complemented by sworn affidavits by the holders) to act as proof of 
ownership in the proposed regularisation process (interviews SP2, SP6)34.  
Before then, share certificates did not suffice as proof of ownership for the 
purposes of obtaining title deeds. 
Where land buying companies are involved, the registration process can 
become more elongated.  This is because the land buying company owns 
the freehold title, and members have first to comply with the requirements of 
the land buying company, such as due payments.  Sometimes it is also a 
challenge to trace the holder35, or to reach a named director, especially in 
cases where the directors of the company are deceased – this adds to the 
frustrations of developers who want to get individual title deeds.  The 
registration process can also become quite complicated, in the event that 
subdivisions were not done legally or in a regular manner.  Not all land 
buying companies are above board, and indeed some are established by 
rogue traders who disappear into the night after subdividing and selling the 
land, leaving the new owners with a catalogue of registration problems which 
have to be made sense of before registration; including issues pertaining to 
the provision of infrastructure and social amenities and plot sizes.  
One senior planner explained: 
…if your land is 10 hectares or more you have to surrender 0.1% of 
that land for public utilities – schools, open spaces, etc.…. But you 
find that later that land buying company they end up selling even the 
surrendered land… the scheme changes.... There are some well-
established land buying companies, but there are some brokers – 
some semi-illiterate people who are land buying companies; they don’t 
care, they go buy a chunk of land and subdivide into whichever 
plots.... But those land buying companies are powerful people; they’re 
                                                                                                                                     
Unfortunately, such certificates are implicated in a lot of malpractices, including multiple 
allocations (using fake certificates)  
34
 It is worth noting that the Regularisation of Developments Bill 2014, at the time of writing, 
has still not been passed in parliament – it has therefore not been enacted. 
35
 Failure to register new directors for such a company should be illegal, but after the death 
of the original titleholder, it is not unusual to have cases where the new ownership has not 
been resolved or established. 
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the people who will come here with the politicians, with senators 
sometimes…. (Interview SP7) 
If a land buying company is legitimate, and after a member has paid their 
dues to the company, the member’s name is forwarded to the Commissioner 
of Lands (Land Registry).  The director of survey will have forwarded 
information regarding the land, clarifying plot numbers – they do not indicate 
the names of the owners, but they clarify what the plot number was before 
the survey and the new number after survey.  The Land Registry is then able 
to process the certificate of title or lease.  Challenges posed by land buying 
companies are explored further in Chapter 6.   
Having looked at the planning framework and how it is applied, the following 
section will look at how the planning authority aims to redress malfunctions in 
the planning system – in particular how it aims to formalise non-compliant 
residential developments in the city.  This is of interest to this research 
because the developments being investigated are mostly implicated in non-
compliance issues. 
 
5.4 Regularisation  
5.4.1 Introduction 
Although there is a planning framework in place, this has been limited in its 
functions by various factors, as will become clear in Chapters 6 and 7, and 
this limitation is more visible in the ‘unmapped’ areas of the city.  Evidently, 
many developers have not paid heed to planning laws and regulations, and 
clearly the planning authority has not been able to stop them.  Lack of 
funding, unprecedented urban population growth, the development of 
unplanned areas and a ‘borrowed’ building code have hindered the planning 
framework from achieving orderly development; the resulting developments 
are anything but (see Figure 14); 
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Figure 14: A disorderly neighbourhood in Eastlands (Author, 2014) 
 
Regularisation of developments is a new process in Kenya, aimed at 
rectifying the past failures of development control; the process is about 
‘formalising’ informal developments in retrospect.  Of middle income 
developments, a planner expressed: 
…. I always thought that [the development of apartment blocks] was a 
neglected area.  And it’s one which pretends to be doing formal 
housing and they are not (interview PA3). 
PA3 used the term ‘pretends to be formal housing’ because apartment 
blocks use formal building materials, and engage in formal processes, albeit 
partially in some cases.  When research for this study was being carried out 
in October 2013, the drive for regularisation of developments was in full 
stride, having been kick-started with much bravado; road-shows led by 
senior planners and politicians were being mounted in areas known to have 
expansive illegal developments, and attempts were being made to streamline 
a procedure to guide the process.  However, a policy for the regularisation 
process had not yet been approved, and planners did not have an 
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operational procedure for it.  The draft of the regularisation bill has been a 
work in progress and has not been enacted, so there has been no guiding 
legislation for the process.   
This section will look at the guiding framework for regularisation, the rationale 
for regularisation, and what the process entails. 
5.4.2 The Regularisation of Developments Bill 2014 
There has not been any law with regards to regularisation of unauthorised 
developments, and the new bill to this end is yet to be enacted.  The 
Regularisation Bill was drawn up in recognition (by planners) that they need 
to address the issue of unauthorised developments in the city.  The bill aims 
to facilitate provision of basic infrastructure in unauthorised developments, 
regularisation of unauthorised developments which meet planning 
requirements, and eradication of developments that do not meet planning 
requirements, such as developments on public land (see Figure 15).  
However, the bill also proposes establishing a framework to ‘provide for 
regularisation of unauthorised developments having more than the allowed 
number of floors’, perhaps in recognition that such developments are the 
norm, rather than the exception.  Due to the magnitude of non-compliant 
developments, planners acknowledge that it would not be realistic to 
demolish all of them, and that it would in fact be considered immoral in the 
context of the acute housing shortage.  They have therefore looked for a way 
to go around the problem, by developing a procedure to legalise such 
developments.  A senior planner explained: 
.... we cannot justify using public funds to demolish; sometimes to 
demolish one house is more than several millions of shillings, so we 
have found that the approach is to involve the developers through the 
new political system where one of the pillars of the governor is to 
deliver titles to those people who are in areas hitherto not based on 
prior planning permission before development so that those areas can 
be regularised, those investments can be seen to be supported 
through honest documents, and then some planning intervention is in 
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place to consolidate the type of investments they have made over 
time...(Interview SP2) 
 
Figure 15: Invitation to developers in Kasarani and Embakasi areas for a 
consultation meeting – notice at the county planning offices (Author, 2014) 
 
5.4.3 The regularisation of developments process 
In Nairobi, there are two scenarios that call for regularisation;  
i) When a property owner has a development which has not been 
approved by the county.   
ii) When a property owner has a development which is part approved, for 
example, the development was approved for three floors but the 
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owner illegally added more floors.  This occurs where development 
owners can apply for planning approval, but for reasons which will be 
discussed in Chapter 8, they either bypass the process altogether, or 
partially engage with it.  Then they apply to regularise after completion 
of the development. 
The regularisation process requires; 
 The development’s owners to submit architectural drawings:  For 
projects which had not gone through the planning approval process, 
there might not have been legitimate architectural drawings; 
submission for regularisation involves getting a Registered Architect to 
provide building plans 
 Structural engineer’s tests report:  A structural engineer carries out 
tests to determine whether or not the building is structurally stable.  
For regularisation, unlike the normal planning approval process, 
structural engineer’s drawings are not a requirement – just the 
structural test reports.  
 Photos of the building as it stands:  This applies to both projects which 
are totally unapproved, and partially approved developments. 
 
Approval fees for regularisation are higher than routine planning approval 
fees, and developers are wary of this.  The fee for regularisation is more than 
double the normal approval costs.  Bearing in mind that normal approval fees 
have recently been increased, regularisation ends up being an extremely 
costly process.  As a result, most developers will only go through the process 
if, for example, they need to raise funds from a financial institution (they are 
asked for planning approval documents), or for insurance purposes require a 
certificate of occupation, which can only be given by the planning department 
if the development has been approved.   
Planners could have another agenda in seeking to regularise developments 
in Nairobi; there was acknowledgment that a lot of developers had 
circumvented the approval process, and developed profitable developments 
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in the city without permission, thus without paying due fees to the planning 
authority.   
…. at some point in 2008, what happened [was] we realised we’re 
losing a lot by not netting these people – they’re not in our laid net, yet 
they’re building and benefiting from the hospitalities of this city…. 
provided the subdivision had already been approved by us, it was only 
that you were waiting for the process at lands which sometimes would 
take forever…. if we have evidence that we approved that subdivision, 
we know that it meets the requirements, therefore what we would ask 
somebody is to bring the share certificate, a signed affidavit from a 
lawyer ascertaining that ‘…this land is mine as per this share 
certificate…’…the rest of the process can wait so that first of all we 
can get some money (interview SP6).   
SP6 affirms the views of public officials (alluded to by Healey, (1998)), that 
developers should contribute some of their profits towards general 
development.  Not only would they pay the planning fees, it would also mean 
that their properties could be followed up for payment of ongoing rates.  
Whatever their reasons, whether a genuine need to formalise developments 
in the city (in retrospect) or to generate income from errant developers, 
planners had every hope in this process, thus the development of the bill.  
Although the bill has not been enacted as yet, the process of regularisation 
had already started and was ongoing during this research, thus planners and 
developers could give their perspectives on its effectiveness.  This will be 
explored further in Chapter 6. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided evidence that there are structures in place to 
facilitate development control - the chapter has detailed the staffing structure 
and processes involved in development approvals.  So given that the 
framework is there (as seen in Chapter 4) and the structures are in place, it 
is of interest to understand why there is no coherent or effective guidance for 
developers, especially for the middle income residential developments.  One 
architect commented: 
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The framework is there, but enforcement of that framework is not.  
And when these things went out of the way, it now just became like an 
avalanche of developments.  And when it’s gone to that level, 
stopping it, saying that from this point on people have to comply, it’s a 
difficult task (interview DV4). 
It is indeed a difficult task, as evidenced by the extensive areas of 
uncontrolled developments.  Land administration, a parallel function (to 
planning) of the city county, has also been facing non-compliance issues, for 
example in subdivisions by land buying companies, which have in turn 
impacted on ensuing developments.  As seen in Chapter 2, the Habitat 
Agenda (UN-Habitat, 1996) advocated for appropriate structures for 
enforcement of land laws and regulations, institutional support, 
accountability, transparency, accurate information on land ownership, land 
transactions, as well as land use.  However, it will become clear in Chapter 6 
that land administration in Nairobi is rife with constraints, ranging from 
problems with rampant speculation and inappropriate demarcations to poor 
provision of infrastructure.  Squabbles between the National Land 
Commission and the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development are 
also a handicap, and problems with land buying companies have only 
exacerbated land administration issues. 
Planners are not oblivious to the fact that the planning framework has not 
delivered as it should have, and the Regularisation Bill of 2014 is aimed at 
giving them a reference in their attempts to rectify past failures of the system.  
However, developers have questions about regularisation, as will become 
clear in Chapter 6; is it going to make things right or is it just another form of 
harassment?  Can it work?  Is it mainly about raising revenue for planning?   
With all the empowerment that has been afforded the city county, what is 
holding them back in monitoring and enforcing the application of planning 
guidelines in the city?  Whilst there could be valid and extenuating 
circumstances for the state of neglect of some of the ‘uncontrolled’ middle 
income residential areas (this will be looked at in the following three 
chapters), there are basic environmental requirements that are a 
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constitutional right for citizens of the city – the Kenya Constitution 2010 
states that ‘if a person alleges that a right to a clean and healthy environment 
recognised and protected under Article 42 has been, is being or is likely to 
be, denied, violated, infringed or threatened, the person may apply to a court 
for redress in addition to any other legal remedies that are available in 
respect to the same matter’.  It gives the County governments the mandate 
to make that happen – it enables a court ‘to compel any public officer to take 
measures to prevent or discontinue any act or omission that is harmful to the 
environment’.   
One planner expressed that, although the Constitution has given directions 
for planners, it did not have the right reference because there wasno Urban 
Policy to refer to (the Urban Areas and Cities Act was enacted in 2011, after 
the Constitutional review in 2010).  That may well have been the case before 
2011, but three years later, planners are still struggling to navigate the sea of 
uncontrolled developments.  Whilst the city waits for the effects of the 
intended reforms, it is groaning under the burden of unmet planning needs 
and defiant developers.   
It could be argued that, although unmet housing need is a trigger for non-
compliance with planning laws and regulations, it is not the main determinant 
because even in developed countries today there are cries of housing 
shortage in the cities:  Instead, the problem could be said to be with the 
planning framework itself – the policies, their application, implementation and 
enforcement.  Berrisford (2011a) had the right idea about reforming the 
planning laws to form a better framework in the context of needs – it is a 
good starting point.  However, there are other complex factors hindering its 
application on the ground, especially with regard to provision of resources 
and governance.  This chapter has demonstrated that planners and 
developers have some insight into what is ailing the planning system.  The 
question which remains therefore is to what extent their perceptions impact 
on the application of the planning framework on the ground.  Chapter 6 will 
give planners’ views of how and why the planning system has lost its footing 
so far.  Chapter 7 will look at how governance of the system has influenced 
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the application of planning laws and regulations.  Chapter 8 will give 
perspectives of the problems in practice in developments.   
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Chapter 6: The Planning Challenge in Nairobi – impediments in 
planning practice 
‘…. development has already taken place and overtaken the planning.  We’re 
concentrating more on development control.  Maybe even 70% of city 
planning now is controlling development….’  (Interview SP7) 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter will explore impediments to planning implementation, monitoring 
and enforcement.  The questions it will analyse are; what challenges do 
planners and developers face in the application of planning laws and 
regulations?  What are their perceptions of the limitations and/or gaps in the 
present planning laws and regulations?  Why hasn’t the planning system 
been changed to improve the quantity and /or quality of housing for income 
groups?  Are planners flouting their own laws?   
In Nairobi, the County government is supposed to implement the planning 
framework.    
… development control all over, it’s always under the docket of the 
city council.  You can never put up a structure if the council doesn’t 
allow you…. (Interview PA5) 
But developers in Nairobi have done just that.  This research was guided by 
the fact that the expected role of planning in creating an orderly urban 
environment (among other functions) appears to have been sabotaged by 
developers/developments, thus the resulting chaos in the city of Nairobi.  
Planners may not be authorising these developments, but consent is implied 
when non-complying developments are tolerated.  One planner admitted: 
Most of the time when the economy is doing well the developers are 
going faster than what we planned.  We may not cope with the 
development trends (interview PA11). 
This is contrary to Taylor’s (1998) argument that when the economy is 
booming, like PA11 noted in the case of Nairobi, planners are well placed to 
drive their agendas forward with developers; it would appear that planners in 
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Nairobi have not quite grasped the opportunities being proffered by private 
capital, and are instead focusing on control.   
Unmet demand for housing can be said to be at the heart of the 
phenomenon of non-compliance.  In the literature review it was evident that 
the population explosion in sub-Saharan African cities poses major housing 
challenges (Rakodi, 1992; Tipple, 1994; Rakodi, 1995; Shilderman and 
Lowe, 2002; among others), but it is also presenting investment opportunities 
to opportunist developers.  According to a retired planner, the last rental 
houses built by Nairobi City County were in the late 1970s, at Kariobangi 
South, Huruma and Buruburu (OP4X).  This corroborated Owour and 
Mbatia’s report (2012), which reckoned the last rental houses delivered by 
NCC were in 1978.  Site and Service schemes were also government 
housing projects of the 1970s, after which the county seems to have 
resigned from housing provision, delegating the responsibility, by default, to 
private developers. 
The demand for non-complying developments is both in ‘un-mapped’ areas 
where the planning department are not empowered to approve 
developments, and even in areas where land owners have titles and can 
apply for planning approval - but planners have not been able to monitor or 
enforce compliance.  Poor enforcement has spanned many years, not only in 
private developments, but even in government led housing schemes, such 
as the site and service schemes in Dandora and Kayole to the east of 
Nairobi.   
The tools that are being used to control developments in the city are not able 
to cope with the reality in the housing and land market.  Unless the 
government can deliver housing for this population, or support and facilitate 
provision by the private sector, the planners are fighting a losing battle to 
control these developments.  As a planner so aptly put it: 
… if the demand is there and the institutions are weak, I’ll be prepared 
to bend the law if not to break that law.  Those are issues we need to 
understand (interview SP4). 
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This is reminiscent of Rukwaro and Olima’s (2003) argument that non-
compliance with planning regulations is a manifestation of the weak 
administrative and institutional framework of the county.  The institutions are 
weak indeed, and as will be evidenced in this chapter, the planning system 
has not been up to the task of controlling those developments.  This was 
affirmed by 18 participant planners and four other government agents.  
Issues with the planning system were also highlighted in qualitative 
interviews with 22 developers and/or their agents. 
Section 6.2 gives perceptions about the planning framework, including views 
on laws and regulations, land administration and the new regularisation 
process.  It relates back to Chapters 4 and 5 on the planning framework, but 
presents planners’ and developers’ perspectives regarding the shortcomings 
of the system.  Section 6.3 addresses the key question of how planners and 
developers view the resources for planning.  These perceptions potentially 
affect the pressure put upon the planning system because if it is widely 
understood to be under-resourced, developers may be more likely to risk 
non-compliance.     
 
6.2 Poor planning framework 
‘You cannot control what you’ve not planned...’ (Interview, PA11) 
Nairobi has been operating without a broader master plan since 2000, and 
has thus lacked an integrated development policy for over 13 years to guide 
development in the city.  Also, the previous master plan did not cover most of 
present day Nairobi, and although projections for growth were made, they 
were rather short-sighted in terms of how far or how fast the city would grow.  
Section 6.2.1 highlights the frustrations posed by outdated plans and laws 
and regulations that are perceived as unreasonable (by both planners and 
developers).  The section argues that, if even planners view the laws and 
regulations as unreasonable, it is no wonder that there seems to be a high 
level of tolerance for non-compliance.  Section 6.2.2 reveals deep-seated 
issues with land administration (ranging from irregularities in allocation and 
subdivision to poor infrastructure provision), which also imply a lack of 
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political goodwill.  These issues have disempowered planners and 
exacerbated non-compliance.  Section 6.2.3 argues that efforts to regularise 
developments are not likely to succeed if faced with the same afflictions as 
mainstream planning. 
6.2.1 Outdated laws and regulations 
As seen in chapter 4, most of Nairobi was zoned for single dwellings, but the 
reality on the ground in the present day, as developers strive to keep up with 
demand, tells something different.  Zoning tools have not been reviewed 
sufficiently given the rapid growth of development, and in terms of plot ratio 
and ground coverage, Nairobi has had a low level for maximum permitted 
development compared to developed cities.  Some consultants’ reports 
argue for the maximum utilisation of available land to match that of cities like 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Tokyo and Shanghai, especially in the areas close to 
the CBD (PA4).  This would be realistic, given the demand for built space in 
those areas.  According to developers and their agents, the most common 
form of non-compliance is exceeding ground coverage and plot ratios.  This 
is not surprising because, as Watson (2013) noted, some investors with 
diverse portfolios have been exposed to other cities, can see the potential for 
developments and have the finance to realise such developments, yet are 
limited by zoning guidelines.  There are still areas in Nairobi where the laws 
only allow subdivisions of a minimum of one acre, for example in Karen 
(DVA8).  This is viewed as being unrealistic, considering the rate of 
population growth in the city: 
… we’re still using very old plans – 1973 plan when I think the 
population of Nairobi was 1 million, now we’re almost 5 million 
(interview DV9). 
DV9 was not far wrong; Nairobi’s population in 1979 was about 800,000, 
whilst in the 2009 census it was about 3.1million.  In some areas like 
Kilimani, Parklands, Kileleshwa, Lavington and Upperhill,36 the stipulation to 
develop buildings of a maximum of four storeys has become quite unrealistic 
                                               
36
 Areas to the West of Nairobi near the CBD (zones 3, 4, and 5), which were formally zoned 
for single dwellings. 
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when gauged against the cost of land in those areas37.  According to a 
consultant commissioned by the planning department to consult the public on 
zoning issues, petition letters had been sent by developers to planners and 
consultants, urging them to review zoning regulations for those areas 
(interview PA4).   
For the entire Upperhill, in the 50s, 60s, 70s, up to early 80s, one 
private dwelling house per acre - not even ½ an acre, an acre.  Lower 
Upper Hill is ½ an acre.  They were now writing submissions to the 
director: please can you guys revise these laws because we want to 
build 50 storeys?  That was just a simple letter.  Another one the 
same.  And then a conglomerate buys an acre in the anticipation that 
one day the laws will be reviewed.  Do you know he’s going to sit and 
say, Ok, I think there’s too much pressure, let’s allow for rezoning and 
let these people do their 10, 20 storeys (interview PA4). 
This was corroborated by a senior planner (interview SP6).  According to 
SP6, this pressure from developers started in 2006.  As a result, spot 
zoning38 has, in recent years, been applied to some areas which were 
originally zoned as low density (single dwellings); these areas have now 
been revised to become high density zones.  Areas such as Kileleshwa, 
Kilimani, Westlands - to the west of the city and surrounding the CBD39, and 
Parklands to the north of the city – have now metamorphosed into areas of 
residential apartment blocks for the high end of the middle income group, 
interspersed with developments and occupation by commercial activities.  
Kileleshwa, for example, was originally zoned for ground coverage of 25% 
and a plot ratio of 25%, but these have been revised to 35% and 75% 
respectively, and even more recently to 100% plot ratio (County Ordinances).  
With regard to plot ratios, Umoja Innercore and some areas of Kasarani are 
an exception, with plot ratios of 150% and up to 200% respectively.  But 
                                               
37
 ½ an acre of land in Kilimani, according to local estate agents, is going for about KSh 250 
million ($2.87 million). 
38
 Spot zoning involves identifying certain areas (especially near the CBD) for a review of the 
zoning policy, usually where substantial developers are exerting pressure on planners.  
Developers in such areas engage with the planning approval process, and also have 
protested against unrealistic planning expectations, thus pushing for a review. 
 
39
 The CBD is mostly zoned for commercial and administrative purposes 
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even where a higher plot ratio is permitted, developers seem to expect more, 
thus issues of non-compliance with regards to building heights persist 
despite the revisions in plot ratio requirements.  However, it is the outer 
areas like Kasarani and Eastlands where the majority of the population is 
spurring on developers to cater for their housing needs, where non-
compliance with planning laws and regulations is most rife.   
 
 
 
Figure 16: A development under construction in Embakasi area – still going 
up.  The roofed one at the front would be within planning guidelines for the 
plot ratio (Author, 2014) 
 
The problem with ‘spot zoning’ is that by the time planners react to pressure, 
some impatient developers have already bypassed the zoning regulations 
and developed without guidance, setting a trend for the area which may not 
be appropriate, because of their failure to take other factors like infrastructure 
provision into consideration.  Also, areas like Kayole and Kamunyu, further 
away from the CBD, and especially outside the former master plan area, are 
neglected in such exercises, and yet the areas are being densely developed. 
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Other forms of non-compliance include changing use from solely residential 
to mixed developments (commercial use, mostly on the ground floor, and 
residential use) without applying for planning permission (interview DVA6).  
In areas like Eastlands and along the Thika Road, planners admitted that 
during the approval application process, some developers give examples of 
other developments in their vicinity, alleging discrimination if planners insist 
on observing the stipulations (OP1, OP2).  Moreover, some developers do 
not even bother to apply for approval – they just follow the trend and build.  
In Donholm phase 8 in Eastlands, for example, a planner thought that 70% of 
the developments had been built using the wrong ground coverage 
allowances, having been built without change of use approval from a single 
dwelling to multiple dwellings (interview SP7).   
Planners acknowledged that the Physical Planning Act is not flexible, and 
gives no room for negotiation: 
 
…. we just prescribe and regulate; we don’t guide…. Because the 
planner that the training institutions churn out is almost a policeman - 
he’s being told ‘...you know what, when you go there, the policy 
frameworks should be your bible.  You must adhere to it, you must 
almost swear allegiance to it…’ so that if a person comes and tells you 
‘…. instead of channelling my waste to the main sewer I want to do 
some recycling facility whereby maybe I’ll use the water for gardening 
and all that, but in exchange for that I need some higher density…’ 
That doesn’t happen (interview OP1) 
Planners’ sentiments regarding their education echo the views of Watson 
and Agbola (2013), who highlighted the need to reduce the gap between 
training for planning students and the realities they confront in the cities.  
Their perception of shortcomings in the approach to date concurs with UN-
Habitat (1976) and Andersen et al. (2015), who suggested that the role of the 
state should be relegated to guiding and facilitating rather than controlling.  
Indeed, developers and their agents viewed the laws and regulations as 
more controlling than facilitative: 
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You see, like, the by-laws that the city council uses are the mzungu 
(white man’s) bylaws which were done in 1948.  By then the building 
line was six metres from the road.  If it’s residential, the back from 
your neighbour you have to leave at least 2.4 metres…. So if your plot 
is about, say, 12.5 metres wide or six metres like in Buruburu, and 
then when you try to apply the by-law you’re left with nothing [on 
which to build].  If it’s six metres by 20 metres, and this side you allow 
border to border on one side, and you have 20 metres – the minute 
you remove six metres you’re left with 14 metres.  Then from the back 
you have to leave at least 2.4 metres.  Assume there was a sewer line 
so you have to leave a way leave.  At the end of the day you’re left 
with something like 6 metres by 10 metres.  That’s about 60 square 
metres.  What kind of a house is that? …... (Interview DV5) 
With that perception, it is not surprising that most developers avoid the 
approval process.  A developer, who is also a contractor for other 
developers, disclosed about his development: 
…. It was zoned for a single dwelling unit for two floors, but we 
decided to do five floors, without any planning……. We decided we’re 
not going there [planning offices], because they were not going to 
approve five floors – they’d only have approved two floors. That’s 
what happens.  In fact, if you go to Eastlands, 70% of what you’re 
seeing there are not approved buildings (interview DV9). 
The building code has been faulted for being outdated and unrealistic.  For 
example, it specifies that every dwelling unit must have its own bathroom 
and toilet, but the reality in the low end apartment blocks is rather different: 
several residents or households on one floor share communal sanitary 
facilities (interview SP6).  There is demand for such accommodation, which 
developers are aware of, and are profitably meeting:  
…. But I know the ones that we felt were too stringent in some areas, 
you know like there was a time we could not approve single room 
developments because of the code; every room must have its own 
bathroom, toilet, stuff like that.….  However, the reality on the ground 
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when you go to Mathare North, when you go to those places – 
Pipeline, you find it’s single rooms, people sharing the sanitary 
facilities.  Which meets their needs and economic capacity – I’ve just 
been employed, I just need a room; I’ve just graduated from 
university, I’m searching for a job – I just want that house of maybe 
4,000 shillings [about $46] where maybe my sister who works can pay 
[the rent] for me as I look for a job, or from the little I’m getting…. 
(Interview SP6) 
In addition, with reference to the 1948 building code, both planners and 
developers pointed out that technology has evolved.  For example, whilst 
access to sewerage previously determined the scope of allowable 
development40, this need not be a deterrent in the face of versatile sewerage 
and sanitation systems that can support higher densities on smaller parcels 
of land.  The building code also stipulated external walls 200mm thick, but 
there are strong arguments for considering the performance of new building 
materials that give the same standards of construction.  Granted that such 
technology may not have been tested exhaustively, this option could be 
jointly investigated by planners and developers in order to refine and adapt it 
with a view to easing development pressures.  As Berrisford (2013) points 
out, planners should focus on the minimum standards needed for basic 
health and safety, rather than stressing the appearance of buildings or 
materials used: 
 ... when we keep insisting on the 1960’s bylaws in today’s context 
then you’re likely to have those sort of conflicts, because these 
developers also – quite a number of them are exposed and they know 
what is happening out there [in the rest of the world] (interview PA18). 
18 years after the review of the Building Code 1968 was initiated, it is yet to 
be completed.  Institutional and professional rivalry, which has resulted in a 
lack of consensus with regards to the review, coupled with the effect of 
transitions in offices, has caused the delays.  This ties in with poor joint 
                                               
40
 In the previous regulations the minimum plot size allowed in areas without a sewer was 
0.1 of a hectare. 
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working amongst professionals and government agencies, as will be 
revealed in Chapter 7.  Planners and other professionals involved are locked 
in debate as to which professionals are more grounded than others, and who 
will lead the proposed umbrella authority:  
Because the authority [the National Building Authority - see section 
4.5.3] was going to control the construction industry in terms of 
enforcing the building code, in terms of review of the building code, in 
terms of checking the building inspection, registering buildings 
themselves, in terms of maintenance, in terms of disaster 
management; it’s quite big (interview PA9).   
In the meantime, more buildings have collapsed41 in the city, with numerous 
fatalities and injuries.  Thus the building code is evidently not being followed, 
because if it had been, there would have been no collapsing buildings due to 
usage of low quality materials or non-usage of professionals in construction.   
Evidently, the legislation and regulations are outdated and inappropriate, and 
both planners and developers find them extremely difficult to work with.  The 
standards are unattainable and unenforceable, as alluded to by other 
scholars (Allmendinger, 2001; Rakodi, 2001; Berrisford, 2011b; Mbaku, 
2010).  Clearly, planners are frustrated by the very framework that should be 
guiding them, mainly due to the fact that planning policies do not keep pace 
with the rate of development or the reality of housing needs.  In addition, 
inflexibility in the application of the Physical Planning Act and an 
unreasonable building code have been inhibitive in dealing with the 
expectations of developers.  Planners are perceived as controlling rather 
than guiding, and this does not bode well for adherence to the laws and 
regulations.  Planners demonstrated insight into these limitations and 
expressed empathy with developers.  Whether this influences their tolerance 
for non-compliance is anybody’s guess, but undoubtedly their passiveness is 
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 Between December 2014 and January 2015 alone, 2 storied residential apartment 
buildings collapsed in Nairobi: In Huruma in Eastlands, a 7 storied residential apartment 
block collapsed, leaving at least 4 people dead and numerous others injured, and in 
Makongeni (again to the East of Nairobi), a 5 storied residential building collapsed, killing at 
least 8 people and injuring many others. 
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costly in terms of environmental degradation, as well as health and safety 
aspects in non-complying developments.   
Developers are defying zoning regulations, which is partly a reaction to the 
‘wasteful zoning’ of the colonial blue prints that Nwaka (2005) alluded to.  
Moreover, piecemeal planning has not controlled development in a 
comprehensive way.  It is a classic case of planning playing catch up with 
development, as referred to by Taylor (1998) and Rydin (2011).  The 
‘Globalisation of real estate’ that Healey (1991) alluded to has underlined the 
unrealistic nature of policies and added pressure for zoning reviews.  
However, spot zoning in reaction to pressure from developers has been 
confined to areas close to the CBD, and there are areas further afield which 
are in dire need of intervention.  More recently, UN-Habitat (2015b) 
recommended a review of building regulations and zoning laws to 
accommodate compact cities with high-rise structures to cater for high 
density populations in certain areas, and clearly it would be desirable to heed 
this call in Nairobi.   
Having looked at the problems in practice with the planning framework, the 
following section will look at land administration issues, which have also 
been a deterrent in planning efforts.  Although land administration is not 
governed under the planning framework, it has a significant role in 
determining the effectiveness of the planning system, as will be evidenced 
below. 
6.2.2 Issues with land administration  
This section gives perceptions of the shortcomings in land administration in 
Nairobi that have contributed to non-compliance by developers.  Irregularities 
in land allocation and subdivision impact on developments thereon, making 
them non-compliant by default.  The section therefore expands on such 
irregularities and how they impact on developments.  Infrastructure provision 
is also important in shaping development, and this section reveals 
inadequacies in provision, with detrimental effects on the urban environment.  
It shows that, whilst poor supervision of allocations and subdivisions has 
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played a big part in the poor provision, financial provision for infrastructure 
provision by the state has also been limited.   
6.2.2.1 Land allocation and subdivision irregularities 
According to an ex-planner (interview OP4X), the political era of the 1990s 
facilitated a lot of land grabbing – publicly owned land was allocated to 
individuals in a dubious way.  It is quite common to find private 
developments, such as apartment blocks, on public utility plots which were 
originally meant for schools, churches, play grounds and other communal 
spaces.  In some cases, even riparian reserves have been subdivided and 
sold, to the detriment of other developers.  Freeholders even sell 
roundabouts!  
This phenomena of people being allocated public utility plots, people 
building houses  irrespective of whether they are approved or not, 
disregarding the authorities, these things are later developments of 
the 80s and 90s. I don’t want to be political, but people started doing 
those things in Moi’s42 time - it was the first time people started being 
allocated public utility plots.......Because as long as you were loyal and 
you shouted nyayo!, nyayo!43, you were given an acre in Upperhill44 
for nothing, you just pay rates maybe of 100 thousand and you get a 
title.  Once you get title the land is worth 400 million - you became a 
millionaire overnight.... (Interview OP4X) 
Some of the informal land allocations in the 1980s, either of public land or 
land purchased and informally sub-divided by land buying companies, which 
resulted in informal developments, were supposedly done above board.  A 
senior planner (SP1) corroborated OP4X, revealing that in the Kasarani and 
Zimmerman areas along Thika Road, the government, with a view to 
‘winding up’ land buying companies and getting the land developed, gave a 
blanket approval to allottees of land buying companies to receive titles, and 
cushioning them against strict zoning regulations.  This suggests that past 
                                               
42
Daniel Arap Moi, The second President of Kenya 1978 - 2002 
43
 Nyayo!  - this was a political slogan of the regime 
44
The land around Upperhill was supposed to be government land, for senior government 
housing (interview OP4X) 
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government complicity created a culture which permeates the current day.  
These areas are now populated with apartment blocks for the middle income 
group, with non-compliance issues ranging from ground coverage and plot 
ratios, to poor infrastructure provision and misappropriation of community 
land.    
Attempts were made to reclaim some public land in the last government 
regime, starting with the Ndung’u Commission Report of 2004.  The 
Commission had been established to make enquiries into the illegal 
allocation of public land, such as riparian reserves and other national land 
reserves.  However, those allocated land had been given title deeds, and 
some refused to surrender their land.  Although caveats had been put on the 
titles, the land had been developed.  Some of the illegal allocations were to 
powerful people45, and land officers are wary of looking into such allocations 
in case they are personally victimised as a result.   
..... we don’t want to dig.  If you dig into the genesis, maybe the plots 
that Uhuru46 has, you’re going to capture them [identify allocations to 
influential people] – who is ready to venture into that?  It’s a risky 
game... (Interview PA7) 
Also in pre-election periods, some politicians apparently drummed up votes 
and enticed crowds by illegally allocating land; this not only compounds the 
problem for land registration purposes, but also exacerbates problems 
relating to infrastructure in the area concerned: 
…then the politicians of the day like Mwenje invaded the place and 
actually allocated the land …[they] sold that which didn’t belong to 
them, to people who thought they were getting the land from the right 
people.  In the first place the ownership is in dispute, no planning, no 
infrastructure, no roads, no sewage, no nothing.  Only that they 
employed surveyors to just demarcate… (Interview OP4X). 
                                               
45
 The Ndung’u Commission Report gave a list of wealthy and prominent individuals and 
corporations who had benefited from illegal allocations (Republic of Kenya, 2004a) 
46
 His Excellency the president of Kenya 
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More often than not, by the time misappropriations and irregular subdivisions 
come to light it is too late; development has already taken place without the 
guidance of planning authorities.  So whilst in the planning records 
everything appears to be above board, open spaces zoned for children’s 
playgrounds have been built on, with wall to wall developments, which are 
considered good if there is a paved open space where playing children can 
compete with cars for space (interview SP6).  Furthermore, in subdivisions 
intended for single dwelling units, land and housing pressure in the city has 
egged investors on to put up apartment blocks, which flout even basic 
planning requirements like provision of natural lighting and ventilation.   
 
 
Figure 17: A typical streetscape in Pipeline, Embakasi (Author, 2014) 
 
As seen in Chapter 5, many developers do not have title deeds, especially in 
Eastlands outside the master plan area, and in some areas along Thika 
Road; areas like Dandora, Utawala and Ruai, among others.  In most of 
these cases, land buying companies like Embakassi Ranching, which had 
purchased almost 100,000 acres, and Kiambu Dandora, with about 500 
acres, hold the mother title, whilst current holders of subdivided plots were 
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issued with allotment letters (interviews PA13, SP7, OPX4).  Moreover, most 
of the original schemes have metamorphosed on the ground, with plots 
changing shape, size and use as compared to what was proposed in the 
original subdivision plans.  What is more, some of the land owners are 
subdividing the plots further as demand rises: 
…. The directors [of the land buying companies] are still the owners of 
the mother title and they don’t want to release it because … in 2013 
you can still get some extra plots and sell them…  (Interview SP7) 
Releasing the title would limit the ease in which freeholders can further 
subdivide their land (sometimes irregularly and illegally, as seen in Chapter 
5).  Developers expressed frustration that the illegally subdivided land 
parcels were sometimes too small, but also noted that following the present 
planning guidelines would not make economic sense: 
We were supposed to cover – I think 60%.  But we covered almost 
everything – I think 80%.  Almost wall to wall.  That’s what most 
Kenyans have done.  Because some of these plots are also very 
small. You find the sub-division, some of these plots are even an 
eighth of an acre.  Like the one I had at Jamhuri was 7 metres by 24 
metres – very small, so we would have to cover wall to wall (interview 
DV9). 
Within such subdivisions, the roads provided can hardly accommodate 
motorised traffic (interview SP7).  What aggravates the problem is that 
developers insist on constructing apartment blocks within such plots, wall to 
wall (beacon to beacon) developments, which fail to comply with planning 
regulations and hinder infrastructural provision further.  Nevertheless, it is 
clear that there is a demand for such development, affirming Payne’s (2001) 
and Musyoka’s (2006) assertions that realities on the ground suggest 
purchasers or tenants mostly accept those developments as they are. 
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Figure 18: A typical dry weather road in a heavily built residential area in 
Pipeline, Eastlands (Author, 2014) 
 
Land buying companies have therefore played a part in frustrating planning 
efforts in Nairobi, mostly because their activities with regards to subdivisions 
and allocations were unchecked.    
Land administrators expressed the belief that the mandate for land 
administration, like other matters pertaining to planning, needs to be free of 
political interference as far as possible; political input should rather be limited 
to resourcing the relevant departments, leaving the technical staff to get on 
with their jobs.  One resource that would be valued by staff is computer 
software to facilitate the cataloguing of land parcels, and to record 
comprehensive land information, including the origins of a subdivided plot: 
.... We could start at the centre of Nairobi, and by the time we retire 
maybe we will have finished one town properly, then we go to another 
one.  And there are some that we don’t need to go that far back 
because, like the land buying companies, we can start at the mother 
title... (Interview PA7) 
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However, such systematic coverage is unlikely to happen when those 
commissioned with development control are embroiled in political power 
games; not only do these delay progress, but they also mean that each time 
there is a change in the government and main players, the games start all 
over again – there is no continuity.  To put it in the words of one planning 
consultant: 
....  So you go all the way maybe to producing drafts, and these drafts 
have to be taken back to the public to be scrutinised and brought back 
for finalisation, you find the elections are here, so whoever was spear-
heading that might leave, and whoever comes in wants to start their 
own agenda (interview PA8). 
It therefore stands to reason that some, like participant PA8, advocate the 
delinking of planning from politics, in order to ensure the continuity of 
planning and administrative reform agendas.   
It would appear that ‘urban containment’, as alluded to by Taylor (1998), has 
not been effective in Nairobi, and that agricultural land surrounding the city 
has been converted to urban land without due regard for the law.  Whether 
this is because of the activities of land buying companies, interference by 
influential people, blinkered developers, or an unsupportive land 
administration regime, irregularities in land subdivision are a source of 
frustration for planners.  For example, when they start considering 
regularisation, they are presented with dilemmas, especially with regards to 
the provision of infrastructure.  This is looked at in further detail in the 
following section. 
6.2.2.2 Inadequate provision of infrastructure 
In the history of planning, infrastructure plays a big part in shaping cities and 
general urban growth.  Once basic infrastructure like sewerage, roads and 
water supply are established, development can then easily follow.  Usually, 
and Nairobi is no exception, land which is advertised as ‘serviced’ is far more 
attractive and commands better prices than un-serviced land.   When 
infrastructure provision is not addressed at the onset, or is not a prerequisite 
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for development, the resulting built environment can present many 
challenges for its occupants, as well as those charged with development 
control. This has been the case in most of the middle income residential 
development areas in Nairobi.  Thus developers feel unsupported by the 
planning system, in that whilst the population is crying out for housing, the 
city government has not complemented their efforts to meet this demand, for 
example by providing the necessary infrastructure.  Despite remittances to 
the county for rates and approvals, developers are frustrated by the fact that 
infrastructure provision is very poor:  
Such areas, although they are built up, have no council services such 
as sewerage (interview DVA10). 
Developers and their agents question how new areas are opened up for 
development before the provision of basic infrastructure facilities like sewers 
and access roads; they see the county as being negligent in allowing such 
areas to be developed (interviews DV4, DVA1, DVA2).  Rather than pre-
empting the negative environmental consequences of unplanned and 
unauthorised developments, the county only seems to react after the fact, by 
which time the situation is way out of control.  Indeed, more often than not, 
developers are the ones to cater for infrastructure (if at all): 
… if there is a wholesale violation of the bylaws whereby everybody 
has built apartments instead of single dwellings, normally what the city 
council will do is build a sewer…. Because when they do a controlled 
development they tell you to use a septic tank, but if you build a high 
rise and your neighbour is building a high rise, then you have a 
problem of soak it [the capacity of the soak-away].  Somehow you get 
sewage flowing on the roads.  So the council don’t have a choice but 
have to react.  Like in Zimmerman47, that’s what happened (interview 
DVA1). 
                                               
47
 Zimmerman, an area along Thika Road, is developed with unauthorised apartment blocks 
for the middle income group  
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Drainage problems, which DVA1 refers to as ‘soak it’, are a common 
problem in uncontrolled development areas; the ground is not able to 
accommodate (or soak up) all the waste from dense developments.   
Even in the high end of middle income development areas, existing 
infrastructure has been unable to cope with increasing demand.  Kileleshwa, 
Lavington, Kilimani, Loresho and other areas close to the CBD did not have 
sewers because they were intended for low density developments, and the 
council had not built a trans-sewer (interviews OP2, OP5X, OP4X).  Zoning 
requirements have been reviewed in the last few years and the areas 
rezoned from single dwellings to multiple dwellings, but the subsequent 
developments have occurred without a matching review of infrastructure 
requirements.  As a result, even rain water/storm drainage, let alone 
sewerage, causes flooding because the systems are not adequate (see 
Figure 19).    
 
Figure 19: Somewhere in Kileleshwa during the rains in May 2015 (Standard 
Media, 17 May 2015) 
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Consultants commissioned by the city county to prepare a zoning review in 
2006 (interviews PA2, PA4, SP6) found that in such areas, most of the 
physical infrastructure had been laid down according to the 1948 master plan 
and its capacity has not been significantly upgraded since.  And as 
discussed in Chapter 4, the 1973 Metropolitan Growth Strategy was no 
closer to addressing the problem, again due to shortage of funds.    
According to developers, problems with infrastructure provision by land 
owners started in the 1980s, when land owners were allocated land and 
allowed to develop without first satisfying the requirement for them to install 
infrastructure. A senior planner (SP1) confirmed this, with regard to the 
blanket development approval given in the 1980s to those allocated land 
along Thika Road: 
..... the people who were heading the land buying companies were 
originally politicians, who had political interests in Nairobi.  So the 
blanket approval released the land and sort of insulated them from 
being influenced substantially by planning, because they were allowed 
to develop without infrastructure – they could develop flats without 
infrastructure.  So they became part of what we call the special 
scheduled areas of development through that political intervention... 
(Interview SP1) 
What the land commissioner had not foreseen was that some land owners 
would sell the subdivided plots without first providing infrastructure – 
because officials were neither looking, nor questioning.  Furthermore, 
landowners were allowed to sell part of their land un-serviced to raise funds 
towards the cost of infrastructure provision (interview DVA2).  
Regulations require that land owners provide basic infrastructure before they 
can sell subdivided land, so the county could have held land owners to 
account during the subdivision stage: 
…the requirements normally are that you should do the basic 
infrastructure – the roads must be up to a certain class, depending on 
196 
 
the area you might be told that you have to tarmac, or put murram48, 
you have to do storm drains, if there’s a sewer connection you need to 
do your sewer extensions, you have to bring in your power and water 
supply – all these requirements are there (interview DVA2) 
Evidently, provision of services to that land was not enforced; the areas 
developed environmental problems because sewers were not planned, nor 
roads or water facilities provided.  Efforts to enforce provision of services 
during the subdivision process did not work because some owners could 
access titles without putting in services – with their titles, plot owners could 
legitimately apply for development approvals and seek financial backing if 
necessary.  Due to the fragmented nature of the system, planners would take 
it that provision of services had been catered for in the subdivision process 
(as it usually is), but in this case it was not. 
Subdivisions of former agricultural land/ranches were done by private 
surveyors, not guided by the council.  Owners, mostly land buying 
companies, were out to maximise profit, and the tracts of land were 
subdivided illegally without due regard to planning guidance or building 
sustainable communities; no infrastructure provision, no spaces for shopping 
centres, schools, churches, play areas for children, open spaces, or other 
facilities for community use.  For every 10 hectares, such an owner is 
supposed to surrender 0.1 hectares for public utilities (interviews SP7, PA7, 
PA6), but this has not been adhered to in many cases. 
…they’re not approved.  They’re subdivided but without sewer, the 
minimum you can go to is ½ acre but we allow maybe ¼.  But they’ve 
gone to plots of 40 by 60, with no access roads.  The people who are 
subdividing there are kangaroo surveyors.  The access roads there 
should not be less than nine meters, feeder roads should not have 
been less than 15 metres.  If you have six, it’s the pathway that’s 
supposed to be the service link where when the sewer comes, that’s 
                                               
48
 Compacted laterite soil commonly used to surface minor roads in Kenya and Africa in 
general 
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where you’re going to put the sewer, the power, everything [that is 
missing].... (Interview SP7) 
SP7 painted a very dire picture of these areas, but unfortunately it is the 
reality on the ground.  In such cases the registration process was bypassed, 
and buyers were issued with share certificates in lieu of titles, thus the 
planning authority missed the opportunity to enforce provision of 
infrastructure.  Even where such companies had submitted proposals for 
approval to the council, and had been given provisional approval subject to 
the conditions for approval being met, they still bypassed these conditions by 
subdividing and selling before final approval was given (interview PA12).  It 
also did not help that such areas were, at the time, not under the city council, 
but under the councils of the counties surrounding Nairobi.  In areas like Ruai 
to the east and Githurai to the north, county council land boards did not 
necessarily share the same urban values, or views on urban standards, in 
assessing suitability of subdivisions, as in the city.  It is obviously frustrating 
for planners when developers and their agents do not want to acknowledge 
the problems their over-development creates: 
I remember even arguing with a professor who is a structural 
engineer: he said this [limited number of floors] will not make 
economic sense.  I asked on what basis?  Let us use a scientific basis 
– all this you want to pump into Eastleigh.  Six floors, where are the 
services to support all these developments? (Interview SP2) 
In the Site and Service Schemes areas, the World Bank had provided a 
small loan of KSh 36,000 for basic development, but most of those allocated 
plots took the loan with no intention of developing their plots – instead they 
sold the plot to another developer.  These plots now have storied apartment 
blocks.  Developers in surrounding areas like Kangundo, Umoja 3, Saika, 
etc, followed these trends, and as demand grew, the buildings became 
higher (interviews OPX4, OP5X).  These developments overwork the original 
designed and installed infrastructural services – roads, sewer networks, 
water supply – because the designs catered for a smaller population than is 
198 
 
accommodated by subsequent development.  A retired planner described the 
situation as follows: 
…. you could not get water pressure to the upper flats, and when they 
were developing, that was an oversight; most of it is black cotton49 
sites, so whatever they excavated most of it they dumped carelessly 
on the infrastructure – on the roads.… The people who were 
supposed to be in Umoja – maybe now it’s about 600% of the people 
who were supposed to stay there.  In what was supposed to be a 
single storey [house] for a single family of five people, now there are 
about 100 people leaving there in those multi storey buildings.  How 
do you maintain that?  …. You find sewage blockages, you find 
surface water overflowing everywhere when it rains because those 
systems cannot work… (Interview OPX4) 
In these areas, the government had provided Y junctions50 for sewerage, so 
that plot owners could connect individual plots (interview OP4X).  Each 
connection was supposed to be authorised and facilitated by the council.  
When illegal development started, developers did not approach the council 
for a connection; instead they got independent plumbers to connect to the 
sewer at the Y junctions (interview OP4X).  
Ordinarily, in zones where there are no sewer lines, like in Kasarani along 
Thika Road, planning regulations allow a maximum of two floors, whilst in 
areas with trans-sewer connections developers can officially build up to four 
floors.  However, the laws are not interpreted or applied consistently, which 
confuses developers: 
… like in Kasarani because they don’t have a sewer they are allowed 
four floors, yet there is no sewer – but it’s a controversial area 
because without a sewer they shouldn’t go to four floors, and years 
later we wonder whether it was done with someone in mind.  Then, 
                                               
49
 Black cotton soil is not a good base for a foundation as it has great affinity to water; it 
swells when wet and shrinks when dry. The soil is therefore removed before a foundation is 
laid. 
50
 The main sewer line running along the road would have Y shaped connection points which 
would enable the different plot owners to connect their units. 
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there are areas with a sewer and you’re only allowed to do one floor 
or two floors.  Like in most of Eastlands there are a lot of illegal 
developments because there is a sewer and they are only allowed 
one floor or two floors, so developers are defiant – you find your 
neighbours have done five floors and the law is telling you can only do 
two (interview DVA6) 
In the Kasarani scenario, the tolerance of four storey construction may well 
have been meant for a few people (as seen in the previous section), but 
planners have not been able to stem the tide of storeyed developments.  
Also, even where developers were officially permitted to build four storeys, 
this was not respected, judging by what is on the ground.  In Eastlands, 
where there is a sewer line but where the zoning guidelines, in contradiction 
of the ‘sewer rule’, allow only two floors, regulations appear to have been 
treated with contempt; not only have developers exceeded two floors, most 
developments are well above four floors. 
Some developers do take it upon themselves to provide infrastructure, such 
as access roads and sewer lines, which would otherwise be the responsibility 
of the city county.   
If you’re doing a development and you realise you’re one kilometre 
from the sewer line, and assuming you have one acre, you’re told you 
can only put up four houses because only four houses can be 
accommodated within a septic tank situation.  But if you have access 
to a sewer, you can even do 50 units.  You can extend to join the 
Tran-sewer at your own cost.  But what happens is that that extension 
you can only own it for six months – after that it goes back to the 
council and other developers can take advantage of that…. I’ll give 
you a good example of a project close to Safari Park, where on 
Waiyaki way we were about two kilometres from the trans-sewer.  
Without the sewer you have low plot ratios and coverage, but by 
accessing the trans-sewer it gives you high coverage.  So you look at 
the value of land versus the cost incurred in doing that (interview 
DVA6). 
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Partnership with the private sector was therefore considered to be one way 
of boosting infrastructural development in the city: 
…. Get people to buy in.  Get investors also to do some commitment 
but you have to convince them what is in it for them.  You see things 
like infrastructure…that would be an immediate [clicked his fingers to 
signify quick returns] because government can give tenders, 
concessions, those kind of things….to private companies (interview 
DVA4). 
The fact that developers do not wait for the provision of infrastructure before 
developing their land is not surprising, since the county is well behind with 
respect to the provision of infrastructure even in well planned areas of the 
county, let alone the ‘unplanned’ areas of development.  Waiting for the 
county to install infrastructure could be a long wait, and developers are not 
inclined to speculate about the delay.  Planners are, therefore, not able to 
stop the tide of development in areas without infrastructure, and appreciate 
that a different approach to dealing with the problem is needed: 
…. there is no machinery for us or justification for us to decline to 
grant approval on account of somebody not having a road leading to 
their plot.  What we go by is whether there is actually a surveyed road, 
whether implemented or not – we guard against someone 
encroaching on what is already on the survey plan or in the structure 
plan because we hope that some time in the future that [road 
construction] will be implemented and we can see a lot of effort has 
been done really, if we were to give credit where it’s due.  A lot of 
things are being done – I know the Nairobi water company is 
extending sewers in most of that area (I’ve been in talks with them) – 
there will be sewer connection in most of the Eastlands, those far 
flung areas, and also roads (interview SP6). 
The problem is that when approval is given on the premise that an access 
road has been surveyed and will eventually be provided, no one takes 
responsibility for ensuring provision in conjunction with development.  It is all 
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very well for the building code to stipulate that an access road be provided, 
but like other stipulations, for the most part this is never followed up.    
Reasons for the poor provision of infrastructure can be related back to 
budgetary deficits, as discussed in Chapter 4.  According to a senior planner, 
the per capita public investment in infrastructure was about KSh 500 (about 
$5.7) in 1996, and the average amount of money spent on infrastructure over 
three years – roads, water and sewer - was less than KSh500 for every 1000 
people in 1992/93, 93/94, 94/95 (interview SP2).  That is a low amount by 
any standards, and could not have provided much infrastructure for the 
general population.  It would be safe to assume that there were conflicting 
priorities as to which areas should benefit from such a limited budgetary 
allocation, and that the low and middle income areas would not have been at 
the top of the list.  However, poor provision of infrastructure has not deterred 
enterprising developers in their bid to meet housing demand: not only do 
planners have an insight into the plight of investors when it comes to 
infrastructure provision, they also know what they need to do: 
…. if I’m buying a property I’ll be looking at it and I say, I see in the 
plan there’s a road, so I’ll buy my plot.  Whether there is sewer or 
water to be supplied, it’ll come tomorrow.  I’ll buy my plot and start 
building…. as you plan you must be very clear whether you get 
finances for your plan…. if it’s a programme for infrastructure, within 
the first five years, which projects do we have to finance this particular 
road which moves from point A to point B?  And I’ve been saying, if 
we can deal with the roads and sewer, the rest can follow….  So even 
as we talk about densities of developments vis-à-vis the land values, 
which have gone crazy, I think the government, not even the county 
government itself, needs to think about improving, adding 
infrastructure (interview SP4).  
For you to develop at development densities that are commensurate 
with the borrowing of funds from the secondary market, then you need 
development densities which are higher.  For them to be high or to be 
enhanced, you need infrastructure to support that development.  And 
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that is what the city has been suffering from – inadequate investment 
in infrastructure development, and this is a responsibility of the public 
sector (interview SP2). 
Poor land administration has definitely impacted negatively on developers’ 
actions.  In some cases, irregularities have implicated political forces, which 
create the conditions for impunity and result in helplessness on the part of 
land administrators.  In addition, deception, especially where land buying 
companies have been involved, is a complicated web, which would take time 
and resources to unravel.  Many investors in such areas are still struggling to 
get their titles and to upgrade their infrastructure.  Kasarani along Thika 
Road is just one example. The problem is multiplied, especially in the areas 
outside the master plan area, and it will take concerted effort on the part of 
the planners and developers alike to put things right.  There has been no 
tangible state intervention to direct development by investing in 
infrastructure, and existing infrastructure such as roads and sewers are 
stretched by overdevelopment.  Planners will have to recognise existing 
developments as they make their plans, affecting the potential for economies 
of scale in infrastructure provision (Adam and Watkins, 2008).  
There were strong views that a comprehensive land use policy, which the 
master plan could draw on, would go a long way towards addressing some of 
the issues: 
.... we’re moving ahead with the national planning master plan, but 
we’ve not done with the land use policy......we should do the land use 
policy so that the master plan implements the land use policy, so that 
we can address these issues of ‘…if you have been seeing these plots 
are too small, how come you’ve been allowing it, what is the thinking 
behind it…?’ (Interview PA5) 
As it is, land administration officials were not involved in the drawing up of 
the master plan, which in hindsight could have prevented contentious issues 
in development control.  But the master plan is a skeleton, with potential for 
further input from strategic stakeholders – perhaps there is still room for 
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negotiations and clarifications while stepping it down to implementable local 
structure plans.    
There is a consensus that development control should never have come to 
this; that developers should never have built without following the proper 
guidelines.  But unfortunately this has occurred, so as well as planning for 
future development, planners have to look back and fathom ways in which 
the past failures of the system can be rectified; the regularisation process, 
which aims to formalise illegal developments in retrospect, is an attempt to 
do this.  However, the process is not only confronted by the same problems 
that have hindered planning efforts hitherto, but also experiences its own 
obstacles.  These are looked at in the following section. 
6.2.3 Irregular regularisation 
Regularisation is a sensible but ambitious process which acknowledges that 
existing development control has failed to cope with developments on the 
ground, but that there is some hope of damage limitation.  It has been 
optimistically viewed by planners as a process which can be used to raise 
awareness amongst developers and other stakeholders in the city.  As to 
whether existing planning guidelines might have been too strict in relation to 
what is permissible on the ground, an ex-planner responded: 
I think so, but even though, it was the law; you can only change when 
the law changes.  They should have changed the law first then effect 
it. You don’t say that ‘…you gave a speed limit of 50, I went at 70…’ 
and when you had gone at 70 that is when you want to be regularised 
(interview OP4X). 
Developers, as evidenced by their actions, disagree with OP4X– they have 
not waited for the laws to change, and the planners will have to catch up in 
order to regularise their developments.  Even among planners, there are 
sceptics who do not have faith in the process, especially in cases where 
approval was completely by-passed.  An ex-planner expressed: 
…. that is so difficult because how do you regularise a building which 
was unsupervised up to fifth floor?  How do you regularise the kind of 
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skill that was used, the quality of materials that was used, the 
concrete that was used, how do you do that? For a building that has 
already been built? …. if you can go back to Umoja 1, leave alone 
[what is] now inner core and Umoja 2, people were provided with what 
they were calling wet core – just one room built in the plot, then you 
get a type plan and you build the rest.  All of them – none of them was 
double storeyed.  And all of them now are storeys.  Some demolish 
[the single rooms], other times they put up buildings in what is 
supposed to be the compounds.  The buildings are uncontrolled, the 
systems are completely overworked, it’s just madness… (Interview 
OP4X) 
The above ex-planner raised some valid questions because as seen in 
Chapter 5, the regularisation process looks at the buildings as they are; it 
uses photos of the building, drawings of the building as it stands, and a 
report from a structural engineer.  An application for change of use, for 
example from a single dwelling to multiple dwellings, is also done for existing 
buildings, therefore not giving a chance for planners to enforce appropriate 
zoning controls with regards to requirements for ground coverage and plot 
ratio.   
It is worth noting also that the process is more expensive than a regular 
development approval.  According to developers,  
It might even be ten times the fee you would have paid.  Because they 
charge per floor and they charge you something like 500,000 per floor, 
so if you have four floors, you’re paying … (Interview DVA1) 
But to me when they say regularisation, I know the council would not 
be very happy to hear me say this, but as far as I’m concerned, it’s 
simply a way of collecting revenue.  Because when you say 
regularise, and that building has not met any conditions for approval, it 
flouts all zoning requirements for that particular area, then somebody 
paying some money so that he gets a stamp does not make it right – it 
flouts all the rules; doesn’t provide parking, doesn’t provide any of 
those required setbacks or anything like that, it’s not even healthy to 
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live in.  It’s basically for revenue collection – to simply certify, putting a 
stamp for somebody to show (interview DVA2). 
Such scepticism about regularisation affects the willingness of developers to 
engage with the process.  Planners are aware of this, acknowledging that 
developers are right to think of the high fees as a penalty for non-
compliance: 
…. regularisation – the way we handle regularisation is a sanction in 
itself.  The charges are exorbitant.  A regular change of use would be 
40,000 shillings in Clayworks, although it changed since the beginning 
of this month.  But for regularisation it is 180,000 shillings – that’s a 
penalty in itself (interview OP2).  
Indeed, many developers view regularisation as a penalty for having failed to 
follow the regulations in the first instance, or just another way for the county 
to raise revenue rather than a way of making the developments compliant 
with regulations: 
You see what has happened; over time they realised that they didn’t 
have capacity.  They also realised that they wanted to make money 
out of these developers.  So they told Kenyans (they gave Kenyans 
some time) – they told them, ‘…even if you have never brought your 
plans for approval, just bring them now, we’ll calculate what you’re 
supposed to pay and we’ll approve your plans…’ (Interview DV9) 
Neither planners nor developers seem to be inclined to acknowledge the 
added value that regularisation might give to a property due to the legal 
security that it offers.  Although DV9 was not implying differential treatment 
for Kenyans vis-à-vis foreign developers, foreign developers might be more 
likely to comply than local developers.  However, DV9, a serial developer 
and a contractor for other developers, has not yet engaged with the process 
– he had not heeded calls for regularisation.  He said: 
We did not go.  You know what happened during Moi’s regime, people 
never used to go to city hall, what happened is that after that, city 
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council advertised and said that we can take those plans for approval 
(interview DV9). 
It would appear that DV9 was not alone in defying calls.  There were 
perceptions amongst planners that political interference and impunity carried 
a lot of weight in protecting such developments, rendering efforts by planners 
to regularise them ineffective (interviews SP7, OP4X).    
Like now about regularisation, all of them [politicians] are actually with 
us, and they organise meetings.  But part of the problem was that 
these were not participatory processes, so when you got to the 
ground, the conflicts were there because the politicians want to 
protect their people, because they think these are your own ideas – 
they don’t want to be a party to them (interview SP1). 
Impunity and political interference emerged as common perceptions amongst 
planners and developers, as will be seen in section 7.2.  
In addition, as regularisation is a new process, only limited guidance is 
available to the public.  It was intended that an operational procedure would 
be available from the county planning offices, but this was not the case.  As a 
result, the process is still lacking in clarity for planners, and there is limited 
information for developers:   
The other thing that you find with regularisation, when we were 
making those enquiries then, you also find a situation where even the 
council officers, it seems like the structure of regularisation has not 
been fully worked out.  So this particular officer will be telling you this, 
that particular officer will be telling you that, at some point you find that 
they’re getting cold feet in terms of processing what you want them to 
process for you – they feel like this might come back to haunt/bite 
them at some point in the future because the rates, issues are not 
very clear.  So you find them not wanting to commit themselves.  
Unless they’ve brought it out very clearly and come out with a proper 
policy paper - but they have not given us anything of that nature.  You 
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know even these new rates they have also not published (interview 
DVA2). 
DVA2’s comments are corroborated by the fact that the process did not 
appear to be very well coordinated, and its effects are yet to be seen or felt.  
Presently, the way it is being applied is rather haphazard, and developers 
seem to be approaching it reservedly, and only when there are economic 
gains (in as much as a proposal for a development needs to be formalised in 
order to raise capital for the development itself), or when a development is 
threatened51.  A developer’s agent, an architect, expressed: 
The most common one is exceeding plot ratio.  Like in Umoja you’re 
only allowed to build two floors.  But you want to build four or five 
floors like your neighbours.  So what you do is build the legal two 
floors, then build the other three floors with protection from local 
agents and come for regularisation. Because once it’s built they will 
not say no to regularisation, unless the building is very poorly done or 
structurally unstable (interview DVA6). 
DVA6 meant that developers present acceptable developments to the 
planning office in order to get approval, but that is just a front in most cases.  
It does not help planners that commercial banks are happy to accept 
developments that have informal aspects as collateral for advancing owners 
capital for more developments, regardless of whether they have planning 
approval or not (interview DVA2). 
A year after the first field study for this research, the initial optimism about 
the regularisation process seemed to have fizzled out.  This was not 
surprising really, putting into consideration the scale of illegal and 
unapproved developments, related costs to the developer with regards to 
formalising such developments, and the fact that there were no coherent 
guidelines in place.  One planner recounted how in Cieko Kasarani, an area 
                                               
51
 There are spurts of enforcement enthusiasm portrayed in the local press sometimes, 
whereby the council coordinates demolition of developments, especially those which are 
deemed as structurally unsafe (often after highly publicised collapsing buildings), or those on 
public land.  
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where more than 2000 properties were targeted for regularisation of 
subdivisions, they had only been able to give allotment letters to about nine 
owners (interview SP7), because other plots had not been surveyed and did 
not have proper records.  The planners realised that some of the drawings 
presented by the subdivision schemes were sketches, not done by 
professionals and therefore not to scale.  In such cases, regularisation of the 
subdivision, which had to be done before regularisation of the buildings 
thereon, was stalled, while the planners regrouped to think of a way forward. 
It would appear that the county planning office has a lot of convincing to do 
before developers will value the regularisation procedure.  Perhaps they can 
justify the high fees, in that the developers did develop before getting 
approval, but they also need to reassure developers that it is not just about 
the money, it is about safety and the provision of sustainable living 
environments for residents.  Any procedure that labels itself as a ‘make-
good’ process would have to address some basic requirements of health and 
safety in developments, if nothing else.  As one developers’ agent pointed 
out: 
…. even when you’re regularising, there are certain particular 
minimum requirements that one must meet in terms of ventilation and 
lighting and your window distances and such…. even if something is 
flouting those regulations, at least it should be safe (interview DVA2) 
As seen in chapters 4 and 5, there are extensive developments that need 
formalisation, especially in ‘unmapped’ areas in the Eastlands, so clearly 
there is money to be made for the county if all such developments are taken 
through the regularisation process.   
Developers, for their part, mount a counterargument: if the planning 
authorities are just collecting fees and formalising developments without due 
process, to right the informalities, then the process could rightly be 
considered a sham.  However, in all fairness the process is still being 
developed; it does not even have legislation or a written procedure in place.  
The fees structure is also very vague and it would appear that there is no 
consistency in the charges; efforts to get a copy of the fees structure in the 
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course of fieldwork for this research were in vain.  This raises the question of 
how the county has, for example, derived the high fees already being 
charged to developers who are engaging with the processes.   
Not only has the planning framework fallen short of expectations in 
controlling developments in Nairobi, but efforts to put right what has already 
gone wrong are not yielding many results either.  The process of 
regularisation is not only confronted by the same problems that have 
hindered planning efforts hitherto, but comes with its own obstacles, as has 
been evidenced in this section.  It is difficult at this point to judge how the 
process will address informality – whether it will do what it says on the label, 
or whether it will fail in its functions, like the rest of the planning framework.  
There is indeed potential in this process to do damage limitation in 
unregulated areas and developments, but only if and when the county 
streamlines the regularisation procedure, and starts implementing it as a 
matter of course.  For this to happen, planners need clear legislation for 
reference, clear operational procedures that leave no room for ambiguity or 
misinterpretation, as well as clear guidelines for developers and their agents. 
it can still bring a semblance of environmental order if planners and 
developers embrace their responsibilities towards damage limitation.  It 
needs collaboration between planners and developers because, as one 
senior planner pointed out: 
The people have created this mess.  It’s like garbage; who generates 
garbage? It wasn’t the local government.  Was it put in the right 
place?  (Interview SP8)  
Private professionals felt there is potential for regularisation to work, but only 
if planners negotiate with developers and demonstrate responsible 
regularisation, for instance by pushing regeneration agendas forward.  This 
was in acknowledgement that developers also get frustrated by lack of basic 
infrastructure such as access roads and sewerage, poor water pressure in 
high rise apartments, and poor garbage collection, and some end up parting 
with some of their investment money to install infrastructure.  Consultants 
were of the opinion that most developers would be happy to work with the 
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county in the provision of services, paying that bit extra so that they can 
benefit from the provision of services, because it would make their 
developments more valuable. One planning consultant expressed:  
So let them first come up with a regularisation plan, because that plan 
will not only look at that building, but it will say what are the 
infrastructure aspects of this place, what are the open public spaces, 
then you can say this is what we propose; we propose there will be 
enhancement of this road, there will be enhancement of this sewer 
here, water here, and it’s a dual job – the infrastructure must be done 
by the city, and they can justify why they are charging that money…. 
Instead of taking 100%, I’m sure he’ll take 80%.  You negotiate, you 
are realistic, then you bargain with the developer; ‘…ok I can add you 
three floors, but can you add this number of spaces for common 
use?’…  You negotiate.  It’s a more flexible way of guiding 
development (interview PA3) 
Some of the developments, especially the low end unregulated apartment 
buildings in Eastlands and Kasarani, seem beyond redemption, but even in 
those developments there is recognition that a lot has been invested:  
…. I think it’s very difficult to demolish because they’re huge 
investments.  Of course there are tenements, there are vertical slums, 
but it’s difficult.  The council has let it go too far.  What we’re saying 
ourselves is that perhaps what can be done is to try and upgrade on 
services (interview DVA2) 
Such buildings may well be vertical slums, going by the level of services in 
some of them, but clearly developments serve a purpose; they meet the 
needs of a large proportion of the city’s population.  Perhaps it is time for 
planners to tackle developers outside the laws and regulations, but at the 
same time meet them halfway and complement their efforts by upgrading 
these ‘vertical slums’.   Upgrading of services is not a new concept in 
development.  In slum areas of developing cities, upgrading has been a 
popular theme amongst government housing departments, with 
encouragement and support from international bodies such as UN Habitat.  
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Even in developed cities, some infrastructure, such as roads, was evidently 
upgraded after the buildings were already in place.  The photos in figures 20 
and 21 demonstrate that infrastructure, for example roads, can be negotiated 
with buildings in-situ.   
 
Figure 20: A side street in Lewes, East Sussex, UK; very narrow and 
negotiating round buildings (Google Maps) 
 
 
Figure 21: Cholmeley Park - a street in North London curved around buildings 
(Google Maps) 
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Planning advisors and consultants were of the opinion that developers were 
way ahead of the planners, following market forces in the housing sector, 
whilst the planners were crippled by an ineffective system.  But unlike 
enterprising developers, who appear to have resources to invest, planners 
have limited resources to guide development.  This deterrent to planning 
efforts is looked at in detail in the following section.  
 
6.3 Limited resources for planning 
This section addresses the question of how planners and developers 
perceive the resources for planning (including staffing).  For planners, 
availability of resources affects how the system is implemented, enforced 
and monitored on the ground, while if developers perceive the resources to 
be inadequate, they are more likely to risk non-compliance.  Ultimately, these 
perceptions impact on the effectiveness of the system. 
6.3.1 Poor allocation of funding  
To implement, monitor and enforce the application of planning laws and 
regulations requires the regular allocation of funding – for infrastructure, for 
staff and for equipment.  Historically, since the colonial era, the planning 
department does not seem to have ever got the funds it required to control 
development in the city.  As discussed in Chapter 4, master plans were 
drawn up, and follow-up strategic plan(s), but implementation has 
consistently been hampered by insufficient allocation of resources.   
It appears that even today, planning is not a priority in budgetary allocation.  
Planners feel that with all the money the department generates, they could 
be afforded more resources.  All the money collected goes to a county pot in 
the central treasury (interviews SP5, OP2), and the amount the planning 
department receives in budgetary settlements is limited.  In October 2013, 
the county government reviewed its fees and charges for approvals, in some 
cases more than doubling the charges, but even then, the benefits were not 
being felt at the frontline. 
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.... you think they would say since I’ve generated one million shillings I 
need a budget of 300,000 shillings to sustain myself, but it doesn’t 
happen like that.  You find that you maybe generate a lot of money but 
the money ends up in other departments or in uses that are not 
necessary.  Maybe it can end up in the mayor’s Christmas tree or end 
of the year party (interview SP5). 
A KPDA representative revealed how they had been trying to ascertain how 
much of the revenue collected from developers was put towards service and 
infrastructure improvements, but this information was not forthcoming from 
planning officials.  According to KPDA, the planning department does not 
satisfactorily rationalise the increase: 
…. they [planners] try to justify the increase in fees by saying this and 
that but none of it is something that is measurable, none of it is written 
down, none of it is something we can track (interview KPDA). 
It could be argued that revenue going from developers to the planning 
system need not be trackable, as it is paid for public services and 
infrastructure.  The problem, however, is that there is no evidence or 
accountability of such spending on the part of the state.  Nevertheless, it is 
worth noting that proper funding of city planning would depend on more than 
the fees and charges collected from planning applications.  For effective 
planning, there should be consideration of the wider need for sustainable 
urban development, and the planning system should make a more significant 
contribution to this by ensuring that land development and usage contributes 
to the city’s economy through a range of means, including appropriate rates 
on landed property.  As noted by Healey (1998), densification by private 
developers, while generating profit for them, also increases demands on 
infrastructure, and it is therefore fair that there should be expectations (from 
politicians and planners) for them to share the cost burden as part of the 
development process.  
Planners lamented that the situation with limited resources is sometimes so 
dire that even basic supplies, such as stationery, are in short supply 
(interviews SP2, SP3, OP2).  Site inspections are often limited due to lack of 
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transportation; either there are no vehicles available, or the ones available do 
not have fuel.  And this is not just in the planning department; peers in the 
Land Registry office were facing the same issues when it came to 
transportation to the field.  For example, one operational staff member 
disclosed that they were reporting to work after 12.00 instead of 8.00am on a 
particular day because a site trip had been aborted due to lack of 
transportation (interview PA7).   
Apart from transportation for staff, other essential equipment is also in short 
supply, from IT equipment in the offices, to bulldozers for demolitions.  The 
county has invested in computers in some of the planning sections, such as 
Development Control, with a view to facilitating online applications for various 
processes.  Introduction of the new online system in 2009/2010 for approval 
applications was heralded with optimism and promises that it would expedite 
the approval process.  However, the computers are made redundant by lack 
of supporting online networks, defeating the very purpose they were meant 
to serve.  Planners disclosed that they brought in their personal internet 
modems to work because without one they could not access the system: 
although there is internet access, the server is slow most of the time, 
sometimes it can be down for up to a week, yet they are under pressure to 
complete work.  As a result, they often have to revert back to hardcopy 
systems due to problems with the online system (interviews PA13, OP2).  
Moreover, not all sections have been provided with an online system; at the 
time of this research the Policy Implementation Section, for example, was 
still hoping the system would be rolled out for them.  In a planner’s words: 
...We lack logistics and capacity.  Office space is also limited.  Like 
now here I would like to have ten officers each with their computer.  
We have four officers, we have two computers.  So when I circulate 
plans to my officers, they have to wait for each other.  Sometimes I 
have to get out for them to work on my computer (interview PA13). 
This problem is not limited to planners at City Hall; their peers at the Ministry 
of Lands, Housing and Urban Development also complained that their 
computer systems are not established yet, thus rendering them ineffective 
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(interview PA7).  The Land officers would also welcome the introduction of 
an effective IT system for land administration: 
There are seven commissioners dealing with land issues – from 
different professional backgrounds.  IT development would help – 
having documents online (like at City Hall).  Having the data in 
software.  History of land; any pertinent issues should be provided for 
but there’s no manpower, will, and no proposals for that – there’s no 
expertise for that.  The search does not show that.  Search is not 
conclusive especially if land is allocated by government 52(interview 
PA7). 
To be fair, it would appear that the problem is more than just the deficiency in 
computers and online systems; some of the officers admitted that they were 
more comfortable and familiar with hard copy systems than the new 
computerised systems: 
...because we’re also not thorough keying in information into the 
system – some of us do but others don’t…. And because there is no 
enforcement for that, you work on the file the traditional way.... 
(interviewPA7) 
Although the new online system has eased the process, it has not taken root 
yet and is a source of frustration not only for planners, but also for 
developers and their agents.   
… I don’t know whether they are good in that system.  The people you 
find there, remember they are the same people who were dealing with 
the manual system, so when this one started being put in place, either 
they have not been very conversant with it, or they are not willing to 
use it, I don’t know (interview DV7). 
                                               
52
 PA7 explained that when land is allocated by government agents, it is usually to influential 
people. Sometimes official plans still show it as Government Land, but the allocator and 
allocated (who could then go on to sell the land) are in collusion. A subsequent search 
reveals the person allocated the land by the government, and does not necessarily show 
that it was previously government land, and legally still is.  Searches of documents related to 
a plot do not necessarily reveal the problem. 
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The above demonstrates developers’ insight into the problems planners are 
facing in adapting to the new system, as well as the issue of inadequate 
internet systems which render the system ineffective; one developer, also an 
agent, speculated that there are about 1500 architects, and perhaps a similar 
number of engineers, who submit plans online, which perhaps could 
overload the system, resulting in regular crashes (interview DVA3).  It also 
reinforces the notion that there are planners who would rather not use the 
system because they preferred the contact with developers (which yielded 
more unofficial payments in terms of bribes) that the manual system offered.  
Reasons for this preference are explored in Chapter 7.3.  Nevertheless, 
there is no denying that IT online systems are full of promise, both to 
forward-thinking developers who believe they can speed up the approval 
system and make it more transparent, and to planners who are frustrated by 
the manual system.   There can be no justification, therefore, for holding onto 
a manual system when clearly an electronic one promises greater efficiency, 
especially at a time when the department is publicly declaring war on 
corruption, as will be seen in Chapter 7.3.  As the IT systems are rolled out to 
all, it is hoped that they will be tried, tested, and fully functional – it is 
otherwise underutilisation of resources to invest in systems that cannot be 
efficient, for example due to poor internet provision. 
To effect the demolition of illegal developments, the county requires 
adequate bulldozing equipment, but such equipment is expensive, and 
therefore only a small fraction of the requirement is available.  The planners 
are aware of this gap, and so are the developers:   
...because like I think we have only two bulldozers if it’s enforcement 
in terms of demolitions.  So if maybe the people see the bulldozer 
heading east, they know activity can continue in the west and south 
and the north.  It’s that kind of scenario (interview SP6). 
However, bulldozers should be a last resort, after planners have exhausted 
other enforcement procedures, such as comprehensive and effective 
issuance of notices, which seem to be falling short. 
217 
 
Even as they are waiting for high capital investment systems, it might 
motivate existing staff to have basic supplies in place, such as stationery, 
fuel for existing departmental vehicles, and a functional internet connection 
for IT systems and software which are already in place.  Without basic 
resources, the capacity of working staff is diminished even further: 
Civil service have very qualified people, but they’re not given a chance 
to work – so they’ll just come and laze about and go away… 
(Interview PA8) 
And that is unacceptable because evidently there is so much work to be 
done.  It is all good and well to have laid out policies and procedures, but 
when planners are in reality struggling with regards to essentials such as 
transportation to the field, and even basic office stationery, it begs the 
question of how the system is ever expected to work - it is indeed a waste to 
have staff on the payroll when they cannot fulfil their duties, for example due 
to lack of transport.  Such paucity is likely to affect feelings of self-worth and 
professional morale in staff.  The irony is that, were investments to be made 
in supportive equipment, it would potentially increase the output of the 
department in terms of efficiency and in reaching a wider populace. 
According to a senior planner, the ratio of capital to recurrent expenditure is 
usually 30:70, and even then at a struggle: 
... Sometimes it’s 65%, 70% going on, … we use on recurrent 
expenditure, which is not fair on a city that is a regional, industrial and 
communication centre in East Africa.  It means we must have less on 
recurrent expenditure - probably to 50% or less, so that we have more 
on the capital expenditure to invest (interview SP2). 
SP2 is right; a regional hub like Nairobi requires a solid fiscal base for 
development control, otherwise the risk of reactive planning and crisis 
management that Rakodi (2001) inferred increases.  Recurrent expenditure 
includes staffing costs, and takes a big chunk of the budgetary allocation.  
This echoes findings by Werner et al. (2011), who reckoned that three 
quarters of local government budgets in the 1990s went to staff salaries, 
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whilst services deteriorated.  Clearly the local authority has a high number of 
staff in its employment; the problem is not shortage of staff per se, but rather 
shortage of the right kind of staff for effective delivery of services.  Staffing 
issues are looked at in the following section. 
6.3.2 Staffing problems 
This section looks at the staffing structure and how it affects implementation 
and enforcement of planning laws and regulations.  Much was said in 
Chapter 5 about staffing issues, stemming from the historical recruitment 
culture and funding problems.  There is apparently a chronic shortage of 
qualified staff, as seen in Chapter 5; only 32 % of the workforce in the 
department are qualified professionals.  Unfortunately, even the developers 
know of this shortage, and feel it.   
Without exception, all the senior planners interviewed lamented that they had 
very low numbers of qualified staff.  An administration worker in the 
department disclosed that about 80% of the employees in the city county are 
not qualified; out of 11,000 staff members, only 2,000 are qualified.  A senior 
planner was of the opinion that the department needs at least 500 qualified 
staff - planners, surveyors, valuation officers, and engineers (SP6).  If that is 
the case, a retired planner (OPX4), who thought the department does not 
even have 20% of the staffing capacity it needs, was close to the mark.  
Instead, each and every section is lumbered with unqualified staff, who, 
rather than easing the workload, end up not only draining departmental 
resources, but also creating challenges for qualified planners. 
You never get a report back, yet people are going to the field every 
day and getting paid.  For 20 unqualified staff I could get two qualified 
officers to do the work, if they got rid of them.  Because right now 
what’s the work of a person who can’t operate a computer in this era, 
a person who can’t construct a sentence in English?  (Interview SP7) 
Developers and their agents also have insight into this staffing issue:  
You see like Dandora, it has about 4,000 workers, what is their work?  
They can’t fit in that office.  They just earn a salary (interview DVA1). 
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The Forward Planning and Research sections of the planning department 
are supposed to facilitate projection and prediction of urban growth, but both 
sections are not only understaffed, but also do not necessarily deliver on 
what they are supposed to.  As a result, there was a general consensus that 
they are redundant.  The Research Section, as seen in Chapter 5, should be 
researching how the functions of planning are being met (or not) and 
informing other planning sections, including Forward Planning, so that they 
can develop and review policies and re adjustments can be made for 
planning functions to remain relevant.  As one planning consultant noted: 
The importance of research is that you’re able to re-look at the way 
you’re doing things and trying to do the necessary re-adjustments so 
that the profession and practice remains relevant…. [for example] with 
the change in technology, how has this affected the carrying capacity 
in terms of development (interview PA18). 
However, the Research Section in Nairobi has only four qualified planners, 
while the rest are unqualified: 
...If you tell them to collect data, they are standard seven drop-outs 
who left school in the 60s or early 70s, what kind of data can they 
bring?  So you see, we’re frustrated in research.... we have saturation 
of subordinate staff…. I have two secretaries, I have a clerical officer, I 
have a messenger – I have more than six people (interview SP7). 
According to the above senior planner (SP7), the Research Section should 
have at least twelve qualified planners for it to make any sense of the city.  
Likewise, the Forward Planning Section, which is supposed to do the broad 
planning and review growth trends, has five qualified planners, thus 
undermining their visionary potential and limiting their ability to carry out 
zoning reviews.  At times their capacity is propped up by planning internees 
from the local university, who can assist, for example, in spot zoning 
exercises, but mostly planners are overwhelmed by routine work, such as 
advising developers and clearing building plans, which ends up taking three-
quarters of their working day (interview SP6).   
220 
 
The Policy Implementation Section, which processes changes of use, 
extension of leases, among other duties, has four qualified planners to 
evaluate applications, advise developers and make site visits – hardly 
enough to meet the needs of the city.  SP7 said they are forced to ‘jump 
many stages’ because they do not have adequate and effective staffing 
capacity in the different sections.  The ‘many stages’ could be during the 
change of use or subdivision processes, when the officer responsibel might 
not have time to go and inspect the land or property, or during the building 
permit approval process, when development on the ground may be different 
from whatever was approved.  And it is not just that stages are jumped; 
whole areas are bypassed because of the staff shortage: For example, 
officers admitted to concentrating on those areas close to the CBD because 
they are easily accessible, ignoring far flung developments in the ‘un-
mapped’ areas.   
Without research and forward planning, policies, or urban growth control 
efforts, are not guided by information from the field.  Instead, qualified 
planners in those sections are deployed to other sections, such as 
Development Control, rather than identifying visionary policies for the 
department.  As a result, planners do not have the empirical evidence to fully 
appreciate the desperation and possibilities in the city.  It presents difficulties 
in trying to reason with far-seeing and far reaching developers when the 
department cannot justify its actions (or non-actions), or table any tangible 
and valid promises to aspiring investors.  This is unfortunate because, if 
those sections were fulfilling their roles of heralding changes and giving 
direction to the planning department, perhaps the latter would be making 
viable and valid projections regarding development control, enabling them to 
plan ahead of developers.  Planners in the research and forward planning 
sections have ideas of what they should do, but these tasks are not 
prioritised or promoted by the department.  To put it in the words of a 
planning consultant: 
You find that here in the NCC when you are taken to Research and 
Development Unit it’s like a punishment – it’s called Siberia because 
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you don’t link with the clients.  Everybody is fighting to be in 
Development Control….  (Interview PA16) 
The ‘fight’ to be in Development Control should raise suspicions, as it 
suggests that contact with clients is a lucrative means of supplementing 
one’s salary.  Corruption, which will be discussed further in section 7.3, 
seems to have played a part in making the Research Section redundant; 
apparently other sections of the department are deemed to be more lucrative 
because staff there have direct contact with developers and their agents 
when they are processing applications – that contact paves the way for 
solicitation of unofficial payments.  As a result, planning policy review in 
Nairobi has been reactive rather than informed.  In most cases, planners find 
that developers have already built, having contravened various planning 
requirements.   In such cases, pressure comes from the fact that, by the time 
planners get there, so many developers are involved, having invested heavily 
in their developments, and also other factors, such as political interference, 
come into play (see Chapter 7). 
After approval, site visits are supposed to occur, to ascertain that what is on 
the ground is what was approved.  Developments are supposed to have 
signboards indicating the name of the developer, consultants, the contractor, 
and plan approval number.  The regulations also require that developers 
have a record book on site, which supervising planning officials are 
supposed to inspect regularly and to make notes on progress – whether the 
project is conforming and if not what amendments should be done to 
conform.  That rarely happens because the planners do not have time (due 
to limited numbers), and more often than not developers complete a whole 
building without having a professional inspection by a planner: 
…. we’ve given a provisional approval, we have checked the roads 
are OK, it’s approvable, but you see, I’m dealing with fifty of them – 
one in Kasarani, another Lavington, another in Karen.  And that fifty, 
it’s only one planner dealing with them because other planners have 
others.  So after you approve the right thing in the office, whatever is 
222 
 
implemented on the ground is something very different.  You don’t 
have time to go and visit.... (Interview SP7) 
Incremental building by developers does not help the situation when it comes 
to site visits (see Figures 22 and 23).  There are developers who, after 
getting approval, do not start developing the site immediately, perhaps due to 
lack of funds, and by the time they start construction months later, the 
planners are not notified so that they can carry out site inspections.  Other 
developers build in phases, leaving lengthy gaps in the construction stages, 
as dictated by availability of funds.  In such cases planning officials might 
believe a development is dormant, but when they revisit later they find a 
completed development. 
 
 
Figure 22: An incremental building in Eastlands; evidently occupied but 
additional floors being built (Author, 2014) 
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Figure 23: Another incremental building in Eastlands; still going up (Author, 
2014) 
According to a senior planner, there are only six qualified building 
inspectors53 presiding over Nairobi, whereas in any one day there could be 
as many as 2,500 developments going on (interview SP2).  This was backed 
up by another senior planner in the enforcement section, who said that not 
only do they not have enough qualified officers, they also only have two 
vehicles to cover the whole city, which spans about 690sq km (interview 
SP4).  The planning department is supported by the county inspectorate 
department, the enforcement wing of the city county, but the planning 
department has no control over the latter.  Also, the problem is that the 
inspectorate employees are not planners – they do not necessarily have 
technical knowledge of planning issues, or the will power to enforce.   
…How will they know this is an approved ten floors building?  Their 
concern is if you have a licence which has been approved … 
(Interview PA16) 
                                               
53
 That implies that of the 20 building inspectors that the Director of City Planning was talking 
about in 2009 (Daily Nation, 24 July 2009), 14 were unqualified.  
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The city county has staff in each ward, who are supposed to police 
developments under their jurisdiction.  However, most of the staff in the 
wards, as seen in Chapter 5, were employed in the 80s under questionable 
recruitment methods, and are not conversant with planning requirements; 
they do not have the technical understanding to monitor building code 
requirements.  They are therefore easily convinced by developers to ignore 
variations, especially where the deviations are not distinctively different from 
the approved development: 
…If the building will only vary by one or 1.5 storeys then the inspector 
can… it’s not a big deal, it’s not so obvious.  Now, if you dispatch your 
child to school and their uniform is torn a little bit or just some speck of 
dust, do you think they’ll not get away with it?.....The teacher will say 
that’s not so bad….If the fare to Buru Buru is twenty shillings and I 
have eighteen shillings or nineteen fifty, I don’t think they will kick me 
off the bus… (Interview PA14) 
Lack of vigilant supervision by the officers frustrates developers who need 
certified developments, as it ends up costing them more in informal 
payments.  
…. when the project is completed and you have to apply for certificate 
of occupation, that is when you have to go looking for them, and that’s 
when corruption comes in.  They’re supposed to be signing green 
cards on site, but they never show up (interview DVA6) 
When developers go looking for planning officials, for example to issue an 
occupation certificate or to inspect for a change of use, more often than not 
the planning officials do not have vehicles to visit sites, and developers often 
have to make transport arrangements for the planners, thus bumping up their 
costs.  These findings echo issues alluded to by Kimani and Musungu 
(2010).  The majority of developments in Nairobi have no occupation 
certificate, either because the developers did not engage with the approval 
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process at all, or because if they attempted to engage there was no follow-up 
supervision, or need for the developer to pursue the certificate.54 
Historical staffing issues are not only evident amongst field officers, but also 
in City Hall.  This sentiment, which was held by planners, was also echoed 
by developers’ agents, who frequently attend to business at the planning 
offices: 
….. most of the problems we have in Nairobi are historical.  Most of 
the workers who are in city hall are politically employed - they are 
handpicked workers.  There was no time that there was an 
advertisement that the city council requires A, B, C, D applications.  
So these people are either friends of councillors or town clerks or 
whatever.  …. Sometimes you might go to city hall, you see a 
messenger there; after two, three years, you meet him signing plans.  
Or four years.  So they’re promoted.  I don’t know how a messenger is 
promoted to be able to sign plans.  Or a clerk…. Some of them don’t 
even know how to read the plans.  They are not qualified – they’re just 
harassing people (interview DVA1). 
As a result of the mismatch between staffing capacities and developments in 
the city, the current planners are overworked, and apparently 
underappreciated: 
You know people say that council employees don’t work – but I’m 
telling you there are no people who are overworked like us 
professionals - sometimes I even leave this office as late as 8.00pm 
(interview SP7).   
One planner argued that the situation would not be so bad if there were 
middle level technicians (not necessarily graduates), supervisors with 
diplomas in construction, who could support professionals like architects and 
development control planning officers in monitoring the application of the 
building code, and to play a supervisory role, carrying out inspections and 
                                               
54
 Developers are likely to seek occupation certificates for insurance purposes, or for 
financial institutions. This would be more likely to occur in the high end middle income 
developments rather than the low end developments. 
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evaluating plans (interview SP3).  Once employed, such staff could then be 
deployed to the different wards to supervise developments, replacing the 
unqualified staff who, as seen in Chapter 5, were allegedly employed under 
dubious circumstances.  However, the county staffing budget is already 
groaning under the weight of staff salaries; they would need to lay off the 
unwanted staff first to pave the way for more appropriately skilled 
replacements.  A retired planner expressed: 
… there are many people who are qualified.  There are many jobless 
people who are looking for work.  Kenya Polytechnic, Mombasa 
Polytechnic, they are produced in those schools - they are there, they  
just don’t employ…. (Interview OPX4) 
Developers echoed what planners said about the lack of training for mid-level 
professionals, who were previously trained in polytechnics: 
Before there used to be polytechnics which were taken over by 
universities and university colleges so the polytechnics just died off.  
Within these polytechnics that’s where the fundis [builders] used to be 
trained and they were given grades.  Even the city council used to 
give grades.  But now it’s no longer there – I don’t know what 
happened to that department (Interview DVA1) 
These perceptions were reiterated by a retired planner, who expressed a 
view that mid-level officers from mid-level colleges and polytechnics with 
diplomas or higher diploma qualifications, were lacking – he reckoned the 
planning department had not employed more since he left the department in 
the 1980’s (interview OP4X).  This corroborates what a current senior 
planner said; that the city county did not hire any staff for the department 
between 1989 and 2009 (interview SP7).  As seen in Chapter 5, there has 
been an embargo on recruitment of new staff, despite depleted numbers of 
competent staff.  As a result of the embargo, county staff who died or retired 
were not replaced, and even those who remained were ‘tired’, thus leaving a 
gap in the capacity of active planners: 
…and they were so many because even the other planners are so old.  
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If government had not increased the retirement years they would all 
have left – the deputy director, etc., would have left when the 
retirement age was 55yrs. So there’s a gap (interview SP7). 
For the planning department to make a tangible impact in steering urban 
growth and in controlling development, developers, like planners, expressed 
that it is imperative to get more qualified staff.  As one developers’ agent 
aptly concluded: 
…to run to touch all corners of Nairobi with the minimal staff that they 
have – it’s not possible really.  They cannot get engineers, planners, 
in all places, everywhere, it’s not possible.  So they just talk, but on 
the ground they are doing nothing because they can do nothing... 
(Interview DVA3) 
Since ‘on the ground they (planners) are doing nothing because they can do 
nothing ‘(interview DVA3), any cries for help by developers, which could be 
implied rather than expressed, are left unheard.   
A senior planner was for the idea of involving private professionals to 
supplement county workforce: 
… we can source professionals from the private sector to work with us 
and take a little bit of our burden, if his excellency the governor and 
his team agree …. we can offload some of our work through an 
integrated computerised system …. [They] can do some of the work 
on a competitive basis and be paid by the same middle class or high 
income class or the developers who want to invest (interview SP2).  
Developers’ agents also thought outsourcing professional inputs from the 
private sector would aid planners in enforcement efforts (interviews DVA4, 
KPDA).   
Apart from the shortage of qualified staff, there is an apparent lack of 
continuous professional development programmes for existing staff; training 
programmes are limited.  Gaps in qualifications were noted not only with 
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respect to technical know-how, but also with regards to etiquette in day to 
day public service.  
…. You see like this person (referring to a person who had interrupted 
the interview) …. they’ve been there so many times; they’ve been 
taken round.…. people have never known that the only way to 
transform the civil service is through customer care training – that’s 
lacking in the government (interview PA8). 
Planners disclosed that there is no training schedule – whatever limited 
training is given is rather sporadic.  For those in the higher levels of 
employment, most training is undertaken following a personal initiative, and 
is not necessarily financed by the government.   
…. I find a member of staff has come approached me ‘…I’ve been to 
the University I’d like to apply for this course, I’ll be going in the 
evenings, because it’s relevant for me…’ …. maybe as time goes by, 
I’ll check on the internet, I’ll see there’s some training somewhere, it’s 
free, and I’ll ask my boss, if I’m released, well and good (interview 
SP6).  
Under new performance contract targets, the city county has started 
nominating staff, usually at the lower levels (like secretaries and clerks) for 
one-day training courses, such as public relations and handling clients, but 
again there is no established schedule for this.  Moreover, these efforts do 
not appear to be well coordinated: 
…. you find memos flying everywhere that your staff are needed for 
this or the other……it benefits people because maybe you find 
sometimes they’ve called all the secretarial staff and they take them 
through a one day [course in] public relations, handling clients and all 
that, which is good.  But the only weakness is that there is no 
schedule – I cannot know two months from now what training will 
come on board unless what I have initiated from here (interview SP6). 
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An improved curriculum for planning staff at the local universities could also 
help future generations of planners to avoid some of the problems that are 
plaguing the Planning Department today.  As Watson and Agbola (2013) 
highlighted, planning educators and their students need to ‘get their shoes 
dirty’ – they need to open their minds up to urban realities of their developing 
city, thus being able to challenge inappropriate laws and regulations which 
are out of context in their world, rather than policing them unquestionably.  
The University of Zambia master’s programme in planning incorporates 
informality in its curriculum (ibid.), and educators in Nairobi could do well to 
emulate this.  Such a curriculum would change the mind-set of planning 
professionals regarding what constitutes informality in the built environment, 
with a view to accommodating local realities. 
Clearly, the planning department is struggling to meet expectations due to 
inadequate resources, as seen above, among other things.  One senior 
planner summarised issues with resources as follows: 
.... It’s because of many reasons; mainly because of our capacity to 
enforce.  Human, equipment, so you find that our officers are strained 
– we don’t have many enforcement officers to have enough coverage 
for a city of 3 million plus, to get to know every site that is happening 
in every corner of this city...  (Interview SP6) 
The researcher could not have put it better. The planning department in 
Nairobi is groaning under the weight of unmet expectations, and it would 
appear that relief is not in sight as yet.  Although there are efforts to improve 
production with existing staff through use of technology (by putting approval 
systems online), this has its own share of problems, and it could be a while 
yet before such systems are sufficiently streamlined to be effective.  The 
capacity to enforce is limited, not only because of staff numbers and 
competency, but also because of deficient structures.  This is a far reaching 
problem that impacts on implementation, monitoring and enforcement of 
policies and procedures.  Developers’ agents feel that if the city county had 
more professional people on the ground to supervise developments, 
developers would heed advice from their agents.  As it is now, developers 
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are well aware of the inadequacies of the system, and have chosen to get on 
with developments regardless.  In the face of limited government resources, 
the local authority does not have the ‘positive’ powers referred to by 
Pickvance (1977), and private developers, as envisaged by Pickvance, are 
the driving force in development in Nairobi.   
 
6.4 Conclusion 
Clearly planners and developers have insights into the issues plaguing the 
system.  They appreciate the necessity for change, as well as the demand 
for the developments in question.  Unmet demand for housing has resulted in 
a situation whereby developers, and their agents seem to be dictating the 
pattern of development and growth in the city – they are way ahead of the 
planners.  Differing perspectives (between planners and developers) of 
‘formal’ and ‘informal’, ‘order’ and ‘disorder’, as alluded to by Pile et al. 
(1999) and Roy (2005), have resulted in areas of expansive uncontrolled 
development.   
With regard to the planning framework, planners have to contend not only 
with poor standards of construction work, but also over-development by 
developers.  Development control seems to be ‘out of control’.   Planners are 
facing challenges not only from developers, but also from the very framework 
that is supposed to be guiding them - there has been little linkage between 
intervention by investors and the way the planners want the city to grow.  As 
to whether planners are breaking their own laws, it is clear that at times the 
laws have been ambiguous and unrealistic, and planners have had to 
retrospectively apply review outcomes, for example with regards to zoning 
stipulations.  These findings concur with other scholars who found planning 
standards in sub-Saharan Africa unrealistic and restrictive (Kironde, 1992a; 
Arima and Adeagobo, 2000; Rakodi, 2001; Watson, 2009; among others).  
Planning policies in the county have not supported high density 
developments, and reviews of these policies are done sporadically and 
haphazardly.  It would have been desirable for the policies to have evolved 
fully in the context of changing economic forces (Healey, 1992), but clearly a 
lot of work still needs to go into this.   
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Land administration issues are another major constraint addressed in this 
chapter: irregularities in subdivisions and allocations and the fact that some 
land owners have no title deeds have compounded the problems for 
planners.  Also, the planning system does not support a robust investment 
climate for developers.  For example, the state has not directed 
developments by provision of relevant infrastructure, as Taylor (1998) 
envisaged.  In such circumstances, it is not surprising that developers find it 
uneconomical to comply with policies which have not been reviewed for 
many years.  And yet, even though developers defy the planning system, 
their contribution to the production of habitable space is commendable – they 
play an important role and planners would do well to embrace this.  As 
Berrisford (2011a) recommended, it is important for planning to understand 
the pressures and interests of relevant stakeholders.  It could be said that 
regularisation is an acknowledgement of developers’ contribution in housing 
provision, but like the procedures before it, though laudable in principle, it 
lacks operational leverage due to the same inhibitive factors that plague the 
rest of the planning system.  Regularisation could be seen as a process to 
‘work with informality’, as Watson (2005) advocated, which could be a 
compromise intervention for both planners and developers.  
Crucially, this chapter has revealed how the planning authority has not had 
adequate resources at its disposal.  The ‘swollen state’ alluded to by 
Diamond (1987) has not helped to make the best use of limited financial 
resources, with excessive numbers of unqualified workers (rather than 
qualified staff) in the planning department, absorbing the allocated 
resources.  While developers have strong incentives to maximise their rental 
returns, planners have not been armed with adequate tools to plan and 
control developments, because of the gaps in capacity and capability to 
monitor and enforce.  As seen in Chapter 4, planners cannot implement their 
plans, laws and legislation without resources – any such plans are doomed 
to fail if they are not linked to resources for implementation.  Change in 
staffing capacity, whether by increasing qualified staff or by revitalising 
planning sections, call for an increase in funding.  Likewise, to improve 
infrastructure in the city in support of development also calls for an increase 
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in funding.  For this to happen, there needs to be political goodwill (as 
inferred by Mbaku, 2010), and a recognition that developers cannot afford to 
wait for planners to catch up.  As Harvey (1982) envisaged, when private 
capital is leading development, then emerging landscapes undermine the 
role of the state in spatial ordering.  Clearly, the county is struggling to meet 
its financial obligations, and allocation of funds to planning is low priority.  
Also, the concept of ‘planning gain’, which is used to maximise financial 
contributions from developers in some developed cities of the Global North 
(Crook and Monk (2011), has clearly not been cultivated to its potential.  
Rather than waiting cap in hand for budgetary allocations, planners need to 
think outside the box, and evaluate what other sources of resources might be 
accessible to them.   
As Guy and Hanneberry (2008) expressed, operations under capitalism 
require buildings to be produced profitably, and evidently developers in 
Nairobi have interpreted their position within the social and economic context 
but contrary to the rationalities of the state.  Clearly the system has been 
lacking in the various aspects of a good planning framework alluded to in 
Chapter 2 by Healey (1992), Berrisford (2011b), and UN-Habitat (2015b); it 
has not evolved appropriately, and it does not seem to understand or 
accommodate the pressures and interests of stakeholders.  Such concerns 
need to be addressed, so that new and appropriate initiatives, such as the 
regularisation process, can deliver as expected.  Having looked at the 
(inadequate) resources, the following chapter will shed some light on the 
systems of channelling these resources; how they’re governed and in what 
way this contributes to the success or failure of the planning system. 
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Chapter 7: Shortcomings in governance 
You know a policeman arrests people because the government and the 
judiciary are behind them – otherwise if…nothing happens to you, you would 
never obey them.  The developers know that - that these guys are barking 
dogs… (interview OP4X). 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Poor governance has been cited by other scholars (Rakodi, 2001; 
Shilderman and Lowe, 2002; Nwaka, 2005; Gandy, 2006) as contributing to 
non-compliance with planning laws and regulations.  It was important for this 
research to explore issues of governance further, with a view to answering 
the question; What are the characteristics of the relationship between 
planners and developers, and why do they foster non-compliance?  This 
question is further broken down into; Are there issues of trust between 
developers and planners?  Why are contraventions by housing developers 
for the middle income group tolerated by planners?  Do developers actually 
get away with non-compliance or are there effective sanctions?  
Section 7.2 examines the effects of political influence and impunity, and 
argues that planners are disempowered in the face of the self-serving 
interests of those in high office.   Section 7.3 expounds on the ‘blind-eye 
syndrome’, raising the question of whether people really want a change in 
culture with regards to this practice, or whether it has become too familiar 
and comfortable.  It argues that corruption has created a new norm in 
planning practice; money and influence seem to determine what is 
acceptable in the eyes of planning.  Section 7.4 addresses issues of joint-
working: it asks whether planners are harnessing the full potential of other 
stakeholders, and explores issues of trust between planners and other 
stakeholders.  The section reveals that relevant stakeholders feel left out of 
the planning arena, and perceive planners to be self-serving rather than 
guiding.  This influences developers’ response to planning agendas.  Their 
perceptions about this are important, in that if they feel guidance is lacking, 
they are more likely to disregard planning laws and regulations which they 
perceive to be irrelevant or unreasonable.  Section 7.5 reveals that a 
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prolonged and complicated approval process has been a major deterrent to 
some developers engaging with the system.  Section 7.6 gives perceptions 
on penalties for non-compliance.  It argues that sanctions for non-compliance 
are meaningless if they are sabotaged by malpractices in the system. 
 
7.2 Political influence and impunity  
‘… ‘Orders from above’ is messing up this city; it’s messing up this country…’ 
(Interview SP7). 
Political interests do not necessarily foster good practices in the planning 
system – these are interests that serve a few, but do not necessarily 
represent the desires of the majority of the affected population.  It is like an 
invisible governance system working alongside the official systems, and 
planners have been rendered helpless by political interference at many 
levels.  Impunity appears to be an accepted way of life:    
In this country … you find that you’re in a fix you find somebody to 
assist you.  And most probably you’ll not run to a bishop, you’ll not run 
to a pastor, you’ll run to a politician... who will fix things for you... 
(Interview PA13) 
According to a retired planner, impunity became rife in the 1990s, following a 
change in government regime; he reckoned that in the early 1970s people 
were not carrying out illegal developments because punitive measures, such 
as demolitions, were being enforced, and also asserted that there were no 
illegal allocations of land, such as public utility land.  This research, however, 
revealed conflict within the planning department, mostly because of political 
interference by powerful and influential people.  As a result,  planners feel 
compelled to abet non-compliance by developers.  A senior planner 
explained that in the previous governance structure (before the new 
government and constitution), the town planning committee used to have 
more politicians than planning professionals, and this influenced how 
decisions regarding approvals were made (interview SP3).  Minutes of a 
committee meeting revealed that some meetings had more councillors than 
all the other professionals combined – in one town planning meeting more 
235 
 
than 30 councillors were on record as having attended, as opposed to 25 
professional representatives.    
Councillors are supposed to present issues from their wards, such as issues 
with drainage systems, illegal developments, outstanding title deeds, and 
illegal invasions of public land.  However, planners revealed that some 
councillors (and other politicians) were using their positions to push their 
private agendas and interests.  Political influence is not limited to the 
boardroom, but follows planners into their offices and their operations.  Even 
in the Site and Service schemes in Eastlands, intended for low income 
households, some powerful people were allocated plots.  In those schemes, 
developers were supposed to use a type plan55 provided by the city council 
(now city county) for their developments, but the developments on the 
ground today bear no relation to any of the type plans, and 90% of the 
developments could be considered illegal (interview OP4X).  For example, 
OP4X, who had been involved in monitoring those schemes, recalled how 
the council had been unable to stop a member of parliament, who had been 
allocated plots, from erecting storied buildings when he was supposed to 
have used type plans for single dwellings.    
Today, planners are subjected to political interference as a matter of routine: 
…. even in places like up-market areas you will find that you as a 
professional you’re forced to approve something that is not 
approvable in those areas because of political influence, and there is 
nothing you can do about it.  A call is coming from a high office and 
you know you don’t have a choice.  The planning process in Nairobi is 
very much affected by politics.... (Interview SP7)  
Political interference seems to know no bounds, and comprises even those 
at senior levels in the planning offices.  For change of use and other land 
administration processes, some developers have been known to bypass the 
city county and go straight to the land commissioner at the ministry, since the 
                                               
55
 The council architects had prepared and preapproved standard and acceptable plans for 
houses in the schemes. 
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latter has more clout in land matters and gives the final word (interview 
DVA8).  As one private planner and consultant expressed: 
The director.... of City Planning works with the mayor ...., and the 
mayor asks for a favour for a friend – asks the director to assist in 
approving a six storey development in Kileleshwa.  The director knows 
it’s bad but not too bad, and through her boss’s request ‘…can you 
please, assist my friend…’ she gets compromised by the political 
environment she’s working in.  The mayor is influencing the planner.  
The mayor uses polite language but sends a strong signal to the 
director to do what he wants ‘…kindly assist this person and give him 
what he wants…’; it’s not written anywhere or said in those words, but 
it’s implied that she needs to do what he wants (interview PA14). 
On impunity, a foreign serial developer of high end middle income apartment 
blocks complained that Chinese developers (for the same market) had a 
more favourable investment environment than other developers:   
...you see what the Chinese are doing; the Chinese in one acre they 
are putting 60, 70, even 80 apartments……I don’t know.  Maybe they 
have some other concessions, maybe because they are bringing 
materials from outside, maybe they’re giving the grants - their 
government is giving grants, their government is giving loans.  
Because even the outcomes which are achieved – even the cost of ... 
business is much cheaper because they’re getting loans from 
overseas, from China in particular.  So we are unable to compete with 
that…. it doesn’t give an even level playing field for us.  Just as an 
example, my friend, one of my colleagues, he is developing a property 
in Kileleshwa.  He built a property of seven floors. His neighbour the 
Chinese is building ten floors.  But my friend has been told to reduce 
from seven floors to six floors (interview DV11F). 
The above developer implied that there were quid pro quo arrangements 
between government officials in high offices and Chinese investors, who 
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have played a big role in Kenyan development projects in recent years56.  He 
complained that they could no longer compete with the Chinese, who due to 
favourable treatment can construct higher volume of development on their 
land, and are thus able to recoup and profit from their investments, whilst 
investments by other developers were becoming relatively less profitable.  
It is not surprising, then, that in January 2015, senior planning staff, including 
the Chief Officer in charge of Planning, Urban Development and Housing, 
were implicated in impunity scandals after the collapse of several buildings in 
the city.  A senior planner recounted how, while engaged in a planning 
investigation that unearthed political interference within the department, was 
side-lined and unofficially removed from the project: 
I forwarded all the data and everything, but nothing happened.  It was 
just silenced.  And that is what is killing me, it’s what is killing Kenya; 
impunity.  You realise there so many things you can point out, but 
there are some people you’re not supposed to question.  Then what 
are you doing? … (Interview SP7) 
Another private planner told of how his client was bullied into submission 
when they questioned some irregular developments (interview PA18).  
Planners reported that, in some cases, politicians have been known to 
promote violence and aggression in a bid to deter enforcement efforts by 
planners.  Indeed, there was a glimpse of this in the literature review; 
newspaper reports of a politician leading a neighbourhood to the East of 
Nairobi blocking demolition orders.  Planners and developers affirmed this:  
There is a time we had this MP called Waititu in Eastlands, and there 
was an issue of demolitions in Eastland and some people had 
constructed on the road and he ganged up with the people to stop the 
                                               
56
 China is reportedly Kenya’s largest source of foreign direct investment, and second 
largest trade partner. By June 2013, China’s direct investment in Kenya reached $474 
million, with bilateral trade alone amounting to 2.8 billion in 2013.  Projects spearheaded by 
the Chinese in Kenya range from $108 million road networks project, to a Research and 
Referral Hospital project at Kenyatta University (Standard Media, 2013; Engineering News 
2013; Capital News, 2015).   
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council demolishing the building57 – when the council went there it 
became war... (Interview PA13) 
Sonko and Waititu stopped demolitions of uncontrolled developments 
in Eastlands58…. Donholm (in Eastlands) is a mess because of 
politicians stopping the law…. I would say politicians and corruption 
are the reason developments are not controlled.  Developers pay 
20,000 to 100,000 shillings to a Godfather at City Hall (interview DV3). 
Perhaps this could be attributed to the fact that politicians do not necessarily 
have the technical knowhow regarding development, and are rather guided 
by other factors, such as maintaining their status and standing with their 
communities.  According to planners, it is not only with regards to demolitions 
that politicians collude with developers, but organised groups (mobilised by 
politicians, especially in election periods) have been implicated in land 
invasions and the ensuing illegal developments, especially in the eastern 
part of the city (interviews SP4, PA13).   
Apparently a ‘godfather’ is especially valuable when a developer has no 
planning permission, but also comes in handy even if planning permission 
has been obtained: 
(The godfather) ... would be the head of the city inspectorate, for 
example at Kasarani.  But guys on the ground keep coming for more 
payments.  Payments are very high where the developer has no 
planning permission …. If we have planning permission, we have to 
observe by-laws for safety. For example, builders have to have hard 
hats and reflective jackets, and there has to be proper scaffolding.  If 
we don’t have these then we still need a Godfather.  And the 
inspectorate will always find a fault so as to get payments. For 
example, in Kasarani, for a plot of 50 by 50, there is no dumping 
ground when one is building; we have to bribe the inspectorate or pay 
fines (interview DV3).  
                                               
57
 This information was corroborated by reports in local press (Capital News,2012; KTN 
News, 2012; Business Daily Africa, 2013, among others)  
 
58
 See note 51 
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Apart from political forces, impunity is also extended by unlawful cartels, 
such as a group called Mungiki, an outlaw group that protects its affiliates 
and associates from planning enforcement. 
What I know in Eastlands, this is Mafia. In Eastlands if I’m a developer 
and I want to do my three storeys in an area that is allowed ground 
plus one, and the Karengata59 of my estate says ‘no way, I will chop 
off the chairman’s head’…. The chairman will or shall receive threats; 
‘…mind your business - this is my business, mind your business...’. 
…..  If a phone call is made to that chairman – ‘…take this, you have 
children to take care of, this is our Kenya, please don’t step on my 
toes….’  What is this phone call trying to communicate to you?  
(Interview PA14) 
Most of the impunity is extended because money has changed hands, 
compelling planning officials to turn a blind eye to malpractices by 
developers, while developers and their agents have become seasoned to 
making informal payments to buy protection.  
Owners ‘talk’ to the council officials before the building works start.  
You pay about 60,000 to 100,000 shillings to the council workers, so 
they will not bother the builders. For example, behind Thika Road Mall 
I have constructed buildings with seven floors, yet the approval was 
only for two to three floors. I have also constructed two blocks of six 
floors each, and one was not even approved.  The owners are now 
looking to regularise/legitimise the building.  In Donholm, I have built 
six houses.  The plots are only approved for single dwellings and a 
DSQ.  But developers have [built] six floors of apartments (interview 
DV10). 
Developers argued that it would be hypocritical of planning regulators to 
enforce laws selectively and inconsistently:  
                                               
59
 Short for Karen-Langata, a residents’ association operating in Karen and Langata high 
income development areas. 
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…. one of the compliance requirements is that if you go anything more 
than five levels you should have a lift – now how many buildings, even 
in the CBD, have more than five floors and they don’t have a lift?  So 
how can you tell somebody in Umoja to put a lift? You cannot stand 
on a podium and start telling people ‘…now we’re going to start to 
demolish all buildings with more than five floors and they have no 
lifts….’ – where would you start it? You go to Umoja, Kayole60 you find 
even five, six storeys, a tower, standing and they don’t have lifts.  
Even a fire escape - forget about a lift – even a fire escape stair case, 
it’s not there (interview DV7). 
The evident lack of enforcement, even in areas close to the planning offices, 
coupled with inconsistent application of relevant laws and regulations, seems 
to have caused confusion for some developers, and spurred on others who 
are intent on non-compliance.  It is indeed difficult for planners to enforce 
planning laws and regulations when some developers have ‘protection’ from 
people in positions of power and influence, and the remaining developers 
follow suit in defying planning laws and regulations.  This defiance has 
resulted in widespread uncontrolled development in the city, while the 
planners look helplessly on.  Any efforts to effect enforcement are greeted 
with valid questions and challenges from developers, with the powerful 
people who have vested interests egging them on. 
… unless you have a very particular concern with a particular person 
who you want to suffer .... how will you justify that it is A and B who 
are wrong, and everyone else has done the same thing?  Even the 
developers will start defying that and say ‘…no, if you want to 
demolish mine you have to demolish the rest…’  (Interview OP4X) 
Thus the phenomenon of non-compliance in Nairobi remains unchecked: 
while the planners appear to tolerate it or are helpless to stop it, developers 
appear to be having it their way.  As OP4X said, the planning authorities 
have been proved to be ‘barking dogs’ with no bite. 
                                               
60
 These are areas to the east of Nairobi which were not allocated for residential 
development in the original master plan 
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Although development control in Nairobi is under the docket of the city 
county, for planners to meet the demands of their profession they need to be 
free from undue political influence, from ‘orders from above’, otherwise the 
checks and controls that the planning system provides in urban growth 
management are dead in their tracks – there may as well be no planners. 
Forester (1982) argued that planners cannot ignore those with power, 
economic or political, because they would be rendered powerless.  However, 
it is difficult for planners to do their jobs with their hands tied behind their 
backs, or in fear of repercussions.  In such circumstances, they are more 
likely to concede to pressure from those in positions of power and influence, 
as inferred by Blundo and Olivier de Sardan (2006), which is tragic for the 
many good intentions of planning with regard to development control. 
There is another element to impunity, which is also a force in its own right, 
but compounds impunity – corruption.  The section below will look at this 
practice further, and how it stimulates harassment by planners (towards 
developers).   
 
7.3 Corruption and harassment 
Kenyans have thought that if they want something and they cannot get it, 
then they can buy their way out (interview SP2). 
Engrained corruption was a common theme among participants; this 
research was made aware of corrupt practices, ranging from grubby 
‘envelopes’ exchanging hands at construction sites between planners and 
developers or their agents, to sophisticated quid pro quo practices in high 
offices by powerful and influential people.  According to a planning 
consultant, more than 90% of the middle income apartment blocks in 
Eastlands, for example, are owned by rich and powerful people who live in 
high end residential developments such as Runda, Lavington and Kitsuru – 
they are the ones with hundreds of million shillings to put up such 
developments, and who can afford to persuade planning officials to look the 
other way (interview PA17).   
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With regard to planning efforts, even government-initiated housing projects, 
such as the Site and Service schemes, were riddled with this practice – 
appointed officers turning a blind eye while those allocated serviced plots 
ignored type plans for single dwellings in favour of storied multiple dwellings.  
According to a retired planner, notices served on those who were not 
complying were copied to the heads of departments, the enforcement team 
in City Hall, the town clerk, and the legal team – all of whom had the power 
to stop such developments in their tracks.   
…I had one box file of notices, another one of warnings and they were 
not followed up… (Interview OP4X). 
However, when the plots were bought by rich and powerful individuals, who 
developed storied apartment blocks (interview OP4X), corruption and 
impunity reared their heads, and other developers, by default, benefited from 
the same impunity that the powerful people enjoyed: 
…. most of my colleagues, they don’t mind if you give them something 
small – they will allow it – they’ll close their eyes, so you’re covered 
(interview OP4X). 
Planners at City Hall were of the view that Ward Officers in the field were 
also in most cases turning a blind eye (interviews OP1, SP3).  They 
attributed this to the fact that remuneration for subordinate staff is 
pathetically low, and so there is no official (as opposed to informal) financial 
motivation.  Developers also acknowledged that planning officials are poorly 
paid, and that this pushes them to harass developers and their agents for 
side payments.  Unofficial payments vary depending on the area and the size 
of development, and the amount is determined by the results the developer 
is looking for.  In the Eastlands and Kasarani areas, developers seem to 
have accepted making informal payments as part and parcel of their 
investments.  Even when they make an effort to comply, when they have 
approvals from the planning department, they are frustrated by the 
questionable practices of some planning personnel:  
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What they do is they just go to the site, collect the money and you 
keep on building.  Some of them protect the illegal construction; they 
condone it and they even protect it. And you know they are the ones 
who have been posted there.  If they see those people don’t have the 
requirements, they are not supposed to arrest you, they are supposed 
to report you (interview DV5). 
It would appear, therefore, that it is not in the interest of planning officers on 
the ground for developers to follow planning regulations.  A developer, and 
also a building contractor, revealed how planning officials in the field bluff 
with enforcement letters, with a view to soliciting informal payments. 
Oh yes – they will come with enforcement letters.... Sometimes they 
say the building should be demolished.  I ‘talk’ (indicated money 
changing hands) to the enforcement officer and if we can’t agree, I go 
to his senior and give however much it takes for them to forget the 
notices or orders. There are also fake enforcement orders made by 
council officials just to make money.  Sometimes they threaten to 
demolish but will only come at night because they don’t have court 
orders to demolish, just to scare the owner so that they can pay up – 
they might knock down one wall.  They can ask for up to 200,000 
(shillings), and then you negotiate (interview DV10). 
Planners reckoned that, because such officers have limited technical 
knowledge of the planning requirements, they are easily ‘persuaded’ by 
developers or their agents to look the other way (interviews OP1, PA5).  This 
notion was reinforced by developers, who were of the view that those 
officials did not seem to have the technical knowhow to inspect or monitor 
developments, or to support developers.  A contractor, who deals with them 
regularly, had this to say: 
Problems originate with the ward inspectorate.  They don’t know the 
building codes but they know about simple issues like dumping, 
helmets for workers, scaffolding.  They don’t know the technicalities of 
building requirements.  They harass developers on the minor stuff 
(interview DV10). 
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Apparently field officers do not like dealing with the owners – they prefer 
dealing with the contractors because contractors are more ‘conversant’ with 
these practices and see them as part and parcel of the construction process: 
….one woman developer insisted she wanted to speak to them [field 
planning officers] or reporting them because they were getting too 
greedy, and she ended up paying more. It is cheaper to deal with 
contractors.  They say the figure they want and look away – won’t look 
at your face while you’re negotiating61.  With the owner they give even 
higher figures and make more threats – create more problems…. 
(Interview DV10). 
Such officers feed on the power and fear (of being brought to book) they 
generate over developers.  A senior planner also expressed a concern that 
planning officers might also be lacking in commitment, instead being more 
concerned about enhancing their own interests.   
At times the quid pro quo is not only in terms of instant rewards, but a long 
term game with high stakes.  Whatever the case may be, such officers are 
happy to look the other way:  
…This guy is the owner of Equity Bank.  He wants offices up there 
and he buys a big plot, even for one billion, to build his office 
headquarters.  And he asks somebody to approve his plans.  And he 
will ask what is happening to my plans.  And this guy [in the planning 
office] will need to go to that big office to get a loan and so forth…62 
(Interview OP4X) 
Malpractices sometimes cause conflict between planners; there are those 
who want to do right but are either compromised by political influence and/or 
pressure, or out of a sense of loyalty to their colleagues.  One planner 
disclosed how, following a field survey, they discovered malpractices by 
colleagues, which put them in a moral dilemma: 
                                               
61
 It is a negotiating tactic – they know whatever figure they have quoted is exaggerated. 
62
 It implied a quid pro quo arrangement 
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…. now I’m in a place I’m not able to analyse data because if I 
analyse the data I will put so many people into problems, and they 
might even lose their jobs (interview SP7).   
Before the online system for planning approval was introduced, there were 
middlemen prowling the corridors in the planning offices at City Hall who 
were adept at progressing applications from developers because they had 
established a rapport with officers in the planning sections – it was an 
industry created by those who wanted to mint money out of the developers, 
and by developers who wanted shortcuts in getting planning approval.  Such 
brokerage is not limited to City Hall; peers at the Ministry of Lands, Housing 
and Urban Development are plagued with the same issues: 
… there has been brokerage in Ardhi house (the ministry offices) 
because if you follow up your file the title will be released faster… 
(Interview PA7) 
Although the middlemen are being phased out by the online system, there 
are still pockets of solicitation of funds from developers and/or their agents.  
What many developers who use such middlemen may not know is that 
sometimes the middlemen collude with corrupt planning officers and jump 
stages, which is detrimental to the validity of the approvals.  For example, 
some building plans are given an approval stamp without having been 
presented to the technical committee, which makes the approval null and 
void. 
…if you are bringing a change of use and I know you can’t be allowed 
to do a commercial something, I cannot take it to the technical 
committee because it will be removed, because nobody wants to own 
that.  But I still give you the approval without taking it to the technical 
meeting... (Interview SP7) 
Such a development application, although bearing an approval stamp, would 
not be genuine or in the office records; whilst some developers may know 
what they are getting, others are naïve and think that it is legitimate because 
it was stamped in the planning office.   There are also fraudulent land titles, 
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whereby an owner of a subdivision scheme surrenders land to the 
government for public utilities/open spaces, but that land is then allocated by 
a government officer to an individual.  
Corruption is not one-sided though, and developers have a large part to play 
in it. According to DV10 (contractor/developer), when developers are 
complying and are not afraid to challenge harassment from the field officers, 
they are left alone.  
I tell the foreman to give them my telephone number if they come to 
the site – they either leave a letter or call me.  If they call, I ask them 
in which department they work and where can I report at city hall, so 
that when I go to city hall I’ll be told what my problem on the site is.  
Most of them disappear, unless it’s a genuine case, like you don’t 
have a sign board, and [then] we have to pay for it (interview DV1). 
‘Disappearing’ officers could well be explained by the notion that there are 
rogues who canvass building sites and departmental halls, homing in on 
vulnerable and desperate developers – they would not wish to be under 
scrutiny by the county. 
Some don’t even have offices.  In fact, sometimes those people who 
left city hall a long time ago, sometimes you see them around 
harassing people, saying they are still employed by the council 
(interview DVA1). 
Developers are harassed for payments, but they cannot claim to be innocent 
in all this.  There is evidently joint-working with the planners to beat the 
system, and together they seem to be chipping away at it, while at the same 
time demonstrating consciousness of general guidelines.   
The people on the ground are also careful - they will only support you 
if you’re working within the harmony of the area.  For example, even if 
you pay them and you want to put up apartments in Karen, they’ll not 
allow you because their job will be on the line.  They’ll turn a blind eye 
within the realm of what is allowed in the area.  They’re not totally 
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blind.  They’ll never allow what is not allowed in that area (interview 
DVA6).  
Indeed, they are not totally blind, and there are lines that cannot be crossed 
in terms of development.  As DVA6 pointed out, for example, it would be 
difficult to ignore apartment blocks in an exclusively single dwelling 
residential area like Karen.  Therefore, there is selective blindness, more 
pronounced in some areas than others.  This could be for any number of 
reasons; problems in and of ‘unmapped’ areas, the vastness of non-
compliance issues in those areas, not forgetting limited resources for 
planners.   
 As one planner aptly said: 
…. City hall will not bribe itself; the officers who are being bribed will 
not bribe themselves, and they will not be bribed by other officers – 
they will be bribed by developers.... Because if you are willing to 
comply with the law why would you like to bribe? (Interview SP4) 
A senior planner told of how one developer went berserk in the planning 
office because he could not understand how the planner could say no to his 
‘gift’ of money, which was more than the planner makes in several months 
(SP7).  However, there are those planners who will not turn such an offering 
away, and this fuels developers’ belief that they can buy planners’ loyalties.  
Planners in City Hall perceived their remuneration to be relatively low 
compared to other government sector workers, and several believed that 
unless salaries were reviewed, they would remain easy targets and prone to 
temptation by developers (interviews SP2, SP7, OP3). 
……a lot of the development we saw in this Upperhill area, we found 
the council officer is aware of the provisions of the law and 
regulations, but when he’s put against the developer and the type of 
financial power the developer seems to command, the council officer 
simply melts, and it comes to a level where you’re saying ‘...so what 
do you want?’….  (Interview PA4) 
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The quagmire that is corruption is a product created by both planners and 
developers, and the powers that be are aware of this.   
Whichever side corruption emanates from, it has eroded the values of the 
planning function in Nairobi.  It is not just that the majority of contravening 
developers are not known to the authorities, but also that those known can 
get away with it.  Even when they are called to face the consequences, for 
example with planned demolitions, they run to the politicians for protection.  
Attempts have been made to eradicate corruption in the city county.  During 
this research, evidence of these attempts was seen in the county planning 
offices; for example, notices to members of the public cautioning them 
against paying bribes, and cautioning planners against accepting bribes (see 
Figure 24). 
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Translation of phrases in the poster; 
‘Pamoja tuangamize ufisadi’ - Together we overcome corruption 
‘Huduma bora’ -  Excellent service 
 
 
Figure 24: Notices at City Hall (Author, 2014) 
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The posters were put up amid cries of ‘reforms’ after the new Constitution 
came into effect in 2010.  The posters are all well and good, but as 
witnessed in one of the offices in the course of this research, developers and 
planners are still engaging in corrupt practice; one developer was expressing 
anger at a planning official because he had apparently informally paid KSh 
200,000 (about $2,299) to a planning officer who had been recommended by 
a councillor to process and progress his application for approval, but this had 
not materialised.  What was interesting about this case was that the 
developer was not upset because he had paid extra informal money for the 
approval, but because he had not got the approval – he would not have 
minded paying extra for it.   
Thus the same people who were crying ‘reforms’ were the ones behind 
corruption, even when reforms are implemented.  For example, at the 
Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, the Constitution 
facilitated a change in governance in relation to land administration, 
establishing a new Land Commission to oversee land administration.  
However, the new Commission inherited most of its staff from the ministry.  
To borrow a participant’s words: 
It’s just like you have a black shoe, and you turn the colour to brown.  
And that shoe is not different (interview PA8). 
PA8 is right; it will take more than shuffling of staff – it will take a change in 
culture across the board to tackle corruption.  The question is, do people 
want to change the culture or they are happy and comfortable with it (the 
human inertia referred to by Connor (1998))?  The evidence suggests that 
there is insight into the scale and depth of the problem.  It also suggests that 
there is some will to eradicate it.  However, it also suggests that corrupt 
practices have become an accepted way of life in the planning system.   
It was surprising that there was no denial of this on the part of planners – 
they acknowledged corruption as a cancer that devours integrity and ethical 
practices in the planning system.  What was even more surprising was the 
high level of tolerance by the public, despite open invitations to object to 
such practices.  And there lies the difficulty; on the one hand are the 
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developers, who even while complaining about corrupt officials seem to have 
developed a mind-set that it is the only way to get results, and on the other 
hand there are planning officials who are only too happy to oblige.  From 
small bribes to poorly paid officers looking to supplement their incomes, to 
sophisticated backhanders to those in positions of power, who ultimately 
want to accumulate and protect their wealth and positions – the cancer that 
is corruption persists and spreads. The negative impacts of corruption are 
known, yet it is accommodated and tolerated by the same people who claim 
to hate it.  It would take a change in culture between the stakeholders to 
eliminate this practice.  Developers’ agents should not have to factor in 
‘kickbacks’ to planning officials while negotiating their fees, and those 
messages of anti-corruption practices which line the walls in county offices 
should count for something.   It would appear that messages are put there so 
that the county can be seen to be fighting corruption, but in reality not much 
is done to fight it.  For any fight against this practice to be effective, it would 
have to start from the people in powerful positions.  They need to lead by 
example, because otherwise it becomes difficult to advocate changes in 
culture and to enforce from within if conviction is not demonstrated.   
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Figure 25: Cartoonist’s impression of the saga between NCL and the ministry 
of Lands, Housing and Urban Development (Nation newspaper)63 
 
It is the same people in powerful positions who can offer impunity and shield 
wrongdoers from punishment, not necessarily because they have the 
interests of the wrongdoers at heart, but because they might lose out in the 
process.  As Chabal and Daloz (1999) have argued, the ruling elite do not 
support procedures which threaten the ‘big man’ patronage system which is 
grounded in interdependency between powerful people and the public.  
Anyamba (2011) also noted laxity on the part of enforcement agencies due 
to corrupt practices within the local authority.  The planning system might be 
flawed, but it is the same people in the positions of power who could 
potentially lead on correcting the flaws, re-writing laws and revising policies, 
facilitate efficiency in the system, monitoring and enforcement, and lead on 
meting out justice without discrimination.  It might seem idealistic and 
unrealistic to expect those in positions of power, who are also involved in 
corrupt practices, to lead on correcting flaws.  However, in certain political 
circumstances they may do so.  For example, in Kigali, Rwanda, Goodfellow 
(2013) found that the government led by example, with sustained zero 
                                               
63
 The ongoing conflict between the Minister for Lands, Housing and Urban Development, 
Mrs Ngilu and the Chairman of the National Land Commission, Dr Swazuri,depicted in a 
local newspaper cartoon  
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tolerance for corruption and illegality, regardless of the status of culprits.  
Indeed, UN-Habitat (2015b) has highlighted the need for government and 
those in powerful spheres to lead in providing a level playing field for all 
stakeholders with a view to promoting investment and transparency, respect 
for legal systems and eradication of corrupt practices.  Only then will there be 
a chance of winning any fight on corruption and impunity.   
There are myriads of reasons for this practice; for example, planners 
capitalising on fear and the possibility of retribution to hold power over 
developers, impatient developers who are happy to ‘buy’ their way through 
the system, middlemen only too willing to oblige, and the ignorance of field 
staff, coupled with a desire to supplement their low incomes.  As one 
participant said: 
You know allegations of corruption and impunity – these are situations 
that arise out of a vacuum or out of lack of proper ways of doing 
things.  The moment you plug them, you also eliminate (interview 
SP3). 
The problem is, there is evident lack of will or determination to eradicate this 
practice, starting from high offices, through to lowly paid staff in the field, and 
including developers.  A willingness to change would have to be cultivated 
consistently and persistently over time.  In the meantime, a major challenge 
to planning practice is that developers are not deterred in their development 
ventures, either because they have some protection (political or otherwise), 
or because they can ‘buy’ their way out of any impediments.  The parallel 
organisation referred to by Anders (2006) and Mbaku (2010) has strongly 
rooted itself, undermining any efforts to eradicate corruption.  Minimising 
corruption will take a concerted effort between planners and other 
stakeholders, which presently is lacking, as demonstrated in the following 
section. 
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7.4 Poor joint working with developers, other government agencies and 
departments 
Developers aired their frustrations that planners did not seem to pay any 
heed to their concerns, and so the planning department did not complement 
their efforts.  According to them, they were not effectively consulted for 
suggestions, and their complaints were ignored.  A KPDA representative 
complained that, although they were supposed to have meetings with 
planning officials twice a year, the meetings were not happening: 
On their part…I think they’re just too busy. We’re trying to reschedule 
because we like to keep them on track but sometimes it’s difficult…. 
we haven’t had one in over a year…because of schedules and 
excuses and all sorts of things…. (Interview KPDA) 
Consultation meetings twice a year is hardly too demanding; in such 
meetings planners would have the opportunity to articulate their reasoning, 
justify their services and gaps in services, and at the same time give 
developers an opportunity to express their views and frustrations.  As it is 
now, developers are left wondering about many aspects of development 
control and approval requirements, such as zoning reviews and fee 
increases.   
According to a KPDA representative, the organisation writes policy review 
documents and provides capacity training for its members i.e. it responds to 
the different capacity needs of the industry.  Regular consultation meetings 
with the planners could therefore be quite productive for both planners and 
developers.  Although there is some scepticism amongst planners that KPDA 
members just lobby for their own interests, it cannot be denied that even as 
they pursue their interests, they would be pushing planners to come up with 
good policies and general practices in planning that could benefit all.  A 
senior planner acknowledged:  
They can lobby for infrastructure, they can lobby for quicker approval 
processes, they can lobby for efficient and effective enforcement 
mechanisms (interview SP4). 
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It is through such forums that civil society organisations and other 
professionals in the industry could contribute to the evaluation and review of 
the planning system.  As one developer aptly noted: 
I don’t think that in the building industry, that development is a 
preserve of the planner.  There are times when the engineers are 
right, there are times when the architects will be right….and a 
developer often has a respectable view about what he thinks ought to 
be (interview DV1). 
Developers’ agents also complained that there are no avenues to give 
feedback to planners or to appeal decisions: 
  …. planning in Kenya is still housed within the government.  We 
have not really become a planning society where we are so informed 
about the structure of planning and where, when you feel aggrieved, 
where you can go…. (Interview DVA4). 
They also suggested that there is potential to help developers by advising 
them what is realistic and acceptable, based on their professional 
experiences: 
… more and more of the developments have become like a 
negotiated process.  Even the council, we are not saying they are so 
unreasonably or irrationally strict to the letter. They know the areas 
that seem outdated, whether they have been revised or not, but they 
know them.  As a practitioner with that kind of knowledge then you 
can help your developer to negotiate their case with the council…. 
(Interview DVA4) 
Making developers’ agents, especially architects, structural engineers and 
even building contractors, more accountable would help to reduce the 
number of county planning staff required to monitor developments.  
However, at present there is no code of ethics for these professionals.  As it 
is now, the system has created a ‘new normal’ of ignoring rules and 
regulations, and developers’ agents are turning a blind eye as much as the 
planners - in practice, developers are aided and abetted by professionals 
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who should be guided by their professional ethics, but are not in part 
because planners do not acknowledge their value in influencing actions (or 
non-actions) by developers.  One suggestion by a senior planner was to 
require: 
….. that every development that is coming up in this city… has an 
architect on record.  Just the way if you go to court you wouldn’t find 
any case going on without an advocate on record…. [then] if one 
architect pulls out and puts it very clearly why he’s pulled out…. then 
any other architect will find it very difficult to come in because the 
guidelines are very clear to all and sundry…. the architect should be 
able to tell the developer, even if you move to the next architect it 
doesn’t mean that he’s going to get preferential treatment in city 
hall…. (Interview SP3) 
However, this research also discovered that developers’ agents do not 
always agree with unscrupulous clients, who pay no heed to their warnings 
regarding health and safety: 
…. you see these residential houses they have to have proper 
ventilation… so that the house may not have dampness…. most of the 
buildings don’t have fire exits – they only have 1 staircase…. if you put 
another staircase, it takes the space of a whole room - so you’re not 
maximising your land (interview DVA4). 
The agents may disagree with the developers they work for, but they also 
need developers to keep employing them: 
…. should you …. submit as per the whims of the developer and it’s 
rejected then they will not pay you – you’ll only be lucky if you had 
received a down payment… the developer maybe has been taken to 
court or to the tribunal and they come to you and they tell you ‘yeah I 
believe you can get me out of this’.  And there are two things here; 
one, absolve them from the blame but two, also push their agenda so 
they’re not only relieved of their charges but they are also allowed to 
carry on with whatever they wanted to do (interview DVA4). 
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Developers’ agents are therefore potentially a powerful ally for planners in 
that they are in contact with developers, but may be more inclined to make 
sense of reasonable laws and regulations, than their clients.  It is in the 
interest of such agents for developers to seek and gain approval, because 
then they are more likely to get commissioned for their input.  If planners 
were to come up with viable programmes for educating developers and 
changing their outlook for the better, then they would most likely get backing 
from developers’ agents.  As one agent put it: 
…. if you [a developer] come to me [because] you want to develop a 
plot, I should have a question ‘…have you attended the council 
training before you came to me?’  And I can’t draw a plan for a person 
who has not attended, because the plan will not be approved by the 
council.  And maybe at the same time there is a form which I will sign, 
or there will be a form that will be attached to your plan to say that 
you’ve attended the training (interview DVA5). 
The theme of poor consultation is visible not only with respect to the public, 
but also between the planning department and other government agencies 
and departments that work towards similar ends.  For example, it would 
appear that there are four government departments which are operating in 
the same space and on the same principles: the Physical Planning 
Department at the Ministry (whose remit includes land management, physical 
planning and implementation), the City Government (which houses another 
Department of Physical Planning), the Ministry of Local Government 
(mandated with developing urban development policies and assisting with 
planning), and the Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development (mandated 
to give technical support and resources for planning and implementation).  
Granted that these bodies have different roles, but there is a lot of overlap in 
their remits.  More coherent joint-working and amalgamation of resources 
could mean increased efficiency in service provision. 
Apart from the wider government departments, there are also overlapping 
departments concerned with planning.  For example, for the Site and Service 
projects, responsibility was given to a newly created department of Nairobi 
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City Council (now Nairobi City County) called the Housing Development 
Department (HDD), which was based in Dandora.  The office in Dandora had 
its own management structure in place, complete with a director for the 
scheme, technical staff (surveyors, engineers, and architects) and other site 
staff, but it still had some officers at City Hall (interview OP1).  Problems 
started when, after the council stopped implementing the schemes, the HDD 
offices remained and were accessed by developers in the Eastlands of 
Nairobi, which were not part of the Site and Service schemes, for advice and 
planning applications.  Developers in Umoja, Komarock, Kayole and other 
areas in the vicinity would go to the Dandora office to obtain approval, even 
though, according to planners in City Hall, staff in the Dandora HDD office 
are not authorised to give development approval because this is beyond their 
remit: 
… they [HDD] are not vigilant because of course their terms of 
reference do not allow them to evaluate and plan approvals, so they 
don’t have a template to work from…. The former city council had its 
(HDD’s) processes shrouded most of the time and it was not a 
transparent entity and therefore it didn’t go out to the public, for 
example to say that ‘…if you want this you can come here…’.  So 
when a developer is on the ground and he sees a council facility next 
door, he goes there to consult … They [developers] come from 
Kayole, they go to Dandora, … to that office, and those people are not 
honest enough to tell them ‘… you know what, we don’t approve this 
here…’ They’ll just say ‘...where is your plot…?’ And they will look like 
they are going to sign.  The next thing you see, people are building 
(interview OP1) 
The officers ‘look like they are going to sign’, but their authorisation is not 
valid because they don’t have the mandate.  Given the extensive demand for 
developments in Eastlands of Nairobi, it makes sense to keep the former 
HDD office in Dandora open to the public as a way of decentralising the 
planning department.  What does not make sense is that it seems to be 
operating within separate guidelines whilst controlling developments in the 
county’s jurisdiction.  It would be in the interest of development control to 
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equip this satellite office with proper guidelines, and to demand 
accountability in its operations.   
The Physical Planning department at the Ministry of Lands, Housing and 
Urban Development has a total of 31 qualified physical planners, spread out 
in Development Control, Policy Planning, Local Planning, Regional Planning, 
Forward Planning, Research and Development (interview PA11).  So whilst 
the Planning Department at City Hall is struggling due to a shortage of 
qualified staff (with a lot of employees doing the wrong jobs), the Physical 
Planning Department at the Ministry, which is privileged to have graduate 
planners, has a duplicate section, which unfortunately works independently 
from that at the county planning department.  The planners in the Physical 
Planning department at the Ministry were criticised on the grounds that, for 
all their qualifications, they do not seem to add much value to the functions of 
planning by the county; it was alleged that they discharge their duties from 
the comfort of their offices, without going to sites or bothering to authenticate 
the county planners’ work: 
…... if a particular plan comes to you, and you’re somebody 
subdividing this land in Kasarani, this person, instead of approving it in 
the office, he’s supposed to go to the site; and see that the plot is one 
acre.... he should check are there roads, are there primary schools 
around, and open spaces, or what, and they should recommend.  … 
And then they [planners at the Ministry] say, ‘…we refer to a letter 
dated this, and we have no adverse comments….’ (Interview PA8) 
A senior planner at the Ministry of Lands and Housing asserted that they can 
demand accountability from the city county with regard to illegal 
developments: 
Of course in terms of advising we do have power.  If we’re not 
satisfied, we can actually require the council to stop those 
developments (interview PA11). 
However, in practice this accountability channel does not appear to function.  
PA11 pointed out that approval for change of use is with regard to the land, 
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not the actual development, and time lapses between approval and 
development make it difficult to follow up and enforce the approval and its 
conditions.  Like his counterparts in City Hall, he too blamed institutional 
incapacity to enforce, claiming there were not enough physical planners to 
monitor development. 
Relations between the Lands Office and Planning Departments (both at the 
county and the Ministry) could also be better.  When these planning 
departments approve a development, the application is then submitted to the 
Commissioner of Lands.  However, the Government Land Act and the 
Survey Act do not recognise the PPA2, the Physical Planning Act instrument 
used for notification of approval – the Physical Planning Act is considered 
weak because it does not give instructions regarding land administration 
(interview SP1).     
There has also been some controversy between planners and their peers in 
the Estates Department of the ministry, with regards to the new Built 
Environment Bill.  Government planners, as opposed to private practitioners, 
were opposed to this bill, claiming that they already had the Physical 
Planning Act to guide them.  As a result, they did not want to team up with 
others in the formulation of the new law.  According to colleagues in Estates:  
It’s because planners want to control planning and the use of land.  
Because that’s where investment is, that’s where the money is. They 
want to control that themselves, they don’t want others involved. 
…The fear (by planners) I think is just that control – it’s just about 
power and who administers land in Kenya and who plans land in 
Kenya… (Interview PA2). 
It is not only in ministries and planning departments that there is overlap and 
rivalry, but in subsidiary departments as well.  For example, Nairobi City 
County, Nairobi Water Company, and the Kenya Power Company were 
operating with different ‘master plans’64 (interview OP2).  It would have made 
more sense for the different agencies to ensure their programmes are 
                                               
64
 This is in reference to organisational programmes and strategies rather than the city’s land 
use masterplan 
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compatible and then team up in implementing their plans and in operations.   
Clearly, developers do not necessarily apply for development approval 
because they believe in the relevance of guidelines for a sustainable 
environment or the effects of their development on infrastructure, but 
because getting approval may be a prerequisite for, for example, funding 
applications to financial institutions (interview OP1).  Planners would 
therefore do well to forge and foster relationships with such institutions, as 
this could potentially improve compliance with planning laws and regulations 
amongst developers.  Such institutions need not be involved for technical 
reasons, but because of their ability to exercise leverage over their clients 
and to liaise with the relevant planning section if they have any concerns.   
 
What frustrates developers and their agents is that the different departments, 
such as water, public health, electricity and roads, are aware of 
developments, yet when it comes to guidance and the provision of 
infrastructural services they are not very proactive or supportive.  Planners 
provided an insight into this problem; a planning consultant expressed:  
If you ask them (developers) they will tell you city planning guys are 
irrelevant.  Because one, they don’t facilitate …[development].  If you 
have a plot somewhere and you want to start building – you want 
hook ups of water, electricity, what not, [but] try to get it!  The water 
department will not even tell you where the water pipe is passing. 
They don’t know because they have no maps.  It’s left to the 
developer to dig round and locate where the water pipe is.  And then 
after that go and apply to be connected. They might even take three 
months (interview PA3). 
This begs the question why, having identified this source of frustration for 
developers, planners have not attempted to rectify it by improving 
coordination between the departments involved in planning approval.  For 
example, the planning department gives approval, subject to approval by the 
environment agency, NEMA.  But every so often NEMA has been known to 
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turn down applications due to environmental implications, after the planning 
department has given development approval.  A developer provided an 
example: 
...There’s a project I’m involved in – the scheme for 2000 apartments 
has already been approved.  After we got the plans approved we went 
for EIA.  There was a sewer passing through, and they said we have 
to cut our project by so many houses, and we had already got the 
approval…. There was a sewer, there was a river – two things. Where 
the sewer was passing, from the river, instead of the sewer following 
the river there was space and in between the sewer and the river we 
had some developments.  These people were arguing that from the 
sewer to where the river was there should be no developments…. 
(Interview DVA1) 
DVA1, among others, thought that the process would work better if all 
departments, including NEMA, gave their approval before the final approval 
from the planning department.  They found it frustrating that NEMA could fail 
to approve a development after the planning department had passed it.  
They also felt that there was an overlap in the roles these departments were 
playing, and that the process could be more streamlined to avoid duplication.   
NEMA does its own research, for example, on alternative means of sewage 
disposal, so could advise and guide the planning department in zoning 
guidelines reviews, but there does not seem to be joint-working between 
them in this respect (interview OP2).  This is frustrating, not only to forward 
thinking developers, but also to planners, who have to answer questions 
from developers, as one operational planner commented: 
...there are also alternative methods of sewer disposal – there are 
these things we’re calling the bio-digesters; those are things we’re 
supposed to look at.  If there is no trans-sewer and the developer is 
willing to use them…NEMA has studied those things and it has 
several models that they have approved.  And I hear they work just as 
well.  I know they’re able to recycle water, I hear they’re very 
effective... (Interview OP2).  
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Occasionally such technology is applied, for example in parts of Kileleshwa 
in zone 4 (where there is no sewer line) (interview OP2), but it could easily 
be rolled out to different areas to meet the needs of the growing population.   
Planners are coming round to the idea of involving the public.  In drawing up 
the new master plan, there were consultation meetings in different wards.  
Likewise, in promoting the regularisation procedure, public barazas65were 
held.  Planners may recognise the knowledge held by members of the public: 
And that’s why every time we engage residents, especially the 
organised ones in terms of resident associations, we encourage them 
that they are our eyes out there – they should not sit there and say 
serikali [government] is not taking care of us because you’re my eyes 
out there in the neighbourhoods, you should be the first to report to 
my office that ‘…we notice that our neighbour is doing this and that - 
could you just confirm whether it’s approved or not?’….  (Interview 
SP6) 
Putting some onus on the public to monitor developments by supporting and 
developing organisational arrangements at the local level might indeed 
complement planning enforcement in the city – there could be public forums 
which could convene with or without the planners, in which development 
proposals for neighbourhoods could be discussed, accepted or objected to.  
There are already some structures in place, such as residents associations, 
that could be groomed and harnessed to support planning efforts, and which 
could ultimately lead the way for others to follow suit.  Promoting such public 
participation and inclusion would be in line with UN-Habitat’s (2015b) 
guidelines, which advocate for local authorities to facilitate equitable 
involvement of urban stakeholders (including communities, civil society and 
the private sector) in implementation, monitoring and evaluation.   
It is clear that developers have no respect for planners and the system as a 
whole, particularly because of the perceived inadequacies of the system in 
guiding them when called upon to do so.  It is no wonder, then, that many 
                                               
65
Public meetings facilitated by various officials 
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developers bypass the planning system.  Also, it appears that there is 
potential for more joint working to enhance the effectiveness of planning 
efforts in the city, but this is not being harnessed presently.  Such joint-
working could start internally between different sections of the planning 
department, and different departments involved in planning approvals.  
However, conflicting interests within and between different departments have 
so far undermined effective joint-working.  There seems to be lack of trust 
between planners and other stakeholders: developers do not believe that 
planners have their best interests at heart, planners feel undermined by other 
professionals, and other professionals believe planners want to hold all the 
power for selfish gains.  And yet, each had insights regarding ways in which 
joint-working could be fostered for more effective planning.  During the 
campaign for regularisation, for example, planners held planning clinics for 
developers, to educate them about the procedures for getting their 
developments formalised.  According to the planners, people turned up in 
large numbers for those meetings.  Perhaps this was because they felt 
threatened and wanted to know what would happen to their buildings, but 
then again, it could have been because they really wanted guidelines on how 
to change their developments and environments for the better.  Whatever 
their reasons, there is clearly potential for planners and their consultants to 
meet developers and their agents in consultations on planning issues. 
However, respect for the system by developers is further undermined by the 
length of the planning approval process, as illustrated in the following 
section. 
 
7.5 Prolonged processes 
Planners acknowledged that the approval process can be quite elongated 
and frustrating for developers.  According to developers and their agents, 
poor monitoring and enforcement is not helped by the level of bureaucracy 
involved in the planning approval process.  Of those developers who gave in-
depth interviews, 69% expressed their frustration at the bureaucracy of the 
system.  Of those to whom questionnaires were administered, more than 
50% did not divulge whether or not they had engaged with the process, but 
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for the majority of those who had done so, it took more than five months.  Of 
those developers who gave in-depth interviews, 63% had been frustrated by 
the length of time it took to get approval, which they felt ended up increasing 
their development costs.  
As seen in Chapter 5, most of Nairobi, especially outside the master plan 
area, was agricultural land.  For residential developments, such land needs 
to go through change of use from agricultural to residential.  Also, most of 
Nairobi was zoned for single dwellings, and developers of apartment blocks 
have to apply for change of use from single dwelling to multiple dwellings, 
before they can get approval for development.  This means developers have 
to go through the approval process with both the Planning Department and 
the Lands Department. This prolongs the planning approval process, as 
developers and their agents have to track applications through the different 
stages and planning sections:  
One of the problems has been the process itself.  Right now it’s less 
cumbersome (the online system of approval application) – not perfect 
but it’s better than what was there before.  The other one was very 
manual; you go, you take your drawings from stage a, b, c, d, 
physically- that was quite laborious (interview DV7). 
Developers lamented that certain officials might delay giving their comments 
and that they are not empowered to ask for faster processing.  However, a 
planner gave an example of how some private physical planners would 
deliberately give vague locations of the properties in question, with a view to 
getting favourable zoning requirements, thus elongating the approval 
process further while the planners sought clarification, sometimes even 
having to ask a developer to take them to the site in question because the 
physical planner the developer had employed had not been clear in his or 
her directions (interview OP2).  Planners empathised with developers in such 
cases, acknowledging that for the fee developers pay upon application, they 
should be expecting a full and speedy service: 
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…. because the person has paid 120,000 shillings, we shouldn’t be 
bothering them with such detail…. By the second day this guy has not 
brought me the elevation plans, I have to write, I have to show that I 
didn’t take more than the 72 hours.  So I end up having to write a 
letter; it’s another process, it has to go to the typist, then back to me 
for proofreading, then to my boss for signature, and this lengthens the 
process... (Interview OP2) 
Technical committee meetings are supposed to be held every two weeks, but 
allegedly, sometimes the intervals are three or four weeks, delaying the 
approval further (interview DVA6).  The process becomes longer still if or 
when comments are given that require a response, or while developers 
assemble the fee, which is charged after the initial assessment. 
Some developers and their agents thought the Nairobi County planning 
department could work better if it is decentralised from one central office to 
minimise bureaucracy; they gave examples of satellite towns like Thika and 
Kajiado, which have much smaller departments, and where application 
processing is much simpler (interviews DVA6, DVA1).  While the county 
already has teams on the ground in the different county wards, as was 
shown in Chapter 6.3, ward staff are mostly unqualified and also are 
notorious for harassing developers on the ground.   
It was not only the length of the approval process that frustrated developers, 
but also the pace at which the planning department reviews their policies and 
procedures, especially with regards to zoning. 
They take so long to execute things on the ground, it takes years – 
like now they took so long to change regulations for a small area in 
Kilimani, Kileleshwa and some areas of Ngara, so other areas are 
neglected.  Those areas had single dwellings and it’s next to the CBD 
and things were changing fast (interview DVA6) 
It emerged that the length of time it took different developers/agents varied, 
sometimes being dependent on how well connected they or their agents 
were with officers in the planning department.  This finding resonates with 
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other scholars, who found deliberate sabotage of state processes to enhance 
personal gain (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, 2006; Bayart, 2009; Mbaku, 
2010).  Although there are developers who do not see the elongated process 
as an issue, since they do not engage with it, there are those who consider 
the length of the process and the bureaucracy involved in obtaining a 
building permit as a deterrent in their intent to seek planning approval, so 
they go ahead and start building without engaging with the process.   
Non-complying developers, when caught, are subject to a penalty under the 
Physical Planning Act.  However, planners perceived these penalties to be 
inadequate in curbing malpractices.  Their perceptions are looked at in the 
following section. 
 
7.6 Low penalties for non-compliance 
… developers can only support systems which have rules.  If the rules are 
not clear to them they cannot.  And if the penalties are not hefty, of course 
they’ll just take shortcuts (interview DV9). 
This section addresses the question of whether developers get away with 
non-compliance.  Planners and developers were of the opinion that the 
penalties on developers for non-compliance are not hefty enough to deter 
developers in their ventures.  The Physical Planning Act specifies a 
maximum penalty of KSh100,000 (about $1,149), and the court takes into 
consideration any mitigating circumstances before making a judgement.  
Some developers felt the penalties for non-compliance were not high 
enough, compared to the financial rewards they were getting: 
..... the penalties are not hefty enough to discourage [us] from doing it. 
Because what happens is, if you’re arrested once and you’re charged 
and fined, you cannot be re-arrested...…If you’re investing 20 million 
and you’re charged only 100 thousand, you can pay. You can even be 
charged three times and you keep paying and you continue building.. 
… make them (penalties) stiffer so that it becomes very expensive to 
undertake illegal structures (interview DV9). 
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DV9 is a serial developer, and a contractor for other developers, and was 
talking about official penalties once non-complying developers are arrested.  
He was talking from experience, and going by the undeterred sprawling 
developments, he may well be right in thinking that the penalties are not high 
enough for the larger projects.   
Developers who are arrested and taken to court can get away with a fine as 
low as KSh 10,000 (about $115), which is insignificant for a development 
worth millions of shillings:  
Come out of court, go continue with my construction. Now coupled 
with this issue of low (staffing) capacity, by the time you catch me, 
maybe I’ve built two floors (interview SP4). 
Weighed against the likely returns, the official penalties do seem puny; for 
example, charging10 flats KSh 50,000 per month would net KSh 500,000 
(about $5,747) monthly rent as middle income residential apartments.  But 
more than that, the reasons for the penalties are not respected, and 
developers continue to take risks after planning officials condemn their 
applications on the ground.  These findings resonate with Mbaku (2010), who 
asserted that government regulations generate high transaction costs, which 
compel entrepreneurs to avoid formal requirements.  The effects of 
bureaucratic delays and limited resources for planning, compounded by the 
blind eye syndrome, contribute to the confidence of developers that they can 
ignore official cautions. 
As noted above, there are other forms of ‘penalties’, namely informal 
payments to corrupt planning or field officers to turn a blind eye, which can 
be as high as KSh 300,000 (about $3,448) (interview PA14).  Even with 
these, the returns in the long run outweigh the costs to developers.  Thus, it 
can be argued that it is not the inadequate level of official penalties that is 
failing to curb uncontrolled developments, but, as seen in Chapter 8, rather 
the fact that ‘unofficial payments’ facilitate impunity for illegal developments – 
it is those unofficial payments that are counterproductive in controlling 
development.   
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7.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the circumstances under which planners might 
turn a blind eye to non-compliance, such as corruption and the impunity 
offered by politicians and other influential people.  Forester (1982) aptly 
noted that planners find it difficult to ignore those in power, because to do so 
may render them powerless.  His argument that private economic actors 
and/or politics can overwhelm planners has been affirmed by this research; 
politicians and other influential people do often undermine planning efforts.  
The impunity for developers that results affirms that planning responds to 
pressure from various sources (Adam and Watkins, 2008; Rydin, 2011).  
Also, as noted by Chabal and Daloz (1999), ‘the big man’ patronage system 
(and the manipulations it allows), which is characterised by interdependence 
between leaders and the general population, is present in Nairobi, like 
elsewhere in Africa. 
Corrupt practices are two-sided and deeply engrained: developers offer 
informal payments to expedite the approval process, while middlemen and 
poorly paid planning staff are only too willing to oblige.  Some planners 
neither have pride in their profession nor the motivation to uphold 
professional ethics.  The blind eye syndrome discussed in Chapter 2 is 
clearly at play here, spanning planning facilitation from lowly paid field 
operatives to the highest planning office, and beyond.  These practices have 
played a major part in non-compliance issues, and in these circumstances, 
even the regularisation procedure, which has the potential to address 
irregularities, does not stand a chance of meeting its purpose.  Unless this 
culture in the planning system is addressed, no amount of reviews or 
additional resources for planning will combat non-compliance issues, for 
there will always be those wanting to push the boundaries and bypass the 
legitimate system.  In addition, people would have to overcome their 
resistance to change, the human inertia that resists disruption to the status 
quo, as inferred by Conner (1998).  UN-Habitat (2015b) emphasises that a 
good planning framework should be transparent and accountable, and these 
are practices that clearly need to be cultivated in Nairobi for more effective 
implementation of the planning framework.  Indeed, transparency and 
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accountability would be a step towards making corruption a ‘high risk’ and 
‘low profit’ activity, as recommended by Transparency International (2000). 
Self-serving interests breed corruption and impunity, and unfortunately, 
influential people in positions of power have been implicated in such 
practices.  As one developer said: 
... when the big man does things violating set rules, it’s expected 
everybody else will also (interview DVA9).   
It is indeed difficult to enforce or mete out justice if there is selective 
toleration of corruption and impunity.  It is even more difficult when the very 
people who are entrusted with power are making a mockery of the best 
practices they are supposed to be promoting, and are involved in violations.  
No one should be above the law.  As Transparency International (2000) 
asserted, a law needs to be applied fairly and evenly (not just to the ‘small 
fry’), otherwise it loses legitimacy.  Only then would the planning system and 
other government departments which are suffering from endemic corruption 
and impunity have a chance of meeting their aspirations.  
There is also room for more consultation and feedback, which if 
accommodated could help to foster relationships between planners and 
developers.  There is an inherent lack of trust between these two groups of 
people: planners on the one hand strictly lay down the law, but are frustrated 
because developers are defiant of the regulations, and on the other hand 
developers (and their agents) are bewildered and frustrated because they do 
not understand or follow the rationale of planning.  The two groups have not 
developed common ground to discuss and resolve development control 
issues and concerns, and neither is happy with the workings of the other, to 
the detriment of the city-scape.  Governance arrangements, as noted by 
Rakodi (2001), need a lot more attention, even as planners look to review the 
rest of the planning framework, otherwise future reviews will still be in vain.  
This involves forging strong links with non-governmental stakeholders and 
developing mechanisms to share planning responsibilities appropriately.  
Streamlining such links and mechanisms could positively impact on the 
number of developers voluntarily engaging with the system, and even on the 
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approval process, which developers presently perceive as unnecessarily 
elongated.  However, this calls for trust in the planning institution, and 
between planners and other stakeholders.  As Braithwaite and Levi (1998) 
suggest, trust can ease coordination and encourage compliance with laws.   
Institutional and departmental rivalries hamper planning efforts in Nairobi at 
many levels; not only is there bureaucracy and duplication of resources, 
there is also unhealthy competition, which in the end leads to a loss of 
credibility in the different departments and institutions.  This is demonstrated 
by the squabbles between the newly formed National Land Commission and 
the Minister for Lands, Housing and Urban development – while they are 
locked in power contestation, land administration functions have been on the 
decline.  Whilst those in power are squabbling over who leads on what, not 
only do they waste valuable time and effort, they leave the city still in the grip 
of unrealistic and impractical laws that continue to frustrate developers and 
planners alike.  It would be more effective for relevant institutions and 
departments to work together, but for that to happen, those in positions of 
authority need to put their self-serving interests aside and engage in round-
table discussions.  This research suggests that these players could serve the 
interests of the public more efficiently by doing an inventory of their staffing 
resources, and looking into ways of teaming up to cut bureaucracy and 
expenditure on staff costs.  Relationships with NEMA could also be 
streamlined to avoid duplication and curtail bureaucracy, and other partners 
in government and supporting parastatals, such as water and electricity 
boards, could be recruited to aid compliance.  
So do developers get away with non-compliance?  To a large extent they do, 
in that the penalties are not sufficient to deter transgressions.  Had they 
perceived the penalties for non-compliance (formal or informal) to be high, 
that would have deterred them from pursuing developments without 
approval.  It should not be acceptable for developers to ignore notices to stop 
a development or take corrective measures, and it should not be acceptable 
for planning officials to tolerate non-compliance.  To date, the evidence 
suggests that developers have indeed been getting away with non-
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compliance, playing ‘catch me if you can’ with planners, demonstrating the 
blatant disrespect for authority that Tyler (1990) alluded to. 
Governance of the planning system in Nairobi is clearly not effective, and the 
results are visible for all to see.  The ‘weak nature of the state and 
governance regimes’ alluded to by Jenkins and Anderson (2011) is clearly at 
play.  Berrisford (2011b) contends that planning should be focused on the 
physical aspects, leaving the economic, social and environmental 
considerations to other laws/authorities.  This research begs to differ, 
demonstrating that it would be difficult for planning to distance itself from 
those considerations because it has a major role to play in integrating and 
coordinating all aspects of physical development.  Chapter 8 will elaborate 
on this by looking at practical problems with developments in more detail.   
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Chapter 8: The development challenge – negotiating with the planning 
system in developments 
‘…. developers can only support systems which have rules.  If the rules are 
not clear to them they cannot….’  (Interview DV9) 
8.1 Introduction 
Having established the problems of implementation, monitoring and 
enforcement in the planning system in Nairobi, this chapter will look at how 
these translate to problems in practice with regard to developments.  As 
asserted by Campbell and Fainstein (1996), developers’ visions do not 
necessarily coincide with those of planners.  It therefore stands to reason 
that developers aiming to maximise returns from their investments question 
the legitimacy and validity of the planning system, and the manifestation of 
their frustrations is visible in their non-compliance.  As Rukwaro and Olima 
(2003) asserted, non-compliance with planning laws and regulations reflects 
the weak administrative and institutional framework of the city county, which 
has been demonstrated for Nairobi in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
Chapter 6 also revealed that there is a dire shortage of qualified planning 
staff.  This is coupled with other influences, such as political and 
social/cultural influences, which are ingrained in the system.  On the ground, 
as will be evidenced in this chapter, this has translated into unruly 
developers operating with minimal guidance and supervision from planners, 
and professionals who feel compelled to support developers’ investment 
visions.  The chapter will answer the questions; what are the actual problems 
in developments with regard to the planning system? How do developers 
negotiate with the planning system? Is non-compliance deliberate or 
accidental?  
Section 8.2 looks at unruliness amongst developers, which, it will be argued, 
is compounded by speculation, greed and ignorance.  It addresses the 
question of whether non-compliance is deliberate or accidental.  As noted in 
Chapter 7, developers are abetted in their practices by professionals, and 
this is discussed in section 8.3.  Section 8.4 discusses investment costs, and 
how these drive developers to negotiate with planning laws and regulations.   
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It argues that if approval fees are not regarded as legitimate, or if they are 
perceived as extreme, unjust or unevenly applied, then developers are more 
likely to disregard the system.  Section 8.5 illustrates problems in practice in 
developments through the use of three case studies. 
 
8.2 Unruly developers: the play of speculation, greed and ignorance 
Complacency on the part of planners in monitoring and enforcement, the 
fragmented departments which increase bureaucracy, or even the extended 
time it might take to get approval may explain developers’ non-compliance.  
As described above, planning guidance leaves a lot to be desired, and its 
inadequacy and inconsistency has definitely exacerbated unruliness by 
developers.  Despite planners’ efforts, developers are still pushing for higher 
densities, as evidenced by the changing skyline of Nairobi.  This section 
provides insights into developers’ shortcomings with regard to the application 
of planning laws and regulations; it explores whether non-compliance by 
developers is deliberate or accidental.   
The main problems identified by developers are shown in Figure 26, which 
gives a breakdown of responses from 65 developers to whom questionnaires 
were administered66.   
                                               
66
 Of the 65 developers, 18 were involved in developments of more than five floors.  52 
developments were for self-contained units, while 18 developers disclosed they had built 
blocks with shared facilities.  Some of the developers or developers’ agents were involved in 
both types of developments. 
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The responses show a general consensus amongst developers about 
corruption being a bane that hinders compliance with planning laws and 
regulations.  This is closely followed by bureaucracy and the length of time 
needed to obtain approval. Of the 65 developers questioned, it is not 
surprising that only seven were concerned about the costs, since the majority 
of developers do not engage with the process.  For most, unreasonable 
expectations were not perceived as an issue, perhaps because they did not 
care to find out what those expectations were.  A shortage of planners was 
not an issue of concern for many either, which is not surprising if, when they 
showed up, developers felt harassed rather than supported.  It is in trying to 
scale down and minimise those hurdles that developers engage in cat and 
mouse games with the planners.   
Malpractices are rife because of gaps and inconsistency in planning 
guidance.  The research found that most developers do not seek approval for 
their developments because they are aware that they would not meet the 
specifications.  When they do seek approval, some developers have two sets 
of drawings; one which is presented to the planning offices for the approval 
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Figure 26: Problems faced by developers (Author, 2015) 
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process, and one which is actually used on site by the builders (interviews 
DV10, DVA2, DVA4, and DVA5).  Developers also know of loopholes in the 
system.  According to one,  
To get to six floors, some developers apply for a penthouse approval.  
Normally the council will authorise ground floor plus four levels without 
a lift, total of five floors. But for a penthouse a lift is not required so 
developers get approval for one, and then build a whole floor 
(interview DV2) 
Although planners do empathise with developers, because they 
acknowledge that the planning framework has fallen short of expectations, 
they also assert that developers are not necessarily honourable, and are 
sometimes driven towards non-compliance by reasons they regard as selfish 
and untenable.  Speculation by developers is rife, and this, coupled with the 
high demand for housing, only adds to the challenges posed to planners.  It 
would appear that some developers are more visionary than planners: For 
example, a planner revealed how some developers, though building three 
floors, would have their structural engineers design for 10 floors, to allow for 
future incremental development when and if plot ratio allowances are 
reviewed (interview PA12).  Whilst that could be considered to be positive 
and harmless speculation, there is another kind of speculation that gives little 
or no thought to planning requirements. 
Apartment blocks for the middle income group are commercial ventures by 
wealthy individuals, institutions or groups of investors.  These are not usually 
the people who live in developments, and, as Rakodi (1995) observed, their 
interests are solely commercial.  Such developers may therefore not be 
concerned with planning standards, which, if adhered to, would limit the 
profitability of their investments.  Planners confirmed this.  For example: 
Yes. I know of many…. captains of industry who have tenements in 
Eastlands.  People who live in Kitsuru, who live in Runda, who live in 
Lavington67 – they are the one who can afford to put up structures that 
                                               
67
 Kitsuru, Runda and Lavington are upmarket residential areas to the west of the city, 
historically populated with single dwellings on substantial land holdings. 
277 
 
are costing 100 million to 150 million (shillings).…. they [such 
developments] have very quick returns.   You do a development in 
Eastlands and you return your investment in five years (interview 
PA17). 
Developers corroborated this, revealing that returns in areas for the low end 
and middle income developments are in fact higher than returns in high end 
developments (interviews DV3, DVA2).  They know the housing market, 
including where the shortages are greatest and where returns are highest.   
… there is a shortage of housing, and of course as a developer, why 
not capitalise on your land and invest and you reap your maximum 
benefits? (Interview DVA9) 
And that is exactly what developers are doing; capitalising on their land for 
maximum returns.  Planners are not oblivious to what is happening on the 
ground, even when developers have gone through the planning approval 
process.  Some contraventions are rather obvious, such as set-backs and 
the height of the buildings, while on closer inspection, other contraventions 
come to light, such as a lack of lifts in development of more than five floors.  
A lot of developments are far in excess of allowed plot ratios.  One senior 
planner described this: 
Then you come[and] we tell you ‘...you can only do 15 units.  You can 
only go this high, this is your footprint...’.  So you find people then say 
‘...OK, just approve what is allowable….’ Ok, they won’t tell you that.  
They’ll say ‘…OK, OK, yes, we’ll amend...’  So the architects amend, 
will do maybe just three floors which are allowable, but on the ground 
they’ll do even ten floors (interview SP6). 
SP6 implies that there may also be conflicts between developers and 
developers’ agents.  The latter are caught in a tug of war between their 
employers and planning officials: 
Most of the times we’re caught in the middle …. the developer wants 
this and the council says this.  When you try to advise the developer 
of council requirements …He’ll say ‘… why not I?  How come that 
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person has been allowed to build flats and you’re telling me I’m not?  
Why are you telling me I’m supposed to leave a provision... [for these 
number of] feet and my neighbour has built right up to the end of his 
plot?’ (Interview DVA5) 
This eventually leads to non-compliance, and although the agents know that, 
they turn a blind eye because if they don’t, someone else will facilitate it: 
Like now if you tell me you want me to draw a plan for a plot of 40 by 
60, I tell you ‘…. you have to leave some space here…’, but you tell 
me ‘…no, no, draw as I’m telling you…’ So I draw as my client is 
telling me to do, knowing that when it goes to the council it will come 
back with some comments.  So when I get the comments I amend the 
plans, but the developer still has the first set of drawings.  So he can 
still use the first drawings (interview DVA5). 
Developers have been known to their sack agents once planning approval 
has been given, so as to avoid further professional fees.  Such developments 
are then left to the devices of the building contractors, without professional 
supervision from an architect or structural engineer.  Architects described the 
outcomes of such practices: 
There are areas such as Pipeline where the residents have no natural 
lighting at all and they need lights even during the day.  No ventilation 
either.  There are no fire escape routes so if there was a fire people 
would be trapped.  And they go up so many floors, up to nine floors 
(interview DVA10) 
Developers of such schemes do not care about environmental issues, and 
will in some cases defy NEMA guidelines, building on sensitive land such as 
riparian reserves.  For example, a planning consultant disclosed complaint 
letters regarding a development by a KPDA member, whereby the member 
had built on a riparian reserve, contrary to NEMA instructions (interview 
PA1).   
According to planners, 90% of developers do not keep plans of their 
developments on site during construction, for fear that inspectors would then 
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be able to tell when they are not following the plans (interviews PA13, SP3).  
Apparently there are also a lot of fake documents presented by developers, 
for example subdivision approvals or fake change of use, so that building 
permits can be processed (interview SP7).  Most commonly, according to 
planners, the building plans which are approved are usually right, but 
developers do not necessarily follow them on the ground; and when they are 
caught they resort to bribery, as seen in Chapter 7. 
Whether totally ignoring the approval process or just going through the 
motions, developers have developed practices to aid them in avoiding 
planning officer patrols: 
It is easier for builders when there is a fence to get on with their work, 
without fear of prying eyes.  In areas like Kasarani and Eastlands 
plans are usually not approved (interview DV10). 
Developers have other tactics for avoiding planning officials.  For example, 
there are those who build at night, during the weekends or public holidays, 
because they know that government officials do not usually work on those 
days.  Once the building is up, planners’ powers, as seen in Chapter 7, are 
limited by social and political pressures, and they are more likely to turn a 
blind eye or regularise a building than demolish it. 
Come Monday, there is no one on site.  You wait; when there are no 
officers on the ground you construct....by the time [officers] realise that 
construction has been going on, it’s two levels (interview SP4). 
Planners and their consultants reasoned that most buildings collapse during 
the weekend because that’s when (unqualified) contractors and builders are 
building in haste and cutting corners, to avoid planning officials (interviews 
PA12, SP4).  This could obviously be just a coincidence – for a building to 
collapse immediately after being (poorly) built, but it is a damning 
coincidence nevertheless.  It is not just by building over the weekends and 
public holidays that developers can avoid planning officials; developers’ 
agents have been known to run away from sites when planning officials are 
expected, or when they are sighted.  Avoidance of their visits is frustrating for 
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planners and also risky at times; the researcher was in a planning office one 
morning in the course of fieldwork, when planners in that office received a 
report about the death of one of their colleagues at a building site – some 
workers had pushed him from a height (perhaps accidentally) as they ran off 
to avoid confrontation.  Apparently the builders had previously been served 
with a notice to stop construction, but that had not stopped them. 
Unfortunately for planners, many of the people who have created the mess in 
the city are people with money and in powerful positions: 
You see it’s about governance – who invests?  Not small timers.  It’s 
just like drugs – who brings drugs?  It’s not the guy who takes it, it’s 
another guy who ships it from Colombia and brings it here (interview 
PA2). 
That is so indeed.  Money, greed and power, as noted in the literature 
review, foster predatory behaviour (McDonald & Sheridan, 2009).  There are 
those who know the law but disregard it, both because it is not advantageous 
to apply it, and because they can.   
However, there are also those who do not understand the finer points of the 
planning legislation; they do not comply because guidance is lacking.  
Planners complained that some developers do not know the special 
conditions attached to their titles, such as road widths and sewer works 
which are meant to support dense developments.  They develop without 
paying heed to such conditions, guided instead by the amount of income 
they want to generate (interview OP1).  This is especially so when 
developers have enough money to build without having to borrow funds from 
lending institutions, who would otherwise require planning approval, in which 
any special conditions would be highlighted.  According to developers’ 
agents, some developers are ignorant of the building code and other 
regulations: 
The developers don’t know anything about buildings, they only see 
buildings.  They have the money but they don’t know how the building 
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comes up, they don’t know the issues concerning the materials that 
are supposed to be used (interview DVA5). 
Feedback from consultants on the ground reinforces that the present 
planners’ approach is off the mark, and indicates that developers need more 
effective guidance, perhaps more than policing: 
… they’ll tell you, ‘…why can’t the planners come and advise me?’….  
Because all they want is - ‘this is the space I have, I want to spend so 
much, how do I get value for my money?  Tell me how I can build this 
house, which will be healthy, which will create necessary spaces, but 
within the economy.  Don’t tell me that I [should] build a 30% floor 
ratio because I can’t recover the money…’ (Interview PA3) 
For planners to be able to do that, they would first have to put their house in 
order; including reviewing the laws and regulations to be more realistic and 
contextual, increasing their resources (including staff), demonstrating 
accountability in the use of their resources, streamlining the approaches and 
practices in planning offices, and being assertive regarding their autonomy.  
Only then will they gain credibility with developers.  In gaining credibility, they 
would gain ground with respect to controlling developments in the city.   
It is not just developers’ ignorance that frustrates planning efforts, Civil 
society and the public at large are not proactive in curbing illegal 
developments; either they are ignorant about the laws, or they do not seem 
bothered by what is happening in their vicinities.  Planners and planning 
consultants expressed concern that most people do not seem to know about 
zoning requirements (interviews PA2, PA7, PA18); perhaps if they were 
more knowledgeable, planning could become a community effort, with 
everyone taking some responsibility for their residential environment.   
This section has shown that there are two sides to the question of whether 
non-compliance is deliberate or accidental: there are developers who 
knowingly take their chances in non-compliance, but there are also those 
who would appreciate planning guidance.  The system has failed with regard 
to both categories of developers, with similar results in both camps.  There 
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are professionals working with developers who should know better, yet 
collude with investors in non-compliance.  Such cases are looked at in the 
following section. 
 
8.3 Unprofessional professionals 
Developers do not necessarily engage qualified professionals to facilitate 
developments without planning approval; they either use unqualified people, 
or qualified but rogue professionals.  For example, in subdivisions, ethically 
guided professionals (surveyors and physical planners) would implement 
planning guidelines with regards to the provision of land for public utilities, 
but most of the subdivision schemes outside the master plan area contain 
many irregularities.  A retired planner attributed this to the use of rogue 
professionals: 
… Leave alone now approval of the developments, the planning itself 
is not approved by the city council.  How do you develop if planning, 
survey is not properly done? …. it was done by rogue surveyors, 
rogue planners, rogue engineers, rogue owners (interview OP4X). 
For developments seeking planning approval, applications are lodged by 
developers’ agents, not the developers themselves.  These developers have 
to engage architects, structural engineers, sometimes quantity surveyors and 
for subdivisions, physical planners and surveyors.  Unfortunately, such 
agents do not always behave professionally, to the frustration of planners.  
Sometimes planners are not able to clarify the information given by 
professionals about a development due to staff shortage, or lack of 
transportation to go to the field (as seen in 6.3); this results in more 
unregulated building (interview OP2).      
For example, areas where the boundaries for zones are along the 
road – like for example, we have zones 4 and 5; in zone 4 we do allow 
apartments but in zone 5 we don’t.  And the boundary is Muthangari 
Road.  So one [physical planner] will lie that his plot is on this side of 
the road where we allow apartments…. by the time they [the 
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enforcement team] notice it, the guy has already started building 
(interview OP2).  
Architects have also been known to collude with developers, for example 
drawing up and submitting proposals for more floors than specified in the 
zoning stipulations: Whilst developers may be ignorant of such laws, the 
professionals should know better.  The researcher witnessed a submission 
where the architect tried to trick planners by resubmitting plans for ten levels 
after consenting to reduce the development to five floors to get planning 
approval.  Even when they submit plans for the correct number of floors, 
operational drawings for a site are often amended to suit the developer’s 
requirements.  Planners felt that some private practitioners are bullied by 
developers and do not stand their ground when it came to maintaining 
professional ethics (interview SP3).  Even those working for KPDA members 
had reportedly been compromised, being influenced by money and power 
(interview PA18).  
However, planners also perceive some of the developers to be ignorant of 
why and how the planning system works, and oblivious to the repercussions 
of not following planning guidelines, until it is too late.  It would therefore be 
beneficial for developers to be educated on the importance of following 
planning guidelines, and knowing how the process is supposed to work, so 
as to avoid being duped by unscrupulous agents: 
Because first of all you should pay the council charges – if you haven’t 
paid then you’re getting a fake document.  You should also know the 
date of the meeting your item was tabled, when the committee 
meeting was held.  Otherwise it’s like you want a degree but you don’t 
want to go to school. 90% will know they used a shortcut – only 10% 
might be innocent.  But they might still think their papers are valid, 
even though they used the shortcut, but they are not unless [the 
application] went to the technical committee meeting (interview SP7). 
Planners were of the opinion that private professionals engaged in 
developments should take responsibility for compliance by developers, 
ensuring that all the relevant regulations are observed, as per the approval of 
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the development (interviews SP3, OPX4).  Unfortunately, as described 
above, this often does not happen, and reportedly, in most cases such 
professionals wash their hands of the development.  In some cases, the end 
result has been fatal when a building collapses: 
 … a developer decides to do more levels, more floors, than what was 
approved.  In which case now it means that whatever was supposed 
to be carried by the columns on the ground – of course when you put 
more than what they were expecting, the result is death (interview 
PA12). 
Of such developments, an established contractor revealed: 
70% of them are not drawn [up] by qualified architects…. Draftsmen, 
people with just basic technical training…. Yes, that’s why they 
collapse.  Because you just engage a fundi [builder], somebody you 
have gotten from the village, you train them for a short time, after a 
few years he takes himself to be a qualified engineer… Most of the 
people don’t use architects.  You see the government has not made it 
mandatory that you must use an architect.  You can even draw [up 
plans] yourself – even somebody who has not gone to school 
(interview DV9). 
It is not only the private practitioners who are employed by developers that 
are compromised; planning officials in the local authority and ministry are 
also able to double up as private practitioners – they have licenses to 
practice outside of their government employment.  One developers’ agent 
(interview DVA2) revealed how some developers try to coerce private 
practitioners into designing unsatisfactory buildings and implicating planning 
officials in abetting malpractices: 
… A few fellows turn up here and ask us to design for them such 
buildings.  But we’re very specific – even if it’s a high rise building, 
you’ll be specific about ensuring that building is safe and comfortable 
to live in.  But many of these characters will never come to an 
architect.  A lot of the time they probably even work with the same 
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council officers – they’re the ones who do the sketches for them 
(interview DVA2). 
Such moonlighters are in demand by developers because they can afford to 
undercut the costlier private practitioners and because they can extend 
impunity.  Developers and planners affirmed this, saying: 
…I’m lucky because my architect is an employee of the Council, so he 
knows his way around and who to talk to…. (Interview DV2) 
There’s a lot of undercutting going on.  We realise there is a developer 
somewhere, I go and quote 1/2m, you go and quote 300 thousand, 
when you know for sure 300 thousand cannot deliver the quality of 
work that is required (interview PA18). 
Moonlighting is bound to cause conflicts of interests for county planning 
officials, who were at times accused (by private counterparts) of coercing 
developers who presented at the planning offices: 
...you take your client there as a planner, but the regulators there steal 
your client, and they do the work, and they regulate themselves.  So 
you wonder what they are regulating if they are now taking the job and 
they sign [the approval]…. (Interview PA16) 
When such planning officials are working privately for developers, and when, 
as may be the case, they are compromised in their work ethics, heeding the 
wishes of the developers and abetting non-compliance, they are clearly 
breaking their own laws.  This has been known to cause conflict with 
planning consultants, when their recommendations are ignored by planning 
officials due to conflicting interests, or when they question malpractices by 
planning officials: 
And I remember in one of those consultation meetings with city hall 
officers, with the directors, we raised the issue to them – how come 
you officially sanctioned this development in this place with total 
disregard of this regulation, for example riparian reserve; you find a 
developer has been allowed to build up to the bank of the river, and 
286 
 
the regulation is very specific about riparian reserve.  So we were 
asking them – how do you want us to change what you have 
approved?  And you have approved knowing very well it is against this 
regulation?... (Interview PA4) 
As seen in 6.3, planners do not have adequate resources to police 
development projects in Nairobi, and are thus lax in monitoring and 
enforcement of planning laws and regulations.  In such circumstances, 
registered professionals working for the developers may be entrusted with 
monitoring development work; for example, supervision of construction, 
including submission of ground bearing capacity, concrete tests of mixtures 
during construction, strength of steel used, and other technical compliance 
tests (interview PA12, Building Code).  However, in the majority of cases this 
follow-up does not occur, either because the private practitioners concerned 
are only partially engaged by developers (to minimise costs), or because the 
approval process was by-passed entirely, or because they do not want to 
draw attention to other non-compliance aspects, such as plot ratio violations.   
Whichever the case, planners are deprived of much needed back-up from 
the private practitioners. 
It is not only in construction works that private professionals let the planning 
system down, but also in land administration processes.  For example, 
physical planners and surveyors could do a better job of ensuring that their 
clients comply with stipulations in subdivisions.  However, there are 
unscrupulous agents who have been known to facilitate irregular 
subdivisions for land owners, resulting in further challenges for planners.   In 
such cases, professionals do not even seem to challenge each other – for 
example a surveyor goes on to demarcate land even when the plans 
provided by the physical planner are clearly not compliant with zoning 
regulations: 
…Even planning [a plot of] 20 by 40 – it’s client based, 
professionalism does not come in for as long as the client has got 
money to pay…. because the surveyor will never survey against the 
plan.  The much that he can do is adjustments - so that a smaller plot 
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can be smaller by a few metres.  The surveyor follows a planner 
strictly. …That framework is provided by the planners, so the survey 
always follows the planners.…. (Interview PA5) 
Yes, the planning system has its faults, but also, when planners want to 
streamline development in the city, they are hampered by rich, powerful and 
greedy developers, who are blatantly dishonest in their ways, and 
unscrupulous private professionals who abet the developers.  To summarise 
this in a planner’s words:  
I will relate this to a case where I’m bringing up my child.  I will 
encourage my children to grow up as obedient children, respectful, 
and try as much as possible to have a good positive attitude towards 
the public – that’s what we teach our children.   However, they’ll go 
out there and commit murder……the developers – they will innocently 
bring their plans, but when they leave the door they know what they’re 
up to.  There’s no way a developer will come and declare – ‘you know 
my friend, I’m going to do ten storeys, but here is my four storeys’.  
Ok, maybe some of them are forthright and will declare –‘you know 
my friend, I’m going to do ten storeys, here’s my four storey plan, and 
here is my economic considerations for the other bit you cannot see’ 
(interview PA14). 
In most cases, professionals have played a part in developments, even if it is 
only at the design stage in some cases.  It is a broken system that gives way 
to unqualified ‘professionals’.  It is an even worse system that allows 
professionals to abet non-compliance.  Professionals implicated in any 
developments owe a duty of care both to the developers and to the planning 
community as a whole, and it is negligence on their part when they ignore or 
abet non-compliance.  It is all the more a failure on their part when such 
professionals happen to be county staff moonlighting for extra income, 
betraying not only their profession but their employer too.  Developers may 
have monetary influence over professionals, but the planning system has 
legislative and procedural backing, which if consistently and vigilantly applied 
could streamline actions by professionals.  Given the county’s limited 
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resources for planning, integrity in private professionals would be a welcome 
credit to the system. 
Investment is not an easy feat for developers, as the cost of investment is 
rather high, which has a huge part to play in determining how big a 
development needs to be to make economic sense.  Aspects of the cost of 
investment in Nairobi and how they influence non-compliance with planning 
laws and regulations will be looked at in the following section.   
 
8.4 Balancing the costs of investment 
This section expands on the challenges faced by developers for the middle 
income group, and perceptions that the planning system does not seem to 
empathise with their plight.  The high cost of investment (including the high 
cost of construction materials) guides developers in calculating the expected 
returns on their investments, and compels them to look for shortcuts in their 
pursuit of a profit.  Developers gave their own experiences with respect to 
the cost of their developments and why they circumvented the expectations 
of planning.  For example, land prices in Nairobi are very high, and these 
costs are not commensurate with the policy-driven density requirements; for 
most investors in the property market, those requirements do not make 
economic sense.  In 2012, Knight Frank, a real estate management 
company, classed Nairobi as the fastest growing real estate market in the 
world (Ventures Magazine, 2014).  For example, a ½ acre of land in Kilimani 
and Upperhill areas could at that time fetch as much as KSh 250 million 
(about $2.87 million).  However, before the recent plot ratios review, zoning 
stipulations for the area allowed only up to four levels, and ground coverage 
of 75% (County Ordinances) – it was therefore unviable for developers to 
invest, and this resulted in non-compliance issues.  To realise a return from 
such highly priced land, investors feel compelled to ignore planning policies 
that restrict the use of their land.   
The high cost of land, coupled with high land rates, and high professional 
and approval fees, deter developers from complying with the system in an 
effort to make savings and maximise returns from their investment.   
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…in Kileleshwa, land was about 50 million shillings per acre or so four 
to five years ago… but now it’s almost about 150 million per acre.… at 
50 million, maybe you’re doing 20 apartments…. Now if you’re costing 
your land value of 50 million and now at 150 million [shillings], which 
means the increment of volume of the houses you should be able to 
put up should increase substantially.  But the problem is that the city 
council, they are not giving you those approvals.  So a lot of people 
are using their own means to sort of get the approvals.  Although 
everyone knows, and even the council knows, even the government 
knows, everyone knows that the land use has to be multiplied …. – in 
the same sort of ratio.  So if your land is approximately 25% [higher in 
value], …then you should be able to put that much [proportionate] 
money in the building itself (interview DV11F). 
However, it is worth noting that if planning regulation followed land prices, as 
DV11F suggests, that could fuel increases in prices even further, creating a 
vicious circle.  On the other hand, if planning regulations are strictly enforced 
and followed, that would be more likely to stop the market value of land rising 
astronomically, thus restricting boom/bust cycles in the land market, since 
value and regulation are intertwined.  The problem therefore is that planning 
regulations in Nairobi are neither strictly enforced nor willingly followed.  
DV11F above specialises in high end middle income developments to the 
West of Nairobi.  These are sensitive areas in that they are in the original 
master plan and close to the CBD, and moreover the inhabitants of those 
areas expect and demand a certain standard in their environments.  As such, 
developers have to go through the planning approval process before they 
can build.  However, developers, local and foreign, also appear to have 
expectations visionary with regards to the development value that can be 
realised in those areas, and this has driven up the cost of land.  As seen in 
Chapter 6, such developers have been putting pressure on the planning 
department to review their regulations, which has resulted in some spot 
zoning in those areas.  DV11F lamented that, although land prices had 
soared, the planning authority had not reviewed the zoning policies to reflect 
this, and as a result developers are struggling to make economic sense of 
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their investments.  He was not alone in this view, and it did not just apply to 
the high end middle income areas: 
… I’m an investor.  I want to reap maximum benefits on that particular 
plot.  You see the problem is, like that area was planned for two floors; 
you can do your two floors, the following day somebody will build ten 
floors, and your house will not have any value.  And you’ve seen it has 
happened in Zimmerman – in Zimmerman people developed their own 
houses, then others came and developed flats.  You find that you 
cannot even be able to sell your house, unless you sell it as a plot 
(interview DV9). 
There is awareness that the land market is distorted; prices for landed 
property are extremely high, pushed up by an unregulated black market.  
This has been attributed to newly wealthy Kenyans, foreign investors, for 
example South Africans, Chinese and Japanese, institutional investors, such 
as insurance companies, and members of the Somali community.  It would 
be safe to say, as Healey (1991) envisaged, that global market relations, for 
example with the Chinese and the Japanese, give rise to pressure and 
financial incentives to open up the property development market to 
foreigners.  Local newspapers are rife with reports of new investors scanning 
the urban sites, and indeed the city is dotted with development projects in 
progress.  The Somalis are notorious for offering and often paying more than 
the real worth of landed property, thus distorting property prices.  The papers 
are full of allegations of Somali pirates being behind the property boom in 
Kenya68, pushing developers’ costs even higher as land prices escalate. 
Other costs associated with land include payments to land buying companies 
towards their administration of share certificates and for processing titles; 
some plot owners end up paying more for the land buying company’s 
administration costs than what they actually paid for a plot.  
Other than the cost of land, developers are also faced with professional 
costs, such as fees for a physical planner, an architect, a structural engineer, 
                                               
68
 The pirates could be presumed to be investing in property as a means of money 
laundering, namely ensuring that ‘hot’ money is transferred into secure assets.  
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and for subdivisions, a surveyor.  In areas where developers have to apply 
for development approval, these costs are not an option and have to be 
factored in as part of the investment.  However, in areas like Eastlands 
where developers have no intention of going through the approval process, 
they avoid the full professional fees by using less qualified technicians, for 
example draftsmen instead of architects, just asking contractors to ‘copy’ 
other similar buildings, or borrowing plans from friends and neighbours 
(interviews DVA8, DV9).  One developers’ agent reckoned: 
…… They do it their own way; the fundi says that they know how to tie 
the steel, to lay the concrete, and they just go on.  And you find that 
the issue of paying an architect or a structural engineer is – there’s no 
such money available to pay (interview DVA2). 
Apparently, even members of the KPDA, a developers’ association that takes 
pride in following planning laws and regulations, have in some cases failed to 
use qualified professionals to supervise building works.  It is not only with 
regards to drawings that developers avoid paying for quality in professionals, 
but also in actual construction works, whereby rather than using experienced 
contractors or builders, some developers have been known to use 
unqualified labour.   
…. Any guy, even you, can go to the site, start as a labourer pushing 
a wheelbarrow, eventually you get to know how to lay a brick, until in 
time you claim you’re a fundi, or one of the foremen declares you’re a 
fundi (interview DVA1). 
In such a scenario, the construction work does not have professional 
supervision.  Not only do such developments not comply with planning laws 
and regulations, but in some cases they collapse, raising accountability 
issues for government planners.  Of the 65 developers or developers’ agents 
to whom questionnaires were administered, only five admitted to using 
unregistered and unqualified contractors.  According to the rest, their 
contractors, even the family and friends who were hands on in the 
construction, were all qualified.   
292 
 
For high end developments where developers make an effort to comply with 
planning laws and regulations, registered contractors are employed.  One 
developers’ agent, who uses registered contractors, disclosed: 
…. in our company we have shortlisted contractors, those who have 
their CVs or company profiles.  The contractors range from those who 
are capable of building a small house, and others are registered by 
the ministry of public works.  When we have a project we call them, 
depending on the project.  We don’t have to know them, they don’t 
have to be our friends, we recommend to the developer depending on 
the size of the project (interview DVA1). 
Such registered contractors are obviously more expensive than un-
registered, unqualified ones, who are more likely to be used by developers in 
Eastlands and along Thika Road, developers who are operating on the side 
lines of the planning system.   
Apart from the cost of hiring professionals, the approval process is made 
costlier by the high approval fees.  As seen in Chapter 5, approval fees have 
gone up drastically in recent years, some fees being increased by as much 
as 318% (interview SP7).  These costs escalate even further when a lease 
extension is required before development can be approved.  Before the new 
county government, the fees for renewing a lease for a residential property 
were KSh100,000 (about $1,149) for every 0.1 hectare – a developer with 1 
hectare would therefore be required to pay KSh1 million.  The fee increase, 
coupled with the extended period before approval can be obtained, cost 
developers more, as described by one developers’ agent: 
…. Approvals are very expensive, for example [an] increase from 
40,000 to 300,000 [shillings] – normal approval, not regularisation.  
More than double the normal approval cost… Like we do projects for 
University of Nairobi (UON) and because government decisions take 
long, 3 - 4 months…. Like we asked for a cheque for the council for 
70,000 shillings after getting the invoice, but by the time the cheque 
came out the rates had gone up to 600,000, and we had …another job 
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of convincing them [the UON] how the rates have gone up, thus 
causing more delays… (Interview DVA6) 
The revised charges that DVA6 is talking about reflect the value of a 
development based on the prevailing Joint Building Council rates.  A report 
by KPDA lamented that the increase translated to as much as 200 to 1150 
times the previous charges depending on the value of the development (from 
previous rates of 0.001% to 0.006% which were based on square metre 
coverage of floor area) (KPDA, 2013). It stands to reason that developments 
in the high end (where KPDA members mostly operate) are costlier, and thus 
attract high charges.  Developers and the KPDA seem to suggest confusion, 
discrepancies and/or inconsistencies with the charges, but whatever the 
case, the increases created uproar on the ground.  Developers’ agents were 
concerned that the increase in fees would serve to further discourage 
developers from applying for planning permission: 
..... like a project we were working on in Industrial area, the payments 
for the council were 4.6 million [shillings] for the development.  They 
[investors] were reluctant to spend this and thought they should just 
get on with the building and hold the council payments.  It [the fee 
increase] will result in a lot of illegal construction (Interview DVA6). 
The Architectural Association of Kenya (AAK) was challenging the high fees 
in 2013 on behalf of their members, and had supposedly taken the city 
county to court after the increase (interview SP7).  Although that action by 
AAK could be perceived as AAK pursuing their own interests (higher fees 
would mean that more developers would be driven to avoid applying for 
planning approval, thus diminishing the need for registered professionals of 
the AAK), it was also an indication that planners were pushing the 
developers further into non-compliance.  By reducing fees to reasonable 
levels and by being more accountable, it is likely that the enforcement 
burden on the planners would be reduced: 
…. Because those who go for approvals tend to comply more than 
those who don’t (interview SP1). 
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Thus apartment blocks to the West of Nairobi, for example in Kileleshwa, 
Kilimani and Lavington (where developers do go through the approval 
process) can hardly be compared to developments to the East of the City 
and along Thika Road, where most developers have not engaged with the 
process.  And yet, as seen in the last three chapters, serial investors (as 
revealed by developers DV3, DV9 and DV10) have the money to develop in 
both types of area.  It could also be argued that the fees are not high in 
relation to the investments, but that developers just do not like being ‘taxed’, 
especially when there is no accountability and transparency in the system. 
Costs related to application approval include payment of outstanding rates to 
the city county, which for some developers might have accumulated over the 
years.  By the time they want to develop, the outstanding rates exceed the 
amount they paid for the land: 
…the land might have accumulated land rates arrears, for example 
you could be asked [to pay] 200,000 shillings for rates, and the 
developer might have one million shillings to start the development. 
…. In Enterprise Road the bill came to 6 million (interview DV3) 
After approval is granted, developers are required to put up sign boards on 
the construction sites.  Apparently such a sign board costs KSh 17,000 
(DVA1), is renewable after one year, and expires after two years (DVA6).  
The board ends up costing more for renewal after expiry: 
It (the signboard) expires after one year.  But it doesn’t mean you go 
back to them, it is the billboard that expires.  You have to go back to 
them for the renewal of the poster, and they’ll look into why you 
haven’t started building – it’ll draw up a lot of things...that’s the whole 
point (interview DV2). 
The cost of borrowing in Kenya is very high69, and in relation to a mortgage, 
the lending financial institutions assess proposed developments for viability 
                                               
69
 In 2013 commercial banks in Kenya were charging between 12.9% (Standard Chartered) 
and 22% (Chase Bank) (The Mortgage Company, 2013).  However, more elite banks have 
been known to charge as high as 28% interest on commercial mortgages (local papers).  
This was because in 2011 the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) increased the benchmark 
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in relation to recovering their funds; this puts pressure on developers 
because not only do they want to meet their financial obligations to such 
institutions, they would also like some profit from their investments.  
According to developers’ agents, most of the developments in the upper 
market areas are financed either by banks, or by other investors, with a view 
to making quick sales after development (interview DVA2).  For such 
developments, planning approval is mandatory in order to get financial 
backing70:  
…. if you’re doing a development of say 20 units, and each of those 
units is costing say 5 million to do it, that’s 100m, you must have 
approval because after that you’re going to sell to somebody, and that 
somebody is going to sign a mortgage – to sign a mortgage you have 
to go through that whole process.  That’s why you find there’s almost 
full compliance on this side (interview DVA2) 
It is a different case in point when developers do not need external finance, 
or where they have no intention of selling their development(s).  Developers 
at the lower end of the middle income developments, as in Kasarani and 
Eastlands, often engage in incremental development, as and when funds 
become available.  There are also those who use their existing properties as 
collateral with commercial banks to raise funds (interview DVA2), without 
necessarily having to mortgage the development in question.  In such 
instances, developers look to minimise costs by avoiding the costs of gaining 
approval.   
This chapter has shown how developers perceive the planning system to be 
lacking in guidance, and this perception has most likely fuelled the 
                                                                                                                                     
lending rate to 16.5%, but even when this rate came down to 8.5% in 2013, commercial 
banks did not reduce their rates.  Having said that, in July 2014 CBK set a bankers’ 
reference lending rate of 9.13%, and since then commercial banks have lowered their rates; 
the average lending rate is now 17%. (The Mortgage Company, 2014). 
 
70
 It is worth noting that getting planning approval as a prerequisite for funding by financial 
institutions does not necessarily guarantee that the developers build as per the approved 
plans, unless the institution (for example, the Housing Finance Corporation of Kenya (HFCK) 
is undertaking the development on behalf of the developer. Once the funding is released to 
developers they are free to manipulate the plans, as will be evidenced by Case Study 2 in 
the following section. 
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malpractices of unruly developers.  It does not help matters that the costs of 
investment are high: developers have to contend with the high cost of land, 
land rates, professional fees, and approval fees.  Given these high costs and 
poor guidance and monitoring on the ground, it is easy to see why 
developers, especially the greedy and ignorant ones, bypass regulations 
which they perceive to be unrealistic, in their quest for maximum profits.  It is 
likely that developers’ perceptions of the approval process and related costs 
are warped and that planners could justify the process, including the fees.  
As it is now, there is a gap in knowledge and understanding on the part of 
developers with regard to the relevance and legitimacy of the system, which 
undermines planning efforts.  It also does not help matters that there are 
professionals (or non-professionals as the case may be) who oblige 
developers because they perceive the planning system to be unreasonable.  
These issues will be illustrated by some case studies in the following section. 
 
8.5 Case Studies 
Three developers’ case studies were chosen to give an insight into the 
various issues plaguing developers when it comes to investment and the 
reasons why they do not necessarily appreciate the role of planning.  They 
demonstrate a spectrum of issues that plague developers in middle income 
areas across the city, each providing a vivid and tangible account of some 
actual developments and alleged transgressions.  Case Study 1 illustrates 
how engaging with the planning approval process drives up investment 
costs.  It also makes a case against unrealistic planning laws and 
regulations.  Case Study 2 illustrates the frustration posed by lack of clarity 
and an elongated approval process, and the fact that developers engaging 
with the system end up paying both formal and informal fees.  Case Study 3 
shows that there are informal costs to developers who do not engage with 
the approval process.  The case studies demonstrate that developers 
perceive the planning system as punitive, and this influences their level of 
engagement.  
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8.5.1 Case Study 1: DV2 
DV2 has a ¼ of an acre worth KSh 10 million in one of the un-mapped areas 
of Nairobi.  His intention is to build 32 units on four floors – one bedroom and 
two bedroom flats.  He reckoned this would cost him about KSh 55 million.  It 
is his first development, and he wanted to get development approval 
because he feared repercussions later.  He admitted that he was naive to 
start with; thinking that he would be allowed to use the whole plot, building 
wall to wall like his neighbours.   
In order to break the law, you need to know the rules.  I was naïve to 
begin with and thought that I could use the whole plot – build wall-to-
wall - because my neighbours have.  But my Architect, who works for 
the council, informed me otherwise.  He’s an asset in that he knows 
what can pass and what cannot be done.  I will build on two sides of 
the plot in such a way that more units can be built in the middle space 
later on (interview DV2). 
DV2 lamented that, unlike his neighbour, who had not gone through the 
approval process, he had already spent close to KSh 1 million even before 
he started construction works.  First, he had to apply to change the use from 
single dwelling to multiple dwellings, and this involved paying KSh 10,000 for 
a gazette notice, KSh 20,000 as county fee for change of use, and KSh 
80,000 for a Physical Planner to facilitate the application.  He had paid an 
architect KSh 300,000 for the drawings, and was told the submission fee to 
the county (for the drawings) was KSh 80,000.  That fee quotation had been 
given one year previously.  At the time of the interview, after the revision in 
fees, he had been advised that he needs to pay KSh 480,000 to submit the 
drawings.  He also paid a Structural Engineer KSh 130,000.  He said he was 
expected to put up a construction sign board, which was now going to cost 
KSh 30,000 (an increase from KSh 15,000).  He was also due to pay a 
Quantity Surveyor KSh 50,000 for a Bill of Quantity, and a similar payment 
(maybe higher) for an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report. 
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The law requires DV2 to provide parking for 1.5 cars per household.  He 
reasoned that he could only get the desired number of units if he increased 
the number of floors: 
…. the laws say I have to provide parking for 1.5 cars per household, 
which doesn’t leave much room on the ground.  I can only get 
reasonable returns on the investment if I go up…. Other developers 
are creating underground parking space.  If the parking spaces cannot 
fit, then you have to reduce the development. …. The rules are not 
realistic.  If one was to decrease the number of floors because of, for 
example, parking rules of providing parking space for 1.5 cars per 
unit, the investment returns would be minimised… Comes to 42 
parking spaces, on a quarter plot.  That is not realistic at all.  You’d 
have to build two floors of parking... …. at the end of the day, you can 
only use 35% for the building – the rest is for parking (interview DV2). 
DV2 revealed that he could not afford to provide all those parking spaces, 
and said that he was not going to – he would cater for them in as far as he 
needed to get approval, but he would not implement them on the ground.  He 
was also frustrated by the approval process because he thought it was taking 
too long: 
So far I’ve spent the last two months pushing someone at NCC – if I 
didn’t have this contact it could take six to seven months (interview 
DV2). 
DV2 did not have KSh 55 million for the development, and he was hoping to 
take out a 15-year mortgage from Housing Finance Corporation of Kenya 
(HFCK), an institution that supports land owners to develop their land.  HFCK 
will only grant funds once the owner has got development approval from the 
county.  It had quoted him a round figure of KSh 60 million to develop his 
plot. 
You tell them you have the land but you don’t have money, so they 
can build the house.  They make sure they build nice houses so they 
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can collect good rent, and after they pay themselves each month if 
there is any balance, they give you (interview DV2). 
The downside to this arrangement is that HFCK ‘owns’ the house for 15 
years, collecting all the rent to recoup their loan, and the developer is lucky 
to get any income at all from the investment during that 15 years.  DV2 
thought that, if his land was in a high income area like Kileleshwa, he would 
probably get a good balance even after HFCK had taken the amount due, 
but considering where his development is located, he thought it was unlikely 
that he would get any substantial income during those 15 years.  He was 
also considering the option of starting to build, then approaching a 
commercial bank for a mortgage.  Another option he was weighing was to 
dispose of some of his other property to raise the funds. 
DV2’s plot has no access to a sewer line – it was supposed to be for a low 
density development, building on 35% of the plot and using a septic tank.  He 
said that his architect tried to push the allowance to 40%, but the county 
insisted on 35% coverage.  However, DV2 was planning to build on 50% of 
the plot, arguing that a sewer line had been proposed and would be fitted in 
future.  He said that he had got ‘help’ from a friend in the county and could 
therefore utilise 50% of the plot.  He was planning to build on two sides of the 
plot in such a way that more units could be built in the middle space later on.  
To be on the safe side, he planned to put up a fence first, with the billboard 
on the other side of the fence. 
.... When inspectors come they’ll be given some money to keep them 
off the construction site.  That’s what other developers do.  Then they 
can do whatever they want…[with a fence, we] can also ignore rules 
about hard hats, reflective jackets and scaffolding.  Without the bill 
board and the fence, the inspectors will storm the site and arrest 
everyone (interview DV2) 
DV2 was confident that his architect, who is an employee of the county, 
would ward off any unwanted attention. 
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By engaging with the planning approval process, DV2 had spent substantial 
money on fees.  He needed to engage with the process because he had to 
approach financial institutions for funding.  However, he was frustrated by the 
fact that, even though he had chosen to engage with the approval process, 
he still had to factor in ‘unofficial payments’, for example to his architect (who 
was an employee of the planning department), so that he could expedite 
approval.  Also, even though he was engaging with the process, he was 
planning to ignore some of the stipulations, such as ground coverage, 
because he thought the laws and regulations were unrealistic, and this 
meant that payments would have to be made to inspectors for them to ignore 
such deviations.  These would also cost him more in future for the 
regularisation process. 
8.5.2 Case Study 2: DV12 
DV12 has a 30 x 70 plot at Kasarani along Thika Road.  He had bought the 
plot in the 1990s, before the development of the highway, when land prices 
were relatively low.  In fact, he later paid more in administration costs to the 
land buying company (to process the title) than he had paid for the plot. 
DV12 wanted to develop his plot in 2010.  He said he was naive in that he 
thought everyone has to get planning permission, and besides, he was 
contemplating soliciting for funds from a financial institution.  His architect 
advised him that ground coverage for that area was 66.6% but that it was 
being revised to 75% in future due to land pressure.  
DV12 wanted to build a total of 12 flats on four floors, and was very excited 
when the architect gave him the first draft of the drawings showing the 
building elevations, including landscaping (see Figure 27) – he could then 
visualise the development and even started thinking of what name to give it.   
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Figure 27: Architect’s impression of the proposed development in Kasarani 
 
Shortly afterwards, the architect advised him that buildings in the 
neighbourhood were going higher, and proposed that they add another floor 
to make 15 flats – he was assured that no lift would be required for five 
floors, or even more (see Figures 28 and 29).   
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Figure 28: An apartment block in Kasarani, exceeding allowable plot ratio 
(Author, 2014) 
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Figure 29: Another apartment block in Kasarani, clearly exceeding the 
allowable plot ratio (Author, 2014) 
 
The architect charged him KSh 150,000, and the structural engineer KSh 
50,000 (friend’s rates). 
The architect submitted the drawings to the city county for approval in June 
2010, and boasted that he had a physical planner contact at City Hall who 
would fast track the approval process. He was advised that the committee 
meeting would be in two weeks’ time. 
It was quite a blow when the comments came back from the planning 
department – the architect had got it so wrong; the ground coverage was 
wrong and the plot ratio was wrong.  The zone guide gave 50% ground 
coverage and 100% plot ratio.  The building could only be three floors, and 
there was not enough empty space on the ground.  In response to this, the 
architect advised DV12 that he would do another set of drawings which could 
be approved, but that for construction they could use the first set of plans.  
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DV12 was not happy working with two sets of plans, thinking that he would 
be looking over his shoulder with worry; he would only use the approved 
plans. 
In July, the architect’s friend at City Hall (the Physical planner) advised him 
that the Physical Planning and Roads departments had given the drawings a 
clean bill, and reported that he was only waiting for comments from the 
Public Health department.  The architect advised DV12 to start sourcing a 
contractor, and to get a water connection to the plot in readiness for 
construction works. 
I did not connect a water meter but I’m being charged water rates for 
the plot for a number of years and I have no building...I imagine the 
bill will be huge... (Interview DV12) 
In September 2010 the architect got the invoice for the approval fees, about 
KSh 60,000, and DV12 was positive that he was about to get approval.  Then 
it turned out that he should have applied for change of use from a single 
dwelling to multiple dwellings, a process which had been totally overlooked.  
For the change of use process, which he was advised would take about a 
month, he needed a physical planner.  His architect recommended a physical 
planner at City Hall, reasoning that it would be faster that way.  The physical 
planner asked for KSh140, 000 (KSh 80,000 for his fee and KSh 60,000 for 
the county fee).  This was really disheartening to DV12; at this point he felt 
that he had already spent substantial money that could have been used for 
construction, the process was taking too long, and he still did not have the 
planning approval.  He decided to shelve the project for a while and diverted 
the funds to other uses.  He was also unhappy with the architect, who he 
thought was incompetent and did not seem to know what he was doing.  He 
thought the architect should have known better from the start, and reckoned 
that perhaps he was more used to designing developments which did not 
need planning approval. 
DV12 decided to go ahead with the project in 2014, and engaged another 
architect to take it forward.  Unfortunately for DV12, by that time the approval 
fees had been increased drastically, and it appeared that his former 
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application was invalid.  This time he decided he would start with the change 
of use.    
...they (the council) are just greedy.  I have receipts for the payments I 
made the first time in 2010, but now they want to charge the new 
rates.... (Interview DV12) 
As of June 2015, he was still going through the approval process, and by the 
end of it was expecting to have spent close to KSh 1 million on the cost of 
professionals and county fees, including 0.5% fees (and an additional 
‘informal fee’ to expedite processing) to the National Construction Authority 
to register the development.  He lamented that he had spent so much money 
on the approval application process, which he could have used for 
construction, and that the delays had cost him a lot of money:   
.... now the costs of building are higher – costs of labour, costs of 
materials.  And I could have been collecting rent already for all those 
years.... Most of my neighbours have now built, and I doubt very much 
that they have planning permission.... (Interview DV12) 
8.5.3 Case Study 3: DV7 
DV7 has a 40 metres x 60 metres plot in Eastlands.  He did not have title for 
his plot – he had a share certificate from a land buying company.  He wanted 
to invest in a block of flats on his land.  He is a young architect with a young 
family, and had not accumulated money for the investment – he planned to 
do it incrementally.  He designed the project himself, and consulted a 
structural engineer friend regarding structural issues.  He had not engaged 
with the planning approval process.  He argued that none of his neighbours 
had, and that he had also been an agent for many developers who had not 
engaged with the process. The building covered the whole plot (beacon to 
beacon), with a just a narrow corridor for access, and definitely no provision 
for parking on site. 
DV7 wanted a 3-bedroom flat on the ground floor for his family, and another 
2-bedroom flat for rent.  On the upper floors he was building three flats per 
floor.  At the time of the interview, he was already living in the first flat with 
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his family, and the second flat on the ground floor was near completion.  The 
builders were already working on the second floor.  It was a public holiday, 
but the fundis (builders) were busy constructing the second floor, which 
would have three flats – 2 x 2-bedroom flats, and a 1-bedroom flat.  The 
developer was planning to go up to four floors to start with because of his 
economic capacity, but there was provision to extend in future when he got 
more money.   
DV7 acknowledged that he had to factor in unofficial payments to planning 
officials on the ground.  Once he started construction, a planning official 
came to the site and he had to pay KSh 20,000 to be allowed to continue.  
Then there were building inspectors, sent by the engineering department, 
who demanded another pay-off.  DV7 thought that the officials alerted each 
other of new developments, and representatives from different offices and 
sections made different visits.  He was contemplating going for regularisation 
(he had a contact in the planning offices who could help with this) so as to 
minimise the informal payments, which could otherwise be never ending. 
8.5.4 Summary of Case Studies 
The three case studies have demonstrated why developers engaging with 
the system might feel they are getting a raw deal.  In Case Study 1, 
developer DV2 indicated that his neighbour had developed his land without 
plans and without development approval for his block of flats, but because he 
(DV2) had applied for approval, his development would be limited if he 
followed the regulations – he would be required to observe parking 
requirements and height restrictions as well as ground coverage, thus 
limiting his investment returns.  Not only that, those applying for approval 
were spending substantial amounts in the process (and still paying informal 
fees), as opposed to non-engagers like DV7 (Case Study 3) who had only to 
contend with informal fees.  Case Study 2 demonstrated the frustrations 
posed to developers by lack of clarity and inconsistency in the system, 
elongated processes and escalating costs in relation to the approval 
application.  It is quite disheartening that even newly formed ‘authorities’ 
designed to champion quality assurance in the construction industry under 
recent reforms, such as the NCA, are already displaying the symptoms that 
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had afflicted the system in the past.  The three cases demonstrate that 
professionals are implicated in developments, with varied levels of 
engagement depending on whether or not approval is being sought.   Even 
where approval is not sought (Case Study 3), county staff are aware of 
developments, turning a blind eye in return for informal payments.  The case 
studies demonstrate the scale of malpractices within the planning system, 
and the frustrations that drive developers to non-compliance.   The 
‘maximising behaviour’ referred to by Becker (1978) is apparent in the three 
cases.  Going by the level of non-compliance with planning laws and 
regulations in Nairobi, it is safe to say that the three developers are 
representative of most other developers in the city, in their reasoning and in 
their ways of negotiating with the planning system.   
 
8.6 Conclusion 
Unmet demand for housing gives room for enterprising developers to step 
into the breach, abetted by unscrupulous private professionals.  Developers’ 
agents, such as architects, physical planners and surveyors, frustrate 
planners when they do shoddy, unprofessional work, colluding with 
developers in non-compliance.  Likewise, consultants are sometimes 
frustrated by planners when, after being commissioned to aid in reviewing 
regulations, their advice is not heeded.  And yet, these are intelligent and 
professional groups of people, and could do much better in addressing 
problems in the built-environment, if only they could find a way to work 
together.   
Clearly there are a lot of conflicts of interests between various stakeholders 
in planning; some conflicts within the department and between government 
agencies, and some with external stakeholders, such as developers and their 
agents.  While planners care about the orderliness and functionality of 
developments in the city, developers seek maximum returns (engaging in the 
maximising behaviour that Becker (1978) alluded to), and the general public 
and civil society are either oblivious to planning concerns, or they trust 
planners to sort out the mess created by developers.  Professionals, who 
should know better, are sometimes in cahoots with the developers because it 
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is in their immediate, short-term interest.  As well as shortcomings in the 
planning framework, these conflicting interests have deterred the planning 
system from realising its goal of a well-planned but functional city for all 
stakeholders.    
Given the poor planning guidelines, elongated approval process, the high 
cost of the approval process, as well as high cost of actual development, it is 
not surprising that developers in Nairobi have found ways and means of 
evading the approval process.  Although there are opportunity costs in the 
form of unwarranted harassment from officials in pursuit of ‘informal fees’, 
developers have not been deterred in their efforts to maximise their 
investment returns, and, in the absence of qualified planning personnel to 
give guidance and supervise developments, developers have determined 
what, where and how they want to develop - like unsupervised naughty 
children in a playground, developers have taken full advantage.   
For the upper Nairobi, I’d say virtually everyone [goes through the 
approval process].  But for the low income areas – Thika Road, 
Eastlands, less than 50%.  In particular areas like Pipeline, people 
who go through city hall might be less than 30%.  The rest of it is just 
wake up in the morning and build, and try and negotiate your way 
through the local ward officers (interview DVA2) 
Perhaps compliance in higher income areas is enhanced by the fact that 
high-end developments usually require formal finance, which in turn requires 
full planning approval.  Residents in such areas are also more proactive in 
planning matters and take an interest in developments in the area, and there 
are established and recognised residential forums.    
In high end middle income areas, developers do engage with the approval 
process, but are disillusioned on many levels; for example, there is the issue 
of stubborn laws and regulations which do not seem to move with the times, 
and disillusion when some developers appear to be more valued, receiving 
preferential treatment with regards to the application of the said laws.  There 
is a sense of bitterness that the Chinese, in particular, have manoeuvred 
their way into unholy alliances with politicians, allegedly offering huge sums 
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of money, and in return have been allowed to dictate their terms and 
conditions. 
Whether in the low end or high end of middle income developments, there is 
no escaping from the fact that this sector, which gives the impression of 
being formal, is harbouring informalities, with developers capitalising on legal 
loopholes and gaps within the planning system.  It is clear that planners have 
an insight into the plight of developers, as seen in Chapter 6.  It is also quite 
clear, going by the rate of urban growth in Nairobi and as people claim their 
right to the city, that developers will continue to plug gaps in housing 
provision, with or without the support of planners.   
As such, the planning problem with regards to residential developments for 
the middle income population in Nairobi has two broad dimensions; damage 
limitation in unruly areas because the informality therein cannot be wished 
away, and controlling future developments in the city whilst meeting the 
housing needs of the population.  This calls for collaborative efforts on the 
part of both planners and developers.  Planners need to acknowledge 
developers’ interests, confront political interference and take responsibility for 
effective planning, for the people.  Perhaps only then would developers get 
on board to aid planning efforts in the city; when they understand the laws 
and regulations, the rationality and accountability in fee structures, when 
planners demonstrate ethical, and informed practice, and provide reasonable 
guidance without undue influence, and also give them (developers) a 
platform to contribute to the planning process.    
This research, as evidenced in this chapter, corroborates the findings of 
other scholars who have blamed non-compliance with building laws and 
regulations by the middle income group on the weak institutional framework 
and the laxity of the planning authorities in enforcement of said laws and 
regulations (Mwangi, 1997, Rukwaro and Olima, 2003; Anyamba, 2011).  
However, it also demonstrates that developers accept their responsibility in 
this, and that many would appreciate support towards complying with 
planning law and regulations.  The developers under study have money, 
some of which could be channelled towards improvements, for example in 
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infrastructure.  The concluding chapter will argue that the interests of 
planning and those of developers can merge in positive collaboration to 
produce developments that meet the demands of the middle income 
population, while at the same time producing orderly and safe environments.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusion and recommendations 
‘You cannot control development by refusing people to build…. If you refuse 
people to build then the city will not grow, or if it grows, it will grow illegally – 
because somehow it grows’ (interview DVA4). 
 
9.1 Introduction 
The aim of the research was to find out why there is non-compliance with 
planning laws and regulations by developers for the middle income group.  
This chapter revisits the aim and objectives of the study, stating how these 
were met by the research.  It gives a summary of findings in Nairobi, and 
new knowledge gained regarding non-compliance issues in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  The chapter also incorporates recommendations regarding areas for 
further research.  In this final chapter, the primary research questions of the 
thesis are revisited: answering these has also given rise to some policy 
recommendations from the research, which are presented in Appendix 6. 
As revealed in the literature review, Nairobi is among the fastest growing 
cities, not only in sub-Saharan Africa, but in the world.  As in other cities, the 
government is not ever likely to meet the supply of housing needed for its 
population, which continues to grow.  For the middle income group, private 
developers have stepped into the breach and are housing a substantial 
proportion of the population in apartment blocks.  The research has revealed 
that in Nairobi developers are responding to demand by exceeding the 
allowable development capacities on their land, while the city planners turn a 
blind eye for various reasons, ranging from low staffing capacities to financial 
inducements to planning officers. These findings echo those of Gatabaki-
Kamau and Karirah-Gitau (2004), about developers leading in setting trends 
contrally to planning expectations.  In Nairobi, these developments, which 
give the impression that they are formal because they do not display the 
same obvious symptoms of informality as slum areas, have spread and have 
clearly been tolerated.  Whatever the reason that they’re tolerated, it is clear 
that there is a need for them, that they serve a purpose.   
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It was clear that whether it is in the form of residential block developments for 
the middle income groups, or informal settlements in marginalised areas, the 
repercussions of non-compliance in residential developments can be serious 
and far reaching.  These not only include deterioration in the quality of new 
housing provision and urban public space, but can sometimes be fatal.  Also, 
non-compliance is costly, in various forms, to various stakeholders.  Planning 
systems are therefore faced with the challenge of intervening in market 
processes, in a way that promotes sustainable residential developments.     
The research approached the issue of non-compliance from a political 
economy perspective, which explains how economic interests of developers 
guide their actions, which end up impinging on planning agendas.  The 
ontological position was that perceptions of the planning system by planners 
and developers are meaningful in explaining the social reality and impact of 
the planning system on residential developments.  The epistemological 
position was that meaningful data on interactions between planners and 
developers can be generated by interacting with them, listening to them and 
asking questions.  This turned out to be so, with the research generating a 
humbling amount of data from planners and their consultants, developers 
and their agents. 
It was of interest to this research to find out why non-compliance is tolerated 
or ignored by planners.  Is it because the planning system recognises that 
the rules were not sensible or appropriate to start with, and if so, why have 
they not been amended to reflect and accommodate what is happening on 
the ground?  This research looked to identify what rules developers find 
practical and/or sensible and are respected, and which ones they choose to 
ignore, and why.  With this in mind, the research addressed the following 
questions; 
1. What challenges do urban planners face in implementing planning 
laws and regulations, and monitoring best practices in housing 
developments for the middle income group?   
2. What challenges do urban developers face in adhering to the said 
laws and regulations? 
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3. What are the characteristics of the relationship between planners and 
developers, and why do they foster non-compliance? 
Although some of the data from the research served to reinforce the existing 
literature with regards to non-compliance issues, this research also found out 
that the phenomenon in middle income residential developments has 
different dimension.  Unlike non-compliance in informal settlements (slums 
and squatter settlements), the rationality for non-compliance in middle 
income developments is buried in differing perceptions (between planners 
and developers) of what is acceptable, relevant or realistic for housing 
provision for this group, while potential residents’ expectations of provision 
are guided by effective demand in addition to their needs.  Also, examining 
housing provision for this group reveals a wealth of untapped resources that 
are within reach of planners – the lived experiences and private capital of 
developers, as well as professional and visionary inputs from consultants 
and private practitioners.  These present a lot of potential for enhancing 
compliance with building laws and regulations in Nairobi and other sub-
Saharan African cities.  Following on from discussions in the literature review 
on non-compliance and contestations within planning systems (for example 
Kironde, 1992; Olima and Rukwaro, 2000; Onyango and Olima, 2008; 
Watson, 2009; Berrisford, 2011b), the research project had assumed clear 
differences in interests between planners and developers.  However, what 
emerged in the field is that there are many interlinking factors between these 
two groups of players, and in many cases, the challenges in the system have 
bred informal collaboration between them.   
The following sections will discuss the findings with regard to challenges in 
planning, in developments, and in interactions between planners and 
developers.  Section 9.2 will address the question of challenges to planners, 
section 9.3 the question of challenges to developers, and section 9.4 the 
characteristics of relationships between planners and developers and why 
they foster non-compliance.  
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9.2 Challenges in the planning framework 
This section gives a summary of findings towards answering the question; 
‘What challenges do urban planners face in implementing planning laws and 
regulations, and monitoring best practices in housing developments for the 
middle income group?’   
The Vancouver Declaration On Human Settlements recognised that the use 
and tenure of land should be subject to public control, since land is limited in 
supply.  It defined planning as ‘…a process to achieve the goals and 
objectives of national development through the rational and efficient use of 
available resources…’.  (UN-Habitat 1976b, pp 5).  However, plans are only 
effective if they are implemented (Wheeler, 2004); if planning powers are 
merely preventative instead of also initiating development, the actual 
developments and development patterns represent responses to market 
forces (Pickvance ,1977).  Unfortunately, sometimes developers and 
planning staff have different and conflicting goals, and planning systems that 
ignore the reality of this usually fail (ibid.).  The literature suggests that non-
compliance with planning laws and regulations is mostly due to failures of the 
system (Olima, 1997; Rukwaro and Olima, 2003; Nwaka, 2005; Watson, 
2009).  This research did indeed find failures in a system that is based on 
laws and regulations adapted out of context, without paying heed to realities 
on the ground.  Developers for the middle income group are a ‘dominant’ 
group, the term used by Pile, Brook and Mooney (1999).  The research found 
that ‘informal’ developments for the middle income group are thriving 
because there is effective demand from this group, spurring on developers.  
In the face of failures of the planning system, the operations of a capitalist 
economy and housing market have produced ‘disorderly’ developments.   
The Vancouver Declaration warned about transposing standards and criteria 
which disadvantage the majority of the population, and this is a risk when 
foreigners from developed countries take the lead in drawing up blueprints 
for cities.  Acknowledging that the planning system has failed to control 
development, planners in Nairobi have followed their counterparts in Kigali, 
for example, and reviewed the city’s master plan.  However, like in Kigali, this 
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exercise was spearheaded by foreigners, in Nairobi’s case the Japanese.  
Whilst the new master plans are ambitious and if actualised would change 
the skylines of these cities, it is the local planners who will be judged by 
history, and they have a role in steering the content and implementation of 
these plans, guided by local contexts and experiences.  The role of political 
and economic drivers in making decisions about who is involved in drawing 
up city plans cannot be ignored, but neither can possible repercussions in 
the years to come if the plans do not accommodate the majority of the cities’ 
population.  As Campbell and Fainstein (1996) asserted, planners’ visions 
compete with interests of developers and other stakeholders – planners 
therefore need to visualise urban futures in tandem with other stakeholders.  
Kenya Vision 2030 is still young; perhaps there could be lessons learnt from 
this research, however small, so that practices of the middle income groups 
to address their housing needs in Nairobi will be within, not contravening, the 
formal systems.  Perhaps then, in 20 years’ time from now, there will be 
more favourable responses to the question ‘whose interests are represented 
in the city?’ 
As seen in Chapter 8, planners and their consultants in Nairobi have also 
been reviewing planning legislation, and the Kenya Constitution 2010, as 
seen in Chapter 4, created other new legislation, such as the County 
Government Act and the Cities and Urban Areas Act, intended to empower 
planners to streamline the planning system.  Berrisford (2011a) advises that, 
when carrying out such reviews, it is important to not only identify the main 
stakeholders’ political and economic interests, but also the resources and 
systems required for implementation.  According to him, good planning 
requires accountability, transparency, consistency, and should embrace 
economic, social and environmental aspects.  Also as seen in Chapter 2, a 
good framework should also evolve in the context of changing economic 
forces (Healey, 1992), be enforceable and transparent (UN-Habitat, 2015b), 
have appropriate partnerships involving all relevant stakeholders (UN-
Habitat, 2015b), and be able to work with informality (Watson, 2005).  
However, it would appear that none of the stakeholders who were involved in 
drafting the new laws – the ministries, consultants from the universities, and 
316 
 
professional bodies, among others – felt any urgency to finalise the review of 
the laws so that those responsible could get on with the job of guiding 
developments in the city.  For the laws to be enacted and to become 
effective in controlling urban growth in Nairobi, there has to be consensus 
about how best to control land use within holistic guidelines.  For example, in 
South Africa, the Council of the Built Environment Act No. 43 of 2000 
provides a framework for professions in the built environment, guiding on 
policy matters and on legislation.  Although this precise arrangement may not 
be appropriate for Kenya and Nairobi, the concept of bringing built 
environment legislation under one umbrella could potentially make 
governance easier.  Perhaps the Kenyan review was too ambitious to start 
with, and building and planning aspects should have been treated separately 
from the onset.  This research found it rather disappointing that reviews and 
enactments of essential legislation can be sabotaged by conflicting interests 
amongst those trusted with the reform assignments, such as the conflicts 
between the NLC and Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development 
over their mandate, as seen in Chapter 5.3.2.  And whilst those in power are 
squabbling over who leads on what, not only do they waste valuable time 
and intellect, but they leave the city in the grip of unrealistic and impractical 
laws that continue to frustrate both developers and planners.   
Lack of consensus, institutional rivalry, and also professional rivalry have 
played a big part in delaying reviews of the relevant legislation intended to 
take into account contextual differences, accommodate changes in 
technology and address the emerging needs of the population.  Inadequate 
and outdated legislation has fostered non-compliance with building laws and 
regulations by developers.  There is, however, hope that whilst previous 
legislation was ‘hand-me-down’ from the colonial masters, and mostly 
favoured the elite in the city, the new laws have been drawn up with inputs 
from civil society, which can influence other players in law making.  
Berrisford (2013) was right to point out that ‘they (civil society) can exert 
influence and assert rights to make decision-makers more cognisant of the 
limits of their powers and more accountable to the general public’. 
317 
 
With regards to land administration, this research echoes findings by other 
scholars (Olima, 1997; Oyugi and K’Akumu, 2007; Mwangi and Nyika, 2010) 
about the challenges poor practices in land administration pose to planners 
with regards to irregularities in allocations, abetted by corruption and 
impunity.  But this research has gone further, revealing particular issues 
regarding subdivisions, including issues of ownership registration, which are 
posed by the activities of land buying companies.  It is clear that there is a 
market for plots in irregular subdivisions.  It is also clear that residential 
developments on such informally subdivided land have a niche in the 
housing market. This reflects the findings by other scholars, who claimed that 
local perceptions and realities, for example with regard to plot sizes, spaces 
for roads and density of developments, were not in sync with the formal 
requirements (Payne, 2001; Musyoka, 2006).  Musyoka (2006) argued that 
such informal subdivisions are deemed to be adequate by those who could 
afford to buy shares and plots in them.  This research found that effective 
demand for informal subdivisions in Nairobi translates, in many cases, to 
ownership by commercial investors in middle income developments, who are 
spurred on by the demand for those units.  Such differing perceptions 
(between consumers and the state) are likely to frustrate planning efforts, if 
and when planners insist on (unrealistic) formal standards.  Although this 
thesis’ evidence was limited to Nairobi, these issues are likely to be present 
in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa.  There is room for research in other 
cities to examine issues related to land ownership, registration, regulation 
and development. 
The literature highlighted the difficulties faced by Nairobi’s planners in 
gathering statistics and information (K’Akumu, 2006; Lewis, 2008). This is 
not surprising, considering that the research section in Nairobi’s planning 
department has not been serving its functions, and is considered to have 
‘dry’ posts, as termed by (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, 2006).   Instead, 
planners compete for more ‘lucrative’ posts in development control, 
contributing to the failure of the visionary sections to make a significant 
contribution to planning the city. 
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It was noted in the literature review that planning has typically not been 
prioritised in the allocation of budgets in sub-Saharan African cities and as a 
result, the objectives of previous blueprint plans have not been not 
actualised.  In Nairobi, the 1948 master plan failed to deliver its promises 
because there was no emphasis on its implementation (Oyugi and K’Akumu, 
2007), and the same fate met the subsequent Nairobi Metropolitan Growth 
Strategy of 1973.  Planning goals have been a low priority within the overall 
political agenda, and planners have been restricted to playing reactive, 
regulatory roles.  The ‘swollen state’ (Diamond, 1987) and ‘oversized’ public 
service (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan) have not helped in preserving 
resources.  Neither has misappropriation of public office resources, as 
alluded to by Mbaku (2010). The research data indicates that there is still a 
long way to go before the planning department in Nairobi is equipped with 
enough resources to fulfil its roles, requiring adequate staffing capacity, as 
well as basic equipment like transport to the field and operational software 
for planners.  Given the rate at which the city is growing, it is doubtful 
whether the planning department in Nairobi could ever employ enough 
qualified planners to oversee development in its area of jurisdiction.  
O’Looney (1998) asserts that outsourcing of government functions can 
generate new ideas to increase efficiency and effectively use knowledge and 
resources, which might be in short supply in the public sector.  But more than 
that, outsourcing also frees up government agencies to focus on their core 
functions.  This research affirms that developers feel under-provision of 
guidance and monitoring by planners.  If this gap was to be minimised and 
more guidance provided, then there would be fewer developers defying the 
laws.   
The study found that there is some hope that whatever has gone wrong with 
development in the city can be rectified to some extent through the 
regularisation procedure.  There is no reason why the regularisation process 
cannot work; it has worked in developed countries where infrastructure has 
been upgraded with buildings in-situ.  Closer to home, the approach has 
yielded positive results in slum upgrading schemes in sub-Saharan Africa 
cities, such as Dar es Salaam, Nairobi, Lagos, and Dakar, among others 
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(Kironde, 1992a; Gulyani and Bassett, 2007; among others).   However, 
initiatives by planners to reach out to developers in an effort to formalise their 
developments under the regularisation process in Nairobi are already being 
undermined by poor coordination as well as high costs.  In addition, the 
process does not compel developers to conform to the procedure.  And yet, it 
would be in the interests of all if the regularisation procedure was to be 
facilitated effectively, even though it affects people’s investments in that it 
can require total or partial demolitions, or adjustments which add to 
investment costs.  As Healy (1992) pointed out, developers invest high levels 
of capital, expecting substantial returns in the long term.  Planners need to 
demonstrate an insight into this, even as they push their well-meant agendas 
forward.  It goes back to the question of whether there is trust between the 
planners and developers - questions such as; where does all the money paid 
by developers for regularisation go? Why are some developments not being 
regularised?  Can developers be trusted to follow guidance and can planners 
be trusted to supervise and monitor necessary revisions?  The general 
consensus in the literature is that trust in institutions, and between citizens 
and state agents, enhances compliance with laws and regulations 
(Blackburn, 1998; Braithwaite and Levi, 1998).  It is evident from this 
research that such trust in the planning institutions in Nairobi is lacking, and 
as result, non-compliance permeates even the remedial process of 
regularisation. 
 
9.3 Challenges in developments 
This section summarises the findings towards the question; ‘What challenges 
do urban property developers face in adhering to the relevant laws and 
regulations in housing developments for the middle income group?’ 
The literature has mostly blamed non-compliance with building laws and 
regulations by the middle income group on the weak institutional framework 
and the laxity of the planning authorities in enforcement of the said laws and 
regulations (Mwangi, 1997, Rukwaro and Olima, 2003; Anyamba, 2011).  
This research revealed that developers do feel challenged by planning 
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requirements, but that the high cost of investment in the city is an equally 
important explanation for the way they engage (or not, as the case may be) 
with the planning system.  Some of the costs, such as land and mortgage 
costs, are taken into account by developers in their investment decisions and 
planners have little or no control over them.  However, there are additional 
investment costs that really irk developers, such as inflated approval fees, 
and the ‘informal’ fees that have to be paid to planning staff if an application 
is to be approved and construction to proceed.   
In talking to developers who do engage with the approval system, for 
example those in case studies 1 and 2 presented in Chapter 8.5, this 
research revealed that such developers would rather develop legally, but are 
frustrated by failures in the system, and feel penalised, for example by the 
high fees.  This echoes Mbaku (2010), who noted that government 
procedures generate high costs.  Such developers engage with the system 
because they are weary of the repercussions of not complying, and 
sometimes because of requirements by funding institutions.  Whatever their 
reasons, the county would do well to foster and ‘reward’ these developers 
rather than punishing them, at the same time meting out harsher penalties 
for non-compliers to deter them from defying the laws and regulations.  
However, planners can only root out ‘rogue’ developers by first ensuring that 
the laws and regulations are understood by all, have a clear rationale, and 
that the system works in support of those engaging with it.  They can only do 
this if their operations are transparent, fair and just, and if their role is truly 
supportive of appropriate and sustainable developments.  This argument 
echoes other scholars cited in the literature review, for example Tyler, 1990; 
Braithwaite and Levi, 1998; Transparency International, 2000; UN Habitat, 
2015b. 
The research was conducted when developers and their agents were still 
reeling from a sharp increase in development approval fees, and the general 
feeling was that this could only bring the numbers seeking formal approval 
down.  They questioned the rationale behind the high fees charged for 
development approval and even higher fees for regularisation.  Developers’ 
Case Study 1 revealed how the developer had spent more than KSh1 million 
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(and rising), before he had even started construction works, because he had 
chosen to engage with the planning approval process.  This is a major 
deterrent for developers.  This research argues that if the fees related to 
planning approval process were to be reduced, developers would be 
prompted and encouraged to seek planning approval – efforts to reel them in 
would be more rewarding.  And if the numbers of developers seeking 
planning and building approval increased substantially, the fees would not 
have to be punitively high, since the county would raise enough revenue to 
meet the target for the department.  Such reforms could, therefore, 
potentially create a virtuous circle of income generation.   
Developers’ ignorance of the regulations,, alluded to in the literature review 
(Arimah and Adeagbo, 2000; Musyoka, 2006), was evident in this research.  
However, it also found that, in the case of middle income developments, 
while ignorance does contribute to non-compliance, the lack of respect for 
the laws and regulations with regard to land subdivisions, as well as 
developments, is even more important.  This affirms Mbaku (2010), who 
pointed out that when citizens do not understand laws, they do not respect or 
legitimise them.  As one participant expressed, developers can only comply 
with systems which have clear rules (interview DV9).  This is supported by 
the actions of many developers, which indicate that they do not understand 
the laws and regulations, or the rationale behind them.  Reality on the ground 
implies that existing irregular subdivisions and developments thereon, which 
play an important role in meeting demand, need to be accepted.  The reality 
cautions against excessive and unrealistic expectations.  Planners therefore 
need to come up with both a way of addressing the deficiencies of existing 
residential developments and an education programme to address the gap in 
understanding by developers, and more than that, they need to be realistic in 
their policies and expectations.  As discussed in Chapter 8, developers could 
be trained in planning clinics, through their agents, or in other forums in 
communities.  However, no amount of education will deter developers if 
innappropriate laws and institutions, such as those inherited from European 
colonists, are still the ones being pushed forward.  Planners need to put their 
house in order first. 
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9.4 Challenges in governance: Distrustful relationships between 
planners and developers 
This section summarises findings with regards to the question; ‘What are the 
characteristics of the relationships between planners and developers, and 
why do they foster non-compliance?’.   
A lot has been said in the literature about corruption in government offices, 
power relations and political motives (Rakodi, 2001; Schilderman and Lowe, 
2002; Nwaka, 2005; Gandy, 2006; Mbaku, 2010; among others).  This 
research corroborated this, revealing a complexity of many-layered conflicts 
of interest involved in the planning system.  There is general concurrence, in 
the literature and this research, about the detrimental effects of corruption 
and impunity in the system.  It is clear that whilst there is corruption and 
‘protection’ in the system, the city will lack effective growth control.  
It is also clear that corruption and impunity practices are fostered by those in 
powerful and influential positions, including high political offices.  The sad 
thing about this is that efforts by those with integrity are easily quashed and 
frustrated by powerful people who want to protect their wealth and position. 
This finding concurs with other scholars, who found that civil servants are 
more likely to lose their jobs by not engaging in corrupt practices than by 
good practice (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, 2006; Mbaku, 2010).  The fact 
that the functions of the planning office are intertwined with political 
structures and governance means that planning and politics are inevitably 
linked, and indeed should be in a democratic system in which elected 
representatives make decision and are held to account by voters.  However, 
in practice in Nairobi, political influence means that the system 
allows/empowers investors to do what they want ‘under’ the law by extending 
impunity.  This is linked with sophisticated corruption in high offices, as well 
as other political intentions.  These findings resonate with Blundo and Olivier 
de Sardan (2006), who noted that laws and regulations are sometimes 
implemented partially and harphazardly, and usually for reasons that have 
little to do with just enforcement.  The findings also affirm Olivier de Sardan’s 
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(1999) assertion that corruption is not necessarily a result of ignorance, but 
rather is calculated to exploit gaps and weaknesses in regulations. 
Eradication of these negative practices cannot be effected overnight.  As 
Oliver de Sardan (1999) pointed out, corruption thrives where government 
departments are suffering financial crisis, and when institutions are weak, as 
is evidenced in Nairobi.  This research concurs with Mbaku (2010), that this 
is one area that calls for a top-to-bottom approach; only in ousting 
perpetrators in high offices can best practices be cascaded to those at other 
levels.  This is echoed by Goodfellow (2013), who found that sustained 
indiscriminate intolerance of corrupt practices can yield results.  However in 
Kenya, as noted by Mbaku (2010), wealthy civil servants and politicians in 
positions of power are among the most corrupt.  The higher people are in 
office, the higher the stakes, and the more difficult it might be to foster 
collaboration or good joint-working practices that promote compliance with 
laws and regulations.   
The research also found that there is collaboration of a different kind 
between planners and developers, one that tolerates and undermines the 
formal planning system.  Contrary to recommendations by Transparency 
International (2000), planners and developers seem determined to retain the 
status quo, despite a rhetoric of institutional reform.  This affirms Blundo’s 
and Olivier de Sardan’s (2006) assertion that corruption results from mutual 
agreement.  On the one hand there are developers looking to exploit gaps 
and weaknesses in the regulations, while on the other, planners are abusing 
the powers entrusted to them for extra-legal gain.   
UN-Habitat (2015b) identified the potential for planning professionals and 
their associations to be more proactively involved in planning processes (for 
example lending their expertise in the preparation of plans), in research and 
knowledge enhancement amongst the public through seminars and other 
consultative forums, in reviewing planning curricula in educational 
institutions, as well as in general advocacy for inclusive and equitable 
development.  This research found that most of the planners consulted 
acknowledged the need for educating, consulting and listening to the public 
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when formulating new regulations, and, as seen in Chapter 6, they had done 
so in reviewing zoning regulations in some areas to the west of the city after 
a hue and cry from developers.   However, as well as educating and 
consulting developers, there is a need to review planners’ education and 
approaches.  Watson and Agbola (2013) noted that planning education in 
Africa has adopted its curriculum from the (ex)colonising countries, which 
even today often promote inappropriate ideas and policies from their own 
countries.  In Nairobi, the research found that there was not even an 
undergraduate programme for planners at the local university until 2003, and 
even today the curriculum is still promoting an authoritarian and controlling 
approach to planning.  This research argues that going forward in sub-
Saharan African cities, education systems need to produce open-minded 
planners who are equipped with the skills to explore and negotiate 
collaborative partnerships with all the stakeholders in urban growth, including 
developers, private professionals, civil society, and the residents of different 
neighbourhoods.  Moreover, continuing education for planners should be 
aimed at addressing professional incompetence and inefficiency, including 
indiscipline, laziness and arrogance, as alluded to by Mbaku (2010).  Such 
reforms would aid in promoting integrative, participatory and strategic 
planning. 
Indeed, there are big challenges in the governance structure of the planning 
system, which will require changes in deep rooted cultures in the planning 
offices, such as the widespread practice (and acceptance) of corruption and 
impunity.  There is also a need to enhance and reward creativity, and open 
minds to how partnerships between relevant departments can be formed to 
combat non-compliance with building laws and regulations.  To address 
challenges in governance, there is a need to cultivate trusting relationships 
between all the stakeholders and institutions involved, which is clearly 
lacking in the present state of play.    
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9.5 Conclusion 
‘.... there is a role for planners in balancing the workings of the capitalistic 
market in property development for the middle income group’ (Author, 2015) 
Planning involves the formulation and implementation of spatial public 
policies which affect urban and regional development, zoning and land use 
practices.  It has been argued that the territorial dimension of planning 
includes the demarcation of administrative boundaries and the determination 
of land use, development and provision of services.  The Vancouver Action 
Plan (1976) recommended that local planning should be concerned with the 
use of space over time, including the designation of general land use 
patterns; it pointed out that governments can use zoning and planning as 
instruments in controlling land use by the population.   
With regard to the question ‘What challenges do urban planners face in 
implementing planning laws and regulations, and monitoring best practices in 
housing developments for the middle income group?’, it is evident that 
inherited planning theories, laws and practice, which were used in different 
contexts in the Global North, have failed to address the problems of 
developing cities like Nairobi, where there are conflicting rationalities 
between what is regarded as ‘formal’ and ‘informal’, creating areas of 
contestation between states and their citizens.  Policy makers, prompted and 
backed by international organisations like UN-Habitat, tend to concentrate 
their welfare efforts on the poor, for example in slums and squatter 
settlements, ignoring a multitude of city dwellers living in middle income 
areas.  Given that UN-Habitat’s headquarters are in Nairobi, it is ironic that it 
has not woken up to the reality of the problems in the middle income 
developments in the city.  In its 2013–2015 Country Programme Document, 
its emphasis was still on slum upgrading programmes, ignoring the plight of 
those living in the ‘vertical slums’ at the low end of middle income areas.  As 
noted in previous chapters, some of the developments in these areas are 
only a step away from total ‘informality’.  Developers in and for the middle 
income group have engaged with the planning system in diverse ways, 
depending on their needs and abilities; in some areas the planning system 
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has been totally ignored, whilst in others developers have negotiated ways 
round the laws and regulations.  This research found that, while planners and 
their consultants in Nairobi debated behind closed office doors on policies 
and other reviews, developers went to work and extended the city’s 
developments beyond the allowable limits.  Now officials are debating the 
best way to regulate existing and future developments.  This research 
acknowledges the progress that developers have made in accommodating 
the city’s population.  It argues that, rather than trying to control them, 
planners in Nairobi and other sub-Saharan Africa cities would be better off 
supporting their efforts, in order to realise habitable, safe and 
environmentally sustainable developments, to meet the needs of a majority 
of the city’s population.   
According to Sandercock (2003), planners are ‘spatial police’, who regulate 
not only land used but also the categories of people who might use that land.  
Today, more than five decades after independence, urban planners in 
Kenya, as discussed in Chapter 4, are still using some of the regulatory 
framework that was inherited from the British, despite contextual differences 
of rapid urbanisation which is not accompanied by equal economic growth.  
Although some modernist plans like Le Corbusier’s explicitly assumed new 
(and more technocratic) social relations, underpinning his vision of the 
modern city, there are some modernistic plans which assume that cities can 
be made better without changing their underlying political economies, that 
outcomes can be known in advance, and that order is better than chaos for 
everyone.  But evidently that has not been the case in Nairobi, or indeed in 
other cities in sub-Saharan Africa. 
In ‘Limits to Capital’, David Harvey (1982) argued that capitalism must have 
its fixes, and that we cannot determine what fixes will be implemented.  He 
argued that capitalism creates the conditions for volatile and geographically 
uneven development.  As Watson (2009) so aptly puts it, ‘…urban space is 
increasingly shaped by the workings of the market and the property industry 
in cities, which may align with urban modernist visions of city governments, 
but which do little to benefit or include the poor…’ (page 2260).  This 
research concurs, but also argues that there is a role for planners in 
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balancing the workings of the capitalist market in property development for 
the middle income group.  With the right kind of intervention and 
collaboration with developers and the public at large, planners could ensure 
that developers provide habitable spaces that meet health and safety 
standards and sustainable environmental provisions, even in low end 
development areas for the middle income group.  The scope of this research 
was limited to perceptions of planners and developers.  However, there is 
another very vital stakeholder in these developments – the residents.  It 
would be interesting to get their perceptions: how is it living in those 
developments which have non-compliance issues?  What are their 
relationships with planners and developers?  This could potentially unearth 
rich data with regards to the effects of non-compliance with planning laws 
and regulations on those who live in the residential environments produced. 
In answer to the question ‘What challenges do urban developers face in 
adhering to planning laws and regulations?’, various themes emerged in 
Chapters 6,7 and 8, to explain non-compliance with planning laws and 
regulations by the developers of middle income apartment blocks.  At the 
heart of failures of the planning framework lie unrealistic planning laws and 
regulations, as well as problems in land administration.  The research 
touched on the ills resulting from the operations of land buying companies, 
and how this contributes to non-compliance by developers.  It would be of 
interest to find out more about the land buying companies; their financial and 
administration systems and any regulatory systems in place, and their 
perspectives of the planning and land registration systems. 
Problems with the planning framework are exacerbated by limited resources 
for planning, coupled with poor governance.  Developers are resentful of the 
limitations in the framework, and being mindful of the high cost of investment, 
and spurred on by ever-growing demand for housing, they have defied the 
guidelines.  This results in ineffective implementation and monitoring of the 
laws and regulations that govern settlement development in Nairobi.  
Questions arose, such as whether the regulations are necessary or relevant, 
and why planning authorities appear to turn a blind eye to regulatory abuse.   
This research has been conducted during a very transitional period in the 
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national government and county governance structures, and in the planning 
framework, including the drawing up of a new master plan and changes in 
relevant legislation.  In fact, the master plan was concluded and validated in 
September 2014, and the new legislation, apart from the National 
Construction Authority Act 2011, is yet to be enacted.  As a result, the effect 
of these changes could not be gauged .  One such piece of legislation is the 
Regularisation Bill, which is aimed at facilitating make-good intervention for 
existing developments that do not comply with planning laws and regulations.  
It would be of interest to find out how effective the regularisation procedure 
is, once embedded, in regenerating and reshaping areas with rampant non-
compliance issues.  In addition, it would be equally interesting to find out 
whether the National Construction Authority practices on the ground are what 
it says on the tin.  
It is clearly a challenge to accommodate growth in cities, especially in cities 
with rapid population growth like Nairobi.  It is also clear that developments 
to accommodate this growth cannot be prevented, because there is demand 
from the population.  With regard to the question ‘What are the 
characteristics of the relationships between planners and developers, and 
why do they foster non-compliance?’, the research found that, although there 
is no trust between planners and developers, they do, nevertheless, 
collaborate informally and have developed a ‘parallel order’ (as alluded to by 
Anders, 2005), which tolerates non-compliance.  There is a spirit of 
entrepreneurship amongst developers in and for middle income group, as 
well as resources (finance, skills and influence) that could be accessed by 
planners to complement their planning efforts.  However, mistrust and self-
serving interests stand in the way of joint-working.  While policy makers and 
planners are having ineffective discussions about environmental 
degradation, sustainability and affordable housing, private money is being 
put to work and plugging the housing gap, with little regard to policy issues.  
It stands to reason that developers present an untapped resource that could 
work collaboratively with planners and policy makers - incorporating them 
strategically by respectful inclusion could change cityscapes for the better.  
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Taylor (1998) asserted, ‘To become effective implementers, public authority 
planners and policy-makers need to become skilled in three tasks.  First, 
they must be able to identify the other actors necessary to the 
implementation of a plan or policy.  Secondly, they must establish contacts 
with these actors.  Thirdly, because these other agents have their own 
objectives which do not always coincide with those of the public authority, 
planners and policy-makers must acquire the skill of negotiating.  Taken 
together, all these tasks require interpersonal skills; in short, effective 
implementation requires planners who are skilled at contacting, 
communicating and negotiating with others’. (pp117).  This research 
concurs with this assertion.  There is room for negotiations with developers in 
creating economically viable but acceptable developments, potential to 
augment staffing capacity with private professionals, opportunities for 
partnerships with developers in infrastructural provision, and ways to 
enhance public participation and inclusion in planning.  But for this to 
happen, planners need to carry out an analysis of the strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats of each of those stakeholders; only in 
so doing would they then be able to harness their full potential to contribute 
to effective development control.  This suggests a collaborative model 
alongside a political economy understanding, which gives planners an 
important role in coordinating input from different stakeholders.  In so doing, 
they could potentially play a role in creating ‘the just city’ which is advocated 
by the political economy model, which would embrace the entrepreneurial 
spirit and generate increased wealth, but at the same time be mindful of the 
welfare of the disadvantaged in society.  This could result in a city that is 
desirable and acceptable by all.  As Farmer et al. (2006) have pointed out; 
‘smart planning’ can control long lasting negative environmental and social 
costs in cities because it would be a ‘responsive learning system’. 
The importance of educating developers and planners, as well as the general 
public, cannot be underestimated.  Even as planners go for capacity building 
and boosting of planning resources by building on existing relationships, 
collaborative efforts can only work if all stakeholders understand what is at 
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stake, and this requires training programmes and training forums tailored to 
meet the needs of each player.  
Whilst the ideology of planning purports that local authorities have power 
over development, the reality, as supported by this research, is that private 
capital drives and directs what happens in the city.  This research asserts 
that, whilst market forces in land and property development dictate the 
direction of growth in the city, planners need not be constrained to their 
traditional role of regulation and control; they could instead be viewed as an 
ally by both developers and a city’s inhabitants.   
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Appendix 1 
Legislation that has been guiding the planning system in Nairobi 
 The Constitution of Kenya (Chapter 5):  states that the state may regulate 
the use of any land, or any interest in or right over any land, in the interest of 
defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, or land 
use planning, and that the state should establish systems of environmental 
impact assessment, environmental audit and monitoring of the environment.  
Section 69 stipulates that every person has a duty to cooperate with State 
organs and other persons to protect and conserve the environment and 
ensure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources. 
 
 The Land Registration Act 2012:  The purpose of the Act is to revise, 
consolidate and rationalize the legislations relating to registration of title to 
land, and to give effect to the principles and objects of devolved government 
in land registration. However, land registers under previous registration are 
honoured under the new legislation. The Act has simplified the process of 
land adjudication by amalgamating laws for demarcation and registration of 
land under one Act, as opposed to multiple registration systems.  The Act 
conferred powers to the National Land Commission to control the Land, 
Land Surveys, Land Registration and Recorder of Titles Departments.  
 
 The Land Act 2012: this Act repealed the Registered Land Act (Chapter 
300), which facilitated the creation of land leases, the Land Acquisition Act 
(Chapter 295) and the Way leaves Act (Chapter 29).  The repealed acts 
were found to have different and confusing definitions, and this Act gives 
land a more encompassing meaning. The legislation is aimed at revising, 
consolidating and rationalizing land laws, to provide for the sustainable 
administration and management of land and landed resources. 
 
 The National Land Commission Act 2012: this legislation gives the 
National Land Commission (NLC), which has replaced the Commissioner of 
Lands, powers in the management and administration of public, private and 
community land.  Among the functions of the NLC are requirements to 
manage public land on behalf of the national and county governments, and 
to monitor and have oversight responsibilities over land use planning 
throughout the country. 
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 The Physical Planning Act 1996 (Revised 2009): the main legislation with 
regards to development control, responsible for processing development 
applications and monitoring of developments in Nairobi and the rest of the 
country (among other things).  States that the planner is duty-bound to 
provide solutions to tackle issues related to poor infrastructure, poverty, 
environmental degradation and declining urban areas, which has a direct 
implication on the wellbeing of the society.  Section 29 gives mandate to 
local authorities for development control - to prohibit or control the use and 
development of land and buildings in the interests of proper and orderly 
development of its area, and to ensure the proper execution and 
implementation of approved physical development plans, whilst section 33 
gives stipulations regarding building and development control, including 
specifications.   
 
  The Building Code 1968: sets out building by-Laws which local authorities 
adopt to regulate building activities within their areas of jurisdiction – it 
stipulates the standard specification of buildings in different stages of 
construction and also gives guidelines about quality of building materials.  
An adoptive by-law which compels developers to submit planning 
applications to the relevant authority prior to commencement of 
development works, provides guidelines on accessibility, safety, sanitation, 
and how to connect to common facilities like sewer, electricity, water etc., 
and empowers local authorities to disapprove any plans which are not 
correctly drawn or which do not comply with the by-law.   
 
 The Urban Areas and Cities Act 2011: This legislation was enacted 
following the review of the Kenyan Constitution in 2010.  It repealed the 
Local Government Act (Chapter 265).  It facilitates classification of areas as 
urban areas or cities.  The legislation provides stipulations for provision of 
infrastructural facilities, including roads, sewerage, waste disposal system 
and street lighting.  The Act also guides on governance and management of 
the urban areas, participation by residents of those areas in governance 
issues, financial provision and integrated development planning; it requires 
that the urban areas have the capability to effectively deliver essential 
services.  Unlike its predecessor, this Act promotes public participation in 
the running and management of urban areas, advocating that citizens will 
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be enabled to express their views about the management of their urban 
areas and can gain access to information about their area. 
 
 The County Government Act 2012 (replacing the Local Government 
Act (Cap 265)): This defines functions of local authorities, including 
mandate for planning and development.  With regards to planning, it directs 
the county governor to submit county plans and policies to the county 
assembly for approval, and holds the seat holder accountable for the 
management and use of county resources. 
 
 The Environmental Management and Coordination Act No. 8 of 1999: 
exercises general supervision and co-ordination over all matters relating to 
the environment, and is the principal instrument of Government in the 
implementation of all policies relating to the environment.  Section 68 
authorises environmental inspectors to assess environmental impacts of 
proposed developments. 
 
 The Public Health Act 1986 (Cap. 242) (Revised 2012): stresses that 
environmental degradation may pose a health hazard to the general public, 
and deems environmental degradation from wastewater from any premises 
and offensive smells such as gases, as a "nuisance".  It acknowledges that 
local authorities are responsible for taking lawful measures to maintain 
clean and sanitary conditions and to remedy nuisance conditions which are 
injurious to public health. 
 
 The Local Government Act 1977 (Revised 2010) (Cap. 265): Section 166 
of this Act gives mandate to local authorities to prohibit and control 
development and use of land and buildings in the interest of the proper and 
orderly development of its area, whilst Section 160 (a) states that local 
authorities have the power to establish and maintain sanitary and waste 
removal services, and to compel the use of such services by persons to 
whom the service is available.   
 
 City Council of Nairobi (CCN) Development Ordinances and Zones: the 
county’s planning ordinances have divided the city into 20 planning zones, 
giving guidelines on different zones and their geographical areas.  The 
Ordinances and Zones give guidelines for developments in the different 
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areas of the city, including minimum plot sizes in each zone, ground 
coverage and plot ratios, types of developments which are acceptable in 
different areas/zones within the city region, as well general policy issues.   
 
 Sessional Paper No. 6 of 1999 on Environment and Development:  in 
line with the concepts of sustainable development, states that every person 
in Kenya is entitled to a clean and healthy environment and has a duty to 
safeguard and enhance the environment for future generations – 
recommends integration of environmental concerns into the national 
planning and management process and provide guidelines for 
environmentally sustainable development. 
 
 The Sectional Properties Act, 1987:  this Act facilitates the division of a 
single residential development into many units, which can be owned 
separately.  The different owners (or tenants in common), do not necessarily 
own the ground on which the whole building stands. Such a property is 
registered under the Registered Land Act, cap 300. 
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Appendix 2 
A sample comments form: Development control Section.  (Author: NCC 
Planning Department) 
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Appendix 3   
Questionnaire for developers 
Introduction of the research – what the research is about and what it is 
aimed for; Researcher will explain that it is for academic purposes and the 
research is not commissioned by any group, organisation or institution.  The 
researcher would advise respondents that they should feel free to ask for 
clarification or meanings of any words or statements. The researcher will get 
a signed consent form. 
Confidentiality statement – the researcher will advise respondents that 
discussions would be kept confidential (as far as possible) and quotes in the 
research report would be anonymous.   
 
Questions  
1. Are you 
a) The developer? 
b) The developer’s agent? (e.g. architect, planner, etc) 
2. Is the development(s) owned by;  
a) You (individual)? 
b) Family Members Group venture? 
c) Investment Group venture? 
d) Other? 
3. How many floors does the development have? 
4. Does the development(s) have; 
a) Shared facilities (toilets and bathrooms)? – how many units per floor 
and how many people sharing? 
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b) Self-contained units? - how many units per floor and how many 
bedrooms in each unit 
5. Is there consideration on whether the plot is serviced or not before 
planning permission is granted? 
6. Do you consider the development to have adequate supportive 
infrastructure e.g. access road, sewage, garbage collection? 
7. Who is responsible for providing the supportive infrastructure; 
a) The owner? 
b) The council? 
8. Which of the following best describes the contractors (foreman and 
labourers) for the development; 
a) Friends (qualified professionals or unqualified)? 
b) Family (qualified professionals or unqualified)? 
c) Professionals (registered contractors or un-registered 
contractors)? 
9. How many times, in Nairobi, have you been involved in the planning 
application process with regards to rental apartment developments? 
10. How long did the planning approval process take? 
11. Were you happy with the length of time it took? 
12. Did you experience any problems with the planning application 
process? 
13. Is there a fast track or short cut route to obtaining planning 
permission? 
14. In your opinion has the planning application process been affected by 
bureaucracy or corruption? 
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15. Did you experience any planning related problems after planning 
approval (during the actual development work)? 
 
16. Did you feel supported by planning officials; 
a) In the Council offices? 
b) During site visits? 
17. Does a planning officer have to visit the site before planning 
permission is given? 
18. Is it possible to deviate or change from the approved development to 
a different development? 
19. If you answered yes to the question above, in what ways is it possible 
to deviate from the approved development? 
20. How do planning officials manage such deviation from approved 
development? 
21. Are there penalties or sanctions for deviation from approved 
developments? 
22. Given the opportunity, what would you like to see changed in the 
planning application process? 
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Appendix 4 
Schedule of fieldwork (Action Plan) – 1st field visit 
Activity Pre-arrival 
preparations 
Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 
 
Researcher(s) 
 
Advertise 
(through 
contacts at 
the local 
university), 
check 
profiles and 
shortlist 
 
 
 
 
Finalise 
recruitment 
of Research 
Assistant. 
 
Carry out 
induction, 
define remits 
and issue 
instructions 
 
De-brief 
and 
feedback 
 
De-brief 
and 
feedback 
 
De-brief and 
feedback 
 
Senior 
Planners 
 
Make contact 
and send 
written 
introduction 
via email 
 
Request (via 
email) 
interviews 
with frontline 
planners – 
nominees 
and 
authorisation 
of interviews 
 
Request (via 
email) 
 
Carry out in-
depth 
interviews 
with 3 senior 
planners 
   
Follow-up 
interviews 
with senior 
planners 
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access to 
records at 
the planning 
offices 
Front line 
planners 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Carry out in-
depth 
interviews 
with 3 front 
line planner 
More 
interviews 
with other 
front line 
planners 
  
Developers  
 
 
 
Source out 
(by phone 
and site 
visits) 
developers 
and make 
appointments  
Interviews 
with 
developers 
 
Source out 
more 
developers 
Interviews 
with 
developers 
 
Source out 
more 
developers 
Interviews 
with 
developers 
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Appendix 5 
 
Research schedule 
 Year 1 
 
Year 2 Year 3 
 
Sept  
Taught sessions 
and literature  
review 
Sorting out 
access/permission 
 
Report writing (and 
literature review) 
 
 
Oct 
 
 Fieldwork 
 
 
 
Nov 
 
  
Transcription and data 
analysis 
 
 
Dec 
  
 
 
 
 
Jan 
  
 
 
 
 
Feb 
 
Research  
Question - aims and 
objectives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
March 
 
Methodology 
 
 
 
 
April 
 
Proposal  
outline 
 
Fieldwork: follow-up in-
depth interviews 
 
Submission of 1st draft 
 
May 
 
Proposal 
 
Transcription and data 
analysis  
 
 
 
June 
Proposal  
presentation 
 
 
 
 
 
July 
 
Revision 
 
 
 
 
Research submission 
 
Aug 
Preparing for 
fieldwork e.g. 
recruitment of 
research assistant, 
use of printed 
materials – 
investigation of new 
legislation.   
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Appendix 6 
Policy recommendations 
‘…. sometimes you look at situations and you say that particular 
neighbourhood has gone to the dogs, but for goodness sake can we ensure 
that new neighbourhoods that are coming up comply?’  (Interview DV4) 
The following recommendations are given with regards to the planning 
system in Nairobi, but may be transferrable to other cities faced with similar 
challenges in sub-Saharan Africa. 
1. The planning framework - what next? 
There are prospects to improve land administration systems, for example by 
adapting supportive IT systems and strategically cataloguing details of land 
parcels, including their genesis.  Technological advances need not be 
confined to IT; in this age of GIS technology it is viable to complement some 
functions of planning sections, such as Research and Forward Planning, with 
information generated by such a system. The system could capture 
irregularities in subdivisions, and abnormalities in developments, 
complementing planning efforts to control land use in the city.  In controlling 
subdivisions, it would be possible to invigilate the provision of infrastructure 
by land owners.  Those owning huge tracts of land could be facilitated to 
subdivide and sell some of the land (partial release) to raise capital for 
developing infrastructure, before selling the bulk of it to other individual 
buyers.  This has previously tried and tested, but failed due to abuse by 
greedy and unscrupulous land owners.  However, with tighter reigns, and 
ICT systems to store data efficiently, it has potential to facilitate provision of 
basic infrastructure by land owners.  The revisions should not end with 
controlling subdivisions, but also apply to the follow up process of registration 
following subdivision.   Investment in such a system could therefore pay off in 
a big way, while at the same time bypassing issues presented by staff in 
terms of capacity and control of their operations.  In Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 
for example, GIS technology was used to facilitate the collection of vital 
information for urban planning proposals, managing services, and collecting 
tax revenues (World Bank, 2011).   
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The UN-Habitat (2015) guidelines for international planning have 
recommended that planners should ‘…identify and recognise the value of 
declining built environments with a view to revitalising them, taking 
advantage of their assets and strengthening their social identity…’ (p. 22). 
Planners in Nairobi (and elsewhere) would be wise to take this on board as 
they drive the regularisation procedure forward.  Only then can the process 
be perceived to have the interests of both planners and developers at heart.  
For the middle income areas, developers could give a hand in meeting the 
cost of infrastructure provision, but they need to be drawn in strategically, 
with a demonstration of accountability and transparency on the part of the 
planners.  Indeed, the UN-Habitat (2015b), in its guidelines for planning, 
emphasised the need for a transparent legal framework, as well as a sound 
financial basis, for effective implementation of plans.  There should be visible 
results for planners and developers if the regularisation process recognises 
that developers have used economic resources to do what they have done, 
and that there were institutional barriers that hindered planning 
implementation efforts.  This would call for reasonable, clear, consistent and 
transparent guidelines on the part of planners, but also for developers to 
accept sanctions when their developments are beyond redemption with 
respect to those guidelines.   
One thing that might give the planning system more control is 
decentralisation of the planning office to the different wards.  The county 
already has offices at at ward level, but apart from the HDD office in 
Dandora, approval processing is done in City Hall.  The city is now sprawling 
outwards, especially towards the east, and establishing functional local 
offices in different areas would give better control.  For one, ease of access 
to planners would be enhanced, as would ease of access to neighbourhoods 
for planners.  Also, it would be easier to hold local offices to account for 
developments in their areas, just like planning offices in satellite towns are 
accountable for their areas.  Decentralisation could also potentially be more 
effective in generating a sustainable stream of data from local 
neighbourhoods, which could be used by researchers and forward planners 
for policy reviews.  But to be able to decentralise development control 
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functions, more resources are called for, at least initially, and the research 
noted how the county planning department is struggling as it is due to 
inadequate resources. 
This research found that there could be more effective use of staffing 
resources in the two institutions dealing with land administration in the 
country – the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development and the 
National Land Commission.  The fact that more than two years since the 
NLC was formed they still cannot agree on their designations and remits is a 
failing of critical importance.  In the meantime, their operational staff are 
rendered ineffective in serving the public.  Regardless of who is issuing titles, 
the end result should be to streamline land administration in the country, and 
in the city, plugging gaps that create frustrations for both planners and 
developers.  Rather than arguing over who controls which resources, the two 
entities should be looking at how best to amalgamate their resources for 
optimum delivery of their mandates.  There is clearly potential for more 
effective joint-working, even as the ministry retains the supervisory role. 
2. Augmenting planning resources 
There is potential for collaboration to substantially supplement planning 
resources.  Capacity does not necessarily have to be built internally within 
the county planning department – it can also be outsourced amongst 
relevant professionals in civil society, with clear lines of responsibility and 
accountability.  The research found that there is potential to outsource 
monitoring and enforcement duties to qualified private partners, thus 
transferring some of the workload off, and in so doing, easing the burden on 
qualified planners.  It could be said that NEMA is already outsourcing 
environmental impact assessments in that developers get reports from 
private practitioners, which are then submitted to the NEMA office.  With 
regards to development control, outsourcing could be done for building 
inspections, whereby qualified professionals would inspect construction 
works and monitor compliance with building laws and regulations.  There is a 
risk involved in this, in that the county would be outsourcing to private 
companies who might be motivated by profit, who might want to cut corners, 
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and who might also be subject to influence by powerful and influential 
people.  For example, it was of interest to this research that the NCA, which 
like NEMA, is autonomous in its recruitment of private professionals, has 
powers to ‘…facilitate, or promote the establishment or expansion of, 
companies, corporations or other bodies to carry on any activities related to 
construction, either under the control or partial control of the Authority or 
independently..’ and ‘…to receive, in consideration of any services that may 
be rendered by it, such commission or payments as may be agreed upon 
with any person’.  Such powers could potentially be damaging in the face of 
self-serving interests, opening the doors for high stakes corrupt practices.  
The onus would still be on the planning office to monitor implementation of 
any contracts.  Outsourcing does not mean that planners would be hands off, 
but it would probably be easier for planners to oversee and bring to account 
a few designated private partners, rather than retaining responsibility for 
development control for the whole city with limited resources. 
Outsourcing could potentially free planners to focus more on wider planning 
strategies.  Costs would have to be weighed; is it cheaper to outsource?  It is 
not just financial costs that should be looked at, but opportunity costs in 
terms of the sustainability of developments and environmental degradation, 
and bearing in mind that so far the planning department has lost control in 
shaping the city’s growth.  There is also potential to develop allies in 
developers’ agents, who can aid in educating and orchestrating their clients, 
because it is also in their interest for developers to go through the application 
process, so that they can offer their services.  Registered contractors could 
also be brought on board to educate developers and raise consciousness 
and conscience in putting up developments, whilst at the same time there 
could be more robust monitoring of unqualified and unregistered contractors. 
There is a lot of potential for embracing the entrepreneurial spirit of 
developers, which could generate innovative propositions to address the 
provision of infrastructure in developing areas.  In Britain, Healey (1998) 
noted how development plans require various contributions from developers 
for facilities previously provided by local authorities.  Although it would be 
reckless to blindly adopt policies from a developed country without taking into 
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consideration social, cultural and contextual differences (as proven by the 
blind adoption of planning laws and regulations), opportunities to get 
valuable contributions from developers in terms of financial and other inputs, 
as well as sub-contracts for infrastructural development, are being missed.  
Some developers are already undertaking infrastructural provision, such as 
sewer lines, as seen in Chapter 6.2.  They would welcome state mechanisms 
that facilitate recuperation of costs from other beneficiaries, ensuring that 
they provide a fair share of the capital outlay.  Private investors would 
welcome any such initiatives because not only would it enhance the value of 
their investments, it would also offset their costs of investment if the 
government was proactive in the provision of infrastructure.  But the data 
also indicated that developers command significant capital, and planners 
could seize opportunities to link spatial planning with private investments.  
Private investors have funds to cater for different income levels, but the 
planners need to improve their operation, draw in the developers, and guide 
and support them to invest their money where the need is, so as to produce 
legally, economically, and morally/socially viable residential buildings.   
The research also highlighted other partners in government and supporting 
parastatals, and asserts that they could be recruited to aid compliance in 
building work.  For example, all developments require input from the water 
and electricity boards, and the planning office could work collaboratively with 
these offices to minimise non-compliance with building laws and regulations. 
Planners could also do more to involve the public in development control, by 
consultations in communities and by raising awareness of development 
issues.   
These measures for augmenting resources for the planning department are 
not only applicable to Nairobi, but also to other cities in sub-Saharan Africa 
which are struggling under the same difficulties.   
3.  Meeting challenges in governance 
Sound political, democratic structures and governance are necessary for 
macro facilitation of the system.  In addition, those in positions of power need 
374 
 
to limit their micro involvement, which damages and undermines the 
technical aspects of planning.  There is no single prescription for eradicating 
corruption and impunity in government systems – it will take goodwill and 
inner resolve to overcome these practices.  For those in high offices, it 
requires downplaying their selfish interests for the betterment of the wider 
society.   
Planners do not have to wait for shouts of desperation which manifest 
themselves in open defiance to the planning system, rather they need to take 
heed when developers question the validity of the laws and regulations and 
plead for flexibility in their application, and constructively rationalise their 
stance when they cannot relax any particular stipulation.  Other than 
professionals, citizens could also be educated, with a view to developing a 
planning society, a society that appreciates the role of planning in shaping 
good quality neighbourhoods that have adequate social facilities and the 
right infrastructure.  The findings of this research suggests that this is viable, 
given that in some areas like Karen and Lang’ata in Nairobi, among others, 
there are established residents’ associations, which demonstrate a desire to 
get involved in the evolution of their neighbourhoods.  It is likely that more 
residents in areas like Karen and Lang’ata are owner occupiers (and thus 
have a stake in the improvement of buildings and neighbourhoods, and 
maintenance of property values) compared to Eastlands where more 
residents are tenants.  Participatory models based on the experience of 
owner occupiers may not be appropriate for those with insecure tenure.  
However, although the skills and interests present within upper-income 
neighbourhoods might influence participation in those areas, residents in 
lower-income neighbourhoods would also like to sleep safely at night, not 
worrying that their building might collapse, and would also welcome good 
living environments – it would therefore be in their interest to respond to calls 
for upgrading their living environments.    
The research also highlighted conflicting interests in different departments 
involved in planning duties, which limit effective joint-working, for example 
between the planning department in City Hall in Nairobi, and the planning 
section at the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development.  To 
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overcome some of these challenges, stronger linkages and joint-working 
need to be fostered in high offices where the stakes are highest; defining and 
agreeing on boundaries, identifying any undermining scenarios, and mapping 
out implementation processes.  Instead of compartmentalising roles and 
functions between different departments, the planning system in Nairobi and 
other sub-Saharan African cities ought to exploit the resources within these 
departments, but in a well-coordinated and coherent manner.  Only then can 
barriers to collaborative efforts be effectively countered.   
To resolve issues hampering planning efforts requires not only intervention 
from high office and political good will, but also selflessness in serving, and 
putting the communities’ interest before personal gains and/or prestige.  As 
UN-Habitat (2015b) articulated in its International Guidelines on Urban and 
Territorial Planning, strong political will is required for successful 
implementation of plans, as well as appropriate partnerships involving all 
relevant stakeholders.  Such partnerships require trust between the 
stakeholders, which can only be cultivated by consensus legitimisation of 
what the system is trying to achieve.  This research asserts that planners 
and others could serve the interests of the public more efficiently by doing an 
inventory of their staffing resources, and looking into ways of teaming up to 
cut bureaucracy and financial outgoings on staff remittances.  Relationships 
with NEMA should also be streamlined to avoid duplication and curtail 
bureaucracy.   
4. A vigorous training curriculum for planners 
If training is coordinated, consistent and strategically aimed at all the weak 
points in staffing capacity, it would be a worthy investment in enhancing 
departmental resources.  That, coupled with comprehensive staff 
performance management, could ease the burden of carrying dead weight in 
staff registers, whose only impact is depletion of resources.  Once improved 
management has been instituted, how many more staff and at what level 
they would need to recruit can be gauged.   
Training need not end at graduation, but should be ongoing in places of 
employment, with well-structured training programmes covering all 
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operational aspects.  The research noted the frustration of planners who 
would like to advance their skills, but are not supported by the county 
planning department, which neither enables them to use external providers 
nor provides the necessary training courses itself.  There is a lot of potential 
for enhancing skills and knowledge, and training could be commissioned 
from private consultants and practitioners.  Joint-training for planners, for 
example with developers and their agents, could also be explored, with a 
view to developing empathy and understanding of the issues that concern 
both. 
Training should also be extended to planning subordinate staff, especially 
those who are at the forefront of serving the public in offices and the field.  
The reputation of field and general subordinate staff in Nairobi is appalling; 
there are reports of ignorance and incompetency, rudeness and disregard for 
the public, general poor customer service, and petty corruption, among 
others.  The planning departments could do well to invest in day release in-
house training programmes for their workers.  Not only does planning 
education need to enhance its curriculum in formal university level training, it 
also needs to be more expansive and inclusive of all stakeholders involved in 
the planning system.  To minimise areas of contestation, a good planning 
system needs comprehensive education and inclusion of the various 
stakeholders in its ideals.  
5. In support of developers 
There are clearly gaps in understanding by the public and accountability by 
the planning department.  For investors developing multi-million dollar 
projects, it is sometimes not a question of money, but rather how that money 
is utilised.  In developed cities such as in Britain, there are tariff charges 
designed to be pooled together across an area for general infrastructure 
provision, and developers are aware of this element.  Similarly, during the 
approval process there are other negotiated financial obligations, such as 
provision for communal facilities, such as play parks, transport 
improvements, or a cash payment for other forms of neighbourhood 
377 
 
regeneration.  It is difficult for developers to argue with such requirements 
since ultimately the improvements enhance the value of their investments. 
Advice to developers could easily be given in planned forums.  Planned 
public forums could be a regular assignment for county planners, with a view 
to imparting knowledge and at the same time gathering ideas and feedback 
on lived experiences from developers. Training for developers could also be 
channelled through their agents.  As well as preparing them for the financial 
demands of the approval process, architects, for example, could help their 
clients by giving them examples of what is acceptable or not.  
Educating developers on county financial demands and how they need to 
contribute to them might be a start.  However, developers would need more 
than that; they would need to be able to verify such statements from 
authorities by actions they can see being taken on the ground.  It is 
acceptable for the county to say that they need levies to instal infrastructure, 
but only if they deliver as planned.  As it is now, most developers would 
rather avoid the process and put the money they would have incurred in fees 
and related costs into their developments.  It would therefore be in the 
interest of planners to work with developers towards setting acceptable and 
justifiable levels of charges.  By encouraging more developers to engage 
with the approval process, the county would be in a position to enforce other 
obligatory dues from property owners, such as land rates and rents, thus 
enhancing their revenue streams.  If these were in place, even developers 
would be supportive of planners’ efforts to punish those who were not 
complying and so shirking the share of the burden of maintaining good living 
environments in the city. 
 
